These are all, of course, very broad questions. The answers, if any, are clearly not for today. Nevertheless, whether we look at the experience of the former Yugoslavia or the conflicts in the former Soviet Union, with their massive casualties and refugee flows, it is imperative that these issues be actively explored and not left to abstract, perpetual “reflections.” The purpose of this paper is to describe how different nations perceive the way ahead. In particular, how do they see the role of the OSCE, a “cooperative security” forum, and of NATO, a collective defence organisation taking on crisis management missions outside of its Treaty area together with its 20 Partners, and the relationship between the two?

2. Security Model

At a July 1992 Summit in Helsinki, the OSCE (then Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE, until 1995) was described as “a forum for dialogue, negotiation and cooperation, providing direction and giving impulse to the shaping of the new Europe...we are convinced that a lasting and peaceful order for our community of States will be built on mutually reinforcing institutions, each with its own area of action and responsibility” (emphasis added). Traditionally it was a conference engaged in norm-setting, monitoring of human rights, and negotiating confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). After the CSCE Charter of Paris in November 1990, CSCE also began to prepare for peacekeeping and increasingly undertake missions on the ground, ranging from assisting in elections to preventive diplomacy to post-conflict rehabilitation (in which the largest operation commenced in 1996 in Bosnia). Unlike the UN, issues concerning human rights are recognised as legitimate matters of concern to all OSCE participating States.

Yet, OSCE has never been vested with powers of enforcement. It has no military committee akin to NATO and, since 1997, WEU. The only derogation from the consensus rule of decision-making is the ability to suspend the offender’s participation (which occurred only once, in 1992, with respect to Serbia and Montenegro, even though OSCE has remained active in trying to engage Belgrade).

Hence, to give another “impulse” to the shaping of a new Europe, in December 1994 an investigation was launched, following a Russian proposal (motivated in part by NATO’s decision earlier that year to open a perspective on enlargement), into “A Common and Comprehensive Security Model For Europe For the Twenty-First Century.” ₄ A discussion ensued, at a decidedly leisurely pace, which in December 1996 was organised at the OSCE Lisbon Summit around six elements:

1. Continuing review of implementation of OSCE commitments;
2. Enhancing “instruments of joint cooperative action” in the event of non-compliance;
3. Defining a “Platform for Cooperative Security” setting out “modalities” for co-operation—a “culture of interaction”—between the OSCE and “transparent and predictable” security organisations whose members have freely joined;
4. Refining OSCE “tools” and developing new ones to encourage States to make greater use of the OSCE in advancing their security;
5. Enhancing co-operation among States to improve their ability to meet risks and challenges to security; and
6. Recommending new commitments, structures, or arrangements.

Then, drawing on this work, the participating States will “consider developing a Charter on European Security which can serve the needs of our peoples in the new century.”

It was also reaffirmed in Lisbon that “European security requires the widest cooperation and coordination among participating States and European and transatlantic organisations,” with the OSCE “particularly well-suited” to enhance “cooperation and complementarity.” Already, however, in June 1992 both NATO and WEU offered to consider requests to support OSCE peacekeeping, and at the Helsinki Summit the next month it was agreed that (then) CSCE “may benefit from resources and possible experience and expertise of existing organisations such as the EU, NATO, and the WEU, and could therefore request them to make their resources available in order to support it in carrying out peacekeeping activities.” It was also proposed that other institutions and mechanisms, including the CIS, may be asked for such support.

Not surprisingly in an organisation of 54 participating States, some of whom have demonstrated scant regard for OSCE commitments, the endpoint of this exercise remains most unclear even after almost three years.

The most detailed approach has been, as was to be expected, taken by Russia. It recalls elements of the longstanding Soviet concept for a pan-European security regime, such as a 1954 proposal for a “Draft General European Treaty” to achieve “concerted action by all European states in safeguarding collective security in Europe”—although initially the United States or Canada were not included. More specifically, a Russian proposal of 17 July 1997 seeks to:

• place OSCE on a legally-based footing;
• affirm but also “interpret” existing commitments such as the relationship between self-determination and territorial integrity;
• develop the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs to include prohibiting any State from supporting on its territory forces aimed at the forced or unconstitutional fragmentation of another State;
• allow OSCE to undertake peace enforcement if so authorised by the UN Security Council;
• allow OSCE to play a coordinating role which could lead to a division of labor among organisations; and
• commit the participating States “to render assistance, by all means available to a participating State facing an act of aggression to be recognised as such by the UN Security Council” ₅

Given that Russia opposes any derogation from the consensus rule, the last proposal suggests a contradiction should aggression come from another participating State. Moreover, the 1994 OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security already commits the participating States to “act in solidarity” if OSCE norms and commitments are violated and to consider jointly “actions that may be required in defence of their common values,” but it has never been elaborated.

Russia would like to see the Charter adopted at the next OSCE Summit, with President Boris Yeltsin having stated on 3 December 1997 that “only [OSCE] can be the foundation of an effective and robust security system on this continent,” urging that preparation of the Charter, which “should strengthen peace and stability,” not be delayed. ₆ How Russia’s own proposals would “strengthen peace and stability,” however, is not clear.

The link to NATO enlargement endures, however, and the Russian goal of securing a Charter at the next OSCE Summit would presumably, in its view, give Russia a kind of agreed voice over the “second wave” of NATO enlargement which some believe will include Austria, Slovenia, and Romania — as Dutch Defence Minister Joris Voorhoeve suggested on 24 November 1997. At the Lisbon Summit, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin stated: “There is still time and point to think over what NATO enlargement can lead to. If our common goal is a united and peaceful Europe, then how can we achieve it through the expansion of military alliances?” ₇ The principle that nations can choose or change membership of treaties and alliance has long been a well-settled OSCE principle, but Russia argues that this must be seen together with the OSCE commitment that states cannot strengthen their security at the expense of others (thus linking the Security Model to the CFE Treaty adaptation negotiations). Moreover, the July 1997 Russian proposal would commit organisations to “consider” how their policies conform with the concept of comprehensive and indivisible security.

Unlike Russia, Ukraine does not oppose NATO enlargement. But it, too, seeks security guarantees in the OSCE as a result of the Model exercise. Such guarantees would be extended by “European and transatlantic organisations” to those who are not members of collective defence structures (which the 9 July 1997 NATO–Ukraine Charter did not do despite Ukrainian wishes).

In the NATO–Russia Founding Act of 27 May 1997, Russia and the allies agreed to consider an OSCE Charter. However, this was not a firm commitment to negotiate a document. A US proposal of 25 November refers to future elaboration of a comprehensive set of OSCE compliance measures, including “incentives and disincentives” in time for a “document” to be adopted at a Summit in 1999, the US view being that more than one year will be required for this process to come to fruition (normally OSCE Summits are held every two years). For example, in the US view one tool would be what it terms “democratisation teams” comprised of experts, diplomats, and political figures. These would make short-term and focused visits to help governments develop strategies to deal with problems such as economic or ethnic instability or civilian control of the military. This would involve something in between the very short-term dispatch of OSCE officials or personal representatives of the Chairman-in-Office (e.g., the work of former Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky in Albania or former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez in Serbia) and longer-term OSCE missions that have tended to acquire a permanent nature and a very broad mandate not favoured by all. The US Ambassador to Germany, John Kornblum, stated on 12 November 1997 that OSCE “cannot be the single structure for Europe,” “cannot replace NATO,” “cannot enforce peace or extract compliance from anyone,” and that “What the OSCE needs more than legally-binding agreements or new security charters” is political will to use existing “mechanisms” such as accepting OSCE assistance (resisted in 1997 by Belgrade and Minsk), financial resources, and responsibility to avoid institutional rivalry. ₈ Ambassador Kornblum cited OSCE–EU competition for responsibility in response to the crisis earlier that year in Albania but he could also have added:

• difficulties NATO has experienced in establishing links with the OSCE and WEU, in the past owing to French objections to NATO straying from collective defence tasks, but also because close NATO–WEU–OSCE links might prompt the CIS to do the same;
• the fact that it took NATO well over a year to agree that OSCE and IFOR arms inspectors should reconcile data (owing to a perceived hesitation over how closely to cooperate with non-NATO states);
• occasional US–EU rivalry in OSCE such as appointment of heads of OSCE missions, the extent to which OSCE should explore the economic dimension or whether the Alliance or the EU should prepare security-related contributions for OSCE (an issue on which the same governments tend to change their minds) or the perceived need for greater consultation on EU and NATO enlargement, even if each organisation naturally takes its own decisions; and
• the view that the Council of Europe should have chief responsibility for human rights.

Some have referred to this situation as the “Euro-Vision Defence Contest” or “kindergarten diplomacy,” leading to an insufficient degree of advance joint planning or even failure to discuss why so many organisations should be involved in a given situation, and, hence, the perceived desirability of the Platform. It should also be observed that intra-institutional demands can also cause delay for OSCE or quash innovative thinking for the sake of consensus, as may occur with the “caucus” system of different organisations within the OSCE, including the EU.

There are also concerns among a number of delegations that OSCE needs less “vision” than implementation of existing commitments, that interaction among organisations should be fluid and not formally defined in a “Platform,” that organisations themselves are changing and thus their roles might not be easily placed into some security matrix, and, more broadly, that outside states should not be in a position to influence or compete with what organisations do—even if their work may overlap—and a continual concern that OSCE “coordination” might mean control.

The link to other security developments may also affect the pace of discussion on the Charter, with Poland having specifically cited in November 1997 the CFE Treaty adaptation negotiations and its interest in assuring that there will be future NATO invitees after it is admitted to the Alliance in April 1999. In addition, there has been the worry that a Platform could equate NATO with the CIS or enhance the profile of the latter, or through “division of labour” bestow unwarranted legitimacy upon Russian peacekeeping and alleged behavior surrounding it in the CIS, which not all would agree are based on purely voluntary commitments. There is also the concern that if enforcement measures were adopted, the privileges of the permanent Members of the UN Security Council, and the interests of their allies, would be compromised.

Yet, without a credible OSCE as an organising security framework, taken seriously by all participating States, might we not risk division of labour in the most negative sense of a precarious dividing line—i.e. NATO or its member states in Western and Central Europe, Russia in the former USSR, a grey zone in the middle, and perhaps tense competition where perceived vital interests are at stake, such as natural resources from the Caucasus and Central Asia? Moreover, if present OSCE commitments are too vague (e.g., from the 1994 OSCE Code of Conduct: “In the event of armed conflict, they [the participating States] will seek to facilitate the effective cessation of hostilities) might not implementation be better secured by a Charter or document which consolidates and clarifies responsibilities in behavior both between and within participating States, and which provides the tools to enforce them, and not necessarily only by cooperative “joint action””? Ultimately, those who choose not to play by the same rules would have no business in the OSCE.

On 20 November 1997, the Chairman-in-Office tabled a “Perception,” based on the major inputs of the EU, Poland, Switzerland, and Russia, elaborating on two elements of a “comprehensive, solemn Charter/document.” The first, “Assistance In the Implementation of Commitments,” included intriguing language such as a pledge to “act jointly and promptly” should one participating State threaten to use or use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another State. It would also commit States to consider “a range of steps”—carefully chosen language—applied as a last resort against a State breaching any OSCE commitment. This could imply a collective security turn away from the prior OSCE language of “not provide assistance to or support” the aggressor, although invariably it could lead to widely different interpretation. For example, in the UK view this does not mean OSCE coercive or punitive steps which should be left to other organisations and individual participating States, whereas Switzerland and Canada would support the “suspension of political and economic cooperation”.

The second element, “OSCE Platform for Cooperative Security,” suggested that there should be increased cross-representation at appropriate meetings and a study (which prompted the Swiss delegation to express regret that only a study was possible) conducted on how the OSCE might confer a peacekeeping mandate to another organisation (thus revisiting the 1992 Helsinki Summit which established peacekeeping as an OSCE option).

Nevertheless, it may prove that the Charter will change little. The OSCE agenda could, instead, more or less retain its very valuable present functions as the “conscience of the continent”: preventive diplomacy, “early warning,” post-conflict rehabilitation, norm-setting, human rights and election monitoring, coordination of international efforts in post-conflict rehabilitation such as in Albania and former Yugoslavia, and arms control. The latter is particularly important given that the current (1994) CSBM regime is out-of-synchronisation with the declining level of peacetime military activity, and given the desirability of establishing OSCE-overseen arms control measures tailored for subregional application, as OSCE accomplished among the warring parties in the former Yugoslavia. After all, the essential assumption is that democracies do not make war upon each other, and hence the importance of agreed standards. But if this view is adopted and OSCE security commitments and enforcement mechanisms are not developed, then how can the OSCE respond to egregious implementation failures and what are the alternatives?

3. The Role of the Atlantic Alliance

At the 8– ₉ July 1997 Madrid Summit, the NATO leaders declared that “An inclusive European security architecture is evolving to which we are contributing, along with other European organisations. Our Alliance will continue to be a driving force in this process” (emphasis added). But although it was NATO which was responsible for many of the ideas which led to the present OSCE structures and away from the conference-only system (although this has been attributed in part to then West Germany’s uncertainty as to whether it would unite in NATO9), in the US view and those of other Allies, “NATO stands at the center of the new security order in Europe,” ₁₀ and that “NATO is a foundation for Russia’s entry into the European security structure.” ₁₁

These assertions must be placed into context. The Alliance is, of course, right to maintain its cohesion, and it is the desire to join a like-minded community of democratic nations able to provide “hard” security—which OSCE is not—which has attracted twelve nations to seek NATO membership. As has been said many a time, “If the Alliance is still required for North America and Western Europe, threat-free and relatively prosperous, why wouldn’t it be so for others—particularly those nations that, with Western complicity, were denied the benefits of the Marshall Plan and the chance to become societies ruled by law and democracy?” ₁₂ Yet, NATO’s collective defence commitment only applies to full members, and even then it is no certain guarantee ₁₃ (which could prove the case in any security organisation). Peace support operations outside the NATO Treaty area are to be decided on a case-by-case basis, and one should remember that it was not until 1995, under US leadership, that the Alliance decisively stepped in on the ground in the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, while NATO’s most important attribute is that it links North America to Europe, so too does OSCE but in a much wider framework: with many more nations and viewing “security” in its widest sense.

Nevertheless, there is no need to reinvent the wheel. The strands of existing or potential OSCE–NATO interaction presently include:

1. The 1992 NATO agreement in principle to support peace operations outside the Treaty area, whether through the Alliance as a whole or through a coalition of the willing, including non-members, namely the NATO-led IFOR/SFOR;
2. The agreement on 2 December 1997 on a new, streamlined Alliance command structure and continuing development of flexible Combined Joint Task Forces;
3. The sense of “equal partnership” between Russia and NATO set down in the NATO–Russia Act, which pledges support for OSCE peacekeeping and which can go someway to further reduce mistrust and Russia’s dissatisfaction with what it perceives as junior status regarding IFOR/SFOR. It could also provide an incentive for cooperative behavior and Russia’s integration into the democratic family of nations (although this has been criticised as risking a OSCE-type veto on NATO action);
4. The NATO–Ukraine “distinctive partnership”;
5. The “cooperative mechanism” of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), whose members, although falling only ten States short of the OSCE, have joined in the grand experiment of the PFP—open to all OSCE participating States which the Alliance will accept—and which can serve as another forum for security dialogue and cooperation; and
6. NATO’s own enlargement, which its September 1995 Study described as “one element of the broader evolution of European cooperation and security currently underway.”

The prospects for this NATO-centric approach to security and cooperation are naturally speculative. Will Russia truly regard NATO as an “equal partner,” and vice versa? Can the EAPC escape the perceived elements of bureaucratic inertia of its predecessor North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and add value to what can be done in the OSCE Permanent Council? Will NATO enlargement in fact draw “new lines” and stoke isolation? Might the lack of attention to OSCE cause some States to form their own regional, and perhaps eventually confrontational, security arrangements? Have circumstances so changed since the Security Model was launched in 1994—the decision to invite three nations to join NATO, the creation of the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council—that attention to OSCE may have dwindled? (Indeed, this appears to be the case with senior officials from OSCE capitals increasingly conducting political consultations, including deliberations on the CFE, in the EAPC and NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council rather than at the OSCE’s Senior Council). Finally, If NATO–Russia relations are disrupted by the next wave of NATO enlargement or some other issue, is not a credible OSCE a useful “shock absorber” for all concerned?

It is now important to move with determination to enhance the role of the OSCE so as to improve inter-institutional cooperation. In this respect various proposals are worthy of further consideration. For example, the US idea for a joint NATO–Russia brigade should not be casually dismissed as militarily “problematic” but grasped as a unique opportunity to bring the NATO–Russia Act into life. Similarly, PFP planning could focus on the possibility of broadly-based, impartial OSCE multinational peacekeeping anywhere in the OSCE region. Indeed, the Russian Chief of Staff Colonel-General Anatoliy Kvashin described on 21 November 1997 IFOR/SFOR as a prototype for Russian participation in future Combined Joint Task Forces (in which all Partners, but not necessarily all allies, can participate). Although there are concerns about “legitimising” Russian peacekeeping in the CIS, such peacekeeping is a fact and it is occurring in areas of tension that, if unchecked, could lead to consequences for many participating States. Why not ensure that these operations are under an OSCE mandate with the widest possible participation, not just a handful of UN or OSCE observers, which would provide a bedrock test of the NATO–Russia Act?

Moreover, the relationship between the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, where Russia and 27 other non-NATO members sit, and the OSCE should be further developed. The EAPC could provide the logical link between OSCE and the Alliance: it will allow “all interested states—and not just the few bigger powers—to take responsibility for European stability.” ₁₄ But it should not be only workshop-driven and conversational but serve as an operational forum, a security arm of the OSCE should the EAPC as a whole decide. And it would hardly detract from either EAPC or OSCE to see where the same issues could best be addressed, e.g., a common verification agency or an OSCE code on civilian democratic control of the military.

We need both a robust OSCE and EAPC if nations are to play an effective role in crises, with, say, the OSCE a forum for first resort but, should political means fail, able to smoothly mandate EAPC to take the next steps. This will require solid interaction rather than glaring anomalies whereby the NATO Secretary General does not address OSCE Summits and NATO has no permanent “nameplate” at OSCE meetings but the EU does.

In this context, it should be noted that EAPC–OSCE mutually reinforcing cooperation of this kind would resemble the relationship between the OSCE and the EU. As early as 1994 the EU made the OSCE a key arena for developing its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This included cooperation in the development of the initiative of former French Prime Minister Eduard Balladur for a Stability Pact to encourage peaceful resolution of disputes among the Central and Eastern European nations seeking EU membership. Further, the OSCE was then charged in 1995 with oversight of the 125 bi- and multi-lateral agreements concluded in this framework, strengthening both EU and OSCE contributions to European security.

4. Conclusion

Ultimately, work on the OSCE Charter is “partly an exercise in self-definition for the OSCE and partly a much broader macro-political evaluation of European security in general.” ₁₅ For this reason it is a valuable exercise, but it should also be a problem-solving one to avoid future Yugoslavias. OSCE itself has set out a vision of a harmonious all-European order, and we should not perpetually gloss over the substance in favour of unenforceable declarations, make-work, marginal institutional adjustments, or euphonious catchphrases such as “solidarity” or “empowerment” alone. It is surely right that what is required is a “really valuable and innovative politically-binding document avoiding repetitions and compilations from previous texts,” ₁₆ and which should “substantially increase security for the participating States and enhance cooperation among them, and this in particular for participating States which do not belong to military alliances.” ₁₇ This is a matter which all national and European and transatlantic parliamentary organisations must deeply scrutinize, supported by a proper OSCE academy or institute linked inter alia to the emerging conflict prevention network of the European Commission, ₁₈ for the Security Model exercise can be part of a hopeful legacy to future generations. One of the enduring lessons from how we dealt with security challenges in the 20th century appears to be that OSCE and NATO should be indispensable partners. Let new thinking prevail.

Endnotes

Note 1: President Vaclav Havel (Czechoslovakia), presentation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, 10 May 1990.  Back.

Note 2: President Vaclav Havel (Czech Republic), “A Chance To Stop the Violence,” Transitions (December 1997), p. 16.  Back.

Note 3: Gregory Flynn and David J. Scheffer, “Limited Collective Security,” Foreign Policy (Fall 1990), p. 79.  Back.

Note 4: For a concise background see Helsinki Monitor, Special Issue, (vol. 7, no. 3 1996).  Back.

Note 5: The proposal is reproduced in Bruce George, Complementary Pillars of European Security: The OSCE Security Model and The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Political Committee, North Atlantic Assembly, August 1997.  Back.

Note 6: ITAR–TASS, 3 December 1997.  Back.

Note 7: Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin (Russia), statement at the Meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the OSCE participating States, Lisbon, 2 December 1996.  Back.

Note 8: Ambassador John C. Kornblum (USA), “America and Europe: An Indispensable Partnership,” presentation at the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn, 12 November 1997.  Back.

Note 9: Rob de Wijk, NATO On the Brink Of the New Millennium: The Battle For Consensus (Brassey’s 1997). See also John Borawski, A Better Peace: the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Occasional Paper no. 65 (Tampere, Finland: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1996) , and Piotr Switalski, The OSCE In the European Security System: Chances and Limits (Warsaw: Center for International Relations, Institute of Public Affairs, 1997).  Back.

Note 10: Ambassador Thomas L. Siebert (USA), “The Baltic Sea Region and European Security After Madrid,” presentation at the Swedish Air Force regiment in Lulea, 7 October 1997.  Back.

Note 11: Assistant Secretary of State John C. Kornblum (USA), “Worldnet” interview, 18 June 1997, US Information Service Washington File 118, 19 June 1997.  Back.

Note 12: Masha Khmelevskaya, “No NATO Mystery,” letter, International Herald Tribune, 20 October 1997.  Back.

Note 13: The White House has been explicit on this point: Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty “does not define what actions would constitute ‘an attack’ or prejudge what Alliance decisions might be made.” “Questions and Answers on NATO Enlargement,” report accompanying the letter from US President Bill Clinton to Senator Jesse Helms, 10 September 1997.  Back.

Note 14: Professor John Barrett, Political Affairs Division, NATO, “NATO Enlargement: Impact On Stability In the Central European Region,” presentation at the Central European University, Budapest, 13 September 1997.  Back.

Note 15: Walter A. Kemp, The OSCE In a New Context: European Security Towards the Twenty-First Century, Discussion Paper 54 (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), p. 33.  Back.

Note 16: Konstantin Dimitrov (Bulgaria), Head of Department, Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, statement to the reinforced meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, 5 November 1997.  Back.

Note 17: Ambassador Raymond Kunz (Switzerland), presentation to the meeting of the informal ad hoc group on a Charter for European Security, Vienna, 9 May 1997.  Back.

Note 18: See Bruce George MP, “An OSCE Academy?,” Helsinki Monitor (vol.8, no.2 1997), pp. 23–30.  Back.