Ethnic Conflict as Demobilizer: The Case of Serbia

V.P. Gagnon, Jr.

Institute for European Studies
- Working Paper no. 96.1

May 10, 1996

Thanks to John Oakley, Liz Wishnick, Jack Snyder, John Weiss, Aleksandar Štulhofer and the participants in the Peace Studies Research Seminar for helpful comments and suggestions.

Research for this paper was assisted by an award from the Social Science Research Council of an SSRC-MacArthur Foundation Fellowship on Peace and Security in a Changing World.

(c) V.P. Gagnon Jr.
This paper should not be reproduced in whole or in part without the prior permission of the author.
All papers published are exact reproductions of the author's text.

The terms ethnic identity and ethnic conflict are increasingly being seen in discussions of international security, and are often portrayed as inextricably linked, the one following the other in a kind of natural progression. Indeed, both the primordialist and instrumentalist approaches to ethnicity seem to agree that appealing to (or framing) peoples' identities as members of a collective group defined in terms of ethnicity is a very powerful mobilization strategy. This ethnic mobilization in turn is said to result in a process of "ethnic outbidding," whereby competition to attract popular support leads political actors to try appear the most supportive of ethnic claims, which causes an almost inevitable spiral toward conflict with other ethnic groups. Donald Horowitz even argues that the only constraint on this process is the ethnic composition of the electorate. ₁ While this is surely an exaggeration, and in fact outbidding is restrained by other factors, ₂ the implicit assumption is that violent ethnic conflicts can be explained in terms of this outbidding strategy.

From this perspective, the outbreak of violent conflict along ethnic lines is explained with reference to nationalist propaganda and mobilization, whereby political elites mobilize populations by pushing the "ethnic" button. The result, called "hypernationalism" by some IR scholars, is an almost Pavlovian response, where "ethnic masses" either awaken to the fact that the true nature of their political interests is along ethnic lines or are manipulated by nationalist propaganda, thereby driving the political actions of the "ethnic group" into greater and greater conflict and violence with other "ethnic groups." ₃

In this paper I'd like to test the hypothesis of ethnic outbidding and the related assertations that violent conflict along ethnic cleavages is just a further step along the road of ethnic mobilization, and that appeals to ethnic identity naturally lead to violence between "ethnic groups." To do so I consider two sets of questions. First, at times of violent conflict and in periods preceding them, what is the message elites are using in their attempts to influence the beliefs and behaviors of the wider population? To what do they appeal? And second, how does the target audience respond to these influence attempts? Are they in fact mobilized? Are they driven to violence against others?

In order to shed light on this phenomenon, I'll address these questions by looking at the case of Serbia between the late 1980s and 1993. This case is generally perceived as one of the most extreme of recent cases of ethnically-based conflict, where appeals to ethnic and national sentiment supposedly mobilized the Serbian population into a long and destructive war. Yet the facts point to a quite different dynamic and casts doubt on the image of powerful, ever more militant appeals to ethnic solidarity mobilizing the population toward ever more violent conflict. Rather, this case shows the very real limits of such appeals, as well as the shortcomings of the concept of ethnic solidarity as an explanatory factor for such violence.

As will be argued below, political rhetoric and imagery of ethnic resentment and racism were dominant in the Serbian leadership's political rhetoric as long as the political system was an authoritarian one, and the leadership did not need the active support of a majority of the population. But in periods when Serbia's leaders needed the support of the wider population to stay in power (because of the introduction of multiparty democracy), attempts by Serbia's political leadership to influence the wider population focused not on themes of hatred, national or ethnic intolerance. Rather the overall message was focused much more on non-ethnic issues; and in those messages related to national identity, the focus was on a broader concept of injustice. In addition, rather than a process of ethnic outbidding, what we see instead is a process of ethnic underbidding, that is, competition between elites driving them to seem less nationalistic and more moderate on nationalist issues.

In terms of the effects of these strategies, what is clear is that despite images of egregious injustices and dangers to Serbs and to Serbia, and of violence being perpetrated against Serbs, the population was not actively mobilized along these issues, and was certainly not mobilized into violent conflict. Indeed, candidates who espoused extremist language consistently did poorly, while in terms of willingness to act in solidarity with other Serbs, military mobilization campaigns were utter failures despite images of innocent victims of atrocities. As for the violent conflict along ethnic lines, it was not the result of nationalist mobilization, but rather a purposeful policy undertaken by political elites. And its goal was not to mobilize, but to demobilize the population.

Just as in the rest of Eastern Europe, so too in Serbia there was a very large constituency for radical change in the status quo political and economic system. But unlike in most of the region, the Serbian communist party managed to maintain its hold on power. By sending military and paramility forces into other Yugoslav republics in order to start violent conflict, which was portrayed as "ethnic conflict," the regime managed to refocus the center of political discourse away from issues of radical change. This meant that the kinds of people who were on the streets, mobilized against the regime in places like Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in Serbia were silenced by the images of war and by the prospect of being sent to the front. In fact, exactly because of the limited effectiveness of appeals to ethnic solidarity the regime had to resort to violent conflict along ethnic lines to keep its opponents from mobilizing the population against the regime itself. This silencing or demobilizing strategy has proved quite successful in the Serbian case.

The paper looks at the two aspects of nationalist mobilization in the context of the Serbian case in the period immediately preceding the wars as well as during the violence. First it looks at the structure of political influence attempts in two ways: one, in terms of the actual content of those political appeals that directly addressed ethnic and national sentiment, and two, the weight of the concept of ethnic solidarity as a factor in political competition. Second, it looks at the actual political outcome of these appeals and the overall impact of appeals to ethnic solidarity and nationalist issues. The focus will be on Serbs within Serbia. (The situation of Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia-Hercegovina was in fact very similar until guerrilla groups from outside began the violence there.) ₄ In the concluding section I'll suggest some possible hypotheses about the link between ethnic mobilization and violent conflict along ethnic cleavages.

A. Structure of Political Appeals

Ironically, the political rhetoric of the leadership of the Serbian communist party was most inflammatory and nationalistic exactly in the period when it did not need to actively mobilize the wider population to support it (by voting in elections); and it was most moderate when it needed that active support. Although throughout this entire period the overwhelming image has been one of Serbs as innocent victims, when the political arena and the politically relevant population was limited to the communist party itself, Slobodan Miloševi_ and his allies actively appealed to this resentment, set up mass rallies, and in the media resorted to racist images of ethnic others to support their contentions. Strikingly, however, this period did not see the outbreak of violent conflict along ethnic lines, much less full-scale war. ₅

But when the political arena dramatically shifted in 1990 to include the entire population, and when the regime needed to gain the active support of a majority of voters in a system of multiparty elections, the rhetorical line shifted. While still portraying Serbs as innocent victims, political discourse in pre-election periods now focused on non-ethnic issues, and on ethnic issues stressed tolerance and peace. Yet it was at this exact time that violent conflict along ethnic lines began in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.

1. Content of political influence attempts related to ethnic issues

An examination of those parts of the political rhetoric of Serbia's ruling party (League of Communists of Serbia, and after July 1990, Socialist Party of Serbia--SPS) which specifically made reference to ethnic or national sentiment immediately reveals that these were not appeals to some abstract sense of Serbdom or ethnic solidarity. Rather, they were structured in a very specific way around the concept of justice. In particular, this rhetoric focused on injustices done to Serb civilians living outside of "inner" Serbia only because they were Serbs. Rather than appealing to some preexisting or abstract sense of ethnic solidarity, these appeals instead distorted reality, drew on specious historical parallels, and resorted to outright lies in order to contruct images of terrible injustices. In the case of Kosovo, discussed below, the mass media also created very racist images of ethnic Albanians, but always in terms of injustices perpetrated against innocent Serbs. Mass media images of Croats and Muslims were also often quite racist. Of course often central to politics and mobilization appealing to issues of ethnicity are grievances, especially injustices against a people because of its nationality, ethnicity, or religion. This concept of injustice along national or ethnic lines helps explain the power of appeals to national or ethnic sentiment throughout the former communist world, since the very concept of national independence and the value of national cultures were suppressed by what were perceived (or portrayed) as occupying, anti-national forces.

In the Serbian case there certainly were real grievances and injustices which political elites could draw on for popular mobilization. In particular, the repression of public expression of national sentiment, to the point where peasants who sang nationalist songs faced imprisonment, was clearly perceived as a grave injustice by a significant part of the population. What made this injustice even more egregious was that it was portrayed as having been imposed on Serbs by non-Serbs--since Tito was identified as a Croat, and all the top Yugoslav leaders after 1966 were identified as either Croats or Slovenes. ₆ In Serbia the League of Communists, headed by Slobodan Miloševi_, from 1987 onward managed successfully to portray the federal and other republics' party organizations as the agents of injustice, and by righting this wrong was able by the late 1980s to gain credibility among the wider population.

Yet this redress of injustices against cultural expression was not in itself sufficient to mobilize the population into violent conflict along ethnic lines, and once these issues of grievance had been resolved, the Serbian leadership had to find others. Here, the rhetoric of ethnic sentiment focused on alleged extreme injustices against the 30 percent of Yugoslavia's Serbs who lived outside of Serbia's borders, that is, beyond the direct experience and knowledge of the vast majority of Serbia's population. Here too, in Serbia's autonomous province of Kosovo (with an 80 percent ethnic Albanian population) and especially after the 1990 multiparty elections in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbs did have legitimate concerns. But rather than trying to address those concerns, Miloševi_ and his allies exacerbated them, instrumentalizing them to create images of injustice. This rhetoric not only focused on injustices, but aso portrayed Serbia's ruling party as the only force standing up for these defenseless victims, while the federal and other republic parties were either indifferent or actually implicated in the injustice. This image was driven home in a very powerful way through the regime's control over the mass media, especially television.

In fact, this discourse of injustice was part of a dynamic process where images constructed in political rhetoric were confirmed by media images, which themselves were the result of violence perpetrated by Miloševi_'s allies in the other Yugoslav republics. This pattern was seen throughout the period when conservatives in the Serbian party were faced with domestic political challenges from forces which sought to mobilize the wider population against the ruling party. The focus began on Kosovo, shifted to Croatia, and then to Bosnia-Hercegovina.

a) Kosovo

The issue of Kosovo was central to the political rhetoric of Miloševi_ and his conservative allies in the period from the mid-1980s until 1990, when the political arena was limited to the communist party. Kosovo, a province of Serbia, in 1980 had 80 percent majority ethnic Albanian population, and had been granted de facto republic status in the 1974 constitution. Starting in the early 1980s conservative forces within the Serbian party began pointing to alleged injustices against the minority Serbian population in Kosovo at the hands of the Albanian majority, portraying the situation as one where innocent Serbian women and children were victims in their own ancient homeland. The injustices, being perpetrated by Albanian "separatists," allegedly included purposeful attempts to drive all Serbs out of Kosovo and create an ethnically pure region which would then detach itself from Serbia and join Albania. The means by which this was done were said to include attacks on and rapes of Serbian women, children and men by Albanians, where the local Albanian officials would not respond to complaints. Albanians were also accused of destroying Serbian cultural monuments, ancient churches and monasteries, and portrayed in the media in very racist terms. The injustice of these acts was reinforced by the fact that Kosovo was portrayed as the heartland of the medieval Serbian kingdom and as the centerpiece of the Serbian epic oral tradition. The Serbian conservatives characterized this situation as attempted genocide against Serbs in Kosovo. ₇ What made this injustice seem even worse was that the federal authorities, reformists in the Serbian party, and the other republican parties were portrayed as doing nothing to address it. ₈

b) Croatia

In the case of Croatia, a very similar scenario of injustice was presented, invoking in particular the events of World War II when the German-installed Ustaša regime massacred hundreds of thousands of Croatian Serbs. From the mid-1980s onward (that is, starting several years before the Croatian nationalist HDZ came to power in the elections of May 1990), Croatian Serbs were portrayed in the Serbian official media as victims of another Ustaša regime which was attempting to subject them to another genocide. ₉ Once the HDZ came to power, this image of life-threatening injustices was strongly reinforced by media images which openly equated Croatian President Franjo Tudjman (elected in 1990 and leader of the HDZ) with Hitler and the Ustaša leader Paveli_, and by events in late 1990 and early 1991, when Serbian guerrilla forces infiltrated into parts of Croatia with minority Serb populations and, with the help of the Yugoslav army, provoked violent confrontation with the Croatian police and army. ₁₀ Although Serb and Croat civilians often fled to the woods together to escape this violent conflict, Belgrade portrayed civilian casualties of the Serb guerrilla attacks as victims of Croatian forces, and as Croatian attempts to destroy the Serbian population. When Croatian extremists reacted to Serbian atrocities with harassment of and atrocities against Serbian civilians, these were held up as further proof of Belgrade's original contentions. This injustice was all the greater because the Croats were portrayed as the tools of the losers of the two world wars, Germany and Austria, who were now said to be seeking revenge on Serbs, while Serbia's traditional allies in the West stood by and did nothing.

c) Bosnia-Hercegovina

In Bosnia, a very similar dynamic was seen, where defenseless Serbs living in "Serbian lands" were allegedly facing the threat of annihilation, this time at the hands of Muslim Slavs who were portrayed as the vanguard of an Islamic fundamentalist onslaught on Europe, as attacks by "mujahedeen" seeking to impose an Islamic state. ₁₁ The violent warfare that began in April 1992 was in fact part of a well-planned strategy directed from Belgrade and included brutal killing and expulsion of non-Serb populations from those regions of Bosnia under the control of the Bosnian Serbian Democratic Party. But it was portrayed by official Belgrade as a local civil, religious and ethnic war in which Serbs were the main victims, and Serbian military activity's only goal was to defend Serbs. ₁₂ Once again, when Croat and especially Muslim extremists sought revenge against Serbian civilians, Belgrade held these atrocities up as proof of its original contentions. The injustice of innocent Serbs victimized by Islamic fundamentalists was made even more egregious because the European powers and the United States were portrayed as siding with the Muslims against the innocent Serbs, who in this story had borne the brunt of saving western civilization from the Ottoman Muslims and who had, as faithful allies of the west in both world wars, suffered tremendous losses.

Common to all three of these cases is the structuring of discourse around injustices that Serbs in those regions were suffering only because they were Serbs, at the hands of crazed, bloodthirsty extremists defined in ethnic or religious terms. Innocent Serb women and children were not safe in their own homes, while the outside world was doing nothing or was actually complicit in this injustice; moreover, the outside was unjustly punishing Serbia for helping these innocent Serbs. An important part of this strategy was the denial of any Serb guilt whatsoever. Thus, for example, Miloševi_ with great outrage denied reports that Serbs had participated in ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, declaring that "the Serbian people would never disgrace itself with such inhuman deeds." ₁₃ In fact, however, the actual violence was started and carried out by military and paramilitary forces under the direct control of the Belgrade government.

An important part of this strategy was that it dealt with injustices committed against Serbs "out there," and it was constructed as the reliving of past historical injustices in which Serbs were the victims of what are portrayed as the contemporary victimizers' direct antecedents (Ustaša, Ottoman Turks). The reality of the injustices was thus constructed beyond the direct personal experience of most of the audience to whom it was directed, but within a framework which refered to familiar historical events. Since information on, and thus beliefs about, the outside depends on indirect sources of information, control over such information is a very powerful means by which to shape overall political discourse. Certainly within Serbia television, and the regime's control of it, played a crucial role in constructing this image of an unjust world. ₁₄ And once conflict was provoked in the ethnically-mixed regions of Croatia and Bosnia, the media "spun" these events in this way in its interpretations not only for observers in Serbia, but also for the victims themselves, who in turn, repeating the official version of events, reconfirmed the impressions of terrible injustices to their friends and relatives back in Serbia.

Thus the structure of appeals to ethnic sentiment was constructed in a very particular way. They were not appeals to ethnicity or ethnic solidarity per se, but rather to a sense of injustice about events beyond the direct experience of the audience. Though the victims of the injustices were Serbs, and portrayal of similar injustices against non-Serbs would probably not evoke a similar response, the important point here is that appeals to ethnic solidarity by the regime had to resort to such a construction of terrible injustices, rather than merely appealing to a pre-existing feeling of solidarity. Indeed, most people, given similar information about defenseless and innocent people being threatened with slaughter only because of their religion, ethnicity or nationality, would react with a sense of outrage against the perpetrators of the injustice as well as against any other forces which either facilitated or were complicit in the injustices. ₁₅ Given this fact, the question thus becomes whether this particular political discourse appealed mainly to a sense of ethnic solidarity, or whether in fact it was more about a sense of injustice, which was used to construct a sense or at least an image of solidarity. People's reaction to such discourse is not necessarily due to any primordial sense of Serbness or visceral hatred of non-Serbs, and their acceptance of it is fully consistent with values such as tolerance, justice and peaceful coexistence.

In fact, a sense of justice and injustice seems to be much more universal among humans than a sense of ethnic solidarity. Justice is a concept that cuts across all cultures and times, and is usually among the central focuses of politics, while ethnicity is a very time- and culturally-specific concept that is the center of politics only under particular conditions. The question of why a particular group is portrayed as the victim of injustices in a particular way is a valid one, and here the particular context of ethnicity must be addressed. But even so, reactions to injustice do not necessarily depend on whether people actively or primarily define themselves in ethnic terms. And given the power of claims of injustice, it becomes clear that those who can construct a discourse of injustice, even by creating those injustices, have a very powerful tool with which to shape the terms of the overall political debate.

A sense of ethnic solidarity created by images of egregious injustice that themselves have been purposefully and with great energy created by certain political actors, is thus clearly not some natural outgrowth of ethnic or national sentiment. Rather, it is a constructed and forcibly imposed image. If ethnic solidarity were as powerful as some of the ethnic conflict literature claims, the Serbian leadership would not have had to have gone to the extreme lengths they have in order to use ethnic sentiment to political ends.

2. The concept of ethnic solidarity

Another implication of much of the ethnic conflict literature is that ethnicity is a natural cleavage in politics, and thus ethnic solidarity, that is, identification with the ethnic group as a natural political phenomenon, can easily be made to take priority over all non-ethnic issues, including economics, class, etc. ₁₆ From this perspective we would expect that political rhetoric and influence attempts would be consistently framed in terms of ethnicity, appealing to ethnic solidarity in either a positive or negative way. But even at a conceptual level, the shortcomings of this assumption are seen even if we ignore direct economic interest, and consider "culture" as a key element of political discourse.

If culture is defined as practice (or even in a more narrow or "primordial" way as that practice to which one is exposed as a child, and which is thereby adopted as one's "own") then it clearly includes many things besides specifically ethnic aspects of being. Socio-economic status may be just as important as ethnicity in defining someone's cultural practices and relations with others, and may at times be more important, especially where language differences are not a major factor in defining ethnic differences. Which parts of culture are relevant to a particular context depends entirely on that context, and even then other parts do not lose all relevance, since different aspects of culture are not mutually exclusive, and indeed coexist simultaneously. Neither "ethnic" or "socio-economic" aspects of culture are more or less real or authentic or "primordial." Both may be inculcated within the family from an early age; both may be either nurtured and defended as identity, or changed according to context, education, etc. Viewing culture only in ethnically-defined terms is therefore just as misleading as viewing it as only class-defined. If political rhetoric is based on cultural affinities, it must be recognized that such affinities are not necessarily limited to membership in the same "ethnic group."

If we accept this wider definition of culture, then it becomes very clear that even beyond divergent economic interests there existed very significant cultural variations--regional, social, linguistic, socio-economic--among Serbs in Yugoslavia (and among Croats and among Muslims). Serbs who lived in large cities in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia itself were very different in overall cultural terms than Serbs in rural regions of Kosovo, Bosnia, and Krajina. These cultural differences were apparently as deep as or deeper than the differences between nominal members of different ethnic groups. Thus in overall cultural terms, taking into account factors in addition to narrowly "ethnic" ones, a Serb lawyer in Belgrade could be closer culturally to a Croat doctor in Zagreb than to a Serbian peasant in rural, underdeveloped mountains of Bosnia or Kosovo. ₁₇ In the case of a Serb and a Croat doctor or lawyer in ethnically mixed areas of Yugoslavia, such as Slavonia, Vojvodina, or much of Bosnia, this was even more so the case.

Given this structure of cultural cleavages, any attempt by political actors to mobilize solely along explicitly "ethnic" lines of Serb vs. non-Serb would meet the resistance of a large number of Serbs, especially in urban areas, who were the bearers of the most liberal and enlightened version of Yugoslavism, and who in political terms were most open to pluralism and coexistence. This is again not to say that these people had no sense of being Serbs, or did not value cultural heritage defined in national terms. Rather, it is to point out that appealing to them on narrowly ethnic terms alone would not necessarily be an automatic success if it ignored other facets of identity and interest, both economic and cultural. And indeed, as the following examples show, non-ethnic issues have been central to political discourse at exactly those times when the active support of the majority of the wider population has been needed (at times of election campaigns), and at times of popular anti-regime mobilizations.

Prior to 1990 and the start of active political mobilization against the ruling communist party by challenger political elites, the focus in political rhetoric was on ethnic issues, especially in terms of grievances against Tito's Yugoslavia, which was portrayed as repressive against Serbs, and grievances against "nationalist" and "separatist" Albanians in Kosovo who were said to be terrorizing Serbs in the province. But in this period the regime had no need to actively mobilize the population for support; politics was still limited to processes and actors within the communist party. The apparent mobilizations of this period will be discussed below. But what is also important to note at this point is that, as mentioned above, there was no violent conflict along ethnic lines in this period, especially nothing comparable to what would occur in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.

1990 marked a striking shift in the political environment. Although the ruling party resisted to the bitter end, by the fall of 1990 events in the rest of Eastern Europe and in the other Yugoslav republics, as well as mass pressure from within Serbia itself, forced the ruling party to accept the holding of multiparty elections. What is of interest here is the rhetorical arguments and issues used by the party in its attempt to gain the support of a majority of Serb voters in Serbia. ₁₈ In the first multiparty elections in Serbia, in December 1990, Miloševi_ focused on social justice and peace, in particular citing the dangers of unemployment, economic insecurity and colonization of Serbia by the European Community as a way of appealing for people's support. He blamed the existing economic problems on the reformist policies of federal prime minister Ante Markovi_. And indeed, among those who voted for the SPS 66 percent gave priority to developing a strong economy (among those who voted for the main nationalist opposition party, the Serbian Renewal Movement or SPO, the figure was 58 percent) and 59 percent to improving the material conditions of life (SPO, 54 percent). ₁₉

On ethnic issues, he sought to underbid the nationalist opposition. Miloševi_ denounced the SPO as primitives who were stirring up ethnic conflicts and who wanted to drag Serbia into war, who threatened to undermine efforts at economic reform, and who "provoke confrontation, incite hatred toward other peoples and nations." ₂₀ His victory, Miloševi_ argued, would ensure peace at home and with the other republics. And while 66 percent of SPS voters listed themselves as "having a strong national orientation," 49 percent also listed good interethnic relations as a priority issue (these figures for SPO voters were 92 percent and 24 percent). ₂₁

The March 1991 anti-regime street rallies in Belgrade, although not fully analogous to election periods, nevertheless provides further evidence along these lines, since the focus of this anti-regime mobilization was purely non-ethnic. Hundreds of thousands of protesters filled the streets demanding an end to the regime monopoly over the media, the introduction of real economic reforms, and an end to the provocation of conflict with other Yugoslav republics. This period also saw massive anti-regime strikes in important industrial sectors, as well as a split in the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) along reform-antireform lines. Miloševi_'s response, after the Army refused to crush the protest with massive force, was to give in on these issues, establishing a roundtable Serbian National Council, allowing the adoption of some economic reform, and printing money to pay disgruntled workers. In addition, following the protests Miloševi_ became much more conciliatory in the inter-republic talks on the future of Yugoslavia, finally agreeing to consider a confederal solution and accepting the basic principles of such a solution, after months of refusing to budge from his demand for a more centralized federation. ₂₂ Although he also portrayed the protests as part of an anti-Serbian coalition that was trying to destroy Yugoslavia, and as agents of Albanian, Croatian, and Slovene enemies of Serbia (a rhetoric lacking from his pre-election speeches), the SPS was forced to undertake a policy of compromise and conciliation toward the other Yugoslav republics for three months, and was able to overcome this focus on nonethnic issues only by engineering and provoking the outbreak of violent conflict in Croatia, which was then pointed to as an injustice that demanded unity of Serbia.

The next elections, at the federal level, were held in May 1992. The full-scale war in Croatia had proved very unpopular in Serbia, prompting thousands of young men to flee the country to avoid being drafted, while whole units of draftees within the army itself deserted from the front. By spring 1992 a very strong anti-war student movement had arisen, and petitions calling for Miloševi_'s resignation gained upwards of one million signatures. ₂₃ Not coincidentally, at this moment the SPS and its allies in Bosnia started perpetrating violence along ethnic lines in Bosnia-Hercegovina, accompanied by even more vociferous accusations of injustices against innocent Serbian women and children in that republic.

But in the May 1992 elections (though they were boycotted by the democratic opposition), the SPS again portrayed itself as wanting peace. It arranged for the formation of a new federal Yugoslavia, thus formally recognizing the other Yugoslav republics' independence, and announced that it had pulled the Yugoslav army out of Bosnia, and that only Bosnian Serb soldiers remained. ₂₄ As mentioned above, the conflict itself was described in terms of innocent Serbs defending themselves. Indeed, not until after the polls closed on election day were Serbian television viewers informed that the forces shelling Sarajevo were Serbian. ₂₅

Perhaps the clearest example of ethnic underbidding (that is, trying to appear more conciliatory on issues of interethnic relations than political competitors) came in the December 1992 presidential elections, where Miloševi_ was challenged by Serbian-born American businessman Milan Pani_. Pani_ ran on a platform that explicitly stressed economic issues, called for immediate economic liberalization and privatization and in particular stressed the absolute necessity of ending the UN economic sanctions. Miloševi_'s response was to emphasize that the sanctions had positive effects (for example, allowing infant industries to develop) and that Serbia had its own resources and the ability to withstand sanctions. ₂₆ He stressed the importance of economic development as a key goal, and again printed billions of dinars to pay workers who had not received a paycheck in months. The SPS accused Pani_ of being a foreign agent, and stressed that Serbia would never bow to foreigners who try to tell her voters how to behave. ₂₇

On "ethnic issues" Pani_ called for an immediate end to the war in Bosnia and recognition of republic borders, improving relations with the west, and (in an uncanny repetition of Miloševi_'s own rhetoric from the December 1990 campaign) called on Serbs to look toward the future rather than the past. He noted that Serbia had to be concerned with the fate of Serbs outside Serbia, but pointed out that their negative situation was due exactly to the past policies of the SPS. In response to SPS claims that Kosovo was being subverted from abroad, Pani_ pointed out that no one recognized Kosovo as independent of Serbia.

Rather than trying to ethnically outbid Pani_, Miloševi_ instead stressed ethnic tolerance, the equality of all citizens of Serbia, and even stated, while in Kosovo, that most Albanians are blameless, and only a small minority of separatists, aided by Tirana, were the cause of problems. Indeed, he even implied that the Kosovo problem was basically resolved since the Serb population there was increasing and thus the ethnic balance was more "natural." ₂₈ Miloševi_ also stressed that Serbia had no territorial claims against any other state, vehemently denied charges of ethnic cleansing by Serbs as impossible, and pointed out that Serbia was extending hospitality to refugees of all nationalities.

Thus in his political rhetoric Miloševi_ consistently recognized the continuing primacy of nonethnic issues. His stress on social justice, economic development and ethnic peace all belie hypotheses that would expect a political rhetoric of ethnic outbidding. In fact, the rhetoric of ethnic injustice came to the fore especially in periods after elections, or when the opposition was mobilizing people against the regime. It was exactly in these periods that Serbian forces would begin to provoke conflict along ethnic lines, which was then pointed to as evidence of injustices. The very fact that the provocation of such incidents was necessary to divert attention from economic and peace issues in itself is evidence that ethnic issues, though not unimportant, are not so central as to exclude people's other nonethnic interests.

B. Effects of Ethnic Appeals

One of the most striking aspects of the Serbian case, and the one that most puts into question hypotheses relying on assumptions of ethnic solidarity, has been that, despite the image of egregious injustices inflicted on Serbs in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, despite the discourse of genocide and anti-Serbian conspiracies, the strength of appeals to ethnic solidarity was in fact surprisingly limited. Part of this is seen in the above-cited need to structure the debate not in terms of ethnic solidarity per se but in terms of egregious injustices. Another part is seen in the emphasis on economic, social justice, and ethnic peace issues. But perhaps the strongest evidence is seen in the actual effects of appeals to ethnic issues.

Of course the first public manifestations of Serbian national sentiment fostered by the regime came several years before multiparty elections, in particular beginning in late 1987, after Serbian party chief Slobodan Miloševi_ and his conservative allies managed to consolidate control over the Serbian communist party. Between this event and early 1990, the most significant type of political event in Yugoslavia was what was termed "the happening of the people," that is, what appeared to be massive, spontaneous rallies and mobilization of Serbs throughout Yugoslavia around issues of economic, social and ethnic or national discontent. As in the rest of Eastern Europe, people in Yugoslavia too had grievances related to repression of issues linked to ethnic sentiment, and it was to be expected that these issues would become politically significant. But these rallies addressed the economic and social problems facing workers at least as much as purely ethnic or national issues. And they did not lead to violent conflict.

These rallies were at the time portrayed by some Serb academics and analysts as signs of incipient democratization, comparable to later mass rallies and anti-regime mobilizations in other parts of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. But in fact, there was a very significant difference. The rallies in Serbia and Yugoslavia were organized and orchestrated by the regime; they were not at all critical of the Serbian government, and in fact participants often chanted slogans in support of Miloševi_ and other communist party leaders and carried their pictures. Even the qualification as mobilization is somewhat questionable. These "mobilizations" in fact had more in common with communist-era "mobilizations" than with the massive outpourings in other East European countries: workers were given a day off with pay, a bus ride to another town, and free food in exchange for participating in the "mobilization." Although to be sure many participants took part of their own free will, out of a true sense of liberation from perceived past oppression, it cannot be overlooked that this "mobilization" was in fact orchestrated from above.

In addition, the goals of these "mobilizations" were to support the existing regime only in an indirect way, rather than to get the active support of the population. The main goal was to overthrow party leaderships at local, regional, republic and even federal levels who disagreed with Miloševi_, that is, to oppose the enemies of the regime. The rallies most often took place at the same time as a party leadership meeting, in front of the building in which the meeting took place, and was used to instill fear into Miloševi_'s opponents in these local or regional leaderships so they would step aside and allow new people to be put into place. The cost to participants was relatively minor, and the psychic benefits were very high. To the extent that one can speak of mobilization of actors who are not directly politically relevant, in an authoritarian system where the mobilization is organized by the authoritarian regime itself, one can say that the regime managed to mobilize significant parts of the population to participate in these rallies. But these mobilizations did not lead to violence along ethnic lines.

As described above, once the regime needed the direct support of the population, and was opposed by forces outside of the communist party, the content and form of its political strategy shifted dramatically toward issues of economics and peace. Thus rather than exacerbating the situation in nationalist terms, and resulting in a spiral of hypernationalist reaction, the Serbian regime and its opponents began a process of ethnic underbidding, in an attempt to seem more moderate on ethnic and other issues. The overall results of these strategies are striking, and seem to disprove hypotheses about ethnic outbidding and mobilization spiralling into violence.

In the December 1990 elections, when Miloševi_ in effect ethnically underbid his nationalist opponents, he received 65 percent of the vote against 16 percent for the SPO's candidate. The even more vocally nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS), which used a rhetoric of ethnic conflict (calling explicitly for expulsion of non-Serbs from Serbia and for war to create an enlarged Serbia, for example) and was thus portrayed in the media, received only 2 percent of the vote.

After the election, the moves in early to mid-1991 by Miloševi_ and his allies to provoke conflict in Croatia and to block compromise in the talks over the future of Yugoslavia, together with his inattention to nonethnic demands, enabled the opposition to mobilize the population against the regime on purely non-ethnic issues. Interestingly, at this time the SPO's leader, Vuk Draškovi_, began ethnic underbidding, and although not renouncing his nationalist viewpoint, accused the SPS of war mongering and called for peaceful negotiations to realize the interests of Serbs and of Serbia in Yugoslavia. Indeed, Draškovi_ publicly questioned the need for war and in fact criticized the destruction of civilian targets and whole cities by Serbian forces in Croatia. ₂₉

Another telling indication of the limits of ethnic solidarity was the response to the army's efforts to draft men to fight in the war in Croatia. At a time when the Serbian media was filled with images of genocidal Ustaša massacring innocent Serb women and children, the attempts to mobilize young men and reserve forces in Serbia to fight against the Croatian fascists was stunningly low. Turnout rates in Belgrade ran about 5 percent. The rates in smaller cities and the countryside the rates were somewhat higher (about 20%), but were still quite low, and could be attributed to a combination of social pressure and the lack of hiding places rather than to a sense of solidarity. In addition, in this period upwards of 200,000 young men fled the country in order to avoid fighting. ₃₀ For this reason, the war in Bosnia was fought not with soldiers from Serbia, but with Serbs from Bosnia itself, who were drafted and had little choice but to fight if they were in areas conflict (calling explicitly for expulsiocontrolled by Karadzic's forces (although here too those who could leave did; less than 1/2 of Bosnia's prewar Serb population stayed in the Republika Srpska.) This hardly squares with the image of irrational nationalistic Serbs who could barely restrain themselves from going out and killing non-Serbs.

Dissatisfaction with the war in Croatia, as well as growing unrest over the war being provoked by Miloševi_'s allies in Bosnia, contributed to the anti-war movement in Belgrade, in which even many nationalistically-oriented intellectuals and the Serbian Orthodox Church joined in to call for Miloševi_'s resignation. Thus in the May 1992 elections, the SPS received the votes of only 27.5 percent of the total electorate, ₃₁ while 36 percent did not vote at all (the opposition had called for a boycott). ₃₂ Its coalition partner, the chauvinistically-oriented SRS, was presented by Belgrade television as respectable and not as extremist, although it clearly appealed to those for whom ethnic outbidding was a positive thing. Yet even with the blessing of Serbian television, the SRS received the votes of only 19 percent of the electorate (at a maximum, 24 percent of Serbia's Serbs). So over half of the electorate (and at least 43 percent of Serbia's Serbs) rejected the SPS-SRS coalition despite the images of injustice.

Although the wave of opposition seen in spring 1992 was submerged under the rising tide of "injustices against innocent Serbs" in Bosnia, the appearance on the scene of Milan Pani_ shows even more clearly the explanatory weakness of the concept of ethnic outbidding. Pani_, from the time he was named federal prime minister in July 1992, took an almost anti-nationalist line. ₃₃ Yet in the election campaign for Serbian president between Pani_ and Miloševi_ in November and December 1992, a time when the most vocal anti-war and liberal elements of the country had fled abroad and images of innocent Serbs under attack from Mujehedeen and Ustaše flooded the airwaves, the SPS strictly limited Pani_'s access to the broadcast media.

The ethnic conflict literature, with its hypotheses about the dynamics of ethnic outbidding and the priority of ethnic solidarity, would have predicted that the Serbian leadership should have given Pani_ all the air time he wanted, since his rhetoric alone would have discredited him. Yet the regime was clearly quite afraid of Pani_'s challenge. Not only did it severely limit his access to the media, it satanized him as a foreign agent sent by the west to subvert Serbia's independence. Nevertheless, at the start of the campaign, in October, Pani_ had a favorable rating of 76 percent, while Miloševi_'s was 49 percent. ₃₄ In the election itself, 5-10 percent of voters, mostly younger ones who would support Pani_, were turned away from the polls, and many people's names had disappeared from the voting lists in Belgrade, the center of Pani_'s support. Yet despite massive fraud, exit polls taken during the voting itself showed an even split of 47 percent each for Pani_ and Miloševi_. (This result is even more striking if we keep in mind that this 47 percent for Pani_ does not include the massive numbers of young men who had fled the country to avoid being drafted to the war in Croatia, and who would have been natural supporters of Pani_.) Even the regime's official statistic, 56 percent to 34 percent in favor of Miloševi_, is startling in this context. Likewise in the December 1992 parliamentary elections, also subject to fraudulent procedures, the regime was able to "mobilize" less than one-half the electorate, and only one-fifth (about 23 percent of Serbs) were mobilized mainly on ethnic conflict issues. Fully half the electorate (and at least 40 percent of the republic's Serbs) remained at home or voted for democratic opposition parties.

The results of the December 1993 elections were similar. ₃₅ The SPS stressed peace in Serbia, political stability, the fight against criminals and growing differentials in wealth, denounced the "looting of state property" and called for a review of all privatizations to date; it managed to obtain 38 percent of the vote, or 27 percent of the electorate. The Radicals, who were no longer in coalition with SPS and had been presented by Belgrade television in their true colors (as war criminals, etc.), received 10 percent of the vote. The SPS's new chauvinistically nationalist coalition party, headed by war criminal Arkan and given much positive coverage on television, received less than 2 percent of votes cast. Thus only 15 percent of the electorate voted for blatantly chauvinistic parties, while at least 47 percent of the republic's Serbs supported either democratic opposition parties or abstained from voting, hardly a massive mobilization based on ethnic outbidding. ₃₆

While the ethnic or national question was clearly one part of political discourse at times of elections, and the "Serbian question" was one that all candidates had to address, there was no automatic mobilization of "Serbian ethnic solidarity" leading inexorably toward greater conflict, no rising up en masse of "the Serbian nation" against other ethnic groups. Indeed, although the SPS and its allies managed in rigged elections and quite favorable circumstances (virtual control of mass media) to receive the votes of about 50 percent of the population--which at a maximum would include 62.5 percent of Serbian population of Serbia--the emphasis on non-ethnic issues, the way in which ethnic issues were framed, and the quite obvious fear of the anti-nationalist candidacy of Milan Pani_ puts into doubt an image of ethnic politics spiralling inexorably toward ever more-extreme and conflictual policies due to the need to gain electoral support or to mobilize the wider population. The dominant image of Serbs under threat of genocide in Bosnia and Croatia, and the outside world's complicity in this injustice, makes these findings even more intriguing.

In fact, as I've shown elsewhere, ₃₇ the violent conflict along ethnic lines in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina was not the result of mass mobilization on ethnic issues, or of nationalistic propaganda driving people into a frenzied killing of others. Although there were some instances of individuals claiming to be motivated by the propaganda, the overall conflict cannot be explained by looking at these individuals. Rather, the violence was a purposeful policy, undertaken by order of political leaders, using the army and paramilitary groups. The "uprisings" of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, though undertaken against the background of real concerns of Serbs in those republics, was a very well thought-out and planned policy. Far from being the result of a nationalistic mobilization, the violence was accomplished by force of arms and the resulting fear among all of the population, Serbs and non-Serbs. This was not a spiralling of hypernationalism or ethnic outbidding out of control, but rather a purposeful strategy by particular people within the political, military, economic and cultural elite.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to show the limited power of the concepts of ethnic outbidding and political mobilization based on ethnic solidarity to explain this case of violent conflict. Of course people can be and are mobilized in an active sense by appeals to injustices defined in ethnic terms. But there seem to be very real limits to mobilization based on such appeals. Indeed, the Serbian case clearly shows that there was no automatic mobilization of ethnic sentiment, no rising up en masse of the Serbian nation, and no endless ethnic outbidding, even in conditions of war and ethnic violence, even with images of egregious injustices and genocide. While ethnic mobilization works up to a certain point, beyond that point, when policies move in to the realm of violent conflict, the phenomenon is no longer one of mass mobilization.

But while violent conflict along ethnic lines was not a means to mobilize the population, nor was it the result of popular mobilization on ethnic issues; indeed, if most Serbs had an accurate picture of how the violent conflict began and the actual behavior of guerrilla forces acting in the name of Serbdom, they would most likely move even more firmly against those responsible. ₃₈ A similar dynamic seemed to be at work in Croatia, where public exposure of the atrocities carried out by Croatian forces against Muslim civilians in Bosnia-Hercegovina resulted in a strong popular backlash against the hard-line nationalist faction within the ruling HDZ, which was responsible for those policies. ₃₉

What then is the link between ethnic sentiment, political mobilization and violence along ethnic lines? Part of the answer lies in the fact that non-ethnic interests remain salient even at times when ethnic issues are at the center of political discourse. Concern with ethnic issues in no way precludes simultaneous concern with non-ethnic issues. This simple fact seems to account for the failure of ethnic outbidding to work as an engine of violent conflict in conditions of political competition. In other words, ethnic solidarity is no more of an all-powerful determinant of behavior than is class solidarity.

Rather than being either the result of, or a means to, popular mobilization, violent ethnic conflict in fact has in this case been started as part of a purposeful strategy, as a means to frame and structure political discourse and thus political competition. An image of egregious injustices in terms of life and death cannot be created out of thin air. Thus the provocation of conflict, the instrumentalization of real grievances of the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs and the purposeful exacerbation of their situation, combined with placing events into a context defined in terms of historical precedents, all served as a way to construct this image. When the regime actually needed to mobilize people, they appealed not to ethnic solidarity, but to the everyday concerns, both cultural (ethnic) and economic. The creation of violence along ethnic lines, rather than a means to mobilize people, was instead a way of defining the limits of political discourse in periods when the political arena's participants are limited to political elites.

In power terms, the regime's goals in non-election periods was to prevent anti-regime mobilizations while carrying out policies meant to enhance its own hold on power. In the Serbian case, these two goals were intimately linked. On the one hand, violent conflict was a means to achieve a long-term strategy of consolidating control over territory, expelling non-Serbs in order to maintain the effectiveness of conflictual strategies based on ethnically defined issues as well as to eliminate a disgruntled "minority" population which would make up 40 to 50 percent of the population. In addition, the Serbian-held regions of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia were for the most part underdeveloped regions where some elites benefited enormously under the statist system Belgrade was attempting to preserve, and who were thus very useful counterweights to the more liberal-leaning elites centered in Serbia itself. The language of injustice was a way of achieving these goals without having to reveal how they were being achieved. But that was not the only goal; indeed, the timing of events shows a very clear link to the short-term goal of preventing popular anti-regime mobilization in Serbia.

The image of ethnic injustice was given the highest priority, and was portrayed as most egregious, between elections. This prevented opposition elites from criticizing the regime's long-term strategy; but more importantly, it prevented an exclusive focus on non-ethnic issues. It limited the agenda, and indeed marginalized other important issues, issues that could have served to mobilize the population against the regime. In effect, conflict and images of injustice were used not to mobilize the wider population, in the sense of getting their active support, but rather in order to prevent popular mobilization against the regime. This strategy of ethnic conflict thus seems to have been one of demobilization, in that it kept opposition elites from organizing anti-regime mobilizations, and it limited the ability of popular discontent to manifest itself in organized behavior.

Violent conflict along ethnic cleavages was thus not a natural outgrowth of ethnic differences, nor was it a natural step in the process of political mobilization along ethnic lines. Indeed, the limits of ethnic mobilization are particularly clear in this case. Rather, it was part of a strategy which constructs political discourse, and thus frames political action, in terms of egregious injustices along ethnic lines. Its main goal thus seems to have been to demobilize political opposition which in the absence of this image of threat would have been able to mobilize the wider population against the regime on the basis of other issues. In short, the existing structure of power faced severe and serious threats from challenger elites. The issues around which challengers sought to mobilize could not be opposed directly by the regime. Instead, the regime bought time to reposition itself by creating an image of threat and injustice, not in order to mobilize the population, but rather to silence them, to prevent challenger elites from using other issues. This time, in turn, was used by the regime to reconsolidate its control over the structures of domestic power, to reposition itself structurally so that it could survive in new domestic and international conditions that had been militating for radical changes in the domestic arena. And while this is certainly so in the case of Serbia, it seems quite likely that similar dynamics are at work in other cases of "ethnic conflict" as well.

Footnotes

Note 1: Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 348. Back.

Note 2: See Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), p. 97. Back.

Note 3: For the ethnic mobilization argument, see Horowitz, Ethnic Groups; Milton Esman, Ethnic Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). In IR literature see for example Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival, vol.35, no.1 (Spring 1993), pp.27-47; Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security, vol.18, no.4 (Spring 1994), pp.5-39; Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State," Survival, vol.35, no.1 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-26; and Snyder, "The New Nationalism: Realist Interpretations and Beyond," in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.179-200 Back.

Note 4: For more detailed background on Serbia in this period, and its involvement in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, see V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnicity and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security, vol.19, no.3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 130-166. Back.

Note 5: The province of Kosovo was put under virtual military occupation by Yugoslav and Serbian military and police. But what is significant is the almost total lack of violent conflict in Kosovo between ethnic Albanians and Serbs on an individual level. (For statistics on the extremely low-level of inter-ethnic violence in Kosovo see report of the independent commission, Srdja Popovi_, et al., Kosovski _vor: drešiti ili se_i?, Belgrade: Khronos, 1990) There was also a complete lack of organized, sustained violence along these lines. And the "mobilizations" of Serbs that took place in the early to mid-1980s were organized by the Serbian regime, secret police and their allies among nationalist intellectuals (see Ivan Stamboli_, Put u Bespu_e (Belgrade: Radio B92, 1995), pp.168-181). Back.

Note 6: Of course similar arguments were made in the other Yugoslav republics, where the injustice of cultural suppression was blamed on the central authorities which were identified with Serbia. Back.

Note 7: For example see Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Back.

Note 8: In fact, however, by 1986 agreement had been reached between the moderate then-president of Serbia Ivan Stamboli_ and a new generation of Kosovo leaders; by this time inter-ethnic incidents of conflict had also dropped to near zero. Yet the rhetoric and provocation of conflict by allies of the Serbian regime and Serbian nationalists actually escalated at this point. See Stamboli_, Put u Bespu_e, pp.168-200. Back.

Note 9: For description of this kind of official propaganda before 1990, see Predrag Taši_, Kako je ubijena druga Jugoslavija (Skoplje, 1994). Back.

Note 10: On the activities in Croatia of Serbian guerilla groups cooperating with the Yugoslav army, see for example, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina (New York: Helsinki Watch, 1992), pp. 230-309. For confirmation from officials who were in the top Serbian leadership at the time as to official Serbia's desire to provoke war in Croatia in this period, see Borisav Jovi_, Poslednji dani SFRJ (Belgrade: Politika, 1995); Veljko Kadijevi_, Moje Vidjenje Raspada: Vojska bez Dr_ave (Belgrade: Politika, 1993). For confirmation from guerrilla group's leaders, see Vojislav Šešelj, leader of the so-called "Chetniks", in BBC documentary "Death of Yugoslavia." Although Tudjman and some within the HDZ certainly also wanted to provoke war and undertook policies that were designed to frighten Croatia's Serbs, others in the ruling Croatian party were seeking honest compromises, which in turn were accepted by moderates among Croatian Serbs. For this view, see interview with Vojislav Vuk_evi_, former head of SDS for the Baranja region of Croatia, "Vlak _e pro_i kroz Knin," Srpska Re_, no.104 (August 15, 1994), pp.23-29. In any case, regardless of HDZ intentions, what is clear is that Belgrade instrumentalized the fears and concerns of Croatian Serbs, exacerbating the situation rather than attempting to resolve these issues. Back.

Note 11: For a summation of the official propaganda along this line, see Miroljub Jevti_, Od Islamske Deklaracije do Verskog Rata u BiH (Belgrade: Filip Višnji_, 1993). Jevti_ is a self-proclaimed "expert" on Islam who has been very prominent in official Serbian propaganda about the war in Bosnia. Back.

Note 12: See for example speech by Dobrica _osi_, then-president of rump-Yugoslavia and one of the intellectual godfathers of the drive for a "Greater Serbia", in Review of International Affairs, no.1005-1006 (1992), p.4. Back.

Note 13: Miloševi_, speech at Kosovo Polje, 17 Dec 92 Tanjug (FBIS-EEU-92-244, 18 December 92, p. 38). Such denials have continued to mark official Serbian reactions to reports of massacres of non-Serb civilians, for example in Serb reports on Western coverage of the massacre of thousands of civilian men after the eastern Bosnian enclave of Srebrenica fell to Bosnian Serb forces in the summer of 1995. Back.

Note 14: As one respected polling institution noted about the influence of television within Serbia, "Television ... has very great influence on public opinion even thought its credibility is widely challenged." Vreme, 16 Nov 92, pp. 26-28, "TV's influence on the ghostly voters," Dr. Miladin Kova_evi_ and Srdjan Bogosavljevi_. On how Serbian television managed to gain credibility, see Biljana Baki_ (Masters thesis, University of Pittsburgh, Dept. of Anthropology, Spring 1994). Back.

Note 15: This kind of outrage on the part of Americans was what kept United States policy in the region relatively sympathetic to the cause of the Bosnian Muslims. Back.

Note 16: Indeed, while critical of Marxist approaches that made class the one "real" determinant of interest and discounted "ethnicity" as false consciousness, some of the literature on ethnicity in fact turns Marx on its head by positing that "ethnicity" is in fact the one real or primordial identification that motivates people with other interests, including class, being of less significance. See for example Esman, Ethnic Politics. Back.

Note 17: Part of this affinity would in fact be related to language; although a Croat doctor from Zagreb and a Serb lawyer from Belgrade may speak in slightly different ways, they would speak standard versions of their languages, as opposed to the "substandard" dialect of rural populations. As Pierre Bourdieu points out, the social importance of language goes well beyond "ethnic" aspects of it, and takes in social status, social position, and gender. This apparently "cross-ethnic" affinity is probably even reinforced by these non-ethnic aspects of language. Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 90-102. Back.

Note 18: Due to its previous use of Serbian nationalist issues, the regime had alienated most of the 33 percent of Serbia's population that was not Serb. It would therefore have to win the votes of about 60 percent of the Serb population of Serbia to win 40 percent of the total vote, enough to win a majority in parliament (due to the first-past-the post system.) Back.

Note 19: "Glasali ste, gladujte," Vreme, January 6, 1992, pp. 12-13. Back.

Note 20: Indeed, Miloševi_ declared, in response to the SPO's references to Serbian history, that "the past can't resolve the problems of the present," and "the past should be left to history." Speech in Niš, November 21, 1990, in Politika, November 22, 1990, pp. 1,2. For other examples see his speeches at Bor, November 1, and in Kragujevac November 27. Back.

Note 21: Vreme, January 6, 1992, p. 13. Back.

Note 22: See for example "Kompromis i ustupci korak ka rešenju," Borba, June 7, 1991, pp. 1,3. Back.

Note 23: On this see Mirjana Proši_-Dvorni_, "Enough! Student Protest '92: The Youth of Belgrade in Quest of 'Another Serbia,'" The Anthropology of East Europe Review, vol. 11, nos. 1-2 (Spring-Fall 1993), pp. 127-137. Back.

Note 24: These moves were also aimed at the international community, which was debating the imposition of economic sanctions against Serbia for its involvement in the Bosnian war. Back.

Note 25: Nenad Lj. Stefanovi_, "Spaljivanje TV-veštica," Vreme, March 21, 1994, p. 16. Back.

Note 26: See for example following speeches by Miloševi_: 8 Dec 92, at campaign rally in Srem, Belgrade radio (FBEE-92-238, 10 Dec 92, pp. 44-45); talk to businessmen 14 Dec 92, Belgrade TV (FBEE-92-241, 15 Dec 92, pp. 50-52); Back.

Note 27: For example, see interview with Serbian prime minister (and SPS member) Bo_ovi_, in Novi Sad daily Dnevnik, reported by Tanjug, 12 December 1992, (FBIS-EEU-92-240, 14 Dec 91, p. 73-74). Back.

Note 28: See, for example, series of Miloševi_ speeches in Kosovo, 17 Dec 92 in Tanjug (FBEE-92-244, 18 Dec 92, pp. 38-39). Back.

Note 29: See interviews with Draškovi_ in Vreme, November 4, 1991, pp. 9-11, and Danas, February 18, 1992. Back.

Note 30: On the issues of draft avoidance and desertion from the front by Serbs, see Dragan Todorovi_, "To nije njihova kolubarska bitka," Vreme, October 7, 1991, pp.24-26; Milan Miloševi_, "Marš preko Drine," Vreme, Octoerber 7, 1991, pp. 20-22; Ivan Torov, "Tko je izdao," Danas, October 1, 1991, pp.32-33. Back.

Note 31: Although the prewar population of Serbian republic was only about 68 percent Serb, the 13 percent of the population which is ethnically Albanian and which is concentrated in the province of Kosovo is boycotting all political participation, and the Serbian population of the republic has been augmented by Serb refugees from Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. The figure 80 percent is a rough estimate of the proportion of Serbs among the non-Albanian part of the electorate (without refugees the figure would be 78 percent). In this paper, figures relating to "the Serbian electorate" therefore should be taken as meaning the non-Albanian part of that electorate. Back.

Note 32: Results in Review of International Affairs, no. 1005-6 (June 1-July 1, 1992), pp. 30-31. Back.

Note 33: For example in his first speech as prime minister in July 1992 Pani_ called for demilitarizing Bosnia-Hercegovina, declared that "there simply is no idea in this world which would be worth killing for at the end of the 20th century," stated as a priority the restoration of cooperation and trust between the new, Serbian Yugoslavia and the other former Yugoslav republics, and put most emphasis on the need for radical economic reform and true democratization. Review of International Affairs, no. 1005-6, pp. 4-6. Back.

Note 34: Poll by Institute of Social Sciences, cited in NIN, 27 November 92, Bogdan Ivanisevi_, "Our Topic: Opposition against itself: running for the arrow," pp. 10-12 (FBIS-EEU-92-243, 17 Dec 92, pp. 45-48). Back.

Note 35: For election result figures, see Milan Miloševi_, "Maratonci tr_e po_asni krug," Vreme, December 27, 1993, pp. 10-14. Back.

Note 36: The democratic opposition bloc (DEPOS), headed by the SPO, stressed the economic, social and national crisis within Serbia, emphasized the need for peace with Muslims in Bosnia and peaceful coexistence; its campaign slogan was "So that we can live like the rest of the normal world." DEPOS's campaign literature also appealed to those who "don't want war, sanctions, hunger and ... having as your greatest happiness a visa to leave Serbia." See campaign ad in Vreme, December 13, 1993. DEPOS and the other democratically-oriented opposition parties received about 35 percent of the total vote. The one real opposition party that attempted to exploit the national question in a strategy of ethnic outbidding, the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), received only 5 percent of votes cast. Back.

Note 37: Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict." Back.

Note 38: Thus Miloševi_'s vehement denials of ethnic cleansing by Serbian forces in Bosnia. Anecdotal evidence also seems to bear this out, for example, a number of reports of Serbian soldiers who were very disillusioned when they saw that the conditions in Croatia and Bosnia in no way corresponded to Belgrade television images. (See for example AP report from Belgrade March 9, 1994 on Serbian soldier who had been in Bosnia.) In neighboring Bulgaria, public awareness of atrocities committed by the ruling communists against the Turkish minority seems to have been the major reason why, in multiparty elections in 1990, the Socialist (formerly communist) Party was so unsuccessful in using ethnic issues to mobilize voters. (personal communication with advisor to Bulgarian president Zhelev, June 1993). Back.

Note 39: The result was a sharp decline in popular support for the HDZ, and especially for those people in the HDZ who were most extreme on the question of Croat- Muslim relations in Bosnia. Croatia's ruling HDZ has also consistently denied that Croat forces in Bosnia committed any atrocities, pointing instead to atrocities allegedly committed by Muslim forces. Similarly, during the invasion of Krajina in the summer of 1995, the Croatian official media vehemently denied that any atrocities against Serbs had been committed, pointing instead to how well the local Serbs who stayed had been treated by Croatian police. Back.