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Email this citationCIAO DATE: 10/00
Rituals of Reconciliation: Arab-Islamic Perspectives
George E. Irani * and Nathan C. Funk **
August 2000
Introduction
Over the past ten years, many Middle Eastern scholars and practitioners trained in the United States of America have returned to their countries of origin ready to impart what they have learned about Western conflict resolution techniques. Because the teaching and practice of conflict resolution is a novel phenomenon in Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and other countries of the Middle East, their testimony has often been greeted with distrust. Many view conflict resolution as a false Western panacea—as yet another program imposed from outside and therefore insensitive to indigenous problems, needs, and political processes. Indeed, some people in the Middle East view conflict resolution as a scheme concocted by the United States meant primarily to facilitate and hasten the processes of peace and "normalization" between Israel and its Arab neighbors. 1
In assessing the applicability of Western-based conflict resolution models in non-Western contexts such as the Arab-Islamic culture area, theoreticians and practitioners alike have begun to recognize the importance of sensitivity to indigenous ways of thinking and feeling, as well as to local rituals for managing, reducing, and resolving conflicts. Moved by a newfound awareness of culture, they have begun to recognize that giving weight to unique patterns of perception and practice will help them to identify preexisting resources for dealing with conflict as well as culturally competent prescriptions for peacemaking in the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian impasse and other regional conflicts.
It is not controversial to point out that, thus far, the Middle East peace process has been a rather superficial phenomenon. Diplomatic agreements have not "trickled down" to the grassroots, where peacemaking has commonly been linked to capitulation or "pacification." 2
Peace treaties dependent upon economic and political enticements, coercion, expediency, and purely strategic considerations cannot last if they are not accompanied by a sincere and profound exploration of underlying, emotional legacies of fear, hatred, sorrow, and mistrust resulting from decades of warfare and recurrent cycles of victimization and vengeance.
Policymakers in the United States of America and in Europe must understand that the Camp David Accords (1978) and the Oslo Treaty (1991) between Palestinians and Israelis are only the diplomatic surface of peace. Since the signing of the Camp David Accords, numerous books and studies have assessed the diplomatic process between Israel and Egypt, drawing pertinent lessons for policymakers and potential peacemakers. 3
The major drawback in this peace process, however, is that it has not trickled down to the Egyptian and Israeli grassroots constituencies. Interactions between Egyptian and Israeli citizens have been sparse and controversial. While large numbers of Israelis have traveled to Egypt as tourists, very few Egyptians have ventured into Israel. 4
The situation is not better following the 1994 peace treaty between the Kingdom of Jordan and the Jewish state. So far, very few Jordanians have visited Israel.
While scholarly and especially popular literature on the Middle East provides detailed documentation of the Israeli existential condition and its links to various policies pursued by the Israeli government, there remains a profound need to fathom the deep cultural, social, and religious roots that underlie the way Arabs behave when it comes to conflict reduction and reconciliation. Just as Israeli reticence to concede occupied territory has been related to a combination of security fears, Zionist ambitions, efforts to control natural resources, and persisting psychological traumas from the Holocaust, the reluctance of many Arabs to embrace American peace proposals must also be related to historically rooted hopes, fears, frustrations, grievances, and needs for empowerment and dignity.
In efforts to bring peace to the Middle East, Western policymakers might benefit from fostering and encouraging a dialogue that takes into consideration indigenous rituals and processes of reconciliation. Peace can be neither achieved nor sustained until the process leading to it becomes both deep and broad. On the one hand, opposing parties must explore the psychological roots of their conflict. On the other hand, broader cross-sections of societies must be empowered to participate through forms of interaction that are both culturally legitimate and symbolically powerful.
The purpose of this study is to explore limitations of Western conflict resolution approaches when presented in non-Western contexts, highlight the continuing vitality of Arab-Islamic rituals of reconciliation, and identify ways in which the United States and other would-be mediators might benefit from a serious appraisal of such rituals. To counteract Arab-Islamic experiences of disempowerment and temper the power-political undertones of the peace process, mediators might consciously integrate some of the principles and symbolic practices inherent in indigenous Middle Eastern reconciliation methodologies. Rituals such as sulh (settlement) and musalaha(reconciliation) exemplify key Arab-Islamic cultural values, and should be looked at — both figuratively and to some extent literally—for insight into how to approach conflict resolution in the Middle East.
Conflict and Conflict Resolution: Assessing the Applicability of Western Approaches
Western Assumptions and Techniques: Although conflict is a human universal, the nature of conflicts and the methods of resolving conflict differ from one socio-cultural context to another. For instance, in contemporary North American and Northern European contexts, conflict is commonly perceived to inhere between two or more individuals acting as individuals —i.e., as free agents pursuing their own interests in various domains of life. Conflict is accepted as a natural concomitant of self-interest and competition which, when subject to an optimal amount of regulation by carefully designed institutions, keeps societies dynamic, energetic, and strong. While the prevailing views of conflict between groups as promulgated by such disciplines as international relations are less sanguine, the Western view of conflict as natural and, in principle, "solvable" has led many proponents of conflict resolution to identify random as well as organized violence as symptoms of a need for social and structural change. While conflict can lead to separation, hostility, civil strife, terrorism and war, it can also stimulate dialogue, fairer and more socially just solutions. It can lead to stronger relationships and peace.
The basic assumption made by Western conflict resolution theorists is that conflict can and should be fully resolved. This philosophy whereby virtually every conflict can be managed or resolved clashes with other cultural approaches to conflict. Many cultures, and not only Arab-Islamic culture, take the less optimistic view that many conflicts, regardless of their nature, may be intractable. 5
They can evolve through phases of escalation and confrontation as well as phases of calm and a return to the status quo ante. Far from implying mere passivity in the face of conflict, such views are often associated with efforts to deal with incipient conflict quietly and indirectly, to mobilize social networks to control and reduce violence, and even to strive for comprehensive reconciliation when circumstances appear propitious.
According to US-based scholars of conflict resolution, conflict erupts either because of different interpretations regarding data, issues, values, interests and relationships 6 or because of unsatisfied human needs. 7 Such scholars view conflict as having a positive as well as a negative dimension. It acts as a catharsis for social tensions, helps redefine relationships between individuals, groups, and nations, and makes it easier to find adequate settlements or possible resolutions. During the last ten years, however, more and more voices within the field of conflict resolution have been calling attention to the centrality of deep psychological dynamics that sustain and reproduce conflict. In response, they have affirmed the importance of acknowledgment and forgiveness in achieving lasting reconciliation among conflicting parties. According to this argument, many of the world's most intractable conflicts involve age-old cycles of oppression, victimization and revenge. These conflicts, which can have dangerous and long-lasting political repercussions, are rooted in a psychological dynamic of victimization. 8 Racism and "ethnic cleansing" are only the most dramatic manifestations of such cycles of victimization and vengeance.
From a psychoanalytic standpoint, conflict management and resolution efforts must help individuals or groups embroiled in conflict to acknowledge one another's psychological concerns and needs so that they will be able to overcome their historic sense of victimization. Advocates of this position argue that acts of individual as well as inter-group violence manifest out of unhealed wounds and deep feelings of persecution. The non-fulfillment of needs for identity, security, development, and meaning, exacerbated by acute feelings of victimization, inevitably leads to conflict and may eventually lead to war. A first step in the process of healing, then, is the mutual acknowledgment by all parties of their emotions, viewpoints and needs. Thus, the first and most crucial skill which conflicting parties must develop is that of actively listening to each other.
In the field of conflict resolution, communication skills are fundamental. In many if not most conflicts, the art of listening is drowned out by arguments and the never-ending struggle to get one's own point across first. The opposite of listening is not ignoring; rather, it is preparing to respond. Active listening is a method that ensures that the whole meaning of what was said is understood. Mediators are trained to listen carefully to all parties involved in a dispute and encourage them to develop their own communication skills. Mediators confront two basic tasks: First, they have to encourage people to communicate clearly and negotiate in such a way that there is an equitable outcome. Second, they have to be unbiased and "neutral," placing the expertise and power of decision-making in the hands of the conflicting individuals or groups themselves. Conflict resolution specialists often affirm "interest-based" negotiation as the best approach for parties to conflict, who are encouraged to focus on long-term interests rather than on tactical positions or short-term gains, and to engage in cooperative problem solving rather than hard or soft bargaining. 9
Although individuals from non-Western cultures often consider Western assumptions about conflict and conflict resolution provocative, they may also find them difficult to accept and apply in their own circumstances. First of all, non-Western students of conflict resolution are likely to be highly sensitive to the general lack of correspondence between the principles and practices espoused by Western conflict resolution professionals and the actual conduct of Western nation-states (primarily the United States) in the international system. If Western conflict resolution specialists are unable or unwilling to diagnose and critique the actual conflict behaviors of their home countries, their message may not be regarded as credible, particularly in societies that have recently experienced fragmentation and violence. Second, there are genuine cultural barriers to the widespread diffusion of Western assumptions about conflict and conflict resolution in non-Western contexts. The reflections of participants at a recent Lebanese conference on are illustrative.
Debating Reconciliation in Lebanon
In April 1994, as a contribution to the ongoing efforts at intercommunal reconciliation in post-war Lebanon, the Lebanese American University assembled on its Byblos campus a group of government officials, NGO activists, students, and lawyers, for a three-day conference entitled "Acknowledgment, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation: Alternative Approaches to Conflict Resolution in Post-War Lebanon." 10
The conference focused primarily on the psychological and interpersonal aspects of the Lebanese War, especially the politics of identity and the vicious circle of victimization and vengeance that fueled the long conflict. Conference participants were initially uncomfortable with and suspicious of the theory and techniques of Western conflict resolution, and mixed feelings were expressed about the applicability of conflict resolution in the Lebanese social context. Noting that conflict resolution theory was initially forged in labor management relations in the United States and that later it was applied to business and then to community relations and academia, a Christian banker who was educated in the United States raised an important methodological question: "How can a theory which is supposed to be dealing with definite, programmed, institutionalized relationships deal with the unprogrammed, informal, and random relationships characteristic of social and political contexts in a totally different society?" A Muslim academic and social activist declared "conflict management" a better concept than conflict resolution, because "it is impossible completely to solve conflicts; the existence of conflicts goes together with human existence." He raised the related point that conflicts cannot be isolated from one another for problem solving. They are often interrelated, and the resolution of one conflict may be contingent upon the resolution of other conflicts. "The crisis of Lebanon and the Middle East are the best proof of what I am saying," he concluded. 11
In addition to prompting the articulation of reservations about approaches to conflict resolution rooted in communication skills and interest-based negotiation, the conference also stimulated reflection on distinctive aspects of Lebanese culture. The National Director of the Young Women's Christian Association-Lebanon (YWCA) commented that the American form of "active listening" might seem artificial in Lebanon. When Lebanese individuals are engaged in "heart-to-heart" conversations, she observed, they often interrupt each other with expressions of empathy and support. "It is not like interrupting rudely. The process of the discussion shows our concern because we are a very emotional people. That is the problem: we usually talk all together. We are active talkers and active listeners!" Other participants raised further questions about the active listening technique, particularly when employed in cases of intense argumentation. In Lebanon, remaining silent when another person is talking is sometimes interpreted as meek acquiescence or agreement. A government representative from the Ministry of Education stated that "in the rural areas of Lebanon, if you do not talk, it means you are dull; the more you talk, the more it is assumed you know. People want to show that they know, especially those who go to town and come back to the village. They always talk."
Participants went on to address the key role of third parties or mediators in disputes. In Lebanese culture, as in Arab culture more generally, the mediator is perceived not as a mere facilitator, but rather as someone who has all the answers and solutions; he therefore has a great deal of power and corresponding responsibility. As one participant put it: "If [the third party] does not provide the answers, he or she is not really respected or considered to be legitimate." 12 Interestingly enough, a number of conference participants expressed this same expectation directly to the conference organizers and facilitators, from whom they requested ready-made proposals for ending Lebanon's woes.
Such Lebanese expectations for mediators and facilitators are not surprising to those who understand the country's culture and politics. For several centuries, political processes in Lebanon have been repeatedly penetrated by outside powers, either to foment strife or to impose solutions. Having habituated themselves to external interference and control, many Lebanese leaders and political thinkers have come rely on outsiders to such an extent that they no longer accept responsibility for the Lebanese actions and behaviors that brought the country to its current state. At a more immediate level, many ordinary Lebanese citizens have attempted to forget about the past and get on with their lives, even if the wounds and consequences of war are still very much alive in the collective and individual Lebanese psyches. Denial seems to be the defense mechanism of choice for many traumatized Lebanese in the wake of the long and damaging war; such behavior is not unique to the Lebanese situation.
Victimization was one concept to which most of the conference participants could relate. While participants differed in their assessments of the viability of acknowledgment and forgiveness as solutions to victimization, they readily explored the types of psychological scars that have sustained Lebanon's conflict. A Lebanese woman educator, for example, acknowledged the value of the victimization-acknowledgment approach but also noted that the post-war fragmentation of Lebanese society makes reconciliation difficult. She pointed out the paradox that Lebanon is a "very individualistic society, but unfortunately, we do not have 'individuals.'" She went on to explain that "in order to have conflict management or conflict resolution, you have to recognize the 'other.' But, you do not have the 'other' if you do not have the 'individual.' That is why there is no reconciliation, forgiveness, and conflict resolution [in Lebanon]. The existence of the 'individual' is essential in this process." This trenchant observation neatly summarizes the condition of post-war Lebanon. Rather than a cohesive group of individuals bound together by an agreed-upon set of rights and obligations (i.e., citizens), the Lebanese instead comprise an agglomeration of competing communities, each of which requires absolute allegiance and obedience from its members. Every one of these communities feels that the others have victimized it, so that any process of acknowledgment, forgiveness, and reconciliation will have to begin at the communal level, with the active participation of important group leaders, rather than at the individual level.
Of the many reactions elicited by new and challenging concepts of conflict resolution, a particularly poignant reaction came from a Lebanese woman whose husband was "disappeared" during the war and who founded the Committee of Families of Kidnapped People. Commenting on what she perceived as an incompatibility between the rights of victims and the process of interest-based negotiations, she asked how it might be possible for ordinary people to counter power imbalances, such as the asymmetries between the people of south Lebanon and Israeli occupiers, and between the families of 17,000 kidnapped Lebanese and those individuals responsible for the disappearance of loved ones. "These [disempowered] people," she proclaimed, "have to stop being victims and maybe they even have to fight not to be victimized.... How can we reach a solution if I have a right and he [the perpetrator] has an interest?"
Finally, many Lebanese participants at the conference raised the issue of government accountability for crimes committed during the Lebanese War. In the case of Lebanon, the state's apparatus was noticeably absent during the long civil war. Thus, the central government and its institutions bear little, if any, direct responsibility for the atrocities committed between 1975 and 1990. Instituting war tribunals or truth and justice commissions in post-war Lebanon without some form of external, third-party intervention would undoubtedly be perceived as an affront by one community against another.
Communal Conflict Resolution: Traditional Arab-Islamic Approaches
The Social and Cultural Context
As the reactions of Lebanese conference participants demonstrate, efforts to facilitate conflict management and resolution in areas affected by protracted inter-group conflict must address not only the psychological trauma of suffering and loss, but also the distinctive cultural setting in which endeavors to ameliorate conflict must take root. That is, conflict management and resolution activities must be culturally competent. In the Middle East, indigenous as well as non-indigenous peacemakers need to draw upon local cultural resources and harmonize their practices with Arab-Islamic culture and relevant subcultures.
Despite the rapid social and cultural changes wrought by modernization, the emergence of nationalism, and state structures in the Middle East, the cultural profiles of Arab-Islamic societies still differ profoundly from those of Western societies. Although pastoral nomadism has declined rapidly in relation to village- and city- based modes of social life, nomadic peoples and their traditions have nonetheless left a deep imprint on Middle Eastern culture, society, and politics. 13 Urban professional classes have indeed emerged, yet the peoples of the Middle East have not yet disposed of loyal attachment to families and distinctive rituals of hospitality and conflict mediation. Nor have they dispensed with their flexible and effective kin-based collectivities, such as the lineage and the tribe, which until quite recently performed most of the social, economic, and political functions of communities in the absence of centralized state governments. 14 Even today, the institutions of the state do not always penetrate deeply into society, and "private" justice is often administered through informal networks in which local political and/or religious leaders determine the outcome of feuds between clans or conflicts between individuals. Communal religious and ethnic identity remain strong forces in social life, as do patron-client relationships and patterns of patriarchal authority. 15 Group solidarity, traditional religious precepts, and norms concerning honor and shame retain their place alongside exhortations of service to the nation and the newer values of intellectuals intent on profound social change.
In Arab-Islamic societies, Western techniques of conflict management and resolution are learned and adopted by urban professional groups such as businessmen or businesswomen, bankers, and engineers. For most people, however, conflict control and reduction are handled either by state-controlled courts or by traditional means. In this context, one of the basic criticisms launched against Western conflict resolution techniques is that they are either too mechanistic or based on therapy-oriented formulas that do not correspond with the idiom of daily life. Although some professionals find Western techniques and skills relevant and useful within the context of their own pursuits and activities, they also recognize a need to adapt these methods to indigenous cultural realities.
In Lebanon, for example, the majority of social workers are women. They are trained in Lebanon's major academic institutions: the state-controlled Lebanese University and the Jesuit-controlled Universite Saint-Joseph. Once their degree is completed, most of these graduating social workers confront the realities of Lebanese society. At a series of workshops in conflict resolution skills, geared to social workers in Islamic NGOs involved in education and family welfare, several problems emerged. In conflicts involving couples, social workers were usually approached by battered wives; husbands usually refused to deal with the social worker. The path to resolution thus went through local religious figures or the political zaim (leader), not through the social worker. 16 Child custody was another issue facing social workers attempting to mediate conflicts. In Middle Eastern societies, in the case of divorce, children are kept in the custody of the father. In some instances mothers try to keep their children, and young ones become hostages in a two-way conflict that pits their father's family against their mother.
These examples highlight the predicament of applying Western modes of conflict control and reduction in communally-based societies where patriarchal authority is predominant. This problematic is related to the basic reality that Arab states do not have "citizens" in the ideal Western meaning of individuals bound to one another and the state by an agreed-upon interlocking system of rights and duties. What they have instead are individuals belonging to communities and abiding by their rules and rituals. This does not exclude the fact that many young professionals and educated men and women aspire to establish more secular societies that accentuate individual rights and responsibilities within a context of state accountability.
In large Arab cities, individuals involved in conflicts are more likely than are villagers to resort to the official legal system to settle their disputes. The legal system, however, is clogged and corruption is pervasive. Moreover, the interpretation of the rule of law in sectarian-based societies or societies based on other forms of group solidarity has a different meaning. The law is usually that of the powerful and the wealthy (politicians, clergy, and associated influential people) or heads of village clans or Bedouin tribes. 17 The rule of law also has to confront the pervasive and powerful influence of patronage and its strong emphasis on asymmetrical power relationships. For example, an individual who has committed a crime can face both the legal justice system and the tribal mode of conflict control and reduction.
This situation underlines the importance of studying closely modes of reconciliation and conflict control in an Arab-Islamic environment. As a corollary to this study, the observer interested in conflict control and reduction in non-Western societies has to look into the rituals that inform individual and community behavior following a crime or any other illegal action.
The Role of Rituals
In his entry on Ritual in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, the prominent British anthropologist, Edmund R. Leach writes that "citations in the Oxford English Dictionary from the fourteenth century on reveal two distinct trends of common usage for the words rite (ritual), ceremony (ceremonial), and custom (customary). On the one hand, these terms have been used interchangeably to denote any non-instinctive predictable action or series of actions that cannot be justified by a 'rational' means-to-ends type of explanation." Leach goes on to write that there is a close connection between rituals and communicative behavior. "Human actions can serve to do things, that is, alter the physical state of the world (as in lighting a bonfire), or they can serve to say things.... Almost every human action that takes place in culturally defined surroundings is divisible in this way; it has a technical aspect which does something and an aesthetic, communicative aspect which says something." 18 Rituals, then, play an important role in human behavior, especially in efforts to control, reduce, and resolve conflict.
Anthony Giddens, the famous British sociologist, remarks that rituals are crucial both to the individual's emotional well-being and to communal harmony and social integration. He writes that:
Without ordered ritual and collective involvement, individuals are left without structured ways of coping with tensions and anxieties....Communal rites provide a focus for group solidarity at major transitions...[while] allocating definite tasks for those involved....Something profound is lost together with traditional forms of ritual....Traditional ritual...connected individual action to moral frameworks and to elemental questions about human existence. The loss of ritual is also the loss of such frameworks. 19
This very important observation brings to the fore a malaise in Western society, where the pursuit of progress as a maximization of personal choice and individual consumption has led to anomie and atomistic modes of living that undermine community and relegate customs and rituals to the trash heap of pre-modern, non-rational history. Despite some of the gains derived from modern technology and institutions that attempt to guarantee civil and political rights, individuals have all too often been left to fend for themselves. In conflicts, individuals in Western societies have recourse to an attorney or a therapist. 20 When nuclear families fragment under the competitive pressures and ubiquitous distractions of post-industrial life, individuals risk falling into alienation, despair, addiction, and violence.
Recognizing the Traditional Arab-Islamic Process
In the late 1960s and in the 1970s, a group of anthropologists (Cathy Witty, Richard Antoun, Laura Nader, Michael Gilsenan and others) published path-breaking studies assessing mediation processes and village politics in countries such as Jordan and Lebanon. 21 Since then, other scholars have emphasized the continuing role of traditional approaches to conflict management and resolution in Arab-Islamic culture. 22 The findings of these studies are provocative, and point to a number of significant contrasts between established Western approaches to facilitation and mediation and comparable Arab-Islamic approaches (see Table 1) . Whereas Western proponents of conflict resolution underscore the primacy of individual choices in facilitated settlement processes, the traditional Arab-Islamic approach is communally oriented. Individuals are considered to be enmeshed in webs of relationships that must be preserved; the preservation of social harmony and the building of consensus sometimes require individual sacrifices. Where Western practitioners of mediation are expected to be formally certified professionals who provide their services as neutral, unaffiliated outsiders, the preferred "third party" in the Arab-Islamic approach is an unbiased insider with ongoing connections to the major disputants as well as a strong sense of the common good and standing within the community (e.g., age, experience, status, leadership). Where the Western approach to mediated conflict resolution is framed by provisions of the state's legal system but generally leaves responsibility for the settlement to the actual participants, the Arab-Islamic approach is legitimated and guaranteed by communal leaders and village elders (who comprise a team referred to as the jaha), who facilitate a process of acknowledgment, apology, compensation, forgiveness, and reconciliation.
While the Western third party relies on a secular idiom, guidelines from a specialized field, and personal experience, the Arab-Islamic process depends on explicit references to religious ideals, sacred texts, stories, and moral exemplars, as well as to local history and custom. The goals of the Western process are pragmatic, and are directed toward the possibility of a "win-win" scenario that will enable disputants to forget the past and move on. In contrast, the goals of the Arab-Islamic process manifest concern for preserving and cultivating the established "wisdom" of the community. The process is therefore continuity-oriented; history is regarded as a source of stability and guidance that provides lessons for shaping a common future. While the Western approach aims to empower individuals to solve their own problems without subjecting themselves to the inconveniences and the adversarialism of the legal system, the Arab-Islamic approach is intended to empower families and the community to participate in matters of common concern.
The Western and Arab-Islamic processes also differ in their relative emphases on the instrumental and relational dimensions of mediation. The Western process encourages direct, step-by-step problem solving between disputants who ideally "separate the person from the problem" and work to satisfy various individual and shared interests and needs through a fair deal that is sealed by a formal, written agreement. In contrast, the Arab-Islamic process prioritizes relational issues, such as restoring harmony and solidarity and restoring the dignity and prestige of individuals and groups. Although magnanimous gestures of absolution are encouraged, the outcome of the process must nonetheless reflect standards of "rightness" and just compensation. Far more is at stake than the interests of individuals; disputing families and lineage groups solicit the intervention of prominent individuals to prevent the escalation of the conflict and the disruption of communal symbiosis. The process is therefore completed with a powerful ritual that seals a settlement and reconciliation with handshakes and a collective meal (see below).
"The Best of Judgments": Rituals of Settlement (Sulh) and Reconciliation (Musalaha)
In such Middle Eastern societies as Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine, rituals are used in "private" or unofficial processes of conflict control, reduction, and resolution. These unofficial, informal processes are not controlled by the state. Instead, customary, traditional steps are taken to restore justice and social harmony. Sometimes, both unofficial and official justice are invoked simultaneously in fostering social peace and reconciliation.
One of the most important unofficial responses to conflict in Middle Eastern societies is sulh (settlement) and musalaha (reconciliation), both of which are often referred to simply as " sulh." The Middle Eastern ritual of sulh (settlement) and musalaha (reconciliation) has its origins in tribal and village contexts. Though not universally legitimated by Middle Eastern states, communities continue to make recourse to the ritual as a means of controlling conflict and maintaining harmony within and between tightly knit social groups. In Lebanon, the judicial system does not include sulh as part of its conflict regulation process. Nonetheless, sulh rituals are approved and encouraged in rural areas where state control is not very strong. The ritual of sulh is today used in the rural areas of Lebanon, particularly in the Bekaa Valley, the Hermel area in eastern Lebanon, and the Akkar region of north Lebanon. In the Kingdom of Jordan, the ritual of sulh is officially recognized by the Jordanian government as an acceptable tradition of the Bedouin tribes. In Israel, the ritual of sulh is still in use among the Palestinian citizens living in the villages of Galilee.
As Laurie King-Irani has observed, the sulh ritual remains important as an indigenous response to conflict because it meets the needs of Middle Eastern communities in ways that nation-state institutions often cannot. "The sulh ritual," notes King-Irani, "stresses the close link between the psychological and political dimensions of communal life through its recognition that injuries between individuals and groups will fester and expand if not acknowledged, repaired, forgiven and transcended." 23 For this reason, the ritual is still used to achieve reconciliation following blood feuds, honor crimes, and cases of murder. 24
Sulh is an important term in both the vocabulary of Islamic law and the language of tribal custom. According to Islamic law ( shari'a), "the purpose of sulh is to end conflict and hostility among believers so that they may conduct their relationships in peace and amity....In Islamic law, sulh is a form of contract ( 'aqd), legally binding on both the individual and community levels." 25 For the Jordanian Bedouin tribes, sulh was the customary process of settlement and reconciliation. For the tribes sulh took on a special meaning evident in its definition as "the best of judgments." The word itself has been used to refer both to a ritualized process of restorative justice and peacemaking and to the actual outcome or condition sealed by that process.
According to Jordanian judge Abu-Hassan there are two types of sulh processes: public sulh and private sulh . 26 Public sulh is similar to a peace treaty between two countries in that its purpose is to "suspend fighting between [two parties] and establish peace, called muwada'a (peace or gentle relationship), for a specific period of time." 27 It usually takes place because of conflicts between two or more tribes that result in death and destruction affecting all the parties involved.
Given the severity of life conditions in the desert, competing tribes long ago realized that sulh is a better alternative than endless cycles of vengeance. When sulh is enacted, each tribe initiates a process of taking stock of its losses in human and material terms. A tribe with lesser losses compensates a tribe that suffered more. According to tradition, stringent conditions are to be set to settle the tribal conflict definitively. The most famous of these conditions is that the parties in conflict pledge to forget everything that happened and initiate new and friendly relations. The consequences and effects of public sulh apply whether those parties that perpetrated crimes are identified or unknown at the time of the sulh. 28
Private sulh takes place when both the crime and the guilty party are known. The family of the victim and the family of the offender may be of the same tribe or from different tribes. The purpose of private sulh is to achieve restorative justice and to make sure that revenge will not take place against the family of the perpetrator, leading to an escalation of conflict.
With respect to the outcome of the process, custom differentiates two types of results: total sulh and partial or conditional sulh. The former type ends all kinds of conflict between the two groups that have come into conflict, who thenceforth collectively resolve not to hold any grudges against each other. The latter type ends the conflict between the two parties according to conditions agreed upon during the settlement process. 29
The actual ritual of settlement and reconciliation follows a similar format in most of its usages. For example, in a case of murder, the family of the murderer will act quickly in order to thwart any attempt at blood revenge. First, family members will call for a truce ( hudna) and proceed to engage village elders and notables who possess sufficient status to qualify as muslihs, or mediators and conciliators. Each individual who accepts the plea of the perpetrator's family becomes a member of a delegation of mediators, usually called a jaha (those who have gained the esteem of the community). The delegation initiates a process of fact-finding and questioning of the parties who are in some way connected to the incident or related to the murderer and the victim. The task of the jaha is not to judge, condemn, or punish the offending party, "but rather, to preserve the good names of both the families involved and to reaffirm the necessity of ongoing relationships within the community. The sulh ritual is not a zero-sum game." 30 The ritual must satisfy the community's need for peace and stability, the needs of each family for dignity and security. The family of the victim must receive some compensation (even if largely symbolic), and the family of the perpetrator must preempt reprisals and, insofar as possible, save face.
Sometimes, a single murder may turn out to be linked to a sporadic blood feud with a long history. Many practitioners of sulh and musalaha deem such cases difficult to settle, but not insoluble. Where victim and perpetrator status are clear, of course, the task of settlement is usually easier. Provided that close relatives of the victim can be persuaded to overcome strong feelings of resentment and ignore pressure to show strength through retribution, a blood price is paid to the family. The payment usually involves an amount of money, diya, set by the mediators. This "blood money," or an exchange of goods (sometimes the exchange includes animals, food, etc.) may prove quite costly to the family of the perpetrator, but the symbolic significance of compensation is at least as important as the substance of the payment. The exchange of money or goods substitutes for the exchange of death; the family that forsakes revenge gains in standing, while the family of the murderer is humbled and indebted by this act of forbearance and magnanimity.
The ritual process of sulh does not end with a payment to the victim's family, which may on occasion refuse to accept material compensation and thereby further raise both its standing and the symbolic indebtedness of the perpetrator's family. The ritual usually ends in a public ceremony of musalaha (reconciliation) performed in the village square or some other public meeting place. First, in a public act of reconciliation, the families of both the victim and the guilty party line up on both sides of a road or path, exchange greetings, and accept apologies (which are due, in particular, to the more aggrieved party). Next, members of the two parties shake hands under the supervision of the muslihs or jaha. Often, the murderer must directly approach the family of the victim, in what amounts to a humbling act of atonement for the guilty party and a test of the ability of the victim's family to forgive. Following these public displays of reconciliation, the family of the murderer typically visits the home of the victim to drink a cup of bitter coffee. The ritual then concludes with a shared meal hosted by the family of the offender. The exact form of the ritual varies from Israel-Palestine to Lebanon and Jordan but the basic philosophy is based on sulh (settlement), musalaha (reconciliation), musafaha (hand-shaking), and mumalaha ("partaking of salt and bread," i.e., breaking bread together). 31
This sequence is represented in Table 2 .
It is important to recognize that the process of reconciliation is deeply laden with religious meanings and references to sacred texts and traditions. 32 Arab Christians and Druze as well as Muslims partake in rituals of sulh and musalaha, and the process itself closely parallels the prescriptions of the Qur'an, which regulates the extent of punishment (qisas) and retribution with the principle of equity and enjoins forgiveness in cases of apology and "remission." 33 The Qur'an is then a very important source to understand modes of conflict control and reconciliation in Arab-Islamic societies.
Implications for Practitioners and Policymakers
Arab-Islamic rituals of reconciliation are a non-Western, indigenous application of the process of acknowledgment, apology, compensation, forgiveness, and reconciliation. Through sulh and musalaha, a ritual of conflict control, reduction, and resolution takes place within a communal, not a one-on-one, framework. Here lies the importance of these rituals for conflict resolution practitioners as well as policymakers.
Though Western approaches to conflict resolution can play a constructive role in efforts to bring peace in the Middle East and other areas of the world beset by ethno-religious conflict, 34 indigenous cultural resources must not be overlooked by foreign mediators, local government officials, and non-Western professionals who are seeking to promote social change. If used creatively, traditional models for reconciliation can contribute directly to the collective empowerment of communities of citizens in coordination with religious leaders and local notables attached to particular communities and tribal groups. Such developments are essential if there is to be a chance to break cycles of violence and create movement toward visions of peace that incorporate elements of equity and reconciliation. The ritual of sulh and musalaha offers an example to follow and adapt.
TABLE 1
THE SULH PROCESS
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(1) An offense is committed, resulting in an injury, grievance or death. (2) To prevent retributive action, the family of the offender or attacker immediately seeks the help of local leaders, esteemed mediators, and "notables," who form a jaha (delegation) and prepare to investigate the case. (3) The jaha visits the family of the victim to hear grievances. The members of the jaha request full permission to intervene and arbitrate. (4) The aggrieved family agrees to renounce retaliation and comply with a truce ( hudna or 'atwa). This marks the formal beginning of the sulh ritual. (5) Following a period of mourning (perhaps forty days), the jaha makes arrangements for the payment of diya , a just and symbolic compensation (or "blood money") determined by the severity and unique demands of the case and by historical precedent. (6) The families gather for the ritual of musafaha, the shaking of hands. The offender must shake hands with each member of the victim's extended family. After this is completed, leaders tie knots in a white flag borne by the offender, symbolizing the consolidation of peace. (7) To demonstrate forgiveness and further musalaha (reconciliation), the family of the victim offers bitter coffee to the family of the offender. (8) The family of the offender serves a meal to the family of the victim. This breaking of bread together, referred to as mumalaha, completes the ritual of reconciliation. |
TABLE 2
| WESTERN/U.S.-BASED APPROACHES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION | TRADITIONAL ARAB-ISLAMIC APPROACHES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION |
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Endnotes:
*: George E. Irani is Visiting Professor in the Department of Political Science at Washington College in the State of Maryland. This study was completed while he was Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace (1997-1998). Back.
**: Nathan C. Funk is a doctoral candidate in the School of International Service at American University. He was Dr. Irani's Research Assistant at the United States Institute of Peace. Back.
Note 1: Muhammad Abu-Nimer, "Conflict Resolution in an Islamic Context: Some Conceptual Questions," Peace and Change, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January 1996), pp. 22-40. Abu-Nimer refers to the fact that many Arab thinkers are inclined to believed that models of conflict resolution are being introduced in the service of Western interests such as containing "Islamic fundamentalism." Back.
Note 2: For the perspective of a Lebanese economist, see George Corm, Le Proche-Orient Eclate-II: Mirages de Paix et Blocages Identitaires 1990-1996 (Paris, France: Editions La Decouverte, 1997). Among Arabs, there is a widespread perception that US-sponsored conflict management has reinforced existing power asymmetries, in effect promoting the relinquishment of justly claimed rights. It is in this context that we can best understand Yasser Arafat's phrase, "peace of the brave," as an oft-repeated denial of the notion that the terms of peace are dishonorable, inequitable, and accepted from a position of weakness. Back.
Note 3: See, for example, Raymond Cohen , Culture and Conflict in Egyptian-Israeli Relations: A Dialogue of the Deaf (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990); William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986). Back.
Note 4: The relationship is very controversial and involves all levels of society. The head of the Egyptian Coptic Church, Pope Shenuda II, has issued an edict forbidding any member of his church to visit Jerusalem as long as it is under Israeli occupation. Paul Salem, "A Critique of Western Conflict Resolution from a non-Western Perspective," in Paul Salem, ed., Conflict Resolution in the Arab World (Beirut: Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1997). Back.
Note 5: Paul Salem, "A Critique of Western Conflict Resolution from a non-Western Perspective," in Paul Salem, ed., Conflict Resolution in the Arab World (Beirut: Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1997). Back.
Note 6: Laura Nader, a prominent cultural anthropologist and authority on cultural aspects of conflict management, writes that "Conflict results from competition between at least two parties. A party may be a person, a family, a lineage, or a whole community; or it may be a class of ideas, a political organization, a tribe, or a religion. Conflict is occasioned by incompatible desires or aims and by its duration may be distinguished from strife or angry disputes arising from momentary aggravations" ("Conflict: Anthropological Aspects," in David L. Sills, ed. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences , Vol. 3 and 4, New York: The Macmillan Co. and the Free Press, 1968, p. 236). For further treatment of conflict and its dynamics, see Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Dean G. Pruitt, and Sung Hee Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement , 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994). Back.
Note 7: From a Western psychological perspective, conflict usually erupts because some basic needs have not been fulfilled, especially the identity needs of ethnic and communal groups. See John Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Prevention (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990). Back.
Note 8: See Joseph V. Montville, "Psychoanalytic Enlightenment and the Greening of Diplomacy," in Vamik D. Volkan Joseph V. Montville, and Demetrius A. Julius, eds ., The Psychodynamics of International Relations, Volume II (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1991). Back.
Note 9: In the influential book, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (New York: Penguin Books, 1991) Roger Fisher and William Ury write that interest-based negotiation, or "principled" negotiation, has four basic elements: 1) separate the people from the problem; 2) focus on interests, not positions; 3) invent options for mutual gain; and 4) insist on using objective criteria. Back.
Note 10: This conference was prepared and organized in Lebanon by George E. Irani and Laurie E. King-Irani. Funded in part by the U.S. Institute of Peace, the conference was the first organized discussion of the applicability and relevance of acknowledgment, forgiveness and reconciliation to conflicts in Lebanon and the broader Middle East. Back.
Note 11: These comments are recorded in George Emile Irani, "Acknowledgment, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation in Conflict Resolution: Perspectives from Lebanon," in George E. Irani and Laurie E. King-Irani, eds. Lessons from Lebanon (forthcoming). Back.
Note 13: See Dale Eickelman, The Middle East and Central Asia: An Anthropological Approach, 3d edition, (New York: Prentice Hall, 1997). Back.
Note 14: For further details see Laurie E. King-Irani, "Kinship, Class, and Ethnicity: Strategies for Survival in the Contemporary Middle East," in Deborah Gerner, ed. Understanding the Contemporary Middle East (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999). Back.
Note 15: A thorough, ground breaking analysis on the role patriarchy plays in the Middle East can be found in Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). Back.
Note 16: This is a typical pattern in patriarchal societies. Back.
Note 17: For an excellent analysis of the legal system in the Arab world see the book by Nathan J. Brown, The Rule of Law in the Arab World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Back.
Note 18: Edmund R. Leach, "Ritual," in David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences , Vol. 3 & 4, (New York: The Macmillan Co. and the Free Press, 1968), pp. 520-526. Back.
Note 19: Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Modern Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 204. Back.
Note 20: It is very interesting to note that rituals of conflict control and reduction are still invoked and utilized in Western societies by less empowered groups that attempt maintain a sense of communal solidarity, such as Native Americans and African Americans. Back.
Note 21: Laura Nader, et. al., eds., The Disputing Process Back.
Note 22: See, for example, Paul Salem, ed., Conflict Resolution in the Arab World (Beirut: Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1997). For of more general treatment of culture as a factor in diplomatic negotiations and reconciliation processes, see Guy Olivier Faure and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, eds. Culture and Negotiation (Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications,1993); Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures: International Communication in an Interdependent World , 2nd edition (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997); John Paul Lederach, Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); David W. Augsburger, Conflict Mediation Across Cultures: Pathways and Patterns (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992). Back.
Note 23: For further details see, Laurie King-Irani, "The Power of Transformation and The Transformation of Power: Rituals of Forgiveness and Processes of Empowerment in Post-War Lebanon", in Lessons from Lebanon (forthcoming). Back.
Note 24: Sulh does not apply to cases of theft and fraud. Given the paucity of sources, this essay relies on anthropological studies conducted in Jordan and Lebanon, unpublished dissertations and books published in Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel, and interviews conducted with attorneys, journalists, and activists in Lebanon and Jordan. Back.
Note 25: M. Khadduri, "Sulh" in C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, and the late G. Lecomte, The Encyclopaedia of Islam , Volume IX, (Leiden, Holland: Brill, 1997),p. 845-846. There are two distinct terms in Arabic for the word "peace": salaam and sulh. According to Dr. Fathi Osman, a prominent Egyptian Islamologist living in the USA, salaam is a "permanent state." "It is a natural occurrence and has a deeper significance in human relations." Sulh, on the other hand, presumes the presence of a dispute and action to settle that dispute (the ritual itself), perhaps on a temporary basis. According to Osman, "if successful the process of sulh can lead to peace." Personal interview with Osman, Washington, April 13, 1998. See also Fathi Osman, Concepts of the Qur'an : A Topical Reading (Los Angeles, California: MVI Publications, 1997). Back.
Note 26: For further details on Jordanian Bedouin rituals of reconciliation see Mohammad Abu-Hassan, Turath al Badu' al-Qada' (Bedouin Customary Law) (Amman, Jordan: Manshuraat Da'irat Ath-Thaqafa wa al-Funun,1987), p. 257-259. Back.
Note 27: Khadduri, The Encyclopaedia of Islam, op. cit. Back.
Note 28: Abu-Hassan, op. cit. Back.
Note 29: Abu-Hassan, op. cit. Back.
Note 30: King-Irani, op. cit. Back.
Note 31: Elias J. Jabbour, SULHA: Palestinian Traditional Peacemaking Process (Montreat, North Carolina, 1996), pp. 53-57. Back.
Note 32: Daniel Smith, "The Rewards of Allah," Journal of Peace Research , vol.26, no.4, 1989,pp. 385-398 Back.
Note 33: See, for example, Surat al- Baqarah (The Cow) (2:178): "O ye who believe! The law of equality is prescribed to you in cases of murder: The free for the free, the slave for the slave, the woman for the woman. But if any remission is made by the brother of the slain, then grant any reasonable demand, and compensate him with handsome gratitude. This is a concession and a Mercy from your Lord." See also Surat Ash-Shura (Counsel)(42: 40-43): "The recompense for an injury is an injury equal thereto (in degree): but if a person forgives and makes reconciliation, his reward is due from Allah.... But indeed if any show patience and forgive, that would truly be an affair of great resolution." Back.
Note 34: The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of superpower competition throughout the world have awakened dormant ethno-religious conflicts in many regions. As recently witnessed in Bosnia and Rwanda, these post-Cold War conflicts have lethal and devastating consequences. Centuries-old feelings of victimization and powerlessness are implicated in many of these conflicts; such feelings are behind the repetitive cycles of revenge and counter-revenge we see in Bosnia and Kosovo, Rwanda and Burundi, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Israel-Palestine, and Lebanon. Back.
