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CIAO DATE: 11/04

From Rockets to Religion: Understanding Globalization

Ellen Frost
Visiting Fellow
Institute for International Economics
Co-Chair, Globalization Project, National Defense University

Occasional Paper Series No. 36


October 6, 2000

European Union Studies Center

Globalization is really defining our era.
— UN Secretary General Kofi Annan

Something we now call "globalization" has ignited street protests and stoked fiery debates in both Europe and the United States. But what exactly is "globalization?" This paper presents an overview of globalization, assesses its benefits and risks, and concludes with a few observations about its implications for the transatlantic relationship.

  1. DEFINING GLOBALIZATION

    1. What is "globalization?"

      Globalization is a long-term process of connection and transformation. It is the non-stop aftershock of the current explosion of knowledge and technology. It has set in motion a living, expanding, and highly uneven network of cross-border flows not only of goods, services, money, and technology, but also of ideas, information, culture, people, and power.

      The word "globalization" implies a transition to "globality" -- a more interconnected world-system in which interdependent networks and flows surmount traditional boundaries (or make them irrelevant).(2) Globality can also refer to global governance -- the idea that the world community should assume "greater collective responsibility in a wide range of areas, including security." (3) This notion highlights the "governance gap" -- the disparity between the existence of global rules governing commercial transactions and the absence or vagueness of such rules in other domains. Finally, globality suggests the basic unity of the human spirit, expressed through global awareness, a consciousness of common humanity, concern for the earth, and a common set of basic norms.

      Globalization should not be seen in exclusively linear terms, but rather as a complex dynamic in which global, regional, national, local, and individual forces are all in play and often interact with each other. It comes in many forms, of which economic globalization is only one. Time lags between these different forms make the mix lumpy, uneven, often disruptive, and occasionally flammable. In a globalizing world, lots of contradictory things are true at the same time and will be for the foreseeable future.

      Over the long term, the defining characteristic of globalization is movement toward integration. Integration refers to the process of incorporating different elements into a whole. One meaning of integration implies intensified contact, but not necessarily common values. High levels of immigration, for example, may bring people from different cultures together, but they may clash. Recent violence against immigrants in southern Spain is an example.

      Another meaning of integration implies close ties and a sense of distinct identities among members of ethnic and religious groups. Globalization has helped to link aggrieved members of a diaspora or persecuted minority, such as Jews, Kurds, and Armenians. It has also divided them from others.

      A "higher" form of integration stands for tolerance, inclusion, and a common identity based on norms and values rather than on ethnic identity, skin color, or language. Globalization has facilitated bonding among groups that define themselves in terms of values (environmentalists and human rights activists, for example). It has also brought into being an elite culture shaped and colored by preferences -- for information, entertainment, and money. This is the world of cybercafes and caffe latte, Madonna and MTV, Web pages and dot-coms, hedge funds and derivatives.

      Internationally, integration implies movement towards a global market, a legal and regulatory framework, a sense of political community, and common standards of governance and justice. At the moment, the European Union is the only major postwar example of comprehensive and durable supranational integration, and many factors besides globalization contributed to this outcome (centuries of war between France and Germany, to name an obvious one).

      The way that globalization fosters integration in any of the three forms -- intensified contact, separate identities, or a pluralistic community respecting common norms -- embodies a change in the way people organize themselves, relate to each other, and exercise power.(4) Thus far, globalization appears to be fostering norms-based, pluralistic, institutional integration only among democracies and quasi-democratic states that have put in place a stable security framework, the rudiments of a market-oriented economy, a rules-based system of justice, and a certain minimal level of tolerance and civic trust -- and only then imperfectly, and after decades (if not centuries) of struggle.

    2. "Sub-Global Globalization:" Regions, Nations, Localities, and Individuals

      Globalization is not limited to the global level as such. On the contrary, it sparks new ways of doing things at all levels and ignites opposing impulses and identities. James Rosenau sees three pervasive tensions characteristic of this era: fragmentation-integration, localization-globalization, and decentralization-centralization. (5)

      Regions. One of the ways that governments have adapted to the challenges of globalization is regional integration. This trend often takes commercial forms but has strategic significance.

      In some parts of the world (Europe, Latin America, and Asia), regional economic agreements designed to promote free trade and investment are becoming the dominant geopolitical expression of relations between states. Roughly two-thirds of world trade now takes place within free trade areas or among countries committed to free trade and investment by a certain date. These agreements have given some regions of the world a certain "face" or geopolitical personality, reflecting emerging integration in the "higher," norms-based sense. Examples include European integration; Mercosur, which for Brazil serves as a geopolitical counterweight to U.S. domination of the area; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), originally designed in part to halt the spread of communism; and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), which has been an important stepping stone for China. Conversely, the absence of meaningful regional economic cooperation is a signal that governments in that region are not adopting policies that will allow them to take advantage of globalization.

      Outside of the transatlantic community, regional security arrangements are evolving more slowly and are likely to be informal and flexible. Rigid adherence to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, often to the exclusion of mutual benefit, dies hard in regions where memories of colonial occupation are still vivid. Nevertheless, working-level dialogues and confidence-building measures are gradually taking shape in key areas of the world. In Asia, for instance, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) draws in major non-ASEAN members to discuss regional security issues. Several ASEAN governments have established an anti-piracy center in Kuala Lumpur, with which the U.S. Pacific Command cooperates in informal ways.

      Nations. Globalization is creating a new context for, and transforming the formal and informal exercise of, national power. The combination of technology, international institutions, local governments, and non-state actors is diluting nation-states' monopoly on governance and creating new forms of power. (6) National power now stems less and less from endowed assets such as land and natural resources and more and more on chosen or created assets such as mastery of information technology, market-friendly economic policies, a climate that supports innovation and risk, and a skilled workforce.

      Although nation-states remain sovereign, their leaders are choosing to shift some of their power "up" to international institutions because of the need for new rules to govern global transactions and to respond to new global threats. Power is also shifting "down" to localities and sub-national groups as local citizens derive information from the Web, mobilize and organize each other through electronic mail, and become both subjects and users of the media. At all levels of authority, power is shifting "sideways," and new power is being created, as non-government players ranging from corporations to environmentalists shape the priorities and outcomes of national decision-making.(7) Cities with commercial links to urban centers in other countries are an emerging part of the new global scene. (8)

      These changes do not add up to a withering away of the state as such. In countries where there are functioning governments, the control of territory and the monopoly of organized force are still the dominant expressions of power. As one scholar puts it, state power is becoming "unbundled" into functional parts -- executives, legislatures, independent agencies, and courts. These parts are networking with counterparts abroad rather than withering or disappearing. (9)

      Non-State Actors, Localities, and Individuals. At the same time, regional and international organizations and national governments must now deal with many more non-state actors than they have ever had to deal with before. The global economy has boosted corporate resources to record levels. Many politically active corporations wield large amounts of money; the market value of Microsoft and General Electric leave most national GDPs in the dust. (10) In the non-profit world, non-government organizations (NGOs) that hitherto confined themselves to domestic politics now travel routinely to places like Geneva, Seattle, and even Melbourne. Nearly a thousand NGOs were represented at the recent ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization in Seattle, up from half a dozen or so attending trade talks in the 1940s and 1950s. (11)

      Rebel movements and other opponents of national governments also make use of the Internet and other forms of modern communication. A good example is the Serbian opposition's radio station, which went on line in 1997-98 even after Milosevic had shut down its studio. Similarly, e-mail messages from Kosovo offered the first clear evidence of Serbian intentions to crush Kosovo Albanian leadership. Terrorists such as Osama bin Laden also have many more tools at their disposal.

      The sudden availability of telecommunications products and services has enabled growing numbers of local communities and groups to mobilize across borders, with or without the cooperation of local governments. In some instances this process creates or strengthens local identities, brings grievances to the fore, and gives rise to organized communal, ethnic, or religious protest movements. E-mail links such groups with each other and with foreign supporters, while instant media coverage raises worldwide awareness of their plight. Human rights activists in Java, for example, say that they first learned about atrocities committed by the army elsewhere in Indonesia from e-mails sent from the New York-based Human Rights Watch.

      Finally, globalization operates at the level of individuals. Individual dissidents like Aung San Su Kyi of Burma or McDonald's-basher Jose Bove of France now have a global audience. More broadly, globalization appears to intensify the process by which individuals in society become differentiated from one another and from their elders. Young people are developing their own life styles, tastes, and convictions to an unprecedented degree. (12) They also connect with each other in new ways.

  2. FOUNDATIONS, DRIVERS, AND ENABLERS OF GLOBALIZATION

    The previous section offered a static snapshot of globalization. This section describes what makes it run.

    1. Drivers

      The major driver of globalization is the knowledge revolution. In the first instance, this knowledge was largely developed by and for business. It takes the form of a business-driven and business-invented triad consisting of advanced telecommunications, technology transfer, and capital flows.

      Globalization would not be occurring in its present form were it not for the business application of the knowledge revolution -- computers, e-mail, satellites, jet engines, and other innovations. These high-technology products and services do not flow around the world all by themselves. The world would not be "wired" to the extent that it is if telecommunications companies had not sold and installed the appropriate equipment. American popular culture would not enjoy a global audience were it not for the American entertainment industry and the hardware and software that goes with it. None of these things would be happening if financial institutions had not made arrangements to transfer funds across borders.

      A related driver of globalization is market competition. The current phase of globalization first appeared in commercial and economic form. Beginning in the late 1970s, breakthroughs in transportation and communications technology, a general lowering of trade barriers, and a worldwide shift toward market-oriented policies transformed the structure of global business. Japanese companies shook the world by improving quality and automating manufacturing, capturing major markets in the United States and Europe as well as in the developing world. Both the lure of new markets and the threat of Japanese competition spurred European and American firms to boost quality and innovation, streamline operations, expand global acquisition networks, establish more footholds abroad, enter into strategic partnerships, and offer new services.

      The globalization of business has led to the dispersal of the phases of production of components, goods, and services around the world for local, national, regional, and global markets. This pattern of production fosters economies of scale and permits adaptation to local consumer taste. It also gives rise to world-class standards of performance, quality, and efficiency. In the 1990s, economic globalization spread well beyond major companies and banks. Thanks to personal computers, globalization has been pulled downward, as it were, into small enterprises and literally into the lap(top)s of individuals. Operating from home with a few thousand dollars worth of equipment, anyone can become a global merchant.

      The globalization of finance went through a parallel transformation to become a hallmark of the present era. Larger banks had operated abroad for decades, but only under restraints imposed by the host government. During the 1980s these restraints began to unravel. Providers of financial services followed their corporate clients abroad and soon developed new customers. They invented new market instruments and offered customers better returns than they had ever had before. The liberalization of financial services has proceeded in parallel with -- or even ahead of -- trade and investment, often in countries where banking supervision is weak. (13)

    2. "Enablers"

      A fundamental "enabler" of globalization in most regions of the world is the absence of a major war or major internal strife. A stable security environment is often taken for granted, but it is the underpinning of growth. Since sound business decisions require a reasonable degree of stability, investments tend to be postponed when nations are at war or on the brink of war.

      Another enabler is the post-Cold War triumph of market-friendly policies in developing countries and the strengthening of those policies in industrialized ones. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, socialism became passe almost everywhere. Deregulation, privatization, the lowering of barriers to trade and investment, and the protection of intellectual property are "in." Implementation and enforcement frequently fall short, and a few governments still haven't gotten the message. Still, globalization would not be as widespread as it is today without a sea-change in the global economic policy environment. Even energy, a strategic commodity long subjected to special relationships and long-term contracts, is now traded or sold in an increasingly global and deregulated market.

      The huge U.S. market, with its seemingly insatiable consumers, is an enabler all by itself. For most of the last decade, U.S. growth has far outstripped that of its major trading partners. Many global industries are targeted first and foremost at the U.S. market. In addition, the United States contributes mightily to globalization because it is a source of innovation and creativity. Its institutions of higher learning attract tends of thousands of students from all over the world. Most of the products and networks that buzz and hum in the service of globalization originate in American brains.

      In all countries, policy "enablers" include sound fiscal and monetary policies, open information, some degree of accountability on the part of both governments and major economic actors, a functioning tax system, protection of private property and intellectual property, opportunities for the rising middle class to find jobs and to enter and exit markets, predictable rules based on some minimum standards of justice, and support for education and training. The extent to which governments adopt and implement this mix of policies is one of the key variables determining whether or not globalization as a whole is stabilizing or destabilizing.

  3. BENEFITS AND RISKS OF GLOBALIZATION: A SURVEY

    The following section sketches the major faces of globalization -- economic, political, cultural, religious, social, demographic, environmental, and military -- and the benefits and risks associated with them. They are all relevant to the specific ways that globalization transforms (or fails to transform) a particular region, country, or locality.

    1. Economic Globalization

      1. Globalization, Wealth, and Poverty

      Most economists are enthusiastic about economic globalization because they place a high value on efficiency. Globalization encourages market behavior, and markets demand efficiency. Resources shift from less productive to more productive use. Lower tariffs help to hold inflation down and spur competitiveness. Foreign investment brings technology, innovation, and management skills. New jobs are created to serve global markets. Job losses occur in less efficient sectors, but these are more than offset by overall gains in national employment opportunities.

      According to at least three major studies, nations with open, market-oriented economies have grown at least twice as fast as those with closed economies, and in the 1970s and 1980s the disparity was even higher.(14) In the last ten years, the period roughly associated with the most expansive phase of globalization, the number of people living in absolute poverty has declined, albeit modestly (24% in 1998, down from 29% in 1990). (15) World health indicators such as longevity and infant mortality have steadily improved almost everywhere.

      Other measures paint a grimmer portrait. According to the World Bank, 2.8 billion people - almost half of the world's population - live on less than $2 a day. Of these, 1.2 billion live on $1 a day. In rich countries, fewer than 1 child in 100 dies before the age of 5, while in rich countries the number if five times higher. (16) The UN Development Program's Human Development Report, 1999 does not go as far as protesters in Seattle, but it complains that globalization is threatening "human security" and "squeezing out care, the invisible heart of human development." (17)

      What is hotly debated is to what extent, if any, globalization is to blame for these iniquities. Everyone agrees that globalization is efficient; the burning issue is justice. To globalization's critics, there is a direct, causal relationship between globalization-fed corporate profits, social injustice, and dire poverty. They cite many examples. (18)

      There is often another side to anti-globalization horror stories. But there is no doubt that the speed, volatility, and sudden withdrawal of financial flows sent a number of countries spinning into recession in 1997-98. This was the first real "crisis" of globalization. The collapse of the Thai baht pulsed through most of Asia and then to much of South America, ravaging the economies of Brazil and its neighbors. The collapse of confidence associated with the Asian crisis ultimately spread to Russia, crippled what was left of the Russian economy, and brought forth a younger, technocratic leader to clean up the mess. From Thailand to Russia: not a chain one might have predicted.

      Some lessons of economic globalization are clear. If a government pursues market-oriented policies that benefit the ruling elite or the middle class at the expense of the poor, if inadequate disclosure and weak supervisory organs trigger a run on the banks, and if social safety nets are weak or absent, openness to globalization can severely destabilize the political system and hurt the most vulnerable members of the population. Since people in other countries tend to assume that the United States pulls the strings of the World Bank and the IMF, sudden financial crises and associated hardship tend to fuel anti-Americanism -- a trend that appears to be growing. (19)

      2. Globalization and Gaps

      A country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) divided by its population, or per capita GDP for short, is a widely used yardstick of national wealth. Globalization appears to have lifted per capita GDP everywhere except Africa. (20) This trend, however, owes something to booming global stock markets, whose dividends accrue mainly to the rich. Critics of the World Bank have argued against excessive reliance on per capita GDP statistics. They prefer broader sets of measures variously known as "human development," "human security," and the like, which include standards of health, education, and quality of life. Nevertheless, per capita GDP tracks fairly closely with these other indicators of development -- at a national or aggregate level. (21)

      There are other ways of measuring gaps besides aggregate per capita GDP. Other comparisons might include the income gap between inhabitants of wealthy coastal regions and those living in more remote interior regions (as in China); between the dominant ethnic group and the entrepreneurial minority (Chinese in Southeast Asia and Indians in Africa); between high school and college graduates; and between those who are computer-literate and those who are not (the "digital divide"). These gaps may have more impact on a country's political stability than changes in aggregate GDP per capita.

      As a rule, globalization offers rising elites and the urban middle class a bigger share of the pie. If this share increases too rapidly, and if the rest of the pie is not made available to others because of monopolies or corruption, the government can lose its legitimacy, as it did in Indonesia. If the speed of change is glacial because the government has deliberately isolated its subjects from globalization and restricted the free flow of information, disgruntled students and merchants may complain or rebel, as they apparently have in Iran.

      There is a huge investment gap between the developed world and a small handful of developing countries on the one hand, and everybody else on the other. Three-quarters of all foreign direct investment in the developing world goes to a dozen or so countries. Out of total private capital flows to developing countries from 1990 to 1996, the Middle East accounted for only 2 percent, which is lower than all other regions. Since most countries need foreign capital to develop (including the United States in the 19th century), the investment gap will intensify a widening income gap within the developing world.

      Do these income and investment gaps undermine political stability? Ordinary people do not normally spend time perusing national, regional, and international income statistics, but they are keenly aware of their own wealth or poverty. One of their questions is likely to be, "Compared to what?" Politically speaking, it matters enormously whether the poor are getting poorer in absolute terms or only relatively less rich in comparison with their own elites. (22)

      The latest gap to receive attention in the context of globalization is the so-called "digital divide." The term refers to the growing divergence between those with access to, and capable of using, computers and the Internet, and those who are left behind. Access to information is a path to empowerment. The challenge is to adopt the right mix of public policies and public-private projects to create a "global digital opportunity" instead of a threat. (23)

      Income, investment, and digital gaps reflect social and geographic divisions both within societies and among countries and regions. Depending on the country, low-skilled workers, workers in protected industries, small farmers, and landless laborers may well be at risk Globalization exposes these fissures and imbalances and may exacerbate them.

      3. Bribery and Corruption

      In countries where there are weak legal and institutional structures, globalization has intensified the problem of bribery and corruption. Analyzing more than 30 economic, political, and social indicators from 34 countries, A.T. Kearney found that rapidly globalizing countries have experienced dramatic growth in corruption. (24) Corruption on a small scale has long served to grease the wheels of society, to provide access for marginalized groups, to guarantee the outcome of elections, and to enable the traffic policeman to feed his family. But in many countries, this "corruption equilibrium" has spun out of control, causing the downfall of governments and companies alike. (25)

      Corruption siphons off resources, warps efficiency, saps the vitality of economic activity, and distorts public perceptions of how a market economy functions. In the area of public works, it jeopardizes public safety and can severely damage the environment. In these circumstances, "it becomes all too easy for economically beleaguered public to confuse democratization with the corruption and criminalization of the economy -- creating fertile soil for an authoritarian backlash and engendering potentially hostile international behavior by these states in turn." (26)

      4. Economic Globalization and Political Culture

      No one has ever been able to predict whether and when rising poverty, inequality, and corruption will erupt in violence, or why some states "fail" while others prosper. (27) There is considerable evidence, however, that political cultures that adapt most successfully to economic globalization feature accountable and responsive institutions based on some minimal level of civic trust, embedded in flexible and adaptive cultures. Policy choices can help to promote the right mix. (28)

      In order for a society to adapt well to economic globalization, cultural attitudes must permit risk and failure as well as success. Cultures must be capable of looking to the future, borrowing and adapting foreign influences as well as rejecting them. Talented young people of both sexes must be put to use. Opening up opportunities to women doubles the talent pool, lowers population growth, and improves public health. Trust and loyalty must extend beyond the family or kinship group, as must the sharing of spoils. For the most part, these last two conditions are absent in sub-Saharan Africa and much of the Middle East. When the king of Jordan died in 1999, for example, foreign governments sent presidents and foreign ministers to his funeral, but most Arab rulers sent their relatives.

      Broadly speaking, the political cultures of North America, western and central Europe (not including the Balkans), most of Asia, and a few South American countries (Chile and Brazil) are either adapting relatively well to globalization or have a good chance of doing so if transitional political problems can be sorted out. India is still a question mark; some regions are adapting far better than others. Significantly, the successful ones are either "free" or "partly free," that is, democracies or "soft" authoritarian states with substantial democratic features. (29)

      By contrast, with some exceptions, nations located in a huge swath of contiguous territory ranging from the former Soviet Union in the north and Pakistan in the east through the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa in the south are presently ill suited for globalization. They exhibit some combination of weak or closed political institutions, inflexible or divisive social cultures marked by vengeance and distrust, predominantly tribal or clan loyalties, and excessive regulation accompanied by a high degree of corruption. Much of the Andean region and the Balkans are also adapting poorly to globalization.

      5. Economic Security

      Thanks to the increasingly integrated nature of the world economy, economic priorities figure prominently in the new security calculus associated with economic globalization. In the 1999 national security strategy document issued by the White House, for example, the tasks of security are not only to protect territory and save lives, but also "to promote the well-being and prosperity of the nation and its people." (30) The broad scope of this thinking brings American security policy more into line with what leaders in ASEAN, Japan, and elsewhere call "comprehensive security." Security thinking in other parts of the world has been moving in this direction as well. (31) The case for closer integration of economic and security policy-making has never been stronger, but the habit of making decisions in separate, "stovepipe" bureaucracies dies hard.

    2. Political Globalization

      The globalization of politics has contributed to a new political awareness. Television has not merely brought other people's politics into our living room -- and ours into theirs. It has also exposed abuses, revealed the face of war, and diffused certain political norms, such as human rights and democracy, to more people than ever before.

      Over time, economic globalization undermines authoritarian governments because markets need information to work. This need for information creates pressures to expose the assets and liabilities of banks and corporations, including those controlled by dictators and their cronies. It also strengthens the ability of the press to conduct honest economic reporting and expose corruption. By providing more economic opportunity, globalization opens the door to new elites and fosters the growth of a middle class with a stake in stable and legitimate governments. It raises awareness of the outside world, encourages behavior that conforms to basic global norms and standards, fosters networking among non-government organizations, and brings abuses to global attention.

      The need to attract global investment creates pressure to institute the rule of law or at least some predictable system of justice, enforced by a modern legal system and a trained and independent judiciary. Modern economies need laws governing market entry (competition), market exit (bankruptcy), contract enforcement, the protection of property, and intellectual property rights, among others. As these develop, the educated middle class tends to grow restless if political rights remain tightly restricted.

      Globalization can help to promote human rights and environmental protection. Political activists use e-mail to communicate with foreign counterparts and expand their networks at home. International observers monitor elections and flash their judgments around the world. Networking of this kind has brought to global attention a number of serious abuses. Among them are the destruction of the rain forest, environmental pollution, reliance on child labor, residual slavery and bondage, mistreatment of women and girls, arbitrary detention and torture, persecution of ethnic minorities, corruption, and many others. Such publicity brings pressure on the governments that tolerate such practices and sometimes stimulates corrective action. (32)

      Globalization threatens fragile political systems as well as dictatorships. Volatile financial flows can wreak havoc with existing power structures before alternative groups and institutions have had time to develop, leaving a temporary vacuum. (This is a problem in Indonesia, where the army effectively ran local government until the fall of Suharto.) Criminal networks can sprout up, wielding political power of their own, as they have in Russia, Kosovo, and Albania. Sudden changes in relative wealth can lead to the scapegoating of successful minorities, such as ethnic Chinese or Jews. Extremist movements, often aided from abroad, can attract those uprooted by globalization. Separatist movements can take root and flourish. Subsistence farmers can be forced to flock to the cities, placing new demands on officials and upsetting long-standing political arrangements between different ethnic groups. Even anarchism has made a comeback. "Nothing has revived anarchism like globalization," commented the New York Times. (33)

      In these circumstances, it is hard for even the best of governments to exercise power effectively. Well-meaning governments can get blamed for dislocations beyond their control. Sometimes they rely on outside pressure from the United States or IMF staff to provide political cover for doing what they already know needs to be done. They may get support from friendly political organizations abroad, such as social democratic parties in Europe or U.S. labor unions. This, too, is political globalization.

    3. Globalization, Culture, and Religion

      Culture is not something separate from globalization, to be pursued at leisure on a Sunday afternoon. Globalization is both shaping and being shaped by ways of thought, habits, values, religion, and other aspects of social life. It has both intensified old identities and fostered new ones. The cultural aspect of globalization is as relevant to foreign and security policy as trade and financial flows.

      1. Culture

      Capital and technology do not sail around the world by themselves. They pass through human hands in the form of paper or by means of human fingers on a keyboard, and they reflect decisions made by human beings. Culture includes symbols, individual experiences, biological dispositions, embodied social habits, and deliberative thought. It is a "meaning-making medium" that influences all spheres, including politics and economics. (34)

      Thanks to the globalization of the communications and entertainment industries, American popular culture is flooding the globe. Most of the best known images, sounds, idols, stars, and even food come from America. (An exception is pokemon from Japan, but its name is derived from the English words "pocket monster.") In 1999 McDonald's opened 1,790 restaurants, an average of 5 per day, more than 90% of which are outside the United States. (35) Embracing the symbols of American "pop" culture make young people feel empowered and define a new youth elite.

      Most cultures thrive on interaction with others. In many countries, however, local cultures are swamped by American imports and commercialized by tourists. In some parts of the world, national identity is weak and young -- only a few decades old, in some cases. Boundaries are arbitrary, left over from the days when colonial powers carved up entire continents between them. Secession of one province or another is a real threat. Elites in these countries see the worst of America washing over their heartland, not the best. They associate globalization with American materialism and self-centeredness, as opposed to loyalty, self-discipline, spirituality, and the well-being of the group. Their images of America, derived in part from movies and television, include promiscuity, violence, materialism, disrespect for authority, drug abuse, divorce, guns, and crime.

      Fortunately, the globalization of culture is not limited to things American nor even Western. Thanks to the entertainment industry, many forms of traditional culture have found global audiences. Globalization has even helped to preserve some cultures from extinction. For example, media attention has lent support to efforts to save indigenous people in areas of Brazil who are subject to rapid and destructive development.

      2. Religion

      The reach of religion is also becoming more global than ever before. Not only is globalization compatible with most forms of religion; it facilitates the spread of religious ideas. The major religions are now world religions. The Dalai Lama, Pope John Paul II, and Billy Graham are world figures. Sacred texts are available on the Web. Interfaith dialogue, aided by globalization, is now well established.

      To some, the popularity of religion is surprising. Beginning with the Enlightenment, modernist thinkers have equated religion with superstition and championed secular and "rational" thinking. The "post-modernist" perspective is similarly hostile to religion. It downplays group cohesion and modern forms of organization in favor of individual fulfillment. This form of individualism can include a spiritual dimension (yoga, meditation, the "New Age" movement, and the like), but it rejects traditional, organized religions as narrow and coercive. In its place, it enshrines the individual as the central focus of worship. (36)

      Despite these intellectual movements, religion is flourishing as never before. Far from destroying religion, globalization has created conditions that allow the practice of religion to expand. Globalization ushers in a greater degree of openness to ideas from the outside world, including religious ideas about the human spirit and the earth. According to one scholar, globalization is the "compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole." (37) Religion has reappeared in the former Soviet Union, and it is clearly making inroads in China. And it is pervasive in that beehive of globalization, the United States.

      Americans tend to have a somewhat negative image of other people's religions, particularly Islam. But religious affiliation can help people in local communities adjust to globalization. Such people share a sense of community, basic moral and ethical values, self-discipline, humility, and willingness to accept rules established for the good of all. This combination can help overcome the alienation and insecurity associated with the collapse of traditional authority and rapid economic change. For example, in Egypt, Islamic movements have mushroomed to fill vacuums caused by the crisis in state legitimacy. These movements provide "a channel for informal political participation, a sense of identity and social justice, and the provision of basic needs and services for the underprivileged." (38) In Turkey and Kosovo, Islamic self-help groups have filled holes in the state's social safety net. Members of religious groups are also in a good position to report human rights abuses and other instances of injustice.

      Much of the violence that occurs in the name of religion is not religious at all, but rather a political backlash against dislocations associated with globalization. Fighting between Christians and Muslims in Moluku (the Moluccas, formerly known as the Spice Islands and now part of Indonesia) stems in part from a sudden, destabilizing influx of migrants that upset the balance between the two groups. Hindu militancy is often political in nature, used to divert popular attention from problems or scandals. Politicians can invoke religious themes to foment separatism, anti-Americanism, or enthusiasm for war. They also use religion to whip up a martyr complex or justify a culture of victimhood. (Serbia and Iran are examples.) Local elders can use religious language to perpetuate tribal customs (such as genital cutting of girls) or to enforce tribal notions of honor (such as keeping women and girls at home and "honor killings").

      In a globalizing world, what is truly destabilizing and disintegrative is not the revival of genuine religious faith but a total collapse of religion-based norms and ethics. This is what appears to be happening in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Congo and Sierra Leone) as well as in Russia. Even harsh justice meted out in the name of the Sharia is better than a war of all against all.

    4. Social, Demographic, Health, and Environmental Effects of Globalization

      1. Migration, Population, and the Role of Women

      Globalization has a profound impact on where people choose to live, the way they reproduce, and the role of women.

      According to a report issued by the International Labor Organization (ILO), entitled "Workers Without Frontiers: The Impact of Globalization on International Migration," there are approximately 120 million migrants as of the year 2000 -- up from 75 million in 1965. As the ILO report makes clear, what is new is the global nature of the migration. Between 1970 and 1990, the number of countries classified as major receivers of labor immigrants rose from 39 to 67, while the number of countries designated as major international labor suppliers rose from 29 to 55. The number of countries that are both suppliers and receivers rose from 4 to 15.

      It is no longer true, if it ever was, that "capital migrates, but workers don't." A record number of people on the move are refugees from war. In the churning world of global trade and investment, the cliché "winners and losers" is often a misnomer. "Losers" don't get lost; they migrate. (39) Some migrate illegally; a new industry -- trafficking in workers -- generates an estimated $6 billion a year for smugglers and forgers, some of whom are members of international criminal networks.

      The cross-border migration of workers has a number of benefits. It brings in people with the energy and courage to start a new life. It serves to fill low-wage jobs that a more affluent population no longer wants, such as street cleaning, janitorial services, and care of the aged. It provides new economic opportunities for both migrants and their host communities. It is another form of efficiency -- the intersection of supply and demand. Beyond a certain point, however, large-scale migration can be jarring and dehumanizing. The sudden influx of large clusters of immigrants strains local resources and often generates social tensions.

      Migration to cities is a particularly urgent problem. Global agribusiness and other changes associated with globalization are driving or enticing many people from the land into overcrowded cities, creating massive social and health problems. In some countries, female infanticide distorts male-female ratios, compounding dissatisfaction with rural life. At the current rate, by 2010 the world will have more than a dozen more cities with populations of 8 million people or more. The supply of water, sewage systems, health facilities, schools, public transportation, roads, and practically everything else that people need to live decent lives will be in short supply. Even draconian measures to discourage such migrations, such as denial of work and residence permits in Chinese cities, do not seem to halt the flow.

      Population trends suggest that both the need for and the supply of migrant workers will continue for some time to come. Birth rates are stable or declining in most of the industrialized and industrializing world, as life choices diminish family size and better health care contributes to the "graying" of the population. As an Italian journalist put it, "The fewer children we have, the more immigrants we need." (40) He might have added that in Africa and parts of the Middle East, the population is growing by as much as 5-6%, with the largest number of births occurring among the poor.

      Many women take jobs out of the home out of economic desperation. Others do so because they want to take advantage of new opportunities swept in by globalization. Worldwide, women increased their participation in the labor force from 36 percent in 1970 to about 45 percent in 1994. This rate varies sharply by region. In Arab countries, for example, only one in four women are in the labor force, compared with 69 percent in East Asia. (41)

      Other things being equal, the chance to earn money is likely to raise the status of women and improve the prospects for female literacy. In areas where women have long been allowed to earn money, such as southern Nigeria and the state of Kerala in India, the ratio of men to women is roughly equal because there is no economic reason to kill or starve female babies and girls. Over time, the empowerment of women could prove to be one of globalization's most positive contributions.

      2. The Environment and Health

      Globalization is clearly a catalyst for rapid growth, and untrammeled growth can take destructive forms. Many environmentalists associate globalization with the destruction of the rain forest, the disappearance of threatened plant and animal species, depletion of marine resources, acid rain, chemical pollution, and a host of health concerns. The data tend to validate these concerns, at least in the near term. (42) For example, A.T. Kearney's survey found that rapid globalizers saw increases of 4 percent or more in their carbon dioxide emissions. (43)

      As national economies have become more integrated, hardship and crisis in one country can puncture livelihoods in the entire region. Environmental disasters -- ranging from Chernobyl-type accidents and erosion-induced flooding to the polluting effects of slash-and-burn agriculture on a massive scale -- can erode the health of people in neighboring countries. One example is the drifting of smoke and haze from burning fields in Indonesia to Malaysia and Singapore.

      Over time, globalization tends to improve environmental protection, but the process is by no means automatic. Foreign investment often brings investors from the United States and Europe who are more sensitive to environmental values than local governments, if only because their shareholders are tracking their performance. (44) Foreign pressure to move toward free trade and investment can reduce wasteful subsidies that distort the use of resources. The drive for efficiency can introduce more rational pricing policies and the "polluter pays" principle. The spread of science and technology around the world can help to clean up the environment as well. But these solutions are necessarily long-term in nature. In the meantime, the emphasis on growth must be linked with serious resource planning.

      From a security perspective, the impact of globalization on the availability of natural resources is a key concern. The most urgent shortage of the first half of the 21st century will not be oil, which is still relatively abundant, but clean water. The demand for water is outstripping the supply. Control of water supplies has long been a strategic objective and is a tension-creating factor in many parts of the world.

      Another problem directly or indirectly associated with globalization is the spread of infectious disease. AIDS in particular is a threat to U.S. security for several reasons. A globally mutating virus could return to threaten the United States and its allies. Certain key countries (e.g., Russia, Brazil, and India) are susceptible. Besides AIDS, cholera, tuberculosis and a variety of other diseases are rampant, and some are taking drug-resistant forms. In addition, the expansion of shipping has given a free ride to many germs and disease-bearing insects.

      Occupational illness has also been on the rise. Women, widely employed in electronics factories because of their manual dexterity, are regularly exposed to carcinogenic solvents, acids, and toxic fumes. Frequent use of microscopes has damaged their eyesight. Women who do fine sewing in the garment trade also report eye problems. Both women and men suffer from exposure to hazardous chemicals.

      Public health is one area where the market alone cannot provide adequate solutions, but public funding for this and other transnational threats is skimpy compared to the need. (45)

    5. Military Globalization and Unconventional Threats

      The characteristics of military globalization resemble what is new about globalization more generally. The defense community has witnessed high-speed communications, cross-border investment, and more competitive procurement. (46) At the same time, globalization has facilitated the rise of criminal networks, piracy, the mobilization of local ethnic and religious groups, and many of the other risks of globalization previously described.

      The new threats associated with rapid globalization have vastly expanded the scope of security policy. Traditionally, security has been an external, cross-border concept. City dwellers built walls and fought off invaders. Alternatively, their leaders went off and conquered their neighbors. Today, the danger of a Soviet nuclear attack has disappeared, but the threat of conventional, territorial war has not entirely gone away (e.g., the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Straits, the Spratley Islands, and Kashmir). Military forces are still organized geographically, and their most basic mission is to protect territorial integrity.

      In the e ra of globalization, external threats have increasingly assumed unconventional forms. Globalization creates and exposes vulnerability to what had previously seemed remote or irrelevant. Information on how to make weapons of mass destruction can be gleaned from the Internet. Because of improvements in transportation and communications, globalization has multiplied the instances and destructiveness of covert criminal activities (crime, drugs, terrorism, and trafficking in human beings) and given rise to new, invisible threats (cyber-terrorism and new forms of germ warfare). Technology with potential military application glides around the world through commercial channels as well as in the computers of criminals. Know-how on nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction can be downloaded from the Internet. Shoulder-fired missiles easily find their way to terrorists.

      So-called "failed states" breed particularly ugly problems. What begins as a collapse of authority soon spawns rag-tag rebel armies, ethnic thugs, armed quasi-religious groups, drug traffickers, vigilantes, and shakedown artists. (47) Other countries can be drawn in if local violence spills across borders, if domestic insurgents and criminal elements receive funding and combat support from abroad, if insurgents take foreign hostages or launch a "holy war" against their neighbors, or if genocide occurs. Devising a global security policy now requires coming to grips with its internal aspect, which is individual and human, as well as its external aspect, which is collective and territorial. (48)

      Mindful of the new security environment, NATO members are now searching for ways of matching up regional security resources and arrangements with threats arising outside of the defined territory to be protected. For similar reasons, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has called for major improvements in UN peacekeeping.

  4. IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBALIZATION FOR THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

    The overarching objective of U.S. and European policy should be to shape the emerging world order in a way that avoids channels the wave of globalization in directions that ease adaptation to rapid change and peaceful integration. The goals required to carry out this objective include the promotion of global norms and values through peaceful adaptation to change and integration, accompanied by the development of corresponding global rules and institutions. The current "governance gap" between advanced rule-making and dispute settlement in the trading system and weak or nonexistent guidelines and rules in other aspects of international life should be narrowed so that legitimate concerns are addressed and not targeted exclusively at economic institutions such as the WTO and the IMF.

    Thanks in part to globalization, world leaders are increasingly being challenged to subscribe to and put into practice an emerging set of global norms and values. The UN Millenium Declaration of September 2000 identified certain fundamental values as "essential to international relations in the twenty-first century." They are: freedom, equality, solidarity (including equity and social justice), tolerance, respect for nature, and shared responsibility (for managing economic and social development, as well as threats to international peace and security). (49) This list downplays certain typical U.S. and European themes (e.g., "basic human rights"), but it is generally consistent with them.

    In the era of globalization, to use James Rosenau's language, the evolution of shared norms gives voice to the collective nature of shared challenges. It is not that a "world society" has consolidated its shared norms, leaving out a small minority, but that "enough evolution has occurred for traces of widely shared norms to be noticeable." (50) The floor of consensus is slowly rising.

    Norms are at the heart of durable institutions. Much of what we recognize today as workaday institutions got started as shared basic norms, which were then hammered into articles of agreement by statesmen of the day. A good example is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor organization, the WTO, whose complex rules on market access and elaborate system of dispute resolution evolved from and are rooted in the principle of non-discrimination.

    If emerging global norms such as freedom and tolerance prevail, globalization holds the promise of global pluralism -- a state of society in which autonomous groups maintain and develop their culture, livelihoods, and interests within the confines of shared norms and a shared world order. This promise is broadly consistent with U.S. and European international security and foreign policy interests as well as the long-term needs of most of the world's people. Over time, globalization promotes openness, encourages political and economic reforms, strengthens the demand for the rule of law, and fosters norms-based integration.

    The worrisome phrase is "over time." In areas of the world where poverty is widespread and institutions are weak, economic globalization is outstripping the development of public and private means to help ordinary people cope with its effects. In the near term, globalization can sharpen class differences, feed rampant corruption, fortify dictators, and arm criminal elements and terrorists. In these areas sound environmental standards, access to clinics, and safety nets may exist only on paper, if at all. Shocks associated with rapid globalization, especially short-term financial flows, can shake up the body politic, throw more people into poverty, foment riots, and force a retreat from market-oriented reforms, whipping up anti-Americanism in the process.

    Despite these threats, there is still no meaningful strategic dialogue about globalization between and among the United States and its allies, let alone coordinated policy responses. Transatlantic leaders should reach a political settlement of current trade quarrels now so that they will be ready, by the time the new U.S. president takes office, to launch a far-reaching, comprehensive, and ongoing policy dialogue involving all relevant government actors, not just foreign ministries.

    Such an effort should draw in relevant non-government expertise on all aspects of globalization. Any combination of these aspects can trigger security problems in which the United States and/or its European partners may be called upon to intervene or otherwise lend assistance. Conversely, the many-sided, interactive nature of globalization presents new opportunities for expanding the democratic community of nations and promoting peace and prosperity in ways not foreseen by conventional analysis. Elsewhere, I have proposed the creation of a "North ATlantic Economic Community" or NATEC (51) to deal with global economic challenges, and that would be a good start. But the full scope of transatlantic thinking should be broader, integrating economics, security, politics, society, religion, culture, demographics, and the environment.

    Future decision-making also requires a more balanced set of tools, namely, adequately funded non-military instruments of foreign policy. This is an American problem. Without a more well stocked and diversified toolbox, U.S. military forces will be under mounting pressure to solve problems for which military power is not well suited. Finally, a strategic transatlantic agenda on globalization should include a streamlined, flexible, and coordinated decision-making process adapted to the Internet age and capable of responding quickly to fast-moving foreign crises.

In sum, the benefits of globalization are substantial, but the short-term risks are numerous and pressing. Globalization is linking together a wide variety of elites, but it accelerates disparities. There is a "governance gap" between new global threats and the institutional means to deal with them.

Because of the multifaceted nature of globalization, coping with these challenges requires a transatlantic dialogue integrating economics and security analysis and adding social-cultural, political, and historical perspectives. A transatlantic strategy to cope with globalization must extend from dot-coms to demographics, from rockets to religion. Holistic thinking has become a security imperative.



NOTES

1.This paper borrows heavily from my chapter , "Globalization and Security: A Strategic Agenda," in The Global Century: Globalization and U.S. National Security Strategy [tentative title] (Washington: National Defense University, forthcoming).

2. The term "globality" is taken from Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), p. 14. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., prefer the word "globalism." See their article in Foreign Policy, No. 118, Spring 2000.

3. Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighborhood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). p. 1.

4. David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 16 and passim.

5. See James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), especially chapters 4-6; and "Stability, Stasis, and Security: Reflections on Superpower Leadership," Global Forum, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Vol. 1, No. 1, June 2000.

6. Jessica T. Mathews, "Power Shift," Foreign Affairs, Vo.. 76, No. 1, January/February 1997, pp. 50-66.

7. Rosenau, op.cit.

8. John Newhouse, "Europe's Rising Regionalism," Foreign Affairs,Vol. 76, No. 1, January-February 1997.

9. Anne-Marie Slaughter, "The Real New World Order," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 5, September/October 1997.

10. See the list of the "35 largest economic entities in "Leviathan, Inc.," Sydney Morning Herald, January 15, 2000, reprinted in World Press Review, Vol. 47, No. 4, April 2000, p.7.

11. For a comprehensive discussion, see Wolfgang H. Reinecke, Global Public Policy: Governing Without Governance?" (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998).

12. For a description of how Coca-Cola and McDonald's are coping with this trend, see "Fallen Icons," Financial Times, February 1, 2000, p. 12.

13. The Asian financial crisis demonstrated that the pace of financial liberalization exceeded institutional capacity to deal with credit booms and liquidity/currency "mismatches." See Morris Goldstein, The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures, and Systemic Implications (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1998).

14. Anton Lukas, "WTO Report Card III: Globalization and Developing Countries," Trade Briefing Paper No. 10, The Cato Institute, June 20, 2000, p. 2.

15. World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2000), p. 3.

16. "New World Bank Report urges Broader Approach to Reducing Poverty," World Bank press release 2001/042/S, September 12, 2000.

17. United Nations Development Report, Human Development Report, 1999 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 7.

18. For a sample of criticism of globalization, see Sarah Anderson and John Cavanagh with Thea Lee, Field Guide to the Global Economy (New York: The New Press, 2000); and www.turnpoint.org.

19. A new Asian monetary fund aimed at preventing or mitigating such crises, proposed by the Japanese, is now under discussion.

20. In Africa, per capita GDP in the 1990s was about the same as it was in the 1960s, while that of every other region has grown. For a clear-sighted analysis of the disappointing record of aid to Africa, see Carol Lancaster, Aid to Africa: So Much to Do, So Little Done (Chicago: Century Foundation and University of Chicago Press, 1999).

21. Debraj Ray, Development Economics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 29.

22. For example, what Alan Greenspan calls "asset inflation" -- the booming U.S. stock market -- has created huge wealth, but that wealth has not been taken away from the poor. By contrast, the financial crisis in Asia in 1997-98 temporarily crushed the livelihood of millions of people.

23."From the Global Digital Divide to the Global Digital Opportunity," Statement of the World Economic Forum Task Force to the G-8 Kyushu-Okinawa Summit, July 2123, 2000, www.weforum.org. See also Andrea Goldstein and David O'Connor, "Bridging the Digital Divide," Financial Times, July 21, 2000, p. 15.

24. A.T. Kearney, Globalization Ledger, April 2000, www.atkearney.com.

25. The collapse of Hanbo Steel in Korea is one of many examples. See Kimberly Ann Elliott, "Corruption as an International Policy Problem: Overview and Recommendations," in Elliott, ed., Corruption and the Global Economy (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997), p. 196.

26. Patrick Glynn, Stephen J. Kobrin, and Moises Naim, "The Globalization of Corruption," in Elliott, ed., op. cit., p. 10.

27. For a thoughtful survey of research on this topic, see Joan M. Nelson, Poverty, Inequality, and Conflict in Developing Countries (New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1998).

28. See Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., Culture Matters (New York: Basic Books, 2000); Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations (2nd ed., New York: Touchstone Books, .1997); Kishore Mahbubani, Can Asians Think? (Singapore and Kuala Lumpur: Times Books International, 1998); J. Timmons Roberts and Amy Hite, eds., From Modernization to Globalization: Perspectives on Development and Social Change (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, Inc., 2000); Robert Hefner, ed., Market Cultures: Society and Values in the New Asian Capitalisms (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998); and World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

29. The index published by Freedom House ranks countries as "free," "partly free," or "not free." See www.freedomhouse.org.

30. A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington DC: The White House, December 1999).

31. See Paul B. Stares, ed., The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey (Tokyo and Washington: Japan Center for International Exchange and the Brookings Institution, 1998).

32. A good example is Transparency International, which ranks countries according to the extent of corruption and has inspired unprecedented efforts to overcome it.

33. "Anarchism , the Creed that Won't Stay Dead," New York Times, August 5, 2000, p. A7.

34. Robert W. Hefner, "introduction: Society and Morality in the New Asian Capitalisms," in Hefner, ed., Market Culture: Society and Values in the New Asian Capitalisms (Boulder, Colorado and Singapore: Westview Press and the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), pp. 3-5.

35. McDonald's Corporation 1999 Annual Report, March 15, 2000, p. 1.

36. James Kurth argues that the "ideology of expressive individualism" can lead to "totalitarianism of the self," according to which human rights are nothing more than the rights of individuals, independent of community or traditions. See Kurth, "Religion and Globalization," Foreign Policy Research Institute WIRE, Vol. 7, No. 7, May 1999. See also "Faith and Statecraft," a special issue of Orbis, Spring 1998.

37. Roland Robertson, quoted in Meredith B. McGuire, Religion: The Social Context (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co.

38. Miranda Beshara, ""Globalization and the Middle East: Growing Together or Apart?" Unpublished paper, Fall 1999, p. 9.

39. International Labor Organization, "World migration tops 120 million, says ILO," Press Release (ILO/00/2), March 2, 2000.

40. Giovanni Valentini in La Repubblica, Rome, July 14, 2000, translated in World Press Review, September 2000, p. 22.

41. Joyce Akins, "Globalization and Women: Progress and Pain," unpublished paper, December 1999.

42. For a comprehensive and readable summary of these concerns, see Hilary French, Vanishing Borders: Protecting the Planet in the Age of Globalization (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Co., 2000).

43. A.T. Kearney, Globalization Ledger,April 2000, p. 12, available at www.atkearney.org.

44. "The Convergence of U.S. National Security and the Global Environment," Third Conference Report, November 12-16, 1998 (Washington DC: The Aspen Institute, 1998), p. 6.

45. See Carol Lancaster, "Redesigning Foreign Aid," Foreign Affairs, Vol.79, No. 5, September-October 2000, pp. 74-76.

46. For a more comprehensive treatment of military globalization, see David Held et al., ets., Global Transformations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2999), Chapter 2. See also William W. Keller, Arm in Arm: The Political Economy of the Global Arms Trade (New York: Basic Books, 1995).

47. See Robert D. Kaplan, The Ends of the Earth (New York: Vintage Books, 1997) and Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy (New York: Random House, 2000).

48. Reinecke. op.cit., , p. 224.

49. United Nations Millenium Declaration, A/55/L.2, September 6, 2000. A similar list appears in the declaration issued by the Millenium World Peace Summit of Religious and Spiritual Leaders, reprinted in the New York Times, September 5, 2000, p. A13.

50. James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier, pp. 180-81.

51. Ellen L. Frost, Transatlantic Trade: A Strategic Agenda (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997).


Selected Bibliography

Aghion, Philippe and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Growth, Inequality and Globalization: Theory, History and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998, 2nd ed., 2000)

Anderson, Sarah, et al., Field Guide to the Global Economy (New York: The New Press, 2000)

Burtless, Gary, et al., Globaphobia: Confronting Fears About Open Trade (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1998)

Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighborhood (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995)

French, Hilary, Vanishing Borders: Protecting the Planet in the Age of Globalization (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2000)

Held, David, et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999)

Kaul, Inge, et al, eds., Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999)

A.T. Kearney, Globalization Ledger, www.atkearney.com

O'Rourke, Kevin H. and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization and History (Cambridge; The MIT Press, 2000)

Program on International Policy Attitudes, "Americans on Globalization: A Study of U.S. Public Attitudes," November 16, 1999 (unpublished summary)

Reinicke, Wolfgang H., Global Public Policy: Governing Without Government? (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1998)

Rodrik, Dani, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997)

Rosenau, James N., Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)

Stares, Paul B., ed., The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey (Tokyo and New York: Japan center for International Exchange, 1998)

United Nations, "United Nations Millenium Declaration," September 6, 2000.

Van de Walle, Nicholas, Economic Globalization and Political Stability in Developing Countries (New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc. 1998)

Wallach, Lori, and Michelle Sforza, Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy (Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1999)

World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001, www.worldbank.org

 

 

 

 

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