CIAO DATE: 09/04

International Cooperation On Nuclear Security Still Lacks Urgency

Benjamin Friedman

Center for Defense Information

January 2003

Drowned out by the cacophonous Iraq debate, warnings persist that terrorists might acquire nuclear or radiological weapons and use them. The likelihood of this prospect is generally judged to lie between possible and likely. Strangely, this observation has not provoked the urgency it merits. Faced with the threat of suicidal fanatics acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb, the obvious course of action is to destroy or capture the terrorists and to destroy or secure the weapons. Since Sept. 11, 2001, the United States has been working feverishly at the former, but efforts in dealing with the worldwide stocks of nuclear weapons and materials have been halting. ¹

The United States stands prepared to attack Iraq in part because Saddam Hussein could soon have nuclear weapons, and, in a desperate and self–destructive act, give them to terrorists. Saddam might be desperate and self–destructive, but terrorists do not need his help to get nuclear weapons. They could get nuclear weapons or, more likely, the components to coble together a radiological weapon, a dirty bomb, from sites all over the world, most of which are in the states of the former Soviet Union. ²

Strewn across Russia, there are tens of thousands of strategic nuclear weapons and components, thousands of small tactical nuclear weapons, and stores of fissile materials (plutonium or highly enriched uranium), which could be used to construct a crude nuclear bomb. Some of these materials are already missing. The Center for Nonproliferation Studies has identified 13 confirmed instances of fissile materials trafficking in the newly independent states since the collapse of the Soviet Union. ³ Additionally, in Russia and across the world, there are vast amounts of non–fissile, radioactive materials, often stored in medical facilities. Terrorists could attach these materials to a large conventional explosive to create a radiological dirty bomb. ⁴ Used in a city, such a weapon could sicken or kill thousands, contaminate large areas and cause massive economic damage. Terrorists may already possess radioactive materials. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has recorded over 1,700 instances in which radioactive materials have been lost or stolen since 1986. In 1995, Chechnyen rebels left an undetonated 30–pound box of cesium 137 and dynamite near the entrance of a busy Moscow park. ⁵

Of particular concern are the tactical nuclear weapons. It is unclear whether all of Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons are secure — the Russians themselves may not know whether any of these weapons are missing. These weapons are relatively portable, and lack the safeguards (permissive action links) other nuclear weapons have to prevent unauthorized use.

To confront these proliferation threats, the United States has spent $7 billion since 1992 under the Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, named for their founders, former Sen. Sam Nunn and Sen. Richard Lugar, (R–Ind). These programs have dismantled and destroyed troves of bombers, submarines and missile silos, consolidated and protected nuclear warheads, and paid the salaries of Russian nuclear scientists. Yet Nunn–Lugar has left large portions of Russia’s arsenal dispersed and poorly defended. Only 40 percent of Russia’s nuclear facilities have received security improvements, and the Russians have not allowed the United States to help inventory and protect their tactical nuclear weapons. Spending to find and control radioactive materials has only begun to have an impact.

The discovery of nascent al Qaeda plans to launch nuclear attacks and the arrest last spring of a suspect planning a dirty–bomb attack dramatically underline the urgency of improving non–proliferation efforts. The administration of U.S. President George W. Bush, which initially planned to slash Nunn–Lugar funds, reversed course following Sept. 11, 2001, and agreed to increase the funding slightly to $1 billion per year. Even that level of funding is a far cry from the $3 billion annual allocation advocated by one blue–ribbon panel. ⁶ While this spending is significant, it is a small amount relative to other security programs. Missile defense development is costing the United States about $8 billion annually. Homeland security will cost close to $40 billion this year. Cooperative threat reduction spending, even if tripled, would amount to less than one percent of the $350 billion annual U.S. defense budget.

The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty), signed in May 2002 by Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, heightened the need for more non–proliferation funds. The treaty neither slashes Russia’s arsenal permanently nor addresses Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons. By obligating both states only to store most of their nuclear weapons, rather than deploying them in the field, the treaty may overburden an under–funded Russian system that is already failing.

The Bush administration took a step towards increasing non–proliferation funding at the group of eight (G–8) summit held in June 2002 in Kananaskis, Canada. Although the G–8, comprising the richest nations in the world, generally deals with economic issues, the United States pushed the other G–8 nations — Russia, France, Britain, Germany, Japan and Italy — to match U.S. funding for non–proliferation programs in Russia, in part by forgiving Russian debt. The program is known as “the 10 plus 10 over 10 plan,” because the non–U.S. members promised to match U.S. spending of $10 billion over the next 10 years.

The details of the plan have yet to be determined. Although the agreement mentions several specific areas for the new funds, including employing weapons scientists, destroying chemical weapons, dismantling nuclear submarines and controlling fissile materials, each country will negotiate separately with the Russians and choose what programs to join. Projects could include securing biological weapons, ending plutonium production, enacting export controls and border security, radioactive waste disposal, decommissioning of nuclear reactors, and blending down nuclear fuel, among other things. Little is off the table. While most G–8 nations have pledged various levels of support, with the European Commission independently offering $1.1 billion toward the total, these funds must still be approved by the various countries’ legislatures. In some cases, the funds represent money previously pledged. ⁷ Critically, the agreement only pledges to spend up to $20 billion, so far less could be spent.

The G–8 agreement, should it come to fruition, will vastly strengthen security across the world, far more than the much–heralded Moscow Treaty. But much remains to be done. Each country would, in theory, administer its own programs, and with even U.S. non–proliferation funds split between the Energy, Defense, and State Departments, disorganization appears likely. Even before the agreement, experts complained that because no single official managed the U.S. programs, coordination could be lacking. ⁸ A hodgepodge of partially redundant programs will be neither efficient nor safe. For maximum effectiveness, the United States must organize the programs, beginning by getting its own house in order. U.S. non–proliferation programs should be coordinated at the highest levels of the national security establishment and become an essential element of American diplomacy, rather than a second–tier issue. ⁹

Just as importantly, the United States should push the Russians to cooperate with donor nations to secure tactical nuclear weapons. With one such weapon, terrorists could kill far more people than died on Sept. 11. Leaders such as Lugar have lobbied to include tactical nuclear weapons within the cooperative threat reduction programs. To date, it is uncertain whether the Russians will agree to do so, or how hard they are being pushed to cooperate on this count. As their strategic nuclear arsenal declines, the Russians, especially the military, increasingly rely on these weapons as a deterrent and will thus be reluctant to reveal their locales. Given the urgency of the matter, the United States ought to exert maximum leverage to gain Russian cooperation to store or destroy tactical nuclear weapons.

The United States and Russia could also use G–8 funding to accelerate efforts to secure radioactive materials and prevent a dirty bomb attack. Recent efforts to collect Soviet–era radioactive canisters and generators left in barns and forests across Russia have just begun, and more funds are needed. ¹⁰ Many experts have proposed an immediate worldwide effort to begin to consolidate and secure radioactive materials worldwide. Without U.S. leadership, such a cleanup may stall.

Iraq, despite its ambitions, probably has no nuclear weapons. A terrorist attack involving a loose nuke or dirty bomb would likely use a weapon stolen or bought in Russia, not Iraq. Though there are other reasons to consider preemptively striking Iraq, it is dangerous to focus myopically on future nuclear weapons threats at the expense of defending against existing ones. The United States should engage the threat of loose nukes and radioactive materials in Russia with the same vigor and diplomatic punch with which it has engaged the Iraqi threat. The effort being made today to secure and destroy nuclear and radiological materials in Russia remains incommensurate, in scope and urgency, with the threat now faced. We are in a race to secure nuclear and radiological materials before terrorists can, but we are not yet running.

Endnotes

Note 1: For simplicity’s sake this article will not look at the potent danger posed by biological and chemical weapons arsenals in Russia and elsewhere. This omission is not meant to downplay these dangers.   Back.

Note 2: There are several stages at which the United States can prevent terrorists from using weapons of mass destruction — several lines of defense. U.S. intelligence services can intercept traffickers and put undercover buyers on the black market. We can improve detection technologies and border controls. But the easiest way to detect such weapons is to stop them from being stolen in the first place. This paper thus focuses on this first line of defense.   Back.

Note 3: “Confirmed Proliferation&-;Significant Incidents of Fissile Material Trafficking in the Newly Independent States (NIS), 1991–2001,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies.   Back.

Note 4: David Isenberg, “Nuclear Materials: More Control is Vital,” www.cdi.org, July 1, 2002.   Back.

Note 5: “Is The U.S. Ready for A ‘Dirty Bomb’?,” Dec. 18, 2001.   Back.

Note 6: In January 2001, a bipartisan task force led by former Sen. Howard Baker, R–Tenn., and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler released a report calling for an increase in non–proliferation funding and urgency and stating that “the most urgent, unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons–usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home.” (“A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia,” The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, Jan. 10, 2001.   Back.

Note 7: “The 10 plus 10 over 10 Initiative: A Promising Start, But Little Substance So Far,” Aug. 12, 2002.   Back.

Note 8: Matthew Bunn, John Holdren and Anthony Wier, “Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action,” Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, May 2002.   Back.

Note 9: “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Testimony of Matthew Bunn for the Subcommittee on National Security Committee on Government Reform, United States House of Representatives,” Sept. 24, 2002, p.5.   Back.

Note 10: Joby Warrick, “Hunting a Deadly Soviet Legacy,” Washington Post, Nov. 11, 2002.   Back.