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Email this citationCIAO DATE: 8/99
Underwriting Humanitarian Assistance: Mobilizing Resources for Effective Action
January 1999
Introduction 1
The hopes and aspirations for international cooperation that marked the end of the Cold War had their most exuberant expression in the industrialized countries’ ambitious approach to humanitarian intervention. Confronted with an unprecedented number of internal conflicts and media images of mass suffering, the Security Council charged the United Nations with more than a dozen new missions between 1987 and 1996. Conceived largely as peacekeeping operations, these interventions nonetheless took on the requirements and drama of humanitarian assistance as genocide, mass migrations and starvation took their toll on millions of people.
The costs of these interventions by and large has been borne by a small number of industrialized countries, principally the United States and European Community members. Yet, despite their generosity in responding to humanitarian crises, little has been done to translate the moral imperative of humanitarian assistance into an effectively organized international response. In fact, as the following pages will argue, the current modes of resource mobilization, including methods of fundraising and the timing and distribution of funds, actually exacerbate problems of equity and efficiency in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
It should not be surprising that the sudden onrush of humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies would reveal a host of unanticipated problems. A large number of diverse actors—donor governments, intergovernmental agencies, international and local NGOs, local authorities, warring parties, and the victims themselves—placed demands and expectations on a new humanitarian enterprise that was in many ways making it up as it went along. Even venerable institutions with long and admirable track records, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, CARE and Save the Children, saw their mandates extended, their capacities taxed and their best intentions put to the severest tests. A plethora of political, ethical and practical problems arose that seemed to call into question the essence of the humanitarian imperative itself. Little wonder that the very countries which established peacemaking and peacekeeping as the buzzwords of the decade began themselves to pull back and question the basic assumptions of humanitarian assistance. Ambivalence replaced ambition as the driving force of this experiment with post-Cold War intervention in domestic crises. Funding levels inevitably declined, placing core humanitarian response capabilities seriously at risk.
The “crises within the crisis” that have characterized humanitarian assistance over the past decade have spawned a remarkable number of re-examinations of the humanitarian enterprise. Some, as in the case of the United Nations, take the form of institutional reform and reorganization; others occasion deep introspection regarding the role of humanitarian workers and their organizations. A number actually question the basic value of interventions which are said to possibly prolong the conflicts and suffering they were intended to abate. In response, a sizeable academic investment is seeking to extract lessons from a fairly complete catalog of case studies of humanitarian interventions over the past decade. Intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations are working to develop new standards of fundraising and accountability and appropriate structures for collaboration. Each of these efforts contributes to the redesign of a more effective humanitarian enterprise and merits careful attention. Central to that redesign, however, is a careful analysis of the role that resource mobilization has played in both the successes and difficulties of humanitarian assistance.
This chapter begins with an analysis of the overall financial situation facing the humanitarian enterprise, with a primary focus on complex emergencies. It examines the way in which the timing and distribution of funding, as well as aggregate amounts, adversely affect the delivery of services in the field. It makes several proposals intended to strengthen capacity and performance in a more integrated humanitarian system, improve the quality of services and contain overall costs. These proposals include advanced funding to ensure the readiness of humanitarian agencies; expansion of the donor base through some regional burden-sharing; and creation of regional and local cadres of humanitarian workers.
The first of these proposals calls for an up-front investment in preparedness measures such as standby capacity, needs assessment and contingency planning, and early response. The second and third proposals, namely regional burden-sharing and local and regional staffing, would appear to have merit in their own right but also make sense strategically in developing an argument for advanced funding. In brief, the current major donors are more likely to commit support for international humanitarian organizations if they can expect some level of burden-sharing in the regions in which crises occur. In turn, the establishment of regional and local cadres of humanitarian workers will reinforce the incentive for regional governments to share in some of the costs.
Taken together, these proposals would dramatically reform the way humanitarian assistance currently is conceived and organized. As the following pages will argue, a package of financing reforms is needed to stabilize and de-politicize the humanitarian response, make it more efficient and ultimately improve services. At root is a belief that the moral imperative that has driven humanitarian assistance in the past needs to be complemented by an effectiveness imperative, lest the political will to engage in humanitarian crises be further eroded in the current donor community. In brief, I am suggesting that a public service model of preparedness replace the present political and altruistic modalities, thereby ensuring that effective response mechanisms are in place when they are next needed.
Current Funding Patterns
The unprecedented surge in armed conflict within states which followed the end of the Cold War resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance. In 1996, over 40 million people were dependent on humanitarian aid, an increase of 60% since the mid-1980s. 2 Their suffering became a common sight on television newscasts, often stimulating demands for assistance among the citizens of donor countries in the West. Triggered in part by this so-called CNN effect, levels of spending on humanitarian assistance increased dramatically during this same period. The proportion of official development assistance (ODA) which the industrialized countries spent on emergency aid quintupled since the early 1980s. Between 1990 and 1996, over $30 billion was spent on humanitarian assistance, with more than 80% coming from OECD governments. 3 Annual aggregate funding levels peaked at around $7 billion in 1994, and recently leveled off at a little more than $3 billion per year.
While this recent decline in humanitarian assistance may reflect a declining number of ongoing emergencies, current funding levels still may not represent sufficient resources to meet current needs. Without systematic and transparent needs and impact assessments, it is difficult to determine whether existing levels of aggregate expenditure are in fact adequate. Unfortunately, government funding tends to arrive following the onslaught of a crisis, when political support has peaked, rather than in its incipient stages when comprehensive need assessments should be carried out. Moreover, national interest criteria usually guide donor government decisions and seriously compromise the equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance across crises, rendering it insufficient in many cases. In any event, there is a strong sense of resource constraint among the community of aid providers. 4
The intergovernmental agencies and United Nations departments most active in humanitarian relief—the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the United Nations Department for Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) [now the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)]—often have to struggle to obtain funds from governments whose national interest priorities usually determine where and for what purposes assistance will be provided. For their part, the private voluntary agencies that implement the majority of humanitarian aid find themselves increasingly dependent on earmarked government funds for their emergency response efforts and spend increased staff time and financial resources raising donations from the public for their general support activities. Furthermore, governmental efforts to encourage private voluntary agencies to play a primary role in the provision of humanitarian assistance have encouraged a proliferation of NGOs which now compete openly with each other for funds.
Mobilizing the financial resources needed for an effective humanitarian response has become a costly ordeal for both the intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations delivering the aid and even for the donor governments themselves. Bilateral donors continue to confront specific funding requests by UN agencies and NGOs and general funding appeals by individual UN agencies and the Red Cross Movement. Other financing mechanisms include emergency funds maintained by most UN agencies, 5 the Red Cross Movement, and the larger international NGOs; allocations from the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) administered by DHA; and public appeals by NGOs, either individually or in consortia. In addition, donors occasionally respond directly, providing resources through donor agency emergency teams, civil defense teams, or military contingents in a humanitarian delivery or support role. While these multiple channels may provide several potential funding windows, they also create ambiguities in the system and often lead to inefficiencies in planning, coordinating, and implementing humanitarian responses in the field.
The percentage of financial resources derived from each of these mechanisms is difficult to determine. 6 Donor governments provide the bulk of financial support, nearly 85% in 1996 (see Figure 1 for funding breakdown). Rough estimates suggest that the United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Assistance Consolidated Appeals Process (the CAP) accounts for about half of donor government contributions; direct donor responses to general funding appeals or requests from humanitarian agencies comprise slightly less. 7 Financial support from non-government sources (corporations, foundations, and the general public) appears to be less than one-sixth of total global funding. 8
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| * See endnote 8. |
UN General Assembly resolution 46/182, adopted by member states in 1991, sought to rationalize the system of fund-raising and coordination of relief efforts through the creation of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the office of the emergency relief coordinator, the CAP, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (see Jan Eliasson’s chapter in this volume for a description of the tasks of each of these organs). Unfortunately, these efforts have only partially succeeded in resolving the complex problems of coordination and competition which result when multiple and diverse agencies seek to raise large amounts of money rapidly in response to complex emergencies.
Shortcomings of Current Arrangements
The CAP has been a useful device for aggregating demand, but it has been unable to mobilize sufficient resources to meet global humanitarian needs. In 1997, only 62.2% of the Consolidated Appeals were met, down from 69.2% in 1996, 72.7% in 1995 and 75.8% in 1994 (see Table 1). Admittedly, the CAP accounts for only one-half of donor contributions, and there is some question regarding the degree to which the “requirements” stipulated in the appeals accurately reflect actual needs on the ground. 9 Still, there is general agreement that its data provide, as one major donor suggested, a “good proxy for the trends in donor response to emergency humanitarian needs.” 10 As such, they suggest that aggregate spending has become increasingly insufficient to meet overall needs.
Table 1: Percent of Consolidated Appeals Covered, 1994-1997
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Affected Country or Region |
Percent of Requirements Covered for Appeals Launched in 1994 |
Percent of Requirement Covered for Appeals Launched in 1995 |
Percent of Requirements Covered for Appeals Launched in 1996 |
Percent of |
| Afghanistan | 59.8% | 52.6% | -- | 33.3% |
| Albania | -- | -- | -- | 56.4% |
| Angola | 83.2% | 45.9% | 56.6% | 52.0% |
| Burundi | 62.2% | -- | -- | -- |
| Caucasus | 62.5% | 60.3% | 35.2% | 62.4% |
| Chechnya | -- | 90.0% | 90.5% | 48.7% |
| D.P.R. Korea | -- | -- | 78.8% | 84.3% |
| Eastern Zaire | -- | -- | 69.3% | -- |
| Former Yugoslavia | 92.5% | 89.5% | 68.6% | 67.9% |
| Great Lakes Region | -- | 91.7% | 86.1% | 84.4% |
| Haiti | 55.5% | -- | -- | -- |
| Iraq | 32.1% | 50.8% | 57.4% | -- |
| Kenya | 57.1% | -- | -- | -- |
| Lebanon | -- | -- | 100.0% | -- |
| Liberia | -- | 74.4% | -- | 36.4% |
| Mozambique | 62.2% | -- | -- | -- |
| Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) | -- | -- | -- | 7.9% |
| Republic of Yemen | 15.7% | -- | -- | -- |
| Rwanda / Sub-region | 95.5% | -- | -- | -- |
| Sierra Leone | -- | 52.7% | 67.2% | 41.6% |
| Somalia | --- | 30.3% | (38.6%*) | 38.6% |
| Sudan | 81.3% | 50.1% | 51.4% | 40.4% |
| Tajikstan | 63.3% | 77.2% | (92.6%**) | 92.6% |
| TOTALS | 75.8% | 72.7% | 69.2% | 62.2% |
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*Somalia appeal covered 10/96-12/97. Data from DHA’s Financial Tracking Database, available on the internet at <http://www.reliefweb.int/fts/fintrack.html>, (visited 5/28/98). |
Funding shortfalls are particularly acute in cases of “forgotten emergencies.” Somalia, for example, has received less than 40% of its CAP requirements for each of the last three years. Afghanistan, which received 52.6% of its CAP requirements in 1995-1996, received only 33.3% in 1997. Similarly, Sudan, Angola, and Iraq hovered at or below the 50% mark in each of the last three years. While there may be many explanations for the uneven distribution of humanitarian assistance, patterns of funding tend to represent clear political choices on the part of the donor agencies. Indeed, some observers have noted that the current humanitarian system may involve a form of triage, in which strategically “important” areas (such as North Korea, which received 79.2% of its 1996-1997 appeals) or widely publicized emergencies (such as the Great Lakes Region, which received 88.2% of its 1995-1997 appeals) are well-funded, while other emergencies are largely ignored. The dominance of such political calculi undermines the “humanitarian” character of these efforts and, in too many cases, leaves humanitarian organizations without the resources necessary to carry out their missions.
Donor funding preferences also result in uneven distribution of resources across sectors. In particular, non-food sectors are consistently under-funded, reflecting the perception of many donors that such sectors are of a lesser priority. The World Health Organization, for example, received less than 15% of its CAP requirements for more than half of the emergencies in 1997; in several emergencies (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Caucasus), WHO received none of its stipulated requirements. 11 This tendency of donors to fund only certain types of activities hinders the humanitarian agencies’ efforts to strengthen the integrated programming approach of the CAP and compromises the effectiveness of the overall multi-sectoral humanitarian program.
The crisis-driven nature of donors’ responses also may result in higher costs over the long run. Donor governments (and private sector contributors) are reluctant to respond with major commitments until compelled to do so by media coverage of tens of thousands of lives in immediate danger. This can cause the humanitarian imperative to converge with a fundraising imperative, causing agencies to rush into the field (where funding is made available) and often encouraging them to remain there at the expense of a careful assessment of their “comparative advantage” to act in certain crises and not in others. Often, agencies have been forced to defer possible early stage mitigating activities and to react to emergencies at a later stage when the complexities of the disaster have expanded exponentially. While hard numbers are not available, it is generally accepted that the human costs are considerably higher at these later stages and that the impact of each aid dollar is much lower.
The short-term nature of donor commitments carries additional costs. Most of the major donor aid agencies will consider only three- or six-month project proposals. These short-term commitments make it difficult for humanitarian organizations to maintain adequate levels of funding beyond a few months. Humanitarian providers are often forced to borrow funds for field operations from other budget lines, anticipating restoration through later payments by donors. With small reserves in constant need of replenishment, humanitarian providers often face cash-flow problems and sometimes deficit spending. 12 These financial pressures shorten the providers’ operational vision, leading them to plan and budget only for short-term projects. The added burden of continually turning out new proposals and concomitant reporting requirements not only requires staff time and resources that might be better utilized in service delivery, but also heightens competitiveness among provider agencies. Crisis-driven funding of this sort, therefore, may well waste resources. It certainly inhibits planning and undermines the effectiveness of programs. Moreover, under these arrangements, donors find it difficult to track the impact of successive appeals or to hold providers accountable for expenditures under specific grants.
Financial dependence on donors with short-term funding horizons also restricts the capacity of humanitarian agencies to set priorities and implement programs that they deem appropriate to needs in the field. As suggested earlier, donors’ decisions to fund only certain programs can severely limit the range of choices provider agencies face. In cases where donors designate a lead agency as the primary channel for their funding, NGOs may find themselves reacting as contractees subject to the lead agency’s agenda rather than as partners in the design and implementation of a shared humanitarian response. 13
Unfortunately, neither the CAP nor the designation of lead agencies has fostered the effective donor coordination they were designed to promote. Lack of real consultation in donor funding decisions creates confusion and inefficiencies in the humanitarian response. In Rwanda, for example, UNHCR asked donor governments to provide “service packages” in an effort to ensure that all sectors were sufficiently covered. Because these efforts were not adequately coordinated among donors, however, certain vital sectors, such as sanitation provision, received little donor support, while higher profile activities, such as the establishment of cholera treatment centers and centers for unaccompanied children, received disproportionately more funding. 14
Uncoordinated needs assessments exacerbate this problem. In fact, the Consolidated Appeals Process has been criticized as being little more than the aggregation of multiple “shopping lists” compiled from the various provider agencies. In at least one instance, inadequate or nonexistent donor coordination even may have contributed to short-term excess. From July to September 1994, at the height of media coverage and public awareness of the Rwandan emergency, the funding “…tap was turned on…” so dramatically that many agency personnel recall that it was possible “…to do anything.” 15 Better coordination and more systematic and transparent needs assessments could have resulted in a more appropriate and sustainable allocation of resources. Accomplishing these, however, would have required up-front resources designated precisely for that purpose.
The fact that virtually all humanitarian activities, with the exception of modest core costs of some of the UN specialized agencies, are financed through voluntary contributions increases the unpredictability of revenues. Voluntary contributions are typically tied to the donors’ annual budgetary processes and are subject to political will. Furthermore, because current financing arrangements are crisis-driven, many organizations have difficulties covering their non-emergency operational support costs, including those associated with personnel recruitment, training, development, and management; public education and associated appeals; financial management; and administration. 16
While greater coordination of efforts, including a clearer division of labor, together with administrative and management reforms, undoubtedly would help to reduce fixed institutional costs, some provision for reasonable overhead charges is necessary if the remarkable strength and resiliency of the humanitarian agencies is to be preserved. 17 Rather than promoting a healthy division of labor among agencies which should be collaborating to ensure that an effective humanitarian response is in place, current patterns of financing create an unhealthy competition among service providers for scarce funds needed to underwrite their operations. In order to attract donor funding, agencies often vie for visibility through the media, profiling themselves in campaigns designed to raise public awareness of an emergency and their own funding requirements. When successful, this phenomenon can create an ironical feedback loop: as donors respond, the increased funding attracts even more humanitarian organizations to the field. Well-publicized emergencies like the one in Rwanda in 1994 can become over-crowded with relief agencies, creating “…the impression of a bazaar” and a “…battle of logos and T-shirts.” 18 The constant competition for funding may skew the humanitarian imperative and hinder coordination among humanitarian agencies.
In Search of Solutions
To address these financing dilemmas and related problems of logistics and coordination, the Center on International Cooperation, at New York University, convened a meeting on “Resources for Humanitarian Assistance” on September 11-12, 1997, at the Pocantico Conference Center, in New York state. The meeting brought together twenty-three senior staff from UN agencies, NGOs, donor governments, and other experts in the field for two days of intense working sessions focusing on several critical topics in humanitarian assistance. 19 Participants at the meeting argued strongly that improvements in the timing, predictability, and flexibility of financing mechanisms would greatly strengthen the humanitarian response. They also believed that cost-savings could be obtained through effective investment in a well-organized humanitarian preparedness system, including on-the-ground material standby and logistical arrangements, rapid deployment capacity, and staffing. They further recommended more concerted efforts at coordination, among donor agencies as well as between service providers’ headquarters and field staffs. In particular, three ideas emerged from the Pocantico meeting which the Center is now developing into a set of proposals. If accepted, these could substantially alter the way in which humanitarian assistance is now structured and financed.
Proposal 1. Up front, un-earmarked funds would enhance significantly agencies’ response capacities, thereby helping to mitigate the worst effects of crises, to save lives and to lower long term costs.
Current modes of short-term, tightly earmarked and crisis-driven financing impede the capacity of humanitarian organizations to plan ahead, to provide early and potentially mitigating interventions, and to fund programs that might have longer term, post-crisis benefits. Noting that the uncertain funding for humanitarian assistance make organizational planning extremely difficult, meeting participants argued strenuously for more predictable and flexible financing to ensure that the core competencies of humanitarian provider agencies could be maintained.
In order to respond efficiently and well to emerging crises, humanitarian agencies need to maintain their readiness. As Larry Minear notes earlier in this volume, “The world does not have the luxury of gearing up from scratch for each new emergency. “ In real terms, this means having sufficient stand-by capacity in the form of experienced personnel, as well as adequate material stocks and the means to deploy them; the ability to conduct carefully coordinated assessments of needs in the field and undertake their own contingency planning; and the wherewithal to intervene early in a crisis when their actions can help mitigate rapid degeneration. Current patterns of crisis-driven funding deny them these capacities.
Some level of predictable, un-earmarked up-front funding is necessary to ensure preparedness in the face of unexpected emergencies. 20 One might well ask what incentive there would be to governments, already reluctant to provide overhead, to advance funds to provider agencies. The answer lies in part in the logic of the argument: to wit, up-front funding will ensure readiness; permit early intervention that helps mitigate the crisis, thereby resulting in long-term cost savings; and enable providers to make more deliberate decisions about entry and exit rather than rush to a crisis and remain there because it contains the font of resources they need for survival.
Convincing governments that the economic calculus makes sense even in the face of strong domestic political constraints will be a formidable task. Most government agencies are reluctant to provide headquarters’ costs because they believe their publics prefer to see funds going directly to field operations. Others worry about the accountability of agencies. Both of these obstacles should be surmountable. Since annual budgets for humanitarian assistance are set in advance and donors know on average what they are likely to spend over a period of time, it should be possible for political leaders to make the case for advanced funding if indeed it were to prove more cost effective and provide better services over time. Moreover, better accountability could result from organizations’ ability to make more deliberate decisions about the appropriateness and timing of their activities, moving from “reflex to reflection,” in the words of Smith and Weiss. 21
To demonstrate the efficacy of this argument, the Center was urged by participants at the Pocantico meeting to undertake a study of the response capacities of several agencies and their impacts on the quality of field operations and ultimate costs. The study, now underway in collaboration with the UNHCR, Oxfam-UK and the International Rescue Committee, 22 is examining: 1) those tasks (and related costs) that are essential to maintain sufficient stand-by capacity, to enable careful needs assessments and thoughtful contingency planning, and to facilitate early interventions; 2) their time sensitivity; and 3) the percentage of overall emergency response budgets they represent. This inquiry should permit us to make a reasonable calculation of the percentage of up-front funding that would be needed by each organization to maintain its core competency at a certain level of readiness. To further make the point, the study is examining with participating agencies actual cases in which the availability of up front funding made a substantial difference and those in which the lack of resources impeded an early response with demonstrable costs to victims and to the agencies and their donors.
Whether these advanced funds are best provided bilaterally or through a CERF-like mechanism would have to be determined. While the former is more likely to satisfy the predilection of donors to fund organizations headquartered in their own countries, the latter—if governance arrangements were properly worked out—would help to free humanitarian aid from some of its political fetters and make allocation of resources more equitable across crises. It could also permit more coordination in the maintenance and deployment of material stocks and provide a mechanism for competitive bidding among agencies. In this way it would substitute a real market mechanism for the current bazaar-like arrangements in the distribution of humanitarian aid.
Proposal 2. Regional burden-sharing will be an essential component of resource mobilization in the future. In addition to helping even out gaps in funding for particular emergencies, it would encourage the current major donors to maintain their commitments to the international humanitarian infrastructure, while ensuring that those most closely affected by crises participate directly in their resolution.
Even at its peak in 1994, humanitarian assistance constituted a very small portion of spending in the world economy, representing only .03% of world GDP, or less than 1% of world defense expenditure for the same year. On a per capita expenditure basis, humanitarian assistance also proved remarkably inexpensive, amounting on average to less than $100 per person in need in 1996. 23 Most importantly, had the humanitarian response not been forthcoming, loss of human life would have been much greater.
Notwithstanding, overall levels of funding for humanitarian emergencies would appear not to be adequate if judged either by the percentage of consolidated appeals actually met or the distribution of funds across crises, sectors and, possibly, agencies. Moreover, the percentage of realized CAP appeals has declined from 75.8% in 1994 to 72.7% in 1995 to 69.2% in 1996 and to only 62.2% in 1997. The fluctuating percentages of appeals met for specific agencies from year to year, even considering changing needs in emergency situations, at best complicate actual response and planning and, at worst, threaten the organizational well-being of the agencies themselves. Most importantly, the needs of many victims are not being met at all.
As noted earlier, the OECD countries provide some 80% of the financing for humanitarian assistance. $5. 5 billion, or 92% of the $6 billion in total reported donor funding for humanitarian assistance in the 1995-96 biennium came from 10 donor countries (over 50% of it from the European Community and the U. S. alone). Another 7% was received from an additional 10 countries, including Australia, Italy, Switzerland, France, Belgium, Finland, Spain and Austria. Some 36 countries accounted for the remaining 1%, leaving over 129 U. N. member states as non-contributors. Of those countries providing humanitarian assistance in 1995-96, fewer than 20 exceeded $10 million in contributions per annum.
Unless there is a shift in the political will of current major donors, it seems unlikely that we can expect increases in their current allocations for humanitarian activities or a reallocation of funds from their other areas of international expenditure. New donors will have to be identified if the present downward trend in meeting humanitarian requirements is to be reversed. While a few additional donor candidates might be found among those non-donor countries with growing GDPs and which rank high in the UNDP human development index, a more comprehensive strategy for responding to emergency crises will probably required.
One possible means to extend the donor base would be to regionalize part of the appeals and response process. There is growing evidence in Africa, Asia and Latin America that regional and sub-regional groupings are opting to resolve their own problems and seeking ways to control their own economic and political destinies. Led by regional powers, or in various coalitions, sub-regional and continental leaders are asserting their desires to settle regional and local conflicts, often through their own trade associations and economic blocs. Regional analyses of emergency situations and their real and potential economic costs, along with an assessment of current (and projected) GDPs and economic growth strategies could demonstrate particular points of convergence between regional or sub-regional interest, capacity and expressions of responsibility.
Evidence suggests that regional economic communities and development banks can marshal some of the resources needed to respond to emergencies that threaten human lives, political stability and economic growth. Precedents for the creation of such regional response mechanisms exist. In 1974, the African Development Bank, then wholly African in its membership, established a Special Relief Fund to deal with droughts and other natural disasters with earned dividends which member states agreed to forego. A Special Emergency Assistance Fund, earmarked for the same purpose, was created in 1985. As of 1993, they had received combined contributions of $50 million. 24 Also in 1993, the Organization of African Unity established a Peace Fund for conflict management-related activities. 25 The Fund for Emergency Programs and Common Services, was established with $50 million in 1976 within the Caribbean Development Bank. The Islamic Development Bank utilizes interest earned on its assets for humanitarian aid within the Islamic community. ASEAN members have agreed to a collective regional response to humanitarian crises but as of this date had yet to create the mechanism or provide the capital for it.
These experiences suggest that the institutional capacity exists to mobilize funds regionally. Moreover, a number of countries that enjoyed real growth in the last few years 26 might be willing and able to contribute financially to the resolution of humanitarian crises that threaten to undercut emerging public and private sector investor interest in their regions. The risk, of course, is that current donors might seek to absolve themselves of responsibility by devolving it entirely on local and regional actors. Furthermore, structures would need to be in place to ensure that humanitarian assistance is not used as a cover for local hegemonic actions (although that is hardly an intra-regional risk alone). Finally, there would need to be some attention paid to a possible dilution of universal humanitarian standards into a variety of regional and ethnic response models that further erode current availability and quality of services.
These are formidable problems, but it should be possible to devise a formula whereby secure funding for international humanitarian organizations would be provided by the 10-20 major donors while a more inclusive burden-sharing system for responding to humanitarian emergencies is developed regionally or sub-regionally. The new found vitality of sub-regional organizations might make them the logical starting place to explore whether a framework could be created for an authentic partnership between local and global actors who until now have been left to play out mutually unsatisfactory roles of donors and recipients.
Proposal 3. The humanitarian enterprise would be greatly strengthened by a more systematic use of local and regional response capabilities. This could be accomplished by training standby cadres of civil servants and other professionals who could be seconded by their employers for humanitarian relief efforts.
Human capital is a prerequisite of a successful humanitarian response. The talented and dedicated staffs of intergovernmental and voluntary agencies carry out extremely difficult missions, often at considerable risk to themselves. Many organizations, however, report that finding experienced staff to deploy to unfamiliar and unstable field locations is one of their biggest challenges. Moreover, unpredictability in the frequency and magnitude of humanitarian crises creates ongoing human resource management problems for NGOs and UN agencies, which are forced to expand and contract their recruitment and training efforts quickly, often without advanced planning. UNHCR, for example, has contracted its staff by 33% since its peak operations in 1994. Whether this represents a momentary lull in the number of crises or is part of a more generalized “downsizing” of intergovernmental organizations, it presents a serious challenge to the UN system and NGOs alike: how to maintain adequate staff capacity during slack periods between crises.
Recruitment and training of qualified aid providers are particularly acute problems in emergency situations, which demand skilled and knowledgeable personnel. Crisis workers are often recruited in a hasty, ad hoc manner for overseas assignments in remote, unfamiliar places to implement complex programs for which they lack adequate experience. They are typically young and mobile individuals whose resourcefulness only partially compensates for their lack of field preparation. They often have scant knowledge of local politics, economic conditions and cultures and generally lack the language skills needed to communicate directly with the people whom they are there to serve. 27 More importantly, while some international presence is often desirable, there is a growing sense that expatriate aid workers displace local human resources which could be employed both to mitigate crises in their acute phase and to promote longer term peace-building and developmental goals. 28
Current personnel preparedness arrangements are largely dependent on a set of reserve rosters maintained for recruiting purposes. Although many NGOs utilize their own reserve rosters for their staffing needs, several of the intergovernmental organizations rely on standby arrangements with NGOs. The self-selecting nature of these rosters and the adequacy of screening and accrediting practices have raised questions about quality control in the recruitment process. Ironically, these same criticisms have limited the use of regionally based rosters that have been developed to facilitate the hiring of local staff. 29
There is a growing sense in the humanitarian community that the use of local professionals in senior operations positions can greatly enhance the emergency response. Yet, while many organizations employ large numbers of local staff, 30 they serve mainly in support functions, and there is a clear preference for employing Westerners in senior policy and management positions. 31 These preferences may be based in legitimate concerns for security, fiduciary responsibility and political neutrality. Nonetheless, the dominance of Westerners is problematic on a number of fronts—politically and ethically, as well as in terms of efficiency and comparative costs. In particular, the relatively rapid turnover of Western recruits, many of whom are available for one to six months, adds to the extremely high costs of field personnel. 32 At the same time, local staff bring special skills and strengths to senior positions, including a greater understanding of the particular political and cultural context in which they are operating. Moreover, building local capacity in the civil sector also contributes directly to post-emergency reconstruction goals and more sustainable solutions. 33
One possible approach to this set of problems would be the establishment of regional and local cadres of civil servants and other professionals who could be seconded by their employers for emergencies within their regions. A set of regionally-based, standardized training programs could add to and aggregate available skills and talents into an effective standby response capability. Issues of security and equity would need to be addressed. For example, some contend that local staff would be more vulnerable to political pressure and physical threat than international humanitarian workers, although—as recent events have sadly shown—the immunity from harm once attached to western status no longer seems to apply. Moreover, it is high time to correct the assymetrical system which exists in the field, with local staff enjoying less authority, smaller salaries and fewer privileges than their Western counterparts.
Many intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies recognize the value of training and development programs for both senior management and new recruits. Anticipating high levels of staff burnout and turnover, however, and with donor emphasis on actual provision of goods and services in the field, these agencies invest relatively few resources in improving worker skills. Some intergovernmental and agency training programs exist, but they are by and large tailored to individual agency needs, philosophies and operating styles. Moreover, even when inclusive of local staff, they are designed largely to enhance individual competencies in particular functional areas.
A standardized training program, flexible enough to incorporate attention to local conditions, could serve several purposes. It could help to prepare standby cadres of humanitarian workers in the field and reinforce the current set of under-financed individual agency training programs. It could, further, provide the basis for certification of humanitarian workers, thereby resolving some of the riskier aspects of current recruitment practices. Making a proposal of this kind practicable, however, would require development of a demand-driven curriculum that would be acceptable to both employing agencies and local users. It also would require a more cooperative system of standby arrangements among agencies and special agreements with seconding institutions.
With will and financing, an experimental program along these lines should not be hard to implement. A number of existing efforts, including national level disaster relief programs, could provide the building blocks. Internationally, training modules for UN and other personnel working in complex emergencies have now been developed by the new UN Staff College in Turin, Italy. An International Diploma in Humanitarian Assistance, offered by The Center for International Health and Cooperation, provides the basis for a certification program. NORAFRIC, the Norwegian effort to create a standby force of 50 African nationals for professional service with UN agencies for emergency operations in Africa, already suggests a model for broader replication. The UN’s Disaster Management Training Programme might provide an initial starting point for a broader effort of the kind outlined here.
Applying this model more widely could help to create a standby capacity of trained, accredited professionals who could be called up on short notice for mission assignments. Such an arrangement would mitigate existing problems of rapid recruitment of often inexperienced and untrained personnel, help to contain costs and contribute to sustainable practices throughout the regions. It would create a sense of local ownership and reinforce local responsibility. There would appear to be sufficient redundancy in the staffs of government agencies worldwide to allow such a program to work. Additionally, the skills and experience acquired by their staffs could bring a host of benefits to the seconding institution.
Conclusion
The shortfalls and predicaments that exist in the current pattern of financing of emergency humanitarian assistance are amenable to correction. Three related proposals which would substitute the current voluntaristic modalities with a public service model for ensuring the provision of essential services have been advanced. These proposals call upon the current major donors to underwrite the international infrastructure required for an effective humanitarian response and sub-regional and regional actors to assume some responsibility for cost sharing when crises occur in their regions. The third proposal urges that the humanitarian work force be realigned to incorporate regional and local cadres of humanitarian workers at all levels of the emergency response.
These proposals, if adopted, would dramatically restructure the way in which humanitarian assistance is now conceived and organized. They would establish an international division of labor based in several partnerships, between major donors and regional governments and institutions, between intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and between international and local NGOs. They would empower local actors and direct their attentions to preventive action as preferential to a far more costly crisis-driven response. Internationally, they would result in increased specialization among public and private agencies, each exercising its particular comparative advantage as part of a system-wide determination of essential core competencies. Overall, they would result in a more efficient and effective delivery system with increased emphasis on cost-effectiveness and impact.
Clearly, a realignment of this magnitude will not be easy to accomplish. It will require extraordinary political will on the part of current donors and a new sense of purpose and responsibility among regional actors, intergovernmental agencies and international NGOs. There may be enough in the way of incentives for most of these stakeholders, however, to encourage them to try. The community of humanitarian providers has learned a great deal from the successes and failures of recent times. The dawn of the new century provides just the right opportunity for them to redefine their goals and cooperate for their realization.
Table 2: Requirements, Funding, and Shortfalls for Humanitarian Emergencies, 1997
|
Affected Country or Region |
Implementation Period |
UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals Requirments
|
Funding
|
Carryover Funds
|
Total Funds Available
|
Shortfall*
|
Percent of 1996 Requirements Covered |
| Afghanistan | 1/97-12/97 | 133,009,192 | 44,297,886 | 0 | 44,297,886 | 88,711,306 | 33.3% |
| Albania | 4/97-6/97 | 10,322,522 | 5,831,391 | 0 | 5,831,391 | 4,501,131 | 56.4% |
| Angola | 1/97-12/97 | 198,735,512 | 103,246,953 | 0 | 103,246,953 | 100,872,975 | 52.0% |
| Caucasus | 6/96-5/97 | 91,291,109 | 52,981,411 | 9,278,970 | 62,260,381 | 34,280,082 | 62.4% |
| Chechnya | 1/97-12/97 | 11,853,100 | 2,976,816 | 2,800,000 | 5,776,816 | 6,076,284 | 48.7% |
| D.P.R. Korea | 4/97-3/98 | 184,393,998 | 158,465,967 | 0 | 158,465,967 | 28,865,287 | 84.3% |
| Former Yugoslavia | 1/97-12/97 | 443,813,734 | 217,105,896 | 91,644,011 | 308,749,907 | 142,463,827 | 67.9% |
| Great Lakes Region | 1/97-12/97 | 313,054,253 | 205,948,983 | 73,676,089 | 279,625,072 | 48,729,181 | 84.4% |
| Liberia | 1/97-12/97 | 31,235,149 | 11,359,872 | 0 | 11,359,872 | 19,875,277 | 36.4% |
| Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) | 11/97-1/98 | 17,730,595 | 1,394,682 | 0 | 1,394,682 | 16,335,913 | 7.9% |
| Sierra Leone | 3/97-2/98 | 57,415,103 | 23,878,455 | 0 | 23,878,455 | 33,539,089 | 41.6% |
| Somalia | 10/96-12/97 | 100,558,830 | 20,063,199 | 21,371,790 | 41,434,989 | 61,755,255 | 38.6% |
| Sudan | 1/97-12/97 | 120,800,500 | 48,799,282 | 0 | 48,799,282 | 72,001,218 | 40.4% |
| Tajikstan | 12/96-8/97 | 33,044,037 | 24,073,725 | 0 | 24,073,725 | 2,431,919 | 92.6% |
| TOTALS | 1,747,267,634 | 920,424,518 | 198,770,860 | 1,119,195,378 | 660,438,744 | 62.2% |
|
Data from the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs’ Financial Tracking Database, available on the internet at lt;lt;http://www.reliefweb.int/fts/index.htmlgt;gt;. *A surplus in one commodity or for a particular agency does not offset a shortfall in another; DHA has adjusted shortfall estimates to reflect actual remaining needs. |
Endnotes
Note 1: I want to thank Rita Parhad for her comments and assistance in preparing this chapter. It draws heavily for date on an earlier draft paper, Paying for Essentials: Mobilizing Resources for Humanitarian Assistance,— which she co-authored <http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/a/a404.htm>. That paper was prepared as a background discussion document for a meeting on Resources for Humanitarian Assistance,— convened by the Center on International Cooperation at the Pocantico Conference Center in New York on September 11-12, 1997. I also would like to thank Douglas Stafford, Thomas Weiss and Randolph Kent for their excellent suggestions. Cesare Romano and Lorenzo Garbo provided valuable comments on earlier drafts. Back.
Note 2: According to former Under-Secretary-General Yasushi Akashi, head of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, about 42 million people worldwide were dependent on humanitarian assistance in 1995. See “Security Council Debate on Humanitarian Crises, Assembly Work on Improved UN Capability, Mark New Peacekeeping Era,” International Documents Review. 26 May 1997, 1. See also Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1996 (New York: United States Mission to the United Nations, 1996) and World Refugee Survey 1996 (U. S. Committee for Refugees, 1996). Back.
Note 3: According to the U. S. Mission to the United Nations, OECD countries provide about five-sixths of global humanitarian aid. See Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1996 (New York: United States Mission to the United Nations, 1996) 23. Back.
Note 4: The widespread perception that dwindling resources for development assistance are being diverted to short term emergency relief only exacerbates this sense of resource constraint. Many intergovernmental and non-governmental development organizations such as CARE and Oxfam, now devote a substantial proportion of their resources to emergency assistance, even though preventive intervention and longer term development assistance are widely believed to be more cost-effective. Back.
Note 5: These include WFP’s International Emergency Food Reserve, UNHCR’s Emergency Response Fund, and UNICEF’s Emergency Programme Fund. Back.
Note 6: According to the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, the difficulty in determining a percentage breakdown from each mechanism is compounded by several practices: funds allocated for one activity are often used for another activity; funds allocated ahead of an appeal are sometimes subsequently counted against the appeal; and agencies sometimes make arrangements for borrowings and reimbursements at a local level. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience. Study 3: Humanitarian Aid and Effects. (Odense:Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996) 111. Back.
Note 7: In 1996, donor governments provided $1.35 billion, or about 49% of total donor funding, through the CAP. Donors reported approximately $1.21 billion, or 44% of total donor funding, contributed to NGOs and intergovernmental organizations outside the CAP. The remaining 6-7% was delivered by donor governments themselves and through bilateral channels. Back.
Note 8: This estimate is based on data obtained from many of the major humanitarian agencies regarding the percentage of their resources derived from non-government sources. Variation in methodologies and definitions render this figure only a very rough approximation. These private donations are critical since they represent contributions to core costs of organizations or permit flexible responses in particular emergency situations. Back.
Note 9: The urgency and the rapidly changing dynamics of a complex emergency necessarily complicate needs assessments, and the desire for rapid donor response may encourage assessment teams to overstate requirements. It should be noted, however, that the Consolidated Appeals are based on a synthesis of information from DHA and humanitarian agencies, in consultation with donor representatives at the country level. Moreover, these appeals are updated frequently—and scaled down as necessary—to reflect changing needs and/or more accurate assessments as they become available. Back.
Note 10: Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1996. New York: United States Mission to the United Nations,1996: 22. Back.
Note 11: Conversely, WFP usually receives well over 70% (and often close to 100%) of its stipulated requirements. See the Financial Tracking Database For Complex Emergencies (visited 05/04/98) at http://www.reliefweb.int/fts/index.html Back.
Note 12: Even the ICRC, one of the most financially stable of humanitarian organizations, has experienced cash flow problems in recent years. Other organizations which have had annual expenditures exceeding annual income include UNHCR, Oxfam, Save the Children, the International Organization for Migration, and Concern. Back.
Note 13: For a comprehensive discussion of current tendencies to contract out,_ see Thomas G. Weiss, Beyond UN Subcontracting: Task Sharing with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-providing NGOs, St. Martins Press, Inc., New York 1998. Back.
Note 14: The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience. Study 3: Humanitarian Aid and Effects, 72. Back.
Note 16: See Ian Smillie, “NGOs and Development Assistance: A Change in Mind-Set,” in Weiss, op. cit., 190ff, for a useful discussion of the costs of not providing sufficient overhead. Back.
Note 17: Practices on overhead charges differ widely. For example, lead agencies are reluctant to cover their partners’ overheads. Not only does UNHCR deny overhead to their contracting_ partners, but it requires them to cost-share in the provision of services. USAID, on the other hand, negotiates a percentage for overhead charges with NGOs which regularly receive contracts and grants from USAID; this percentage is then added automatically to all contracts and grants with that NGO. See also, Larry Minear’s article earlier in this volume. Back.
Note 18: Richard Dowden, The Independent on Sunday, September 4, 1994, quoted in The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience. Study 3: Humanitarian Aid and Effects, 48. Back.
Note 19: A Meeting Report including summary notes from the eight working sessions and the plenary discussions is available on the Center’s website at <http://www.nyu.edu/pages/cic>. Back.
Note 20: USAID service contracts’ were intended to provide guarantees to selected provider agencies, but they serve simply as statements of intent and carry no cash payments to ensure that the providers will be ready when called upon. Back.
Note 21: Edwin M. Smith and Thomas G. Weiss, “UN Task-Sharing: Toward or Away from Global Governance,” in Thomas G. Weiss, op cit, p. 234. Back.
Note 22: The study’s results will be available on the Center’s website at <http://www.nyu.edu/pages/cic>. Back.
Note 23: This calculation is made on the basis of an estimated 40 million in need of humanitarian assistance and aggregate expenditures of $4 billion. Back.
Note 24: E. Philip English and Harris M. Mule, The African Development Bank, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1996, p 119. Back.
Note 25: On that occasion, Secretary-General Salem Ahmed Salem, said, ‘We now have a mechanism, a means which empowers us to act together in the search of solutions to our conflicts. What we need now is to believe in it, to strengthen it, to use it. We must share the burden.’ The Financial Times, July 8, 1996. From 1993-1996, the fund received $11 million in contributions, nearly half from OAU member states. Back.
Note 26: Sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP is estimated to have grown by 4.0% in 1995a trend that seems to be continuing. Back.
Note 27: Participants at the Pocantico meeting suggested that older, more experienced individuals might be better able to manage stress and cope with bureaucratic frustrations. They also contend that more mature personnel show greater tolerance (rather than moral absolutism) in accepting imperfect means and ends. Back.
Note 28: See “Aid Groups Are Hands That Help In Bosnia,” by Elizabeth Becker, New York Times, Sunday, April 17, 1998, p. 7. Back.
Note 29: For example, Africa Humanitarian Action, an Addis Ababa-based NGO, maintains a roster of close to one thousand entries of Africans available for rapid deployment across the continent. Back.
Note 30: For example, CARE, Concern the ICRC and Médecins Sans FrontiÅres report staffing figures of 80-95% local hires. Back.
Note 31: Except when UN personnel are seconded under special mission replacement_ arrangements, recruits are typically Westerners. Obviously, increasing the number of non-Western UN personnel in special field assignments would advance staff development and diversify the profile of humanitarian workers abroad. However, mission replacement often creates serious staffing difficulties at headquarters and does not guarantee that the most qualified people are in the field. Back.
Note 32: A comparison between local and expatriate staff costs suggests that expatriates may cost ten to forty times more than locals. This estimate is based on costs reported by one organization, without indication as to the type of work performed by expatriate and local staff (e.g. management versus support services). Francis Kpatindé, “Real Purchasing Power,” Refugees: The High Cost of Caring. (Geneva: The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1996) 16-18. Back.
Note 33: See Alex de Waal, Dangerous Precedents: Famine Relief in Somalia 1991-1993,_ War and Hunger: Rethinking International Response to Complex Emergencies. New Jersey: Zed Books, 1994, p. 151. Back.
