CIAO DATE: 02/02

Implementation of Multilateral Arms Control Agreements:  Questions of Compliance
Nuclear Tests

Trevor Findlay
Executive Director of the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC)

1999 - 2000

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)

Introduction

The current arms control constraints on nuclear testing are the result of negotiations that spanned more than four decades, from the 1960s to the 1990s. The resulting treaties vary greatly in their scope, applicability and verifiability. The two agreements with potentially universally applicability are the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), which bans nuclear tests in all environments except underground, and the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans all nuclear explosions anywhere. The treaties are open to signature, ratification and accession by all states and are multilateral in the broadest sense. Unlike the PTBT, which lacks a dedicated verification and compliance system, the CTBT is being provided with a full-scale multilateral verification and compliance system of its own.

In addition to these two key treaties, there are five nuclear weapon-free zone treaties which ban nuclear testing, using various formulations. ₁ They are open only to membership by regional states, while the relevant protocols are open to signature and ratification only by the declared nuclear weapon states. None of these agreements has established a technical agency or system to verify compliance with their constraints on nuclear testing. Most do, however, have arrangements for dealing with compliance issues.

Finally, there are two bilateral nuclear test agreements between the United States and Russia (as successor state to the Soviet Union). They are the 1974 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which limited nuclear explosions by the two countries to 150 kilotons, and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), which applied the same limits to so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. Following their signature, the two sides established detailed procedures to help them verify each other's compliance with the agreements.

Although the treaty has not yet entered into force―since it has not acquired the requisite number of ratifications―this paper will mostly be concerned with verifying state party compliance with the CTBT. Not only is the CTBT acquiring the most sophisticated verification and compliance system of any of the test ban treaties, but it will de facto supersede the PTBT and the test ban provisions of the nuclear weapon-free zone treaties for those states which become party to it. It will also render the TTBT and PNET completely redundant if and when Russia and the United States become parties, since neither will be permitted to conduct any nuclear explosions whatsoever.

The Range of Potential Violations of the CTBT and PTBT

Compared with other arms control agreements, the range of potential violations of the CTBT is relatively small, since the treaty itself is 'comprehensive' and relatively simple: it bans all nuclear test explosions in all environments—underground, under water and in the atmosphere. This includes so-called 'peaceful nuclear explosions'―the use of nuclear explosives for civil engineering purposes like the diversion of rivers or creation of underground storage cavities. ₂

The treaty does not define a nuclear explosion, a result of tortuous but ultimately fruitless attempts by international lawyers, diplomats and nuclear scientists to arrive at a satisfactory, agreed definition. However, the negotiating record indicates a common understanding, at least on the part of the nuclear weapon states, that the treaty bans any explosion which produces a chain reaction, however small. So-called 'sub-critical' nuclear tests, in which some atoms undergo fission, but no chain reaction occurs, are not banned. ₃

The treaty also does not ban computer simulations of nuclear tests. Finally, the treaty does not ban preparations to test, partly because it was found to be difficult to define 'preparations', but also because most states parties will also be parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which bans the acquisition of nuclear devices by non-nuclear weapon states and subjects them to an increasingly stringent nuclear safeguards verification regime. ₄ Such decisions have important implications for the verifiability of the treaty, since they narrow the range of activities to be monitored and the facilities to be inspected.

The most likely way that a state would attempt to violate the CTBT is a small underground explosion in an existing cavity. It would be done underground because atmospheric tests are easier to detect and underwater tests more difficult to conduct in a way that produces useful weapons-related data. An illicit underground test would most likely be done in an existing cavity to avoid the necessity for excavation activities which might be detected and in an attempt to attenuate the seismic shock-waves (a scenario known as 'decoupling'). If a state were to attempt to excavate a tunnel or bore hole especially for an underground nuclear test it would most likely do so in an area where existing mining operations could mask such activity and to establish a pattern of normal activity. The explosion would be kept small, under one kiloton, in order to avoid detection by seismic and other means. It would be conducted at night and timed to avoid passes overhead by satellites with remote detection capabilities.

The challenge of verifying compliance does not end here, however, since a state may be suspected of violating the CTBT when carrying out completely lawful activities. The first scenario might unfold when a state conducts large conventional underground explosions for construction or other purposes. The second, more complicated scenario, is when an existing nuclear weapon state, or other state, conducts sub-critical nuclear tests. Although not banned by the treaty, these tests may be suspected of being nuclear explosions with a small nuclear yield, rather than a sub-critical test with no yield. This latter scenario is one of the most difficult that the CTBT verification system must face.

Since the PTBT remains in force and may be the principal constraint on nuclear testing for some time to come for those states which do not accede to the CTBT, it is worthwhile briefly considering potential violations of that treaty too. The range of potential violations is in theory even smaller than for the CTBT, since the PTBT bans only atmospheric and underwater tests. However a complication results from the fact that the treaty also bans underground nuclear tests which vent into the atmosphere any radioactivity that subsequently crosses an international border. This means that even the minutest amount of fallout constitutes a violation of the treaty once it is detected outside the state in which the test has been conducted. Proving a violation therefore depends on the sensitivity of the measuring instruments used and a determination of the source of the radioactivity. This is a different verification task to that facing the CTBT verification system, which must prove only that an explosion took place and identify the state party that carried it out. In the absence of a dedicated multilateral verification system, monitoring and verification and, indeed, accusations of violations of the PTBT (several of which were traded between the United States and the Soviet Union), have been handled by the individual states parties themselves.

The CTBT Verification Regime

Verification of compliance with the CTBT will, in contrast, be carried out by an elaborate international, global system established by the treaty. That system is currently being inaugurated under the auspices of the CTBT Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) which began work in 1997. A Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) based in Vienna, Austria, has been responsible for establishing the International Monitoring System (IMS), which is the principal means by which compliance will be verified, and the International Data Centre (IDC) which will be the hub of the system. In addition, there will be an on-site inspection mechanism for cases in which compliance by a particular state party is under challenge. The PTS aims to have the IMS in place by 2003, regardless of whether or not the treaty has entered into force. ₅

The International Monitoring System

The IMS will consist of 321 monitoring facilities and 16 radionuclide laboratories located in some 90 countries. Some of these already exist, while others will have to be constructed. Four types of stations are to be established―seismological, infrasound, hydroacoustic and radionuclide. In many cases, existing facilities are being upgraded and certified for use by the IMS. While IMS monitoring facilities will be operated by the states on whose territory they are based, the costs of operation and maintenance are borne by the IMS on the basis of assessed contributions by all states signatories and parties.

The four different technologies operated by the IMS are able to detect tests in different environments. Seismic monitoring is best at detecting underground tests (although it might also detect atmospheric tests conducted at low altitude); hydroacoustic technology primarily monitors the oceans; and infrasound is most efficient at detecting atmospheric tests (although it may also detect underwater and shallow underground events).

The Seismic Network

The principal and most mature verification technique for the CTBT is seismology. Fifty primary and 120 auxiliary seismic stations, distributed worldwide, will be used to detect seismic waves generated by earthquakes, explosions or other phenomena. Primary stations will report continuously and in near real time. When fully implemented the network of primary stations should be able to detect all underground nuclear explosions with a yield greater than one kiloton. ₆ If additional information is needed to help clarify the nature of suspicious events, the CTBTO will use data from auxiliary stations. The seismic network will be able to determine the location of an event in an area of a few hundred to a few thousand square kilometres. As of early 2000, fourteen primary and 29 auxiliary seismic stations were certified to PTS specifications. Fifteen more primary and three more auxiliary stations were being installed.

Hydroacoustic Network

Eleven underwater hydroacoustic stations will be used to detect explosions under water or in the atmosphere at low altitude. Six of these will use hydrophones, which have three microphones at each end of 100-kilometre fibre-optic cables, located mostly in the oceans of the Southern hemisphere. Five so-called T-phase stations are based on islands in oceans in the Northern hemisphere and will be used to detect seismic signals created when hydroacoustic waves hit land. Hydroacoustic stations are more expensive, but more sensitive than seismic stations. The hydroacoustic network is expected to be able to detect underwater explosions below one kiloton. In broad ocean areas, the location of such an explosion can be determined within an area of less than 1,000 square kilometres. As of early 2000, four hydroacoustic stations were being installed.

Infrasound Stations

Sixty land-based infrasound stations will use sonar to detect atmospheric tests. Although at present infrasound is the least developed of all IMS technologies, the broader frequency ranges now available make it potentially very sensitive. A single station will usually consist of three or four microbarographs spaced about one kilometre apart to increase sensitivity and help determine the location of an event. Infrasound stations should be able to detect a one kiloton nuclear explosion within several thousand kilometres. The coverage of the network will be global and the network by itself will be able to determine the location of a nuclear explosion within an area of 1,000 to over 10,000 square kilometres, depending on regional and weather conditions.

As of early 2000, three infrasound stations were complete; thirteen more were being installed. The few stations operating have already demonstrated the capabilities of this technology: a Canadian station has detected a space shuttle launch in Florida, some 2,500 kilometres away, while a station in Germany has detected the sound waves from the sonic boom of the Concorde aircraft over the Atlantic. ₇

Radionuclide Stations

Eighty radionuclide stations will measure radioactive particles in the atmosphere from atmospheric nuclear tests or underground tests which vent. Forty of these will also be capable of detecting relevant noble gases, specifically various xenon isotopes. The stations will have the capability to analyse samples and report the findings to the IDC. In the case of suspicious findings, sixteen designated radionuclide laboratories will analyse filters from the stations, plus samples taken by inspectors. While the radionuclide network will be able to detect atmospheric nuclear explosions with a yield of less than one kiloton, its capability to detect underground nuclear explosions will largely depend on the degree of venting of nuclear particles. The network's ability to pinpoint the location of an event is relatively uncertain and will depend largely on the ability to model weather conditions before an event was detected. The main task of the network is not the detection and location of small nuclear explosions but helping distinguish between nuclear and non-nuclear events detected by other verification technologies. Four radionuclide stations had been completed as of early 2000, while fifteen were being installed.

The International Data Centre

Integrating data on a large scale from many different sources poses a completely new monitoring and verification challenge, but is likely to result in great synergies. ₈ Thus, while seismic and acoustic detection technologies under specific circumstances might not provide enough conclusive data to reveal whether a large conventional explosion or small nuclear test has taken place, radionuclide stations might help clarify the nature of the event by detecting radioactive particles.

The IDC, which is being progressively commissioned at CTBTO PrepCom headquarters in Vienna, will receive and process data from all the IMS monitoring facilities. A global communications infrastructure (GCI) has been established for the system using very small aperture terminals (VSATs) to ensure the swift and secure transport of up to 11.4 gigabytes of data between facilities, the IDC and states parties. By March 2000, VSATs had been installed at 25 IMS stations, National Data Centres and developmental sites. Thirty-seven more VSATs will be installed in the near future. Three regional 'hubs', which receive data collected by IMS stations in a specific region for transmission to the IDC, are completed and are now transmitting data from Germany (European hub), Italy (Atlantic and Indian Ocean hubs) and California (Pacific Ocean hub).

As of May 2000 the PTS maintained that the IDC facility was 50 per cent complete. About 100 IMS stations were reporting to the facility and more were expected on-line soon. ₉ The IDC will make both raw and processed data available to all states parties. The extent to which the IDC will make judgements about events is, however, unclear. Yet states without significant national technical and analytical means will naturally look to the IDC for more precise information once initial suspicions are aroused.

One type of monitoring technology that was not incorporated into the CTBT verification system was remote sensing by satellite. This was largely due to the cost of the CTBTO establishing its own satellite system and suspicions about international organisations collecting 'intelligence' information on state activity. However, states parties are free to present satellite imagery derived from their own so-called national technical means (NTM). Moreover, there is nothing to prevent the CTBTO purchasing such imagery from the increasing number of commercial firms selling them or from government agencies which sell degraded versions. Commercial firms are now selling photographs with 1 metre resolution, equivalent in many cases to that available to national security intelligence agencies. With the increasing capabilities of commercial satellites the days when states had a monopoly on high-resolution satellite imagery is fast disappearing. In addition, as a result of the experience of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) for Iraq, there is less reluctance on the part of states to provide national intelligence information to international organisations, and less timidity on the part of these organisations in accepting it.

Satellite imagery could only be used to help determine that a nuclear test had been conducted. It could not be officially used to determine that preparations to test were being made, although one can imagine that it would difficult for the CTBTO to keep such knowledge secret and in any event other states parties and non-governmental organisations with access to the same information would be keen to release it or to use it privately to warn the intending violator to desist.

Apart from satellite imagery, states parties are also able to provide any other form of information derived from their national technical means to the CTBTO to assist it in verification. Such information may be derived from both governmental and non-governmental networks, especially in the seismic area. ₁₀ Apart from the CTBTO's official network, there are several international seismic networks which produce enormous amounts of information. Some real-time seismograms are now being posted on the Internet and would be instantly available to the CTBTO. ₁₁

The treaty also specifies confidence-building measures (CBMs) to reduce the likelihood that verification data may be misinterpreted and to assist the IMS in calibrating seismic stations. The most important CBM involves voluntarily notifying the Technical Secretariat of any single chemical explosion of 300 tonnes TNT-equivalent or more.

On-Site Inspection Arrangements

In the event of information coming to hand that indicates the possibility of a violation of the treaty, any state party may request the CTBTO's Executive Council to order an on-site inspection (OSI) to be conducted on the territory of any other state party. The PrepCom is laying the groundwork for such inspections. Unlike the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the CTBTO will not have a standing OSI inspectorate, since there are no 'peaceful' nuclear test facilities to be routinely inspected and suspect events are expected to be extremely rare. Moreover, any particular OSI will require highly specialised personnel and equipment that can be maintained on a full-time basis only by the most advanced and wealthiest of states parties. ₁₂ Members of any inspection team required will thus be drawn from a pool of trained inspectors nominated by member states. This pool needs to be geographically representative and large enough to supply a team of up to 40 inspectors within six days. Inspectors will require a diverse range of skills and the ability to work in harsh climates or terrain.

OSI teams will be permitted to spend up to 130 days on an inspected state's territory and will therefore require significant in-country support. Substantial amounts of portable equipment will also be needed, including geophysical and radionuclide equipment, drilling equipment, communications equipment and the means to conduct over-flights.

Development of an OSI Operations Manual is proving one of the most difficult areas of the CTBTO Prepcom's work. A group of Friends of the OSI Programme Coordinator has been established, open to participation by all state signatories, to draft the Manual. There are serious disagreements between participants over its scope and purpose. States wary of OSIs favour a minutely detailed manual which explains the purpose, methodology and parameters of the activities to be undertaken by inspectors. Others prefer a manual that outlines the general responsibilities of the inspectors but leaves room for flexibility and, more importantly, is within the spirit of the treaty's OSI provisions. The PTS is currently taking a more active part in the drafting of the operational manual. International experts are also assisting in identifying elements required for an OSI infrastructure, including an Operations Support Centre, information data bank and an equipment storage and maintenance facility.

The Compliance Record to Date

Since the CTBT has not yet entered into force, it is impossible to speak of compliance with the treaty in a strictly legal sense. However, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties obliges signatories to a treaty to act in accordance with its spirit. In the CTBT case, refraining from conducting nuclear explosions would certainly be expected of states signatories. On that basis it must be concluded that to date there is no firm evidence that any state has 'violated' the treaty.

However, there have nonetheless been compliance questions raised about the activities of three nuclear weapon states which have signed the treaty―China, Russia and the United States. In August 1997, Russia was accused by the US of having conducted a nuclear test explosion at its nuclear test site at Novaya Zemlya. The combined data from prototype IDC and non-IDC stations was able to clarify the event and determine that in fact an earthquake with the magnitude of 3.5 had occurred, at least 80 kilometres from the test site. ₁₃ New allegations were made by US intelligence sources in September 1999, during the debate over US ratification of the CTBT, that the Russians had conducted a 'small nuclear test' at Novaya Zemlya. ₁₄ The allegations were muddied when a Clinton administration official suggested that the seismic event detected might have been a Russian sub-critical test.

In fact China, ₁₅ Russia and the US have all been accused of conducting small nuclear tests in the guise of sub-critical experiments (which are permitted by the treaty). The difficulty in verifying the veracity of such allegations is that no verification methods are currently available to distinguish between the two types of tests. Sub-critical tests and contained small nuclear tests which produce a nuclear yield are equally impossible to detect by seismic means or by the other technologies available to the IMS. ₁₆ And even if they were, it would still be impossible to distinguish one from the other by remote means (although they might detect a sub-critical test that had gone unintentionally critical). The CTBT provides for on-site inspection in the case of compliance doubts of this type. However since sub-critical tests are permitted by the treaty and will in all likelihood continue to be conducted by all existing nuclear weapon states, it would be provocative and impractical to conduct a challenge inspection every time a suspected sub-critical test had been conducted.

There are however a number of ways to alleviate concerns about sub-critical testing, principally through greater transparency. While the US does, at least, announce the dates of its sub-critical tests, it does not allow observers at its test site in Nevada where the sub-critical tests are usually conducted underground. Russia does not even announce the date of tests. The US Energy Secretary, Bill Richardson, in October 1999, offered to talk with Russia about bilateral transparency measures, such as reciprocal visits to their test sites and 24 hours' pre-notification of sub-critical tests. ₁₇ By inviting representatives of the CTBTO to observe sub-critical tests, other states could also be assured about their nature and purpose.

Options in Case of Suspected Non-Compliance

The CTBT provides for a standard chain of events in the case of suspected non-compliance by a state party, ranging from consultation and clarification through to referral of a case of proved non-compliance to the UN Security Council. Since the treaty has not yet entered into force, none of these options has of course yet been utilised. Moreover, none of the other treaties dealing with nuclear testing provide much in the way of precedents. While the PTBT has been violated several times, at least by the United States and Russia, through the release of radioactivity from underground nuclear explosions, the onus has been on individual states parties to make accusations, provide evidence and demand that violations cease. In the bilateral US/Soviet relationship such activities simply produced bitter recriminations, since verification of compliance by a disinterested verification body was unavailable.

Consultation and Clarification

States parties are encouraged by the treaty to attempt to resolve, either among themselves, or through the CTBTO, concerns about possible non-compliance, including ambiguous events, before resorting to a request for on-site inspection or other action. Strict deadlines are set for an accused state to respond to a request for clarification, either from a state party or from the Executive Council ₁₈ (48 hours), and for the Executive Council to respond to a state party's request for assistance in obtaining clarification (24 hours). Notably, both the accused state and the Executive Council are given no choice in responding to a state party's concerns. This is meant to preclude procrastination either by a suspected treaty violator or the Council. If the requesting state is dissatisfied with the response, it may request a meeting of the Executive Council. The Council may decide to take action under Article V of the treaty described as 'Measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions'. Alternative, the state party may request an on-site inspection of the suspected non-compliant state before resorting to Article V.

Request for an On-Site Inspection

Any state party has the right to seek an on-site inspection on the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of any other state party to determine whether a nuclear test has been conducted. An OSI request may be based on information collected by the IMS or, more controversially, 'any relevant technical information' obtained by NTM 'in a manner consistent with generally recognised principles of international law', or on a combination thereof. ₁₉

The treaty implies that the Director-General of the CTBTO has no choice but to act on the request, as long as it is accompanied by the relevant supporting information. Indeed, the Director-General must assist the requesting state party in filing its request properly. The deadlines for reacting to an OSI request are much tighter than for a mere clarification request. The Director-General must communicate the request to the named state party within six hours and to the Executive Council and all other states parties within 24 hours. The Executive Council is enjoined to take a decision within 96 hours of receiving the request. A decision to approve an OSI must be made by at least 30 affirmative votes out of 51. This so-called 'green light' provision is in contrast to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), whose 'red light' provision requires a three-quarter majority of votes to stop an OSI proceeding. ₂₀ A separate decision is, however, required by the Executive Council, for an OSI team to conduct drilling, the most likely means of detecting radioactivity caused by an underground nuclear test.

Conduct of an On-Site Inspection

An inspection would be expected to collect evidence such as air and soil samples and measurements of earth and ground water displacements. Additionally or alternatively, it may involve overflights of suspected test sites by aircraft or helicopters. Any OSI must be restricted to an area not exceeding 1,000 square kilometres, with no linear distance greater than 50 kilometres in any direction.

The team must arrive at the point of entry to the receiving state no later than six days after the request for an OSI. The inspected state is obliged to cooperate fully in the OSI, but does have the right to take necessary measures to protect its national security interests and prevent disclosure of confidential information not related to the purpose of the inspection. The inspection team is obliged to conduct the inspection in the least intrusive manner possible, consistent with the efficient and timely accomplishment of its mandate. Where possible, it should begin with the least intrusive procedures and move to more intrusive ones only if it deems it necessary. An observer team of no more than three people, either from the state party concerned, and/or a third party, may observe the conduct of the OSI.

Nonetheless, the inspected state is obliged to provide access to suspect sites, including 'physical access of the inspection team and the inspection equipment to, and the conduct of inspection activities within, the inspection area'. This pedantic wording may well have been inspired by the difficulties experienced by UNSCOM in conducting OSIs in Iraq. The treaty also contains provisions to avoid 'frivolous or abusive' OSI requests. OSIs cannot be used to confirm suspicions that a state party is preparing to test, but only that it has tested.

The treaty's OSI provisions represent a delicate balance between the need for rapid and intrusive access by international inspectors to a suspect nuclear test site, before evidence has disappeared or been deliberately removed or obscured, and the sensitivity of states about their perceived national security requirements. The OSI provisions, in the view of some, represent more a deterrent that may never actually be used, than a verification measure of practical import. ₂₁ Once a clandestine test has been conducted it is unlikely that the offending state, unless it was supremely confident of its ability to hide its activities, would permit access to a test site. Such a refusal would be tantamount to an admission of guilt and is likely to be treated as such. Even if an OSI were agreed, it would not necessarily provide compelling evidence of a violation. As Eric Arnett notes, '...such evidence would not always resolve lingering uncertainties or be compelling to a sceptical audience'. ₂₂ Hence, the emphasis in the treaty is on remote monitoring. A combination of seismic monitoring for seismic waves, radionuclide monitoring for radioactive venting and satellite photography to detect test site activity and changes in the earth's surface—especially cratering—after underground tests, is most likely to be the foundation of proof of a violation.

Follow-up after an On-Site Inspection

The CTBTO Director-General is obliged to make draft inspection reports available to the inspected state party. The party has the right to provide the Director-General within 48 hours with its comments and explanations, and to identify any information in the report which, in its view, is not related to the purpose of the inspection. Once such concerns have been dealt with, the Director-General must promptly submit the inspection report to the requesting state party, the inspected state party, the Executive Council and all other states parties. The results of sample analysis, relevant IMS data, the assessments of the requesting and requested states and any other relevant information must also be provided.

The Executive Council will then decide, on the basis of the report:

1. whether any non-compliance with the treaty has occurred
2. whether the right to request an OSI was abused.

The Council may decide to 'implement appropriate measures' with regard to either of these matters, including referral of the matter to the Conference of States Parties. Such decisions, being matters of substance, require a two-thirds majority of Council members to be passed. If it finds that there has been a frivolous or abusive OSI request, the Council may require the requesting state party to pay the cost of the OSI or suspend its right to request OSIs or sit on the Executive Council. Notably, the Council itself may decide to take measures to redress the situation before or regardless of whether the Conference of States Parties becomes involved.

Measures of Redress and to Ensure Compliance

Ironically, the treaty contains more detail on possible penalties for states making frivolous or abusive OSI requests than on penalties for a state found to be in non-compliance with the treaty. Article V, which is entitled 'Measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions', provides for the Conference of States Parties to decide such measures in accordance with international law, taking into account, but not necessarily following, the recommendations of the Executive Council. ₂₃ Despite its title, Article V enumerates no particular sanctions. In this respect it emulates the CWC, whose negotiators felt that to list the potential sanctions would limit the flexibility of the Conference in dealing with non-compliance.

t is not clear what measures of 'redress', as opposed to punishment, might consist of in the CTBT case. In fact the CTBT is unusual in that a violation could simply be a single discrete event―a nuclear explosion―which, once finished, cannot be construed as a continuing violation requiring redress. Once a test has been conducted and the necessary scientific and military information obtained, there is little possibility of turning back the clock short of seizing the data, which seems unlikely. Since test preparations or the existence of a test site do not constitute violations, there is little that might be 'redressed'. There are no production plants, precursors, materials or weapons to be destroyed, as would be the case if major violations of the CWC and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) were detected. However, since 'redress' is undefined in the CTBT and it appears that the Executive Council and/or Conference can decide on any measures, it may order the offending party to close its test site, presumably with some international on-site monitoring.

In cases where a state party has been requested to take action by the Executive Council to redress a situation regarding its compliance and fails to do so, the Conference may take action. It may also take action when it judges, apparently regardless of the Executive Council, any case where non-compliance with basic obligations may damage the 'object and purpose of this Treaty'. It appears then that the Conference may seize the initiative itself in particularly grave cases, although it is unclear precisely how these are to be distinguished from cases that the Executive Council is dealing with involving non-compliance. Presumably there will be close coordination between the Council President and the Chairperson of the Conference on these matters.

The Conference, in dealing with a case of non-compliance, may inter alia, decide to restrict or suspend the state party from the exercise of its rights and privileges under the treaty. This is a particularly lame threat, since, unlike other arms control and disarmament treaties, there are few side benefits that the treaty gives to states parties. There is no scientific and technological cooperation in the sense of that provided for in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the CWC, since there are no recognised legitimate uses of nuclear explosive technology. States parties will receive some benefits from hosting IMS stations, which will be upgraded to international standard and presumably maintained indefinitely in such a state. However, if a state was intent on violating the CTBT, having capable seismic stations on its territory that might very well detect its own violation is hardly a side benefit. Nor are their trade benefits which might be put at risk, as there are in being a party to the CWC.

Similarly, suspension from participation in its organs or its on-site inspector training programmes is hardly an earthshattering deterrent for a state bent on non-compliance. Suspension from the treaty itself is expressly forbidden in Article II.2. In any event, it would be pointless expelling from a treaty a party which had already treated it with such disdain by violating its principal prohibition.

However, if the violator is also a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT and its attendant safeguards agreements, it will also have violated these agreements by constructing a nuclear device. In this case the IAEA will wish to conduct its own compliance investigation, and if non-compliance is confirmed, enact its own penalties. These are likely to be much more threatening to the interests of the violator, since they may involve banning it from possessing any fissionable material that can be used for weapons purposes. It is for such reasons that cooperation between the CTBTO and IAEA should be encouraged.

The CTBT does, as in many other cases, provide for recourse to the UN Security Council, which may wish to impose much harsher sanctions on a violating party than a treaty body feels able to. The Council will, naturally, have the usual panoply of options open to it, including sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. These included economic and other sanctions and the use of military force, with all the drawbacks that these various measures have. It is difficult to see what use military force might be except for the destruction of nuclear test sites. There has only ever been one case―that of Iraq―in which the Security Council has imposed sanctions on a state for violating its multilateral arms control and disarmament obligations. Since this was also done in the context of a sanctions regime imposed after Iraq's defeat by a Security Council-mandated military action, it is not particularly instructive. The failure of the international community to react to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998 with convincing sanctions may be attributed partly to the fact that they had not violated any international law, but rather a developing norm. Nonetheless it does not augur well for future Security Council action. Moreover, should the violator of the CTBT be a permanent member of the Council, with a veto, or one of its close allies, recourse to the Council may be pointless.

Interestingly, the Executive Council can bypass the Conference of States Parties in seeking such recourse in urgent cases. Presumably this refers to instances where a nuclear explosion has been detected and attributed to a particular states party and evidence exists that further explosions are to follow. It also may occur when the Council is aware that the offending state may be able to command a majority of supporters in the Conference of States Parties to block any proposed action.

Conclusion

Verification of compliance with the CTBT will be immeasurably more effective than has been the case with previous restrictions on nuclear testing. The ban is relatively clear and the verification system is being established to high technical standards. There is a high probability that any state attempting to violate the treaty by conducting a nuclear test in the atmosphere or underwater or a test underground which has a yield of approximately 1 kiloton will be detected and identified. Underground explosions below one kiloton, while more problematic for the system, also may be detected in certain circumstances, providing potential violators with sufficient uncertainty as to constitute a deterrent. The synergies of the international verification system have yet to be revealed, but promise to vastly complicate the plans of a potential violator. The combination of this official system with commercially-derived satellite imagery, non-official monitoring sources, such as scientific seismic networks, and information derived from national technical means, is likely to make the CTBT verification regime an especially powerful one.

What is less clear is what compliance measures would be taken were a case of non-compliance to be verified. The CTBT suffers, as do all other multilateral disarmament and arms control agreements, from a vague and potentially vacuous compliance procedure. Only minor penalties are adumbrated, while recourse to the Security Council may be a remedy that is more illusory than curative. A general lesson that might be drawn from the CTBT is that as verification regimes become more sophisticated, intrusive and expensive, greater attention must be given to the use to which verified evidence of non-compliance is put and the consequences for those whose violations is proven beyond reasonable doubt.

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Note 1: Such zones have been created for Antarctica by the Antarctic Treaty; Latin America by the Treaty of Tlatelolco; the South Pacific by the Treaty of Rarotonga, South East Asia by the Treaty of Bangkok and Africa by the Treaty of Pelindaba. Back.

Note 2: For a detailed account of the history of peaceful nuclear explosions see Trevor Findlay, Nuclear Dynamite: The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Fiasco, Brassey's Australia, Sydney, 1990. Back.

Note 3: Eric Arnett, 'The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty' in SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p. 406. Back.

Note 4: For arguments about the pros and cons of including an explicit ban on preparations to test in the CTBT see Eric Arnett, 'The proscription on preparing to test: Consequences for verification' in Eric Arnett (ed.), Implementing the Comprehensive Test Ban: New Aspects of Definition, Organization and Verification, SIPRI Research Report no. 8, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 48-64. Back.

Note 5: For details of progress in implementing the verification system see Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier, 'Not Quite Ready and Waiting: The CTBT Verification System', VERTIC Briefing Paper no. 99/3, September 1999 and 'Fulfilling the NPT: A Verifiable Test Ban', VERTIC Briefing Paper no. 00/1, April 2000. Back.

Note 6: Provided they are not 'decoupled' by detonating them in existing underground cavities. Back.

Note 7: See Peter Marshall, 'Achievements of the CTBT: Efficacy and Benefits of the Treaty Regime', presentation at seminar on 'CTBT Three Years on - Significance, Achievements, the Way Forward', Vienna, 4 April 2000. Back.

Note 8: A good summary of synergies between the different IMS components is given in Larry S. Walker, 'A Systems Perspective of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Monitoring and Verification', Sandia Report, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, Nov. 1996, SAND96-2740/UC-700. Back.

Note 9: See www.ctbto.org/ctbto/verif for the latest updates. Back.

Note 10: For details see Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier, 'Not Quite Ready and Waiting: The CTBT Verification System', VERTIC Briefing Paper no. 99/3, pp. 6-7. Back.

Note 11: Charles R. Hutt and Harold Bolton, 'Live Seismograms from the NET', IRIS Newsletter, vol XVIII, no. 1, spring/summer 1999, pp. 2-3. Back.

Note 12: For a useful chart showing the type of OSI expertise needed see Wang Jun, 'CTBT Verification Regime: Preparations and Requirements', Disarmament Forum, UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), no. 3, 1999, p. 43. Back.

Note 13: Hans E. Hartse, 'The August 16 1997 Novaya Zemlya Seismic Event as Viewed From GSN Stations KEV and GBS', Seismological Research Letters, vol. 69, no. 3, May/June 1998, pp. 206-215. Back.

Note 14: Bill Gertz, 'Russians may have tested nuclear device underground', Washington Times, 15 September 1999. Back.

Note 15: Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, Washington Times, 18 June 1999, cited in Arms Control Reporter 1999, p. 608.B.512. Back.

Note 16: Although they may be detected by signals intelligence operated by states as part of their so-called national technical means (NTM) of verification. Back.

Note 17: 'U.S. And Russia To Seek New Ways To Monitor Nuclear Test Ban Pact', Michael R. Gordon and Judith Miller, New York Times, 4 October 1999. Back.

Note 18: The Executive Council, comprised of 51 selected states parties, is the executive organ of the CTBTO and is responsible to the Conference of States Parties. Back.

Note 19: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Article V (D), para. 37. Back.

Note 20: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Article IX, para. 17. Back.

Note 21: Steve Fetter, Towards a Comprehensive Test Ban, Ballinger, Cambridge, Mass., 1988, pp. 132-136. Back.

Note 22: Eric Arnett, 'The complementary roles of national, private and multinational means of verification' in Eric Arnett (ed.), Implementing the Comprehensive Test Ban: New Aspects of Definition, Organization and Verification, SIPRI Research Report no. 8, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, p. 83. Back.

Note 23: The following analysis was assisted enormously by that done comprehensively for the CWC by Douglas Scott and Walter Dorn, 'The Compliance Regime under the Chemical Weapons Convention―A Summary and Analysis' in Canadian Council on International Law and The Markland Group, Treaty Compliance: Some Concerns and Remedies, Kluwer Law International, London, 1998, pp. 87-131. Back.