Changing Worlds of Security

This article has been prepared for publication in: Keith Krause and Michael Williams, ed. Critical Security Studies (forthcoming: University of Minnesota Press). The author would like to thank the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research (University of Amsterdam) for their generous support of this project.

In recent years scholars of international relations have been preoccupied with redefining security, ₁ which implies that the meaning of this concept, as used in the Cold War context, has changed. The purpose of this article is to return to the 'rough ground' of the everyday language of the Cold War and its aftermath to trace the changes which gave rise to these definitional questions on the part of scholars. The task is not to ask 'how should we redefine security' but rather what was the meaning of security for actors within this context and how was this world transformed, given the regularities and constraints assumed by the logic of 'security dilemmas'?

Arguments that the West 'won the Cold War' have become a standard feature of public and academic discourse. Charles Kegley, in a recent article, raised questions about this or other overly hasty and single cause explanations for the transformation of the East-West relationship. ₂ He called for a more thorough investigation, an openness to multiple causal relationships, and presented a metaphor of 'autopsy' to lend coherence to a set of procedures for future coroners to follow. While sympathetic to Kegley's critique, and the need to look more broadly at this context, the autopsy metaphor, in so far as it relies on procedures adopted from the natural sciences, will not solve the problem he identifies since, based on these procedures, the scientist brings a set of meanings to the world he or she analyzes. The task in this case is to trace a change in the meanings political actors attached to practices of security.

The scientist, like Kegley's coroner, begins by positing the object of explanation (identifying the body), fixing the meaning of terms, and establishing relationships, after which he looks at the world. To fix is to hold the meaning of words in place on the basis of the scientist's definitions. Another way of proceeding, more appropriate to the analysis of change, is to approach the context, that is, the social relationships in which meanings are embedded, directly. This involves examining the positioning of subjects or objects in relation to others, their meaning within a whole; how the actors themselves establish boundaries and act within a particular time and place, what kinds of distinctions are made, what kinds of relationships are constrasted, what types of language games are played, what actors in different positions 'do', and the meaning of these acts within a context. In undertaking this excavation, I draw on several themes from the work of Wittgenstein, and particularly his Philosophical Investigations.

Rules and Language Games

A central point of the hermeneutic critique of positivism was that social activity could not be simply observed without taking into account the meanings social actors attach to their actions. Rules are a part of social life, of meaningful speech or other forms of action and we cannot begin to have knowledge of a context or the practices by which it is constituted in the absence of knowledge of the conventions by which practice is guided.

Rules often makes us think of games. Since game metaphors have been so important in the field of international relations this may be a useful place to briefly explore a contrast between the assumptions of procedures drawing on a natural science model as opposed to a more explicitly social alternative.

Waltz' neorealism has often been conceptualized in terms of a billiard game. The metaphor tells us something about the assumptions of this model of interstate relations. The billiard ball has a hard crust. We can't see inside it. The insides of each ball are identical, as far as the observer can see. Any movement of a ball on the table arises not from the ball itself; it is rather propelled across the surface on impact from another ball or changes course as it collides with the rim of the table. The cause of action is outside and independent of any one billiard ball.

A different game illustrates the underlying assumptions of an approach that begins with a notion of social rules. In a game of chess individual players have to think strategically in making moves. Notice already that the focus is on the players not on the objects as in the billiard's metaphor. When applied to international relations, no mention is ever made of those who initiate the movement of the billiard balls. In any case, in a game of chess, movement of the pieces is not determined, as in the example above; rather, in making any move from a particular place on the board or with a particular piece, for instance, a knight or bishop, the player employs the rules of the game. This is not to suggest that she cannot cheat or break a rule--this is given by its existence--rather, so long as two players are playing chess, any meaningful or strategic move will depend on the rules by which the game is constituted, which may be either followed or broken. If one player doesn't know the rules, says he wants to learn them, but the other says, sorry, they are a secret, it is not possible to proceed with the game. If one player starts playing according to the rules of monopoly we can't say this is a game of chess. The point is that the rules are public in nature, shared by both players, In playing, action is not determined by the rules but players follow rules in acting.

One question one might ask is why a particular move rather than another was made; that is, what were the intentions of the player. This has been the focus of many hermeneutic approaches. My focus, however, is the public nature of the rules themselves and how these rules provide a tool for mapping moves in a changing game in order to gain knowledge of the nature of the game and its transformation over time.

The public nature of these rules points to the centrality of language in either learning or knowing how to proceed with a particular kind of game. Public, in this case, refers to the social nature of meaning and language in contrast to arguments that both originate with 'mental processes'. Wittgenstein argued against the idea of 'private language.' ₃ While experience may be individual, it can only be meaningfully understood or communicated to others on the basis of a language whose rules are shared. These rules must continuously be projected into new contexts in which their meaning may change. It is not possible to simply observe behavior, to understand its meaning, without analyzing the language games by which action is structured, any more than we know or can learn the meaning of various pieces of chess or the rules by which they are used in the absence of language. Language is woven into the range of acts constituting a game and language is the vehicle by which we are socialized into, or learn the rules of how to proceed in any context. Analysis of this kind, of changing language games, makes it possible to identify a degree of coherence, at least in the contexts analyzed here, that is often presumed to be missing at the international level. This coherence cannot simply be observed in nature; it has to be recovered from a context, by returning to the rough ground to see what actors are doing, what rules they follow, and how they make different kinds of moves from any one position in social space.

Language Games and Forms of Life

The language games of a specific culture, the fact that they are shared games, rich with meaning, tell us something about the contours of a world. Within the culture of the Cold War, 'security' is the glue by which multiple language games are bound. The English term 'domestic' derives from the Latin 'domus', meaning home or house. The Russian word for house is also 'dom' ₄ . The use of the word 'domestic' to describe the internal sphere of the state is rooted in the grammar of a particular kind of space, a home, which is occupied by particular kinds of human beings, that is, families. Security within this world belongs to the same grammar. The use of the word 'social' security emerges along with the increased role of the state in providing certain types of services or care traditionally left to the family, and was followed, in the post World War II world, by the language of 'national' security, defining an explicitly protective relationship between a state and its citizens. The elevation of 'security' to the state level involved conceptualizing states in terms of families, homes, and the protection and security they are presumed to provide.

Metaphors of homes providing security to a family are not specific to the Cold War but relate to a longer tradition of conceptualizing security in terms of particular kinds of structures whose boundaries distinguish the intimate relations inside from those who threaten from outside. What now finds expression in metaphor can be traced back to historical forms of life which continue to be meaningful in conceptualizing relationships between more abstract entities such as states. The medieval fortress was composed of impenetrable walls intended to keep enemies out. The impenetrable walls of the fortress or castle existed to protect the more intimate relations inside from those outside who potentially threaten to penetrate these barriers. When deterrence, during the Cold War, was referred to as a foundation of Western security, the structural metaphor conveyed a similar meaning that the nuclear threat works to keep the Eastern enemy out of the nuclear fortress occupied by the transatlantic alliance. When Gorbachev conceptualized changing security relations in terms of a common house, or NATO proposed a new architecture, the structural metaphor spatialized the security relationship, in so far as structures construct walls distinguishing those inside from those outside. The insides and outsides of Gorbachev's common house were quite different than those of the architecture and it was precisely the boundaries and definition of Europe, as well as who was inside and who out, that was at stake.

Marriage and courtship are also forms of human life which in an earlier period were practices constituting diplomacy. Conceptualizations of the classical European balance of power rely on related language games. Take, for instance, the following discussion of the working of that system:

With more than two states, the politics of power turn on the diplomacy by which alliances are made, maintained, and disrupted. Flexibility of alignment means that the country one is wooing may prefer another suitor and that one's present alliance partner may defect. A state's strategy must please a potential or satisfy a present partner. [...] Similarly, with a number of approximately equal states, strategy is at least partly made for the sake of attracting and holding partners. Suitors alter their appearance and adapt their behavior to increase their eligibility. [...] Ever since the Napoleonic wars many had believed that the 'Republic' and the 'Cossack' could never become engaged, let alone contract a marriage. The wooing of France and Russia, with each adapting somewhat to the other, was nevertheless consummated in the alliance of 1894 and dully produced the Triple Entente as its progeny"

While the language of courtship structures our understanding of the classical European balance of power, language games relating to intimacy also constitute alliance relations within the Cold War, and by comparing the two, both the common origin and the distinction in the rules structuring the two eras becomes evident. Within the context of the Cold War both NATO and Warsaw Pact refer to each other as neighboring 'families'. NATO discourse is filled with language games relating to the commitment between two partners, United States and Western Europe, which is directly related to the central speech act by which they are united, the promise of the nuclear guarantee. The following is one of the more blatant examples of this language game:

The United States and Europe are an old couple. Almost forty years of marriage is a long time at the end of the twentieth century. The knot was tied at the end of the 1940s in a storm of passion. [...] The U.S.-European relationship has never really fully developed; it has never acquired the calm resignation of those couples who understand that, while their love is imperfect, wisdom and happiness in some ways involves a readiness to live with the faults and shortcomings of the other party. [...] The U.S.-European couple cannot be divorced. For the United States, such a divorce would mean surrendering the role of superpower; for Europe, it would mean re-examination of everything which it has been since 1945. But can this couple devise a relationship which, while no longer exclusive, would remain privileged? ₅

While security within the Cold War is heir to an earlier culture of international relations, it shares only a family resemblance, since they are structured by two different sets of rules which are quite opposite. The classical European balance of power worked largely to prevent a major power from securing the space of a smaller state in anything more than a temporary sense. The language of the classical balance of power was one of 'courtship' and 'wooing', not permanent alliance. It is only with the Cold War that this game of courtship is replaced by one of 'commitment' and 'marriage' and with it the securing of spaces larger than particular states on what seemed to be a permament basis. Most noteworthy about the map of Europe during the forty some years of the Cold War was that it was frozen or secured in place. There was no movement from one alliance to another; to have done so would have been to risk nuclear war.

Both the difference and the commonality of the two eras is expressed in a grammar of intimate relations. Here I use grammar to refer to a particular region of language involving clusters of related concepts, both adjectives, nouns and verbs which we recognize as related on the basis of a particular language, in this case English, and which contains the range of possible moves from any one position. The notion that a grammar structures knowledge of alliance formation in different historical contexts is significant on two levels. First, the distinctions illustrate the relationship between contextual games and particular cultural forms. As will be explored below, NATO's nuclear family is structurally similar to cultural representations of the nuclear family in the West in the post-World War II context. Knowledge of actors and action at the international level relies on cultural forms; language games from one level of human experience are projected metaphorically to the realm of interstate relations. ₆ Second, these language games construct particular spatial distinctions, which emphasize certain aspects of identity while obscuring others. The heterogenous national landscape of Europe, or its numerous divisions into separate states, fades against the background of a spatial division between two blocs, East and West. Western and Eastern Europe are homogenized, constructed as members of a single family, sharing a single set of values, contrasted with those of the 'other' family. This particular distinction between families relies on a much different division of space than the 'courtship' games of an earlier period within which separate European states 'woo' or 'attempt to remain attractive' in a context of ever changing affairs. The point is that language games construct a field of action which is defined by specific possibilities.

The remainder of this text is based on an analysis of changing grammars related to language games of structure and intimate relations spanning a period from the mid-seventies to the first half of 1994. The analysis is drawn from a large number of texts from several actors, both state and non-state, in East and West. The analysis is presented in a narrative form in which I attempt to demonstrate the forms of action characteristic of each player at particular points in time and how the games begin to change as actors make different moves, drawing on the possibilities belonging to one grammar or the other. Only direct quotes have been footnoted, but all references to attributes or actions belonging to one grammar or the other are based on their recurrence in text after text by different authors at particular points in time. In it not possible for purposes of publication to include either the detailed references or the complete bibliography. Readers interested in this information are encouraged to consult the larger study. ₇ The exercise is primarily descriptive in nature, attempting to trace changes in language games related to security and thereby say something about the context from which current questions about redefining security have emerged.

Family Affairs

Language games of family structure the public texts of both alliances within the Cold War in slightly different ways. Both rely on a grammar of security but the structuring rules of each family are different. This does not mean that any one writer is forced to use exactly the same words, but that they draw on a shared language comprised of clusters of concepts belonging to a grammar of families and security. The following story illustrates the structure of relationships underlying this versatile grammar at the beginning of the 1980s. A main point is that these do not represent the interpretations of individuals, but rather a public language which reappears again and again and, subsequently, constitutes the identities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as knowledge of what they do.

The relationship between the NATO discourse of security and the construction of NATO as a family is evident from the public artifacts of this organization in the early 1980s. The nuclear family of the West is built on a commitment between a stronger partner and a weaker one. The title of one article in the NATO Review, "The Atlantic Family--Managing its Problems" ₈ , names the metaphor directly. This family includes partners whose stable relationship is characterized by commitment, faithfulness, duties, responsibilities, common burdens and obligations. The stronger partner has gotten into the habit of making most of the decisions, however, partly due to his more global responsibilities, in contrast to the primarily domestic responsibilities of the other. This relationship, which 'is now an old one,' ₉ has become no less intense over the years. The partners are bound by what bound them forty years ago and would not feel safe if they could not rely on each other. As one partner described it, "their safety and ours are one" ₁₀ "We were with you and are with you now, our hopes are your hopes, your destiny is our destiny." ₁₁

The stable and secure relationship of NATO's nuclear family is based on a foundation of values and friendship, as well as inequality, since the two differ in capabilities. The one, being stronger, offers protection and ensures the security of the weaker, who cannot feel secure on her own, in the face of the Soviet Union, who wants to isolate the two, making the feminine partner docile, productive and supportive. The main objective of the Soviet Union is to split or decouple the partners.

The neighboring enemy to the East also refers to its unit as a family, although based on different values. They occupy a 'home', but it seems to be a very masculine family, 'fraternal' and attached to a 'fatherland', where everyone is said to be equal. It is a particular kind of individual that is protected by the fraternal family, the laborer, and the socialist system in which he labors. Like NATO, the Soviet Union is concerned with preventing a shattering of the unity of this family by an 'interference' in its domestic space. Poland, in the early eighties, is a key concern precisely because it is the place where this interference is said to be most evident, and a space most vital to the maintenance of international security. Actors in both households are concerned that their unity is being shattered, both are protecting a set of values. It is this difference in values which is said to be the cause of conflict between them.

In the West 'security' was inseparable from the need to secure the space of Western Europe, the securing of a feminine object by a masculine subject, the United States. The relationship was consensual, based on a shared history and culture, was less imposed by the Americans than desired by the Europeans--although the balance between these two was precarious--but the relationship, nonetheless, involved the securing of a larger continental space by an external power. While the Warsaw Pact also presents itself as a family, the Soviet Union actually focuses its gaze, like the United States, on Western Europe and its relationship with the United States. The Soviet Union transforms the hierarchical commitment and need expressed by NATO, into the imposed obedience of Western Europe to the diktat of the United States. For the Soviet Union, the Western alliance is a form of imprisonment, done by people 'overseas,' not present, not part of the European continent. While Western Europe was the feminine object which held each superpower's attention, Eastern Europe lacked any identity whatsoever, largely invisible, indescript, historically abandoned, visible only as a domestic space in which the West should not interfere. The two family spheres in East and West, as well as the security dilemma constituted between them, were mutually reinforcing, a family feud in which the 'other' was not to be trusted because of the lack of correspondence between words and deeds.

In the early 1980s, both East and West are consumed by the need to keep their families together, in light of a renewed threat from the 'other' and the activities of a 'younger generation,' which begins to question the fundamental values upon which each family is based. The naming of oppositional movements as a 'younger generation' is particularly evident in NATO artifacts, ₁₂ in which the Western peace movement is characterized, among other things, as 'immature, naive, and irresponsible'. The connotation of this particular label is that these movements are made up of rebellious 'kids' reminiscent of the sixties. ₁₃ Participants in the peace movements are not necessarily young, however, as various opinion polls have demonstrated. ₁₄ This labelling effort on the part of NATO communicates a particular image of these movements and what they are about, that is, overturning a set of values by which peace has been maintained in Europe since World War II. While Eastern European 'dissidents' are cast in less familial terms by state officials, the conflict has been discussed by many as the difference between the World War II generation and those who grew up in the relative wealth and security of the post-War period. ₁₅

While the two families are concerned with providing security for their domestic spaces, the younger generation in each house is attempting to emancipate itself from the destructive practices of each family. In this sense the critical movements take these language games of security very seriously: while the families claim to provide security, the oppositional movements expose or rename this security as a source of insecurity. Their actions relate to this same grammar of families or intimate relationships, but they make a different move in the game, based on a renaming of the relationship. 'Emancipation', and the cluster of concepts belonging to it, is a game that can belong to a grammar of families, ₁₆ but is not within the realm of possibility in alliance games based on the permanence of a particular family structure. The structuring role of these concepts is evident in the texts of Solidarity and the Western European peace movement.

The central value of the Eastern house is protecting workers in the process of building socialism. Yet, as the protector becomes a source of threat to workers, KOR, and later Solidarity in Poland, attempt to reveal, to expose abuse by the Party and State of those rights which the latter has promised to protect, both in its own constitution and in signing the international Helsinki accords. The younger generation is revolting against the oppressive control of the family over all spheres of life and wants to open up a dialogue with the government so that society can take its fate into its own hands, speak with its own voice, and develop its own self-governing and independent institutions.

In the West, while the Alliance partners claim to be protecting the Western family, the acquisition of more and more sophisticated weapons, as well as heightened tensions between the two families, are making many feel insecure. While the family names the neighbor as the source of threat, the peace movement names the deployment of a new generation of weapons, as well as nuclear weapons and deterrence in general, as the primary threat. Like Solidarity, the Western peace movement is busy exposing a distinction between the words and the deeds of the older generation.

Social movements in both houses are calling for emancipation from a particular form of politics, a politics which has become a source of insecurity. At the international level, 'talk' between the two households, in its present form, serves only to fix the antagonistic relationship between them. The main function of this antagonism, and the negotiations by which it is preserved, is, in their view, to 'discipline' the younger generation and the alliance partners. That which the Alliance names a relationship of security and protection, the Western European peace movement renames a relationship of dependence and submission. They call on Europeans within each alliance to reclaim responsibility for their own lives by taking a more independent role, disengaging from the military side of the relationship and liberating themselves from the ideology of the Cold War. Common security between East and West requires loosening the hold of the two families and opening up spaces for more voices to speak.

The foundations of each bloc enclose two different kinds of families, neighbors who can't get along because of a difference in values. In both houses the 'younger generation' is making different moves within these family games, pointing out the distinction between the claim to provide security and protection and what is in fact being done. The analysis can be broadened by looking at the relationship between these family games and a structural change over a longer period of time. The structural grammar was excavated from a larger range of documents, involving the same actors, covering the period from 1975 to 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed. This involved pulling out predicates related to a range of attributes, from ceilings to walls to foundations, as well as a range of possible moves, both active and passive, for instance, maintaining, building, eroding, undermining, restoring, etc., attempting to delineate patterns of action attached to specific actors. What follows is a rough sketch of moves in language games by which the structures of the Cold War were dismantled. Following this I return to the further transformation of both security grammars in the post-Cold War world.

Dismantling the Cold War Structures

In the mid-seventies, at the height of detente, following the signing of the Helsinki Final Act by the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) , both superpowers engage in acts of structural maintenance. NATO provides a framework that rests on the foundations of deterrence capability and transatlantic ties. NATO is a political structure furnished with military means, a structure whose central task is one of maintaining deterrence, defense capabilities and the political cohesion which provide the cement of the foundation. Likewise, the socialist family of the Eastern bloc also provides a framework which rests on the foundations of socialist production, Marxism-Leninism and the unity of the socialist countries. The socialist alliance is the cornerstone of relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Like NATO, maintenance is a central task of the Warsaw Pact, in this case the object of which is socialism, peace, and equilibrium. Detente also provides a framework which needs to be maintained.

Within the detente framework the West is facing several problems maintaining its own security structure; it is proving difficult in the context of a deteriorating economy to convince Western publics to pay for defense, against the background of relaxed superpower relations. Despite these economic problems, no one at this point believes the welfare state, which is seen as a barrier to Soviet political intentions in Western Europe, can be dismantled. NATO is concerned that the Soviet Union, in the meantime, is building up its military potential and attempting to undermine the internal politics of the West. It is believed this combination of factors may make it possible for the Soviet Union to fulfill its ultimate objective of dismantling the NATO Alliance and separating Europe from America.

The Soviet Union expresses confidence at this point that socialism is being built in Eastern Europe and maintains a consistent policy that the military organizations of the two blocs should be dismantled. By 1977, however, the Soviet Union becomes increasingly concerned that the Eastern foundations, as well as the framework of detente, are being undermined by the West. One source of concern is the development of momentum in the United States to restore the deteriorating foundations of deterrence. In conjunction with this, the SALT II treaty is being undermined, as are the social and political systems in the East, as evidenced by Charter 77 and other human rights groups, whose activities are said to be orchestrated by the United States.

About the same time KOR forms in Poland, followed a few years later by Solidarity and with it a conflict between workers attempting to dismantle totalitarianism and the Party attempting to restore order. Notice the relationship between dismantling and restoring. There is an oppositional relationship between the two forms of action, accompanied by a different naming of the object of action, which for Solidarity is totalitarianism and for the government socialism. According to the government, the foundations of socialism are eroding as a result of this conflict. The government argues that the West is attempting to undermine socialism and the leadership of KOR and Solidarity, as distinguished from the mass of workers, are its puppets. As it is forced underground with the implementation of martial law, Solidarity continues with its efforts to construct independent Polish institutions.

In the West, in 1979, NATO begins the restoration effort with the decision to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles in five European countries. Reagan is elected to office in the United States on a platform to restore both the American defense posture and the economy. The restoration effort involves movement toward a countervailing strategy, based on arguments that a MAD posture is an inadequate basis for the American strategic commitment to Europe. In response a mass peace movement emerges in Europe, particularly in the five NATO countries slated for deployment. At the basis of many of these movements is a rejection of deterrence and arguments that peace can only be built on trust. In contrast to NATO claims that nuclear deterrence preserves peace, the peace movements question whether the arms race contributes to security or undermines it, given the movement toward a first strike strategy and the increasing destructive power of nuclear weapons. The peace movement is attempting to build a new power base within Western European societies, and similar to Charter 77 and Solidarity, it argues this movement has to be built outside established political institutions.

Reagan and NATO, following on the coattails of the Committee on the Present Danger, undertake efforts to restore the nuclear deterrent. Related to this, Reagan sets out to restore the American economy by cutting back on government bureaucracy. In order to restore America's position in the world, it is necessary to increase spending for defense in order to rebuild systems that have become antiquated through years of neglect. This can only be done by restoring the economy, which is held back by bureaucratic stagnation.

While the initial concern stimulating this restoration effort was a Soviet buildup and erosion of the nuclear deterrent, by 1982 and 1983 it is the 'unilateralist' peace movement that is undermining and eroding the Western foundation and the Soviet Union, it is claimed, will use this to its advantage. NATO is increasingly pulled apart by the conflicting demands of public opinion and the rhetoric and policies of President Reagan. The source of the renewed fear of nuclear war is, however, attributed to a change of consciousness which is part of a psychological war waged by the Soviet Union against the West, aimed at undermining its will to preserve its way of live.

As the deployments in Europe begin in 1983, Reagan is confronted with his own domestic battles relating to the Nuclear Freeze proposal which has been introduced into congress. In April he announces SDI as an alternative to nuclear deterrence, stating "what if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon a threat of instant retaliation." ₁₇ He presents a future when security would not rest on the foundation of deterrence but argues it is necessary in the meantime for the US to remain constant in preserving and maintaining deterrence. The deployments proceed and Reagan is re-elected by a landslide but the alliance continues to be threatened with the erosion of its foundations. The concern of 1980 and 1981 about erosion of the deterrent, due to Soviet actions, is replaced by concern about the erosion of public support upon which that deterrent is based The conflict is qualitatively different than past conflicts within the alliance--not just routine conflicts between states within NATO but points to the crumbling framework within which defense debates have been conducted throughout the post-war years. The deployments have gone ahead but the consensus upon which Alliance policy is based has all but collapsed.

Part of the Western European peace movement has a two-pronged strategy and as deployments begin, they shift attention to the other part of this strategy. The focus prior to 1983 was attempting to persuade national governments to refuse deployments. The other objective, articulated in the END appeal of 1980 begins with a renaming of the two mutually sustaining structures of the Cold War. It is not one side or the other that is maintained by the practices of the superpowers, but the Cold War itself. The objective is to dismantle this structure and break down the barriers separating East and West. While the central actions of the two superpowers, restoring, maintaining, undermining, are acts undertaken with military tools, the dismantling actions of independent movements are directed more to the ideological structures in which the military actions of the arms race are embedded. Dismantling takes the form of beginning a dialogue with independent counterparts in Eastern Europe.

Within the context of the Cold War, movements on the two sides are by definition at cross-purposes with each other; Western authorities see the population as prey to a psychological war on the part of the Soviets relating to issues of peace; Charter 77 and Solidarity, according to the Soviet Union, are stimulated by a psychological war on the part of the West. The United States cheers on the latter; the Soviet Union the former. There is a direct relationship between the maintaining and the undermining efforts of each bloc--these are rules structuring the interbloc relationship. The dismantling effect of this dialogue can be understood within the framework of Vaclav Havel's argument that the dissident's act of breaking the rules, disrupts the game itself, exposes it as a game, as convention, rather than permanent necessity. ₁₈ From the perspective of the Soviet Union this dialogue effort by END is aimed at undermining the anti-war movement and the socialist system. The attempt to develop a dialogue between Western peace movements, whose disarmament demands have been cheered on by the Soviet Union, and independent initiatives in the Eastern bloc creates a blurring of the distinction between friend and enemy.

Part of the dialogue effort is to restore the Helsinki Final Act to its original meaning. Although Helsinki has been interpreted as cementing the status quo and the Cold War division, it contains possibilities for breaking up the bipolar structures. Helsinki doesn't cement the division of Europe, but opens the door for change towards a pluralistic Europe. This involves building a civil society that transcends national frontiers while dismantling the Cold War. with military tools,

As this restoration effort is underway, NATO is increasing divided in 1985 and 1986 by concerns that SDI is undermining arms control, while the Soviet Union is concerned that it will destroy the foundations for a normal relationship between the two sides. In response, the Soviet Union begins to talk of restoring the balance through reciprocal actions. Reagan, on the other hand, is increasingly concerned that his plans are being undermined by domestic critics and particularly those who hold the purse strings in congress.

Reagan's SDI creates new divisions in the alliance at a time it has not yet recovered from the domestic battles over the cruise and Pershing II missiles. The NATO house is still suffering from erosion, and this erosion and deep cracks in the structure are recognized by the Soviet Union. By 1986 the bipartisan support upon which the foreign policy consensus in Europe rested has collapsed, there is an increasing distance between the United States and Europe, in part because of SDI, and the Soviet Union is aware of this erosion. In addition, the image of the Soviet Union as a threat has begun to disappear, which is a further blow to NATO cohesion. "Without a common perception every NATO activity is undermined." ₁₉ The common perception of a Soviet threat is fading among the Western public--a trend which Gorbachev encourages--and, for many, the United States poses an equal threat. On the one hand, Gorbachev is undermining enemy images by taking unilateral steps, such as the 18 month moratorium on nuclear weapons tests, and shattering old views about nuclear deterrence and balance of power politics. In addition to the double burden of maintaining a deterrent and public consensus, NATO also has to concentrate on maintaining its image. Further confusion emerges within the alliance as a result of the unexpected outcome of the Reykjavik summit between the superpowers which is depicted alternatively as an assault on the foundation of post war strategy of both pacts or as a potentially disastrous blow to Western security.

As the Western security consensus crumbles, Gorbachev makes a move to rename the future contours of the European security structure by proposing to construct a European house, including both East and West, which is closely related to the restructuring of the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Union. NATO since 1983 has begun to emphasize a more European identity, as opposed to Atlantic. In 1984 attempts are made to breath new life into the dormant West European Union and in 1985 Delors, chair of European Commission, launches a campaign for a new Europe free of borders. Two models of Europe are being discussed at this point in time: one building on Wetern institutions and Gorbachev's house which emphasizes a historical European culture transcending the East-West divide.

SDI is undermining arms control; the popular consensus which had underpinned NATOs deterrent in the post World War II era is eroding; Reagan is concerned that congress is undermining SDI; there exist blueprints for two different European structures. It is against this background that the peace offensive between the two superpowers must be understood. At earlier stages, the superpowers were doing the same things: maintaining and undermining. Now they both are making moves in a different game belonging to the same grammar. Gorbachev is restructuring, an action which shares a family resemblance with restoring, but the building blocs are political rather than military. His peace offensive is launched against balance of power and deterrence thinking as a foundation of international relations. Reagan focuses his offensive on breaking down the division of Europe, but the condition for his change of course is the technological and military solution of SDI. Both superpowers are now negating the foundations of traditional deterrence, focusing on the insecurity and fear upon which it is based. Two different kinds of solutions are offered: the technological solution of SDI and the political solution of Gorbachev. Neither position is inconsistent with past positions of their respective bloc: Reagan, emphasizing human rights, wants to tear down the Berlin Wall and Gorbachev, focusing on disarmament, wants to dissolve the two alliances. What has changed is the context in which the game is being played. The cross-beams which kept the two separate parts of the Cold War structure standing side by side, are shifting: Eastern advocates of human rights and Western advocates of peace--representing movements which challenged the foundations of their respective blocs--are talking to each other and are doing so on the basis of principles agreed to by states within the framework of Helsinki. That which was viewed as merely a principle in 1975, given concerns about the possibilities for implementation, has become the backdrop for action, in which human rights and security, as well as a notion of detente characterized by cross-bloc citizen contacts, are not weapons in the superpower conflict, but become a common frame of reference for actions aimed at dismantling the Cold War and building a democratic and peaceful Europe.

By the beginning of 1989 change is in the air but an end to the division of Europe is not yet in sight, although there are hopes on both sides for a gradual effort to overcome the bloc division. An infrastructure of cooperation is being constructed between East and West, in the form of treaties and accords both between the superpowers and within the Helsinki process, but with the exception of Poland, where roundtable negotiations between Solidarity and the Communist party begin, and Hungary, the Eastern European communist parties, against the urgings of Gorbachev, are resisting change. As the iron curtain between Hungary and Austria is dismantled in September of 1989, thousands of East Germans make their way to the Federal Republic of Germany via Austria. Throughout the autumn the flow of East Germans to the West continues, as massive demonstrations calling for the dismantlement of the various East European Communist regimes develop.

As the Berlin Wall collapses and remnants of the iron curtain are dismantled in November of 1989, followed by the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, a little more than a year later, NATO is faced with the task of defining a new identity. The collapse of the Eastern bloc also means the dismantling of the Cold War structure within which NATO's raison d'etre had been defined. In this sense, NATO has come full circle from the beginning point of this analysis in the mid-seventies when many were questioning the future need for the alliance in a context of relaxed tensions between East and West. NATO is wondering whether it will survive in the absence of an enemy, but is quite clear that it should not be dismantled. Despite Soviet claims that both alliances should be dissolved, NATO argues that the Soviet Union remains a military power and therefore NATO has to remain intact.

As in 1975, there is agreement about the need to build a European security structure, but the foundations of this framework remain unclear. There is a consensus that the structure should be based on the rule of law and human rights. Nonetheless, the ground upon which the building should be constructed has not yet been established. While Gorbachev continues building support for a common European house, NATO has brought out its tools to contribute to the construction of a new European architecture. Although there is no agreement about the blueprints for the European structure in either bloc, the two general themes are distinguished by the emphasis on the construction of a new structure encompassing all of Europe, as opposed to eventually constructing additions onto the Western framework. Both the common house and the architecture are meant to be multidimensional structures containing several different sections. Besides the greater connotation of intimacy suggested by the metaphor of a house, the difference may be that all the rooms in Gorbachev's house would be equal, although based on different societal models, of which socialism would be one, while the architecture is designed on the basis of a Western model, with a Western European pillar standing at the center, which interlocks with a variety of different institutions drawing the former Eastern European satellites into dialogue and potential future membership. The role of the Soviet Union in the architecture is ambiguous.

The CSCE would provide the infrastructure of the common European home, while it would be a central, but not the defining feature of the architecture, within which it would complement NATO. In 1990, the independent citizens initiatives in both blocs institutionalize the detente from below process, by creating a parallel citizen's parliament of the official CSCE process, as a basis for developing a pan-European civil society. The blueprint for this parallel institution was formed in 1988 at a seminar in Prague, which would be the eventual setting of the new institution. Jiri Dientsbier, one of the founders of this non-governmental institution, who after the Velvet Revolution became Czech foreign minister, described this Helsinki Citizen's Assembly as "typical of the dramatic pressure which has arisen due to the penetration of awakening freedom and responsibility into the ossified structures of the Cold War." ₂₀ While the hope of the former Eastern European dissidents, many of whom have now become members of government, had been for the transformation of NATO as it merged into an all-European security structure, covering the whole of Europe, as well as North America and the Soviet Union, they now approach NATO for the necessary support for the fragile democracies of Eastern Europe, whose economies are threatened in the aftermath of the collapse of the COMECON.

Both NATO and the former Eastern European satellites are aware of the possibility that forces in the Soviet Union may attempt to restore an authoritarian system, a possibility exemplified by the failed coup against Gorbachev. Gorbachev, attempting to preserve the foundations of socialism while restructuring the framework, is pulled in two opposing directions, by, on the one hand, the conservative forces of the old Communist guard, and on the other, by demands for more dramatic market reforms. In light of the further disintegration of the Soviet economy, and predictions of its breakdown, his policies, both internal and external, are increasingly viewed as a source of the Soviet Union's economic problems. In 1991 as the economy and the Soviet state further disintegrate, and the Soviet Republic's begin to dismantle the Union, its collapse becomes inevitable.

Rebuilding the Structure

Foundational metaphors played an important role in the naming and construction of the Cold War. The stable foundation of deterrence was to thank for preserving the security of the transatlantic family for four decades. As the boundaries distinguishing East and West begin to fade, a new competition emerges between two different European spaces, each of which is bound in different ways. In response to Gorbachev's Common House, including all the CSCE countries, and a variety of rooms based on different models, NATO presents its European architecture within which it would provide the central pillar of stability in a network of interlocking institutions.

Another structural metaphor emerges about the same time which serves to recast the shape of the architecture. The structures of the Cold War in both East and West contained families who provided security, two families whose acts of mutual maintenance held the Cold War relationship in place. The form of life attached to the architecture is quite different. The architecture has an anchor, a solid core and centre from which bridges emanate in several directions, connecting the core Europe to its previous protector, become equal partner, that is, the United States, as well as the new neighbours in Eastern Europe who want to rejoin Europe.

The relationships connected by these bridges are somewhat less intimate than the transatlantic family; in place of the security and protection provided by the American nuclear guarantee, the field shifts to one defined by membership in a Western club, which is an investment providing security benefits. In order to join NATO, potential members must demonstrate that they possess assets.

It should be noted that there is an intermediary step in the transition from a security relationship structured by protector and protected to one of club membership, based on assets and investments. In 1989 to 1990, as the Eastern bloc was transformed and as Gorbachev won the trust of the West, NATO's security becomes an insurance policy. The logic of insurance demonstrates its role in this context as part of an effort to convince public opinion of the need to continue to pay for defenses at a time when the threat from the East seemed to have dissolved. One purchases insurance while healthy as a way of being prepared for future sickness.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the threat is no longer another family, as in the Cold War, but the dangerous swirling waters surrounding the bridge which threaten to engulf the West if not for the NATO anchor. The 'dangers' are now more likely to come from 'out-of-area,' lacking any specific identity, or nationalist conflicts, especially in former Yugoslavia, and the threat of renationalization which, it is feared, will spread to Western Europe. The main concern is survival in these troubled waters, given the diffuseness of the threat, its unpredictability, and the difficulty of making populations understand the necessity of maintaining an active defense policy given the disappearance of the Soviet threat.

Membership in the Western club is attached to conditions. Potential members, to become 'normal', must demonstrate that they hold and act upon a set of values, growing out of a common cultural heritage and attached to the Judeo-Christian and Enlightenment tradition, which is said to be the opposite of nationalism. The association of the centre with a particular set of universal values relates to another structural metaphor in these texts: the pillar. Western Europe is the central pillar in the architecture. The Maastricht Treaty is composed of three pillars. The centrality of pillars in this new Europe has been conceptualized in the image of a Greek temple, a symbol of the origins of Western culture.

The anchor, the bridge, the architecture and the pillar are fixed structures in dangerous seas, yet in 1993, these stable bounded images begin to fade until they largely disappear in 1994. There is too much tension between the erecting of structures and language games being played in the new Russia. Lurking in the background of NATO texts are alternative images of webs, fabrics, networks. The web or network lack any clear boundaries distinguishing outside and inside. Yet they are not without structure or form. They are characterized by different, more intricate, complex forms, with many beginnings and endings, many interconnections. Structure is an objective, a rule from the past framing knowledge of what makes for security, a rule projected into a future where it isn't working, where there is tension between these language games and others within this world.

Structures and Partners

Action, and particular military action, requires a unitary identity which is capable of projecting power outward. The United States and the USSR were such identities in the Cold War but Europe, after the collapse of this relationship, is having problems constructing itself as a similar kind of unitary actor. Europe, as an identity, overlaps with too many other identities, which hold a tension between them, more like the fabric, whose boundaries are interwoven. This problem of overlapping identities is a central tension in post Cold War Europe, a tension most evident in the relationship to the Soviet Union. NATO's architecture first arose as an idea in competition with Gorbachev's Common House. The Common House, which would have enclosed the Soviet Union within Europe, was viewed by the West as an extension of the traditional Soviet objective of decoupling Europe from the United States, leaving it alone on the European continent with the dominant military presence of the Soviet Union, even though Gorbachev's house, based as it was on the CSCE model, would have included the United States and Canada. The architecture shifts the centre of gravity toward Western Europe. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, questions arise about the appropriateness of Russian membership in the European club. On the one hand, it is argued that the Russian presence would overwhelm and dominate the smaller countries of Eastern and Western Europe. On the other, there are concerns about the consequences of 'isolating' this large historic power. Whether Russia should be 'inside' or 'outside' the architecture is central in this division. The question itself is inseparable from the foundational metaphor, insofar as 'structures' constitute strict boundaries distinguishing an inside and outside in a way that webs or networks do not.

Concerns about isolation in the post Cold War world relate not only to Russia, however. The Europeans are concerned that the Americans will return to isolationism now that the Cold War is over; and the Eastern Europeans fear that the West Europeans will isolate themselves behind a new cordon sanitaire leaving them once again forgotten and alone.

The language games of the post-Cold War period, like those of the Cold War construct insides and outsides. One is either inside or outside a structure, although in this case several are standing at the doorway waiting to get in. While one can, with some difficulty, 'join' a family, joining or bringing in new members is a regular practice of clubs. One can move from the 'outside' to the 'inside' of a club, and it is precisely this issue of who belongs and where precisely the boundaries of Europe will be drawn that is the source of tension.

The possible placement of Russia outside Europe, and the emphasis on the West 'winning' the Cold War, provides fuel to nationalists and former communists in Russia who play on themes of reviving Russia's lost empire and place in the world. On the one hand, these actors reinforce Russia's isolation. On the other, there are clear signs that a decision to move the boundaries of Europe eastward to include former Soviet satellites would harden anti-Western feelings among the Russian public and increase support for nationalists such as Zhirinovsky.

The response of the former Eastern bloc countries, recently having escaped the yoke of Soviet power, is anxiety and increased urgency in their need to get inside the Western club. It is at this point that the attempt to construct a European 'structure' with clear insides and outside becomes problematic. To accept the Eastern Europeans into NATO would only contribute to the construction a new security dilemma with the former superpower. It risks making the boundaries of Europe, and the space occupied by former Eastern Europe, a place from which new divisions and conflicts, potentially more dangerous than those of the Cold War, may arise. Drawing lines in this context would contribute not to the preservation of peace, as in the Cold War, but the exacerbation of conflict at the heart of Europe.

In the first half of 1994, as this tension increases, the structural metaphors fade into the background of NATO's conceptualization of European security and are replaced by the Partnership for Peace in which the boundaries of Europe are more flexible, and the drawing of lines distinguishing identities less important than the opening of communication, dialogue and the development of cooperation. The purpose of the Partnership, like the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), is to draw Russia, as well as Eastern Europe, closer to NATO.

Two different language games are being played by NATO and there is a tension between them. On the one hand, NATO projects a rule from the past into this new context, that is, the rule that security is equal to the construction of unitary identity, surrounded by hard boundaries, as reflected in the structural metaphors, an identity capable of projecting power outward to stabilize and bring areas of conflict under control. In 1994, for the first time in its history, NATO actually uses its military power in the context of the Bosnian conflict.

On the other, NATO makes a decision, for the time being, to avoid drawing new lines around Europe. Instead of fixed spaces connected by bridges, relationships are conceived, among others, in terms of overlapping 'rings of love.' ₂₁ The 'rings of love' denote a quite different form than either the courtship games of the classical European balance of power or the Cold War families. The former involved courtship and 'wooing', 'remaining attractive' in order to be able to change partners. The Cold War, on the other, was a permanent commitment to one of two families representing quite different values and gender relationships. With the rings of love, on the other hand, Europe remains at the centre, or at least several countries of Europe, but is woven in a range of different partnerships which overlap, making it difficult to distinguish its boundaries. The relationship between the intersection of the rings in Europe to the United States, now in the periphery, is quite different than the relationship to either Russia or the Eastern European or European Economic Area countries. Europe is constructed at the intersection of countries in the Western European Union, NATO, European Union, and the CSCE, and is also embedded in the UN. There are many overlapping identities and relationships which limit freedom of movement but do not fix a space. While military projection remains a possibility, is in fact being undertaken for the first time, it is neither the most evident choice in the conflicts with which NATO is confronted, or, where it seems necessary, as in Bosnia, the unity required to project military power is difficult to construct. The political side of identity and the necessity of dialogue are emphasized, given the redrawing of lines would only create the conditions for a new security dilemma, a realignment of identity, and perhaps the renationalization of Europe. There is a tension between the need to respond to the humanitarian disaster in Bosnia, to project NATO's military power, and the desire to avoid hardening the lines between the West and Russia or within the Alliance, given the range of different interests and concerns which intersect in this conflict. Except for limited bombing from a distance, a unified military response proves impossible, resulting at the time of this writing, as Bihac is about to fall, in the talk of the possible collapse or divorce of NATO.

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War European state leaders engage in a process of reconceptualizing Europe, a renaming which, they recognize, is essential for defining their own possibilities for action in the world, for knowing how to proceed. ₂₂ This reconceptualization, while different from the Cold War, draws on familiar conceptualizations of security in terms of some form of structure. On the one hand, the possibility of a more equal marriage between the transatlantic partners, as well as the possibility of divorce, are entertained. On the other, the transatlantic partnership fades in significance against the background of an expanding club and overlapping rings of love. The new structure becomes increasingly shaky as NATO is pulled between conflicting objectives or interests. The problem is that this attempt to reconstitute a structure is in conflict with other processes and potentialities in the 'New World Order' which require a different kind of response, a different form of relationship, than the military relationships of the past. NATO is pulled between the need to respond in some way to the carnage in former Yugoslavia, yet faced with the prospect that such action may construct the very outcome it seeks to avoid: a renationalization of Europe.

Conclusion

Cold War language games of security are paradoxical. While the American ppromise' to use nuclear weapons in defense of Europe is an expression of potential violence and destruction, it is framed in a context of family, commitment and protection. In this semantic disarrangement properties conventionally ascribed to one form of lide, families, are unconventionally ascribed to another, a military alliance. In this act an otherwise abstract experience of a promise binding populations on two distant continents is described in the more understandable everyday language of th protection provided by families. The act is not simply one of description, however; it also replaces the destructive fearful emotions associated with nuclear war with positive emotions of safety and belonging.

Traditional garne theory has been criticized for trivializing life and death experiences at the international level by drawing on game metaphors. By contrast, the language games explored here are not 'mere games' but rather acts by which we are connected and reconnected with a particular kind of ecperience. ₂₃ Alliance 'garnes' connect us to an everyday cultural experience of family and the structures containing them. At the same time, these language games organize and construct the identity of NATO or the Warsaw Pact. creating and maintaining the sensibility upon which these 'irnagined communities' depend. The emancipatory acts of social movements reverse the paradox, ecposing the violence and dependency underlying this external image of commitment and protection, much as the women's movement in Western culture exposcd the prison of dependence andlor violence that the nuclear family can sometimes become.

This analysis has demonstrated an underlying continuity to changes in the meaning structures to which security is related. The transformation is evident on the basis of two grammars which have historically framed understanding and action related to security: structures and intimate relations. The central role of these language games historically, yet the various forms in which they have been expressed in different historical eras, is the basis for distinguishing that which has changed. In contrast to the deterministic notion of games or structure employed in theories of international relations, which not incidently emerged in the context of the Cold War, the more fluid notion of language games makes it possible to recognize that the current need to redefine security is inseparable from practices in the real world by which the structures and relationships of the Cold War were called into question as actors began to make related but alternative moves. Similar to the assumption of structural theories, such as Waltz' neorealism, moves within these games seemed to be determined, therefore giving rise to a permament game of competing families. Once those outside, that is, social movements in both blocs, began to dismantle the structures of the Cold War and emancipate the families, the game itself was transformed. In the process of challenging assumptions that the walls or intimate relations were providing security, social movements began making different moves--the maintenance activities of states were countered by the dismantling acts of movements, accompanied by a renaming of the relationships as a source of dependence, hierarchy and danger. These challenges from outside recast the terms of the game. Both superpowers began to negate the foundations of deterrence, and Gorbachev proposes a security structure based on a renaming of the outsides and insides of Europe which, like the social movement efforts to restore the meaning of Helsinki, is based on the CSCE model. NATO also engages in an act of renaming the boundaries which results in a new competition between two different structures. With each move, as the game is politicized or the space renamed, the relationships within or outside spaces are also recast. As competition over the naming of the European space emerges, the relationships become less intimate--clubs rather than families--accompanied by the emergence of different levels of intimacy, as characterized by the rings of love, and the absence of clear boundaries between intimates and others. It is difficult in the post-Cold War context to redefine the meaning of security precisely because this concept has traditionally required the drawing of lines, the building of walls to distinguish the space occupied by intimates and others outside. We are faced with a choice between security in this form, as traditionally defined, a choice that has become increasingly dangerous, or finding new forms of security more fitting to a world of overlapping identities.

Note 1: For an overview of contributions to the academic discussion over redefining security, see: Michael Williams and Keith Krause, 'The Subject of Security: Foundations of Rethinking Security'. Paper presented at the Critical Security Studies Conference, York University, May 12-14, 1994. Back.

Note 2: C.W. Kegley, "How Did the Cold War Die,": Principles for an Autopsy," Mershon International Studies Review , Vol. 38, Supplement 1, April 1994.Back.

Note 3: Chilton and Llyin have written a fascinating analysis of the difference in meaning between these two concepts in East and West as they related to interpretations of Gorbachev's common house proposal. P. Chilton and M. Llyin, "Metaphor in political discourse: the case of the 'common European house,'" Discourse and Society , 4, no. 1 (1993). Back.

Note 4: Waltz. 1979, pp. 165-166. Back.

Note 5: Philippe Moreau-Defarges, Anti-American Feeling in Europe: Between Fear of War and Obsession with Abandonment, NATO Review , 35, no. 2 (April 1987). Back.

Note 6: Hollis and Smith have also made a connection between the dominance of 'chicken' as a cultural game in 1950s America and the emergence of 'chicken' as a model for conceptualizing the nuclear relationship between the superpowers at about the same time. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 127. Back.

Note 7: See: Karin Fierke, Excavating the Ruins of the Cold War: Recovering the Contours of a Changing Security Culture  (Dissertation Manuscript: University of Minnesota 1995). The analysis draws on the following sources: NATO Review; The Current Digest of the Soviet Press ; speeches of President Reagan; documents of the Western European peace movement, taken primarily from END Journal  and the archives of the International Peace Coordination and Cooperation Centre; documents of Solidarity, published primarily in the Labor Review on Eastern Europe ; documents of Charter 77, published primarily in the Bulletin  of Palach Press, and documents of the Committee on the Present Danger, published in Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger  (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984). Back.

Note 8: Ernst Hans Van der Beugel, "The Atlantic Family - Managing its Problems," NATO Review , 34, no. 1 (February 1986). Back.

Note 9: The American relationship with Europe is now an old one..The US has been fully joined with Western Europe in the security process. W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., The US and the Atlantic Community, NATO Review , 31, no. 2 (July 1983). Back.

Note 10: Speech by Ronald Reagan, delivered at the White House, Washington, D.C., March 23, 1983, Peace and National Security: A New Defense, printed in Vital Speeches of the Day , XLIX, no. 13 (April 15, 1983). Back.

Note 11: Speech by Ronald Reagan, delivered at the U.S. Ranger Monument in Pointe du Hoc, France, June 6, 1984, published in Speaking my Mind , by Ronald Reagan (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1989). Back.

Note 12: 'It is our task to explain to the new generation what we consider as self-evident truths, as basic values in our lives, and which they may disregard out of ignorance or neglect, as if it were sufficient to want something and shout for it in a street demonstration in order to get it.' Arrigo Levi, NATO, Key to Peace and Security, NATO Review , 31, no. 6, (January 1984). Back.

Note 13: Interestingly enough, if one looks back at NATO documents from this earlier period, the 'younger generation' is handled in a much different way. Within the European context, the student movements of the 1960s were more focused on transforming the universities. Vietnam, while an issue, has much different tenor in this context than within the United States; in any case, it is not  a NATO issue. Texts at the time focus on grooming future leaders who are afforded space to speak within the magazine. They are praised for making certain kinds of distinctions between East and West against the background of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. See, for instance: Edmund Nessler (extracts), "Explanatory Memorandum"; and Oscar de Wandel, "NATO's New Frontier: A Student's View of NATO", NATO Review , 17, no. 2 (1969); Kaare Sandegren, "The New Generation and NATO", NATO Review , 17, no.9 (1969). Back.

Note 14: Opponents of the cruise and Pershing II deployments were in fact distributed across the age spectrum. A poll in February 1983 in the FRG showed 57% of age groups from 25-39 and 60+ agreeing with the demand not to deploy any new missiles in the FRG. The other age groups differed only by a few percentage points, including 59% of the 18-24 year olds, 51% of those 40-49 and 53% of those between 50 and 59 (Hans Rattinger, "The Federal Republic of Germany: Much Ado about (Almost) Nothing", in Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense  (London: Croom Helm, 1985). In Italy the differences were more noticeable. Among educated Italians, 71% of university students opposed the INF deployments, followed by 69% in those up to age 34, 58% of those from 35-44; 48% of those 45-54, and 34% of those above 55 (Sergio A. Rossi, "Public Opinion and Atlantic Defense in Italy", in ibid.). In Britain, a poll from January 1983 showed the following percentages of those disapproving of the government decision to deploy American cruise missiles on British soil: Age 15-24, 64%; age 25-44, 66%; age 45-64, 57%; 65 and older, 58% (Ivor Crewe, "Britain: Two and a Half Cheers for the Atlantic Alliance", in ibid. ). Back.

Note 15: 'The direction the ideological thinking of the young generation will take - as well as the drift of political change in Poland and in other countries of Eastern Europe - will depend on the convergence of these groups with the activities of the working class.' A New Evolutionism, by Adam Michnik, 1976, in: Letters from Prison and other Essays  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). Waller, for instance, discusses the emergence of a generational cleavage in Eastern Europe which favored development of 'anti-politics.' M. Waller, The End of the Communist Power Monopoly  (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993). Back.

Note 16: One need only think back to the type of language games on which the women's movement relied. Emancipation, is of course, not exclusive to this type of context. Emancipation games are also played by other types of resistance movements. Back.

Note 17: R. Reagan, Speech, delivered at the White House, Washington, D.C., March 23, 1983, "Peace and National Security: A New Defense," Vital Speeches of the Day  (April 15, 1983).Back.

Note 18: See, Vaclav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," in Vaclav Havel et. al., The Power of the Powerless , John Keane, ed. (London: Palach Press, 1985). Back.

Note 19: van der Beugel, "The Atlantic Family." Back.

Note 20: Jiri Dienstbier, "The Helsinki Citizen's Assembly", Europe from Below: An East-West Dialogue , Mary Kaldor, ed. (New York: Verso, 1991). Back.

Note 21: This metaphor appeared, along with a nice diagram, in "Europe: Partners for What?" in Economist  (24 September 1994), 29-30. Back.

Note 22: "The alliance has made impressive progress, at least at the level of conceptual clarification. Understanding must precede action. However, understanding does not take us very far unless it is followed by action. Conceptual agreement must lead to concerted implementation, to a commitment to resources and forces." Johan Jorgen Holst, "Pursuing a Durable Peace in the Aftermath of the Cold War," NATO Review , 40, no. 4 (1992), 10. Back.

Note 23: Geertz articulates this notion best in his analysis of the Balinese cockfight: "It is this kind of bringing of assorted experiences of everyday life to focus that the cockfight, set aside from that life as 'only a game' and reconnected to it as 'more than a game' accomplishes, and so creates what, better than typical or universal, could be called a paradogmatic human event...Enacted and re-enacted, so far without end, the cockfight enables the Balinese, as read and reread, Macbeth enables us, to see a dimension of his own subjectivity....Yet, because - in another of those paradoxes...- that subjectivity does not properly exist until it is thus organized, art forms generate and regenerate the very subjectivity they pretend only to display. Quartets, still lifes, and cockfights are not merely reflections of a pre-existing sensibility analogically represented; they are positive agents in the creation and maintenance of such a sensibility." Clifford Geertz, Chapter 15, 'Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight,' The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 450-451. Back.