"Lost an Empire, Found a Role". British Foreign Policy at the End of the Twentieth Century

Jeremy Fielding _**

International Security Studies at Yale University

December, 1997

Introduction

On May 1, 1997 Britain went to the polls. The Labour Party, refashioned into "New Labour" by its leader, Tony Blair, achieved its best ever result. The new government assumed power with a parliamentary majority of 179, a convincing mandate for change. The Conservative Party, previously the most successful political party in the history of Western European democracies, suffered its worst defeat since 1905 in terms of seats, and its worst since 1832 in terms of percentage of the popular vote. Professor Anthony King described the election not as a landslide, but as a 'seismic event.' In order to describe the magnitude and effect of the victory, he exuberantly employed the colorful analogy of an asteroid that impacted on earth and destroyed all that preceded it. ₁

Hyperbole aside, the new government committed itself during the campaign to a radical change in British foreign policy. The election manifesto of New Labour declared the intention of the party to place "Britain . . . once again . . . at the center of international decision-making instead of at its margins". ₂ The new Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, and the entire government recognized that, although the world presently viewed the United Kingdom as a middling power with a Great Power history, Britain could rapidly achieve promotion to the first tier of states. In order to accomplish this, the government needed to build on traditional strengths and work actively within the international system. Possessing such optimism, the new government had an unprecedented chance to contradict Dean Acheson's famous dictum that after 1945 Britain lost an Empire, but had not yet found a role. The Labour government sought to prove that the United Kingdom had finally developed a new global and European role.

The timing of this opportunity was propitious. The Blair government will still be in power at the turn of the millennium. Therefore, this government's actions carry a large degree of symbolic significance. In addition, a number of positions of international leadership coincidentally converged on Britain in late 1997 and throughout 1998. In October 1997, the government welcomed to Edinburgh the heads of state of Commonwealth countries. Most notably, the United Kingdom assumes the Presidency of the European Union on January 1, 1998 for six months. In addition, Britain will host next year's G-8 summit in May 1998. These lend extra importance to the British government's attempt to re-design its foreign policy. After a six month preparatory period following the May 1997 election, the British government became responsible for setting the agenda of all of these bodies. The United Kingdom had the opportunity to use these positions of authority to present its concerns and policies to the international community of states.

Before the government can develop a coherent and relevant British foreign policy for the next century, Britain and its leaders need to confront two critical issues that have repeatedly constrained the nation over the past hundred years. The first major question was the limitations on foreign policy caused by the British economic situation. Economic weakness restricted the policy options available to the state. The second was the way in which the British people conceive of themselves as a nation. National self-definition directly affected foreign policy because such sentiments shaped the definition of the national interest.

 

Economic Limitations

Throughout the 20th century, economic weakness has restricted the means available to British foreign policy and therefore its efficacy and very credibility. Limitations forced Britain to default on its outstanding obligations. Consequently, consecutive British governments have frequently been unable to enforce stated policies. In 1967, for example, under the pressure of fragile financial and economic conditions, Britain accelerated the withdrawal of military forces from East of Suez and abandoned commitments in the Middle and Far East. Obviously, all states have wrestled with the relationship between desired policy and the ability of the state to afford a course of action. However, the global extent of British interests and responsibilities at the beginning of the century was unparalleled. The inability of a succession of governments both to recognize the precarious situation of the economy and to accept the consequential limitations on foreign policy distinguished the British experience from other great powers.

As David Reynolds demonstrates, for the past century British diplomats attempted to implement a wide-ranging foreign policy, in spite of economic weakness. Successive governments discovered that economic forces restricted diplomacy and deprived Britain of options other than withdrawal from previously established positions. ₃ In the first forty years of the century, the recognition of relative economic weakness compelled a policy of appeasement. ₄ Victorious British military efforts in two world wars only worsened the British economic situation, and a newly expanded, expectant electorate increased the demands on the state for welfare spending. ₅ The Suez fiasco marked the apex of the British government and people's exercise in self-delusion, as the United States exploited the financial dependence of the pound on Washington to halt Britain's military operation. ₆ In the 1960s, the Labour government under Harold Wilson refused to accept the necessity of devaluation and adjustment of the exchange rate. The result was a series of financial crises that culminated in November 1967 with the aforementioned decision on foreign policy commitments. In the end, Wilson still had to order the devaluation of sterling.

After 1945, economic restrictions even overshadowed apparent successes in British foreign policy. This was particularly evident after military campaigns. The Royal Navy could not have dispatched the task force to the Falklands had the government already implemented the economizing recommendations of the 1981 Nott Defense Review and sold the aircraft carriers Hermes and Invincible. In addition, the British were fortunate that the Argentine invasion of the islands occurred at a time when much of the fleet was temporarily concentrated in Britain. It is extremely dubious whether the operation would have been possible had the Navy been normally dispersed. During the 1991 Gulf Conflict, the British government contributed an armored division to the allied effort only after the Army had cannibalized tank forces in Germany that were putatively assigned to NATO duties.

Therefore, in order for any re-formulation of British foreign policy to succeed, the government must accept Britain's relative economic decline in the world over the century. It also must concede the economic situation directly affects the scope and nature of any Foreign Office initiatives or policies. The new government indicates its readiness to acknowledge these conditions. Both in its campaign and after its entry to office, the Labour government has stressed the need for a new economic policy.

New Labour embraced the idea that the structure of the global economy fundamentally and rapidly has changed. It accepted that the stop-go economic policies pursued after 1950, followed by Thatcherite attempts to implement a monetarist economic policy, severely weakened the infrastructure and the traditional industries of the British economy. However, the radical changes after 1979 also enhanced Britain's competitiveness in a post-industrial era of high-technology products and services. The Blair government emphasized the need to ensure flexibility in the labor market in order to keep high levels of employment. The attempt to equip workers with the skills necessary to compete in this new information age was a critical component of this philosophy. The rhetoric stressed "employability rather than employment." ₇ Thus, education of both young people and older unemployed workers, in order to achieve high rates of employment, formed the foundation of the new government's economic policy. But, this different approach also recognized the inability of Britain to maintain extensive commitments in the world.

Alongside this innovative perspective on the economic situation, the government willingly re-examined all foreign policy commitments and reassessed them in terms of utility and affordability. This was particularly evident in the new defense review announced by Minister of Defence, George Robertson. There are now no sacred cows in the defense budget. The armored divisions in Germany are a prime target for cuts, as the government attempts to build armed forces configured towards peacekeeping duties rather than a structure designed to meet conventional force threats. In addition, a virtual repeat of the carrier debates of the 1960s occurred. The navy has to defend the existence of the three 20,000 ton mini-carriers (which are one quarter of the size of the US navy carriers) while simultaneously justifying requests for new aircraft carriers to avoid future obsolescence. ₈ Just as the cancellation of the carrier class CVA-01 in 1966 signaled the end of a British heavy carrier capability by the end of the 1970s, so the current review may yet find that British foreign policy priorities do not justify the mini-carriers. But political considerations weigh against the cancellation of carriers. Britain has no desire to leave France as the only Western European state with a carrier capability. ₉

From the start of the 20th century until 1967, successive governments incorporated an element of bluff into British foreign policy. Although this was less significant before World War I, increasingly after 1918 nominal foreign policy commitments were maintained without commensurate resources, as economic limitations restricted the means available to Britain to fulfill these roles. For three decades following 1967, governments seemed unable to reconcile Britain's place in the world with the economic situation. The Blair government has demonstrated its ability to redefine foreign policy and adjust to economic realities.

 

Alongside this innovative perspective on the econom

National Self-Definition

The way in which the population views its own national identity has been a major issue in the formulation of British foreign policy. The national interest of the state and subsequent governmental policy was largely dependent upon the population's perception and definition of "Britain" and the values it represented. ₁₀ Joseph Chamberlain raised this question at the beginning of the century with his contention that Britain was part of a larger organic grouping of colonies and Anglo-Saxon dominions. While governments officially rejected his vision, the Imperial Preference campaign stirred up debate on the issue, and supporters of his view regularly exercised influence on foreign policy until the Second World War. A key part of this wider discussion revolved around the extent to which Britain was a European power. Michael Howard maintained that until 1939 it was not clear whether, despite the evidence of the First World War, Britain was a European country with vital interests at stake on the Continent. Therefore, at times British foreign and defense policy did not focus on ensuring the continuation of the European balance of power equilibrium, with disastrous results. ₁₁

Following the Second World War, Labour and Conservative governments presented the British people with the beguiling idea that their country stood at the center of three circles - a relationship with the United States, a closer connection to the Commonwealth and involvement in a community of European nations. It was largely irrelevant that, in reality, if Britain became deeply committed to either Europe or the Commonwealth, enthusiasm for one would hinder the UK's participation in the other. For most of the next half century after 1945, British governments tried to follow the willo-the-wisp of embracing all these three choices. Even after the process of de-colonization and Britain's entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) seemed to show that the country had made its decision _*

, British support was half-hearted. Governments and electorates always believed in a self-image that the country had other interests beyond Europe which distinguished Britain from the rest of the EEC. However, the advent of the Blair government coincided with and reinforced the emerging post-Imperialist, Europe-oriented conception of the United Kingdom. The Economist correctly noted that "a campaign to 'rebrand Britain' is already under way . . . Mr. Blair wants to drop Lady Thatcher's concept of Britishness, with its xenophobic and imperialist overtones, in favor of something new." ₁₂ The Prime Minister's speech to his party's annual conference hinted at the innovations in question. William Rees-Mogg reported that

"three times in his speech he [Blair] referred to Britain as a 'beacon to the world'. This is a religious concept . . . Tony Blair seems also to see Britain as 'the light of the world' . . . Mr. Blair struck a patriotic theme: 'We can never be the biggest. We may never again be the mightiest. But we can be the best. The best place to live . . . the best place to lead a fulfilled life' . . . Yet Mr. Blair means more [than simply improving standards of living] . . . Even in this early passage, he says: 'We may never again be the mightiest.' That is unexpected. It implies what most British people probably feel but do not say." ₁₃

The reaction to the symbolism of June 30, 1997, indicated that the British people had finally accepted the end of Empire. Positive self-reflection marked the transfer of Hong Kong to the Chinese government. While attention in the United States focused upon how Chinese rule would affect the residents of the territory, in Britain the event led to an introspective and optimistic mood reflecting that the UK had entered a new era. The hand-over of Hong Kong coincided neatly with the accession to power of a new government with a youthful image. Pundits such as Andrew Marr proclaimed "the end of empire, the beginning of modern Britain," and declared that "it is time to move on. Let this be the last Last Post." ₁₄ Indeed, the muted official British response to the pleas for aid from the residents of the colony of Montserrat effectively demonstrated the lack of concern that the British people had for other remnants of the British Empire. However, the issue of Gibraltar remains unresolved.

A major part of the re-definition of British identity occurred during the vast and complex public reaction to the death of Diana, Princess of Wales. A century earlier, the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria was the occasion for public ceremonies and for "a self-indulgent affirmation of the achievements of the British people and of the glory of the British Empire. They were marked by over-wrought sentiment," public pride and jingoism. ₁₅ In contrast, during the week of mourning and the funeral of the Princess, criticism of the Royal Family mounted as the media and population accused the House of Windsor of being stuck in the era of Empire and out of touch with the rest of Britain. Prime Minister Blair's description of Diana as "the People's Princess" rang true for many Britons. Andrew Neill, editor of the Scotsman, declared that the British reaction to Diana was understandable as a reaction of a modern people to the loss of the only modern member of the Royal Family. ₁₆ The Editor of the New Yorker, Tina Brown, stated that the funeral of Diana, Princess of Wales marked the end of Old England. ₁₇ The funeral confirmed the emergence in the 1990s of a national identity qualitatively different from the Imperial British character that Queen Elizabeth still embodied.

Changes to the British constitutional structure also aided the development of a new identity for the United Kingdom appropriate to a post-imperial Britain. The Blair government committed itself in its manifesto to holding referendums on devolution for Scotland and Wales. ₁₈ The resounding endorsement of Scottish devolution, including the approval of tax-raising powers for the new Scottish Assembly, prompted the Secretary of State for Scotland, Donald Dewar, to declare that the result showed that "We [Britain] are a nation that believes in ourselves." ₁₉ As The Economist notes, the weakness of nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales makes a future dissolution of Britain unlikely. Instead, "Britain will [launch] a long overdue political evolution already experienced by most other nations of its size." ₂₀ A successful devolution of power also provides an example that the current negotiators on the future of Northern Ireland, a hangover of the British Empire, might use. Thus, the government and the electorate are re-defining Great Britain and in the process forging a new national consciousness.

In 1995, Tony Blair declared "I want us to be a young country again." ₂₁ In a recent report, Demos, a New Labour-oriented think tank, expanded this notion and envisaged Britain as a global hub, a creative island and a silent revolutionary. ₂₂ There are strong indications that this new, more cosmopolitan image of Britain is seeping into both business and culture in a way that indicate its wider and deeper acceptance in British society. In an attempt to remain competitive in a global market, businesses are adapting and adopting a more international image and perspective. British Airways is the most interesting example. On June 10, 1997, British Airways, the historical product of a merger between British European Airways and British Overseas Airways Corporation (formerly Imperial Airways), unveiled a radically innovative corporate image. The company declared that "in the 1990s, 'global and caring' does not mean post-imperialist flag waving," and announced that it would encourage a new, multi-cultural philosophy. ₂₃ British Airways (BA), while retaining its name, will transform itself into a truly global brand, based around an international image. The new paint scheme for the aircraft is the most striking evidence of this change. BA retired the old tail design that focused on the union flag. Instead, fifteen new "world images," based on different artists' work from every continent, will replace the old livery. ₂₄ Only Concorde will incorporate the union flag into a revamped design.

British culture is also adapting easily to the new cosmopolitan attitude. Culture, music and fashion are all proving successful British exports to the rest of the world. Musicians and designers create products and images consciously rooted in Britain and reflective of British assumptions, language, and traditions, but with a style and message that international consumers embrace. British music groups are achieving worldwide distribution, sales and promotion on a scale comparable with the global invasion thirty years earlier. Indeed, bands such as Oasis and the Spice Girls unashamedly copy the path that the Beatles forged. Noel Gallagher, the songwriter and lead guitarist of Oasis, admits that John Lennon was his musical influence. In a July 1997 interview, Gallagher stirred up controversy with his statement that his band was more important than God. ₂₅ Lennon had caused a similar outrage with his comment that the Beatles were bigger than Jesus. Meanwhile, the Spice Girls, Britain's other major musical export, recently completed a remake of the Beatles' first film, "A Hard Day's Night."

The resurgence of British popular culture in the international arena was also evident in two other areas of culture. London resurrected itself as a trendy city and Newsweek anointed the capital "The Coolest City on Earth." ₂₆ In the world of international fashion, an unprecedented series of appointments of British designers to head major French fashion houses further demonstrated the strength of current British culture. Dior appointed John Galliano as its chief designer; in addition, Alexander McQueen at Givenchy and Stella McCartney at Chloe assumed similar positions.

Thus, both the British government and the wider population accept the change in the long-term parameters of economic limitations and national self-definition. This shift in attitude is perhaps generational, and certainly the election of the youngest Prime Minister this century embodies the new situation. The electorate has entrusted to the government an opportunity to decisively reshape and forge new directions in British foreign policy. The three principal questions that confront Britain's diplomats today are relations with Europe, a new moralism, and the partnership with the United States.

 

Europe

The British position within Europe obviously revolves around the European Union (EU). Debates over the future structure of the EU, and Britain's place within it, tore apart the Major government. Even during the general election campaign, the Conservative 'Eurosceptics' and 'Europhiles' were unwilling to call a truce to their wrangling over participation in a single currency. However, the result of the election confirmed a pro-European majority in the House of Commons. The scale of the Labour victory created a government that was far more pro-European than if the electorate had returned a small Labour majority. Most of the Labour candidates selected in constituencies that were not traditional Labour seats were young, loyal to Blair and committed to the ideals of New Labour. They therefore largely favored further EU development and British involvement. To their surprise in the 1997 landslide, these candidates were sent to Parliament as Labour MPs. The more leftist wing of the party, historically opposed to Europe, lost much of its power in the face of New Labour's electoral success. The retirement of Peter Shore also deprived the Labour anti-European bloc of its chief spokesman. The Liberal Democrats, with a strongly pro-European stance, doubled their representation in Parliament. Within the Conservative party, the Eurosceptics fared far worse at the hands of the electorate than the Europhiles. ₂₇ Michael Portillo, the future hope of the right wing of the Conservative party, lost his seat. William Hague, the eventual winner in the succession contest to John Major, was reluctant to take a firm position on European questions. Overall, the greatly diminished anti-European forces in the new Parliament received far less support and attention from the media and the public.

The Amsterdam summit in June 1997 demonstrated how the atmosphere had vastly changed. Britain was enthusiastically welcomed, and other European leaders lavished attention on Tony Blair. The Prime Minister's actual achievements at the meeting were mixed. However, in addition to the public relations and media management success of the conference, the Blair government had reason to find the results of the conference gratifying. The government positioned itself adroitly so that it was pro-European, but brought an agenda to the summit and the EU different from the dominant Franco-German priorities.

The accession to the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty was the new government's first major action. John Major had strenuously refused to accept this subsection of the agreement. This reversal not only created goodwill in the EU towards Britain, but it also signaled a new strategy that stressed a counter-vision to the current Franco-German obsession with the single currency and the Maastricht economic criteria of conditions for inclusion in European monetary union. As demonstrated at the Amsterdam summit, the Blair government advocated a platform of 'enlargement and employment'. The British continued to push for the enlargement of the EU into Central Europe. This policy was largely a continuation of the Major government's stance, albeit with more enthusiasm. It coincided with the announcement by Jacques Santer, President of the European Commission, of "Agenda 2000." The new plan envisaged negotiations to incorporate six new members into the EU by the year 2000: Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Cyprus. Although actual membership would not take effect until 2002, Santer hoped that the negotiating process would be concluded by the end of the century.

The emphasis on the message of employment constituted a major difference between the old and new Prime Ministers. At the Amsterdam summit, in keeping with the government's domestic agenda, Tony Blair presented his case for an EU which devoted attention to job generation, flexibility in the workplace, and skills education. Indeed, the resulting communiqué from Amsterdam included a new employment chapter that "is supposed to encourage undefined cooperation among member countries and allow for 'guidelines' to create jobs. It also allowed for limited spending on 'incentive measures.' such as pilot projects." ₂₈ In anticipation of the assumption of the EU Presidency in January 1998, during the summer and autumn of 1997 the British Treasury prepared a number of welfare-to-work schemes that the entire EU can implement.

The employment issue in British foreign policy was so central that, if necessary, the government was willing to bypass the other EU heads of state and take the British agenda to the population of Europe. During the less formal moments at Amsterdam, and in an interview with Bild, a German tabloid, the Prime Minister gave indications of this course of action. In response to Blair's speech at the Labour Party Conference, William Rees-Mogg stated that "Mr. Blair's Britain will not be content to lead a bureaucrats' Europe . . . He [Blair] wants a 'People's Europe, free trade, industrial strength, high levels of employment and social justice, a democratic Europe.'" ₂₉

The British government clearly viewed the job creation message as attractive to the European people. The British sought, in Foreign Secretary Cook's words, "to cultivate the confidence which helps people accept that rapid change is an unavoidable part of the modern world." ₃₀ This strategy placed Blair's concerns at the top of the EU agenda. It meshed well with the European and global identification of an emerging crisis of persistent unemployment and the increased recognition of the necessity of skills training as a possible solution. ₃₁ In September 1997, the unemployment rate in France (at 12.5 percent) and Germany (at 11.5 percent) was more than double Britain's rate of 5.5 percent. Therefore, it is unsurprising that many in Europe received the Blair program enthusiastically. ₃₂ On the other hand, some commentators interpreted the Jospin victory in France as evidence that the French electorate were unwilling to adopt the Blair remedy, even if they agreed with the diagnosis.

However, this change in British foreign policy was not just a shift in emphasis or issues. It also represented a fundamental challenge to the established leadership of the EU. During Prime Minister Thatcher's tenure, a loose grouping of member states developed that opposed initiatives which originated in the Franco-German core. These states (such as Ireland or Denmark) did not need to voice their opposition, because London's obstreperousness and veto obviated the need for smaller countries to publicly take a stand. Instead, these states would quietly support Britain. John Major's ineffective posturing lost Britain allies, and his government abdicated the position of alternate EU leadership. In contrast, the revitalized British policy under Blair reinforced the image of the Prime Minister as the heir apparent to the crown of EU leadership after Kohl.

Even if Kohl wins the German Federal elections in 1998, the long reign of the German Chancellor is coming close to the end. After Kohl, there is no other natural German leader of the EU. Because the French elections in June 1997 returned the Socialist Party under Lionel Jospin to government, the prospect of a Chirac succession to the EU leadership seems far less likely as the left and right adjust to cohabitation. The French President is now simply too weak. At the Social Democrats' Congress at Malmo, the British Prime Minister began to sell his re-fashioned conception of Socialism to other leftist parties. He spoke of the need for "flexibility" and proclaimed that Social Democrats had to "adapt or die." Notably, his audience responded well to these entreaties. The Times noted that "Mr. Blair made more of Europe in his speech than M. Jospin, giving a foretaste of the crusade he plans to lead to wean Europe off the rigid regulatory culture that he considers a burden on employment." ₃₃ While Jospin was less excited about such ideas, neither could he avoid using the rhetoric or concepts of the Blair philosophy. As Lord Dahrendorf concluded,

"Britain and France have seen the collapse of the ideological right . . . Blair is now in a strong position to play a leading role in Europe. His government recognizes the requirements of competitiveness, it appreciates the need for social cohesion, and it has no ideological hang ups, whether Eurosceptic or Euro-fanatic. As a result, British ministers could steer a course which takes Europe out of the cul-de-sac into which the German Chancellor and two French Presidents have led it." ₃₄

 

The New Moralism

During the Cold War, it was difficult to find any particular emphasis on morality within British foreign policy. Obviously, governments portrayed opposition to the Soviet Union as an ideological and moral mission. Apart from this overall British grand strategy, that depended upon a subjective ideological judgment that the West was morally good as opposed to the 'evil' Soviet bloc, foreign policy lacked deep conviction.

However, a brief survey of British foreign policy over a longer period of time reveals a deep sense of morality that infused both governmental policy and public opinion on international issues. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, public agitation against slavery swept through Britain and eventually forced the government to adopt an anti-slavery policy. ₃₅ While this had little economic impact on the British economy or on London's relations with the other Great Powers, the issue affected British diplomacy in West Africa and relations with plantation-based colonies in the West Indies and Caribbean. Public interest in the topic also influenced naval deployments because of pressure to enforce legislation that banned the slave trade through the dispatch of ships to the West African coast. Morality also infused much of the ideology of British Imperialism with a belief in the civilizing mission. Moral considerations permeated the debates about Free Trade, the economic system that underpinned the entire British empire until the 1930s. Dennis Judd comments on the discussions about the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 (the event that marked the beginning of the British commitment to Free Trade) that "Free trade came to mean, in the imaginations and memories of countless numbers of British and imperial citizens, freedom . . . Free trade and free political institutions seemed to be linked in a benevolent pattern." ₃₆ In the twentieth century, moral arguments were partly responsible for the adoption of an appeasement policy. The post-1940 revulsion to appeasement similarly derived from moral repugnance at how events unfolded after Munich.

Morality, then, has a rich tradition in British diplomatic history. The Blair government committed itself to making idealism a central tenet in Britain's foreign policy. In doing so, the government preempted criticism from the left wing of the Labour party, that often leveled the charge against Conservative and Labour governments that cynical realism dominated foreign policy. In addition, it proved relatively easy to form a public consensus around a moral foreign policy; public opinion, especially in the age of satellite television and news, tended to demand the immediate gratification of its crusading moralistic spirit. As the post-election Foreign Office mission statement noted, "we are instant witnesses in our sitting rooms . . . to human tragedy in distant lands, and are therefore obliged to accept moral responsibility for our response." ₃₇ The government used such a policy to embellish its claim that it was qualitatively different from other recent governments, and that on a wider scale British foreign policy was unlike other significant powers' practices. Several small initiatives rapidly became policy, including official encouragement and cooperation with Non-Governmental Organizations, and support for proposals to establish a permanent International Criminal Court. ₃₈

The new government also implemented more substantial measures in order to demonstrate its commitment to a moral foreign policy. In particular, various ministries collaborated to overhaul British trade and aid policy. Under the previous Conservative governments, British companies experienced relatively lax enforcement of restrictions on military equipment exports. In the infamous case of arms exports to Iraq, the Scott Report highlighted the fact that officials turned a blind eye to the illegal export of military supplies to a rogue state and then misled Parliament. Governmental development aid was maintained at a low level and, on at least one major occasion, linked to the award of contracts to British companies. In 1988, the government allegedly made assistance to the Malaysian government for the purposes of construction of the Pergau dam dependent upon the purchase of one billion pounds of British arms. ₃₉

However, the Blair government engaged in a major re-evaluation of trade and aid policy. A new Department for International Development headed by Claire Short replaced the Overseas Development Agency. The new minister was given a Cabinet level appointment. Short repeatedly emphasized the need for a reassessment of the pattern of British aid, and although a White Paper on the subject was not due until November, by the summer of 1997, it was possible to sketch the broad outlines of the new aid policy. At a speech on May 28, 1997, Short reiterated the government's commitment to raising the aid budget to the UN target of 0.7 percent of GNP; in 1996 this figure equaled 0.27 percent of GNP. ₄₀ In comparison, the United States spent 0.15 percent of its GNP on its aid programs.

The government also revised its guidelines for arms sales. The Foreign Office, theoretically reaffirmed its determination to prioritize human rights over export orders. Therefore, the government committed itself to halt the export of equipment used in torture. The Foreign Secretary also announced new criteria for the approval of military exports in order to ensure that the government "will not permit the sale of arms to regimes that might use them for internal repression or international aggression." ₄₁ However, one early decision led many to question the sincerity of this new policy. Foreign Secretary Cook decided that despite Indonesia's repeated refusal to honor human rights in a manner compatible with Britain's new rules, he would not oppose the sale of 160 million pounds worth of Hawk aircraft to that state. The government claimed that the order, placed during the last government, was too advanced and so cancellation jeopardized existing British jobs dependent upon the contract. ₄₂ Thus, the depth and extent of the government's commitment to a moral trade policy was dubious.

The new government's decision to prohibit the use of anti-personnel land mines by the British armed forces, and destroy all military stocks of these devices by 2005, encouraged supporters of a moral foreign policy. ₄₃ Prime Minister Blair repeatedly highlighted the official approval given to the campaign against land mines that Diana, Princess of Wales pursued. Certainly in the aftermath of the death of the princess, the government has an excellent opportunity to capitalize on world sympathy and public attention for the cause in which Diana was recently interested. The government could attempt to spearhead a move to implement a global ban. Even if this campaign fails, the Blair government will have reestablished and emphasized the morality in British foreign policy.

Concern for the environment also emerged as an important component of Britain's moral foreign policy. Notably, even the last government had a better record on global environmental issues than many administrations of other industrialized nations. However, the New Labour government has indicated its willingness to commit Britain even further to pro-environmental policies. The government unilaterally declared a further 20 percent reduction in British carbon dioxide emissions by the year 2010 in its election manifesto. ₄₄ Moreover, at his speech to the United Nations Special Session on the Environment on June 23, 1997, Prime Minister Blair announced a range of initiatives. He pledged government support for a new approach to sustainable forestry based on new standards and increased aid to developing nations. The Prime Minister also implicitly criticized the United States for its environmental policy. He noted that while John Major's government had met the targets for greenhouse gas emissions established at the Rio summit, "some other countries cannot say the same, including some of the great industrialized countries. I say that our targets will not be taken seriously by the poorer countries until we, the richer countries, are meeting them." ₄₅

The emphasis on two international roles in particular enhanced the moral image of Britain's foreign policy. The Blair government portrayed Britain as an international problem solver that built on its diplomatic experience to help find solutions to some of the world's festering wounds. In its capacity as President of the EU, Britain will achieve the international prominence and backing necessary for such a role. In anticipation of this task, Prime Minister Blair met with President Yassir Arafat and hosted the leader of the Israeli Labor Party, Ehud Barak. Blair also expressed interest in working with US envoy Richard Holbrooke to find a solution for Cyprus, especially as the island is a prospective applicant to the EU. Nevertheless, until the government forges a settlement in Northern Ireland, the conflict in which Britain is directly involved, ministers will find it difficult to devote too much attention to other intractable problems. If Tony Blair, with his Northern Ireland Secretary, Mo Mowlam, can preside over an agreement in Ireland, then the government's prestige and reputation for conflict resolution will be very high; the credibility of Britain's diplomacy will surely grow.

Alongside the depiction of the United Kingdom as an international problem-solver, the new government stressed the image of Britain as a nation involved heavily in peace keeping. The parameters of the Defense Review highlighted this priority - in order to allow greater British contribution to peacekeeping operations, the Ministry of Defense seemed willing to cut back the armored component of the Army. However, the government did not intend to eliminate tanks altogether, as their contribution to the NATO Bosnia force demonstrated their utility in peacekeeping operations. Instead, the Royal Air Force has become the focus for the deepest spending reductions, as fighters and bombers proved less relevant to peacekeeping missions. ₄₆ This role did not merely emphasize the moral element in British foreign policy. It also usefully demonstrated Britain's commitment to the United Nations, where the UK still possesses (and wants to retain) one of the last trophies of its former Great Power status, a permanent seat on the Security Council. The Blair government also was clearly willing to fulfill Britain's peacekeeping duties outside of the UN. On July 11, 1997, NATO forces attempted to arrest Simo Drljaca and Milan Kovacevic, and killed Drljaca in a fire fight. While not reported widely in the United States, the soldiers sent to detain the accused war criminals were British Special Forces, using American transport and logistical support. ₄₇ The Prime Minister decided to commit British troops to this hazardous operation after talking privately with President Clinton during the NATO summit in Madrid. Indeed, this example of active British peacekeeping in Bosnia illustrated an important feature of the third major change in British foreign policy - the evolving relationship with the United States.

 

The United States

The alliance with the United States has deeply concerned all postwar British governments. As American interest in their transatlantic associate waxed and waned, successive Prime Ministers worried about the present and future of their connection with Washington. It is clear that the term "Special Relationship" overstated the depth of the Anglo-American alliance. However, over the past fifty years, the two countries possessed common national interests more often than not. In addition, the personalities involved frequently discovered a mutual affinity. William Rees-Mogg noted with some justification that, "in terms of culture, the Atlantic is narrower than the Channel." ₄₈

The new British government was well positioned to continue the tradition of very close relations with the United States because of compatible characters and mutual interests. The personalities of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton were suited to each other. They shared similar life experiences although, as many commentators emphasize, differences existed; however, the parallels are striking. The two studied at Oxford and married successful lawyers. Most importantly, both hail from the same generation. They have similar philosophical and ideological outlooks. Blair and Clinton accepted that the proper role of government was to mitigate the worst excesses of the market. Both the President and the Prime Minister refashioned their political parties and espoused a new more pragmatic set of center-left ideas in order to win the trust and votes of the electorate after the Thatcher-Reagan years changed their societies. ₄₉ These principles were qualitatively different from the previous mainstream of the Democratic or Labour parties, and so the President and the Prime Minister have had to debate and defeat more traditional party members. The close Clinton-Blair axis was notably different from other successful relationships between American and British leaders. Ever since World War II, the most positive relationships have involved statespeople who were opposites that attracted. In the 1940s, the contrast between Secretary of State Dean Acheson, a product of the North Eastern establishment, and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, a founder and former general secretary of the Transport and General Workers' Union did not preclude close cooperation. Two decades later, both states benefited from the surprising partnership of Harold Macmillan and John Kennedy.

The mutual affinity between Clinton and Blair also reflected contemporaneous public feelings about the relationship between the two nations. The British population continued their propensity to believe in the existence of the "Special Relationship." In the United States, in a very recent Harris poll, Britain ranked second only to Canada in a public survey to identify America's closest allies. 63 percent of respondents described Britain as "a close ally," in comparison with 73 percent who viewed Canadians in that role. Another Commonwealth country, Australia, polled third, with only 48 percent. France was the only other European country towards which the sample of Americans exhibited any substantial goodwill, with 36 percent of interviewees describing it as a "close ally." ₅₀

The close partnership produced dividends with important implications not just for the future of Britain but for the emerging European security structure. The NATO summit in Madrid demonstrated Clinton and Blair's desire to work together. The final formula of enlargement, extended to just three states, depended upon a British-American united front against French proposals to invite five nations to enter the alliance. In addition, joint decisions bolstered NATO peace enforcement efforts. As noted earlier, the President and Prime Minister decided to order the NATO force to start to seek and detain Bosnian Serbs wanted for trial.

The affinity between leaders may have a future beyond the tenure of President Clinton. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States seemed to have chosen Germany as its closest European partner. The Gulf War checked this slightly, as the British and French sent troops and Germany dithered. But by 1993, following the British and American elections, the prospects for British influence in Washington still seemed to be in decline. In terms of the personalities at the time, this was not surprising. Chancellor Kohl and President Clinton developed a positive relationship. Prime Minister Major unsuccessfully concealed the assistance his government rendered to aid President Bush's campaign effort. In particular, the media focused on the alleged misuse and sharing of Home Office information concerning Bill Clinton's activities while at Oxford. With such a shadow over Anglo-American relations, at that early stage of the Clinton Administration, commentators in Britain searched for a panacea. They did not have to look far, as they quickly proclaimed that while the US President did not feel particular warmth towards Britain, his Vice President, Al Gore, was a committed Anglophile.

In 1997, in the midst of the second Clinton Administration, relations between the British and American leaders are positive. The prospect remains that this supposedly pro-British Vice President will attempt to use his office as a springboard to launch a campaign for the White House in 2000.

The current close relationship between Britain and the United States spread to other levels of government, and resulted in some practical political cooperation. During the US Presidential election of 1992, the Labour Party gave advice and assistance to the Democratic Party, based on their experience of the British general election earlier that year. In the end this expertise was extremely useful, as the Bush campaign attempted to level many of the same charges against Clinton that the Conservatives had used against Labour. ₅₁ In return, the Democratic National Committee sent many of its strategists and pollsters to Britain in 1997 to assist the victorious Labour effort. This influence was especially evident through the focus groups and "prebuttal" spin in which the Blair campaign engaged so effectively.

Common personal philosophies and the ability to drink beer together were not the only important features in a successful relationship between governments of different states. However, perhaps because of the similarities in the relevant British and American personalities, it was unsurprising that a number of shared interests allowed the governments to further their partnership. A British Foreign Office Briefing accurately stated that:

"In a world which is fast changing, countries depend more, not less, on tried and trusted partnerships. New and increasingly complex issues demand an international response. The end of the Cold War has not diminished the importance of consultation on political and security issues - and, indeed, the expansion of international terrorism and organized crime has increased the need for extensive links. A strong transatlantic relationship remains vital to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century." ₅₂

On the issues of NATO enlargement and action on Bosnia, as discussed above, the two states showed their ability to take the initiative and work together to force other states to accept the American-British positions on these security issues. The two countries' responses to the UN reforms proposed by secretary-general Kofi Annan suggest the emergence of a similar situation. Finally, the prospects for a solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland may well depend on whether Britain and the United States maintain a shared position.

In addition, the new morality embraced by the Blair government resonated well in the United States. American foreign policy has always contained a degree of moral rectitude. It is notable that British commentators compared the new foreign policy of the Blair government not with its predecessors in London, but with the policies of President Jimmy Carter. While Carter stood as the postwar President who most forcefully attempted to introduce morality into all aspects of foreign policy, the crusading component of American foreign policy continued into the 1990s. The annual debates about human rights and China and Most Favored Nation trading status, and the recent introduction of legislation to ensure that other states respect and enforce freedom of religion, illustrate the level of interest in a moral foreign policy which even saturates Congress. More cynically, it can be argued that Congress uses morality as an effective political tool. This in itself represents a judgment on the responsiveness of the public mood to the issue. Many in the executive branch, especially Madeline Albright, the current Secretary of State, are vocal about their commitment to human rights. Here, they share these concerns with sympathetic members of the British Cabinet, including Foreign Secretary Cook and the Secretary of State for International Development Claire Short.

The US government also has a common interest in the future economic and political development of Europe. Britain is the most important American investment and trading partner in Europe - over 40 percent of all US investment in Europe in 1996 flowed to Britain, more than the entire amount of American investment in the whole Asia-Pacific region. ₅₃ While President Clinton has a close friendship with Chancellor Kohl, the Administration can not ignore the possibility that the man with a longer tenure in office than Bismarck may not continue in office for a significant amount of time. The French elections cast a shadow of doubt over President Chirac's ability to vigorously promote the policies of European enlargement and deficit reduction that the Clinton Administration supports. To the United States, Britain is now the natural partner and the key point of access to the EU. This situation ironically represents the fulfillment of much American Cold War policy towards Britain. From the 1940s until the 1970s, US officials attempted to convince Britain that, in the words of George Ball, Under-Secretary of State in the 1960s, "she would never realize her full potential vis-à-vis the United States" unless the United Kingdom was an active and enthusiastic participant in the EEC (and later the EC and then EU). ₅₄ As Michael Jones noted in The Times, Secretary Cook echoed exactly those words during his first official visit to Washington - "Britain, as a leading player in Europe, would be a more useful partner to the United States than one that was drifting into being a marginalized offshore Island." ₅₅ Cook's words would have delighted previous generations of American policy makers. Arguably, this policy met with approval from the current Administration. According to officials at the British Foreign Office, the G-8 summit at Denver in June 1997 was extremely successful because the meeting firmly established Britain as "the linkman" between America and Europe. ₅₆ The combination of Blair's victory, and the lack of French or German leaders of sufficient stature to succeed Mitterand and Kohl, allowed Britain to fulfill the role that three generations of American policy makers have envisaged. Indeed, the scale of the Labour victory in the British election made continuity in British foreign policy over the next eight to ten years entirely likely.

The landmine campaign that the Blair government is pursuing may yet hinder the British relationship with the United States and detrimentally affect the Blair-Clinton partnership. The British position has the potential to embarrass the Clinton administration in the eyes of world opinion. In addition, the US Congress has already declared its opposition to a ban on these weapons. However, here the example of environmental issues is instructive. The question of lowering American output of greenhouse gases threatened to cause the same potential problems as the anti-landmine campaign, and perhaps humiliate and pressure the President. However, in October 1997, President Clinton announced a range of initiatives to lower the US production of these damaging emissions. ₅₇ Therefore, this move forestalled the probability of any public disagreement between Britain and America on this subject.

 

Conclusion

After the general election, the British government clearly engaged in a major re-orientation of its foreign policy. Prime Minister Blair and his government already have become much more assertive on the international stage than its predecessor, but also firmly committed itself to operating within the institutional structures of NATO, the UN and most importantly, the European Union. It is possible to outline a number of challenges in the near future that reveal whether the government will be successful in its new foreign policy.

The British Presidency of the EU is a critical period, and coinciding with the German elections, may well confirm the strength and dominance within Europe of the British agenda of cooperation in order to promote the two 'E's - employment and enlargement. The introspective obsession of the Union that the single currency debate occasions should end, although the process of introduction of the Euro will undoubtedly continue. Britain will no doubt eventually join the single currency, and organizations such as the Confederation of British Industry are preparing for this with calls for that course of action. The Treasury's decision to grant operational independence to the Bank of England fulfills an important condition for monetary union. However, it is extremely unlikely that Britain will be ready in 1999 to join the Euro with the first group of participants, especially as the government is committed to a referendum on the issue. Nevertheless, an active cooperative Britain within the EU acts as an alternative source of policies and initiatives that differ from the uninspiring post-Maastricht agenda of monetary union and convergence targets.

In the wider arena, the industrialized and developed world can expect the Blair government to promote the new economic agenda of employment, labor flexibility and skills training. Under this philosophy, the state performs a fundamental role in partnership with private enterprise. This whole program represents a major challenge both to the neo-liberal ideology that denies the constructive role for the state and to the Franco-German corporatist model. In addition, the government will use a variety of issues to demonstrate its commitment to a moral foreign policy to the world, especially as the Indonesian Hawk deal did not provide an auspicious start. The most practical expression of this new direction will be concern for environmental issues, and Britain's desire to force other industrialized countries to commit to specific targets on emissions and other forms of pollution. The G-8 summit in Birmingham will provide the perfect opportunity to assess the degree to which other nations are willing to share the Blair vision for the future.

The new foreign policy also affects Britain's relationship with developing countries. In this instance, the Commonwealth summit is Britain's showcase. There will be no repetition of the events of the 1980s, when Mrs. Thatcher found herself isolated at the Nassau, Vancouver and Kuala Lumpur meetings of Commonwealth heads of state (over the issue of sanctions against South Africa.) ₅₈ Instead, the redefinition of British trade and aid policy allows a new spirit of cooperation to enter into relations between Britain and the developing countries. It is possible that such examples of dialogue can serve as a model for the more general discourse needed between North and South. Finally, the Blair government can capitalize upon the emotive memory of Diana, Princess of Wales to encourage the campaign in favor of a global ban on anti personnel land mines. This in itself helps enhance the government's image in the wider world and especially in regions where mines are such a plague.

In the immediate future this foreign policy may be entirely unsuccessful in winning promotion for Britain back into the first tier of states. Even if the Blair foreign policy does not lead to these anticipated results, the fact still remains that Britain and its new government confronted and abandoned the self-delusions and assumptions that have clouded the judgments of successive generations. Throughout the twentieth century, British foreign policy labored under mistaken assumptions concerning Britain's economic ability to act and national self-definition. The Blair government that will lead the country into the next millennium has successfully begun to create a new position for Britain in Europe and the world. Dean Acheson's comment, so appropriate to British policy in the Cold War era, has lost its descriptive accuracy. Having fully accepted the loss of its Empire, Britain has finally found a role.

 

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**: The author would like to thank the Smith-Richardson Foundation for funding a pre-dissertation research trip to London for this and other projects. He also thanks Professors Paul Kennedy, Diane Kunz and Will Hitchcock, and Lisa Ciccone. Back.

Note 1: BBC Television Election Night Coverage, May 1, 1997. Back.

Note 2: New Labour: Because Britain Deserves Better, (The Labour Party, London, 1997), p.39. Back.

Note 3: David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century, (London, Longman, 1993).. Back.

Note 4: A position examined in greater detail by Paul Kennedy in "The Tradition of British Appeasement, 1865-1939", Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945, (London, Fontana, 1984), pp. 15-39. Back.

Note 5: A point developed by Correlli Barnett in The Collapse of British Power, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, Humanities Press International, 1972) for the aftermath of World War I and The Lost Victory: British Dreams, British Realities, 1945-1950, (London, Macmillan, 1995). Randall Woods shows the impact of these pressures during and immediately following World War II in A Changing of the Guard - Anglo-American Relations, 1941-1946, (Chapel Hill, UNC Press, 1990). In Part IV of The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980, (London, Fontana, 1981), Paul Kennedy analyses the impact of these pressures between 1945-1980. Back.

Note 6: For a full explanation of this critical angle of the Suez Crisis, see Diane B. Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis, (Chapel Hill, UNC Press, 1991). Back.

Note 7: "Eurohoneymoon", The Economist, June 14, 1997.. Back.

Note 8: "Carrier Questions", The Economist, May 31, 1997. Back.

Note 9: "New Labour's Model Army", The Economist, September 27, 1997. Back.

Note 10: Denis Judd, Empire - The British Imperial Experience from 1765 to the Present, (London, Basic Books, 1996). Back.

Note 11: Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defense Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars, (Atlantic Highlands, Ashfield Press, 1989). Back.

Note *: or, in the case of the Empire, the former colonies had forced the decision upon the UK. Back.

Note 12: "A New Brand for Britain", The Economist, August 23, 1997. Back.

Note 13: William Rees-Mogg, "Blair's New Patriotism", The Times, October 2, 1997. Back.

Note 14: Andrew Marr, "The end of Empire, the beginning of modern Britain", The Independent, July 1, 1997, p.21. Back.

Note 15: Judd, Empire, p.131. Back.

Note 16: Comments on CBS This Morning, September 6, 1997. Back.

Note 17: Comments on Meet the Press, September 7, 1997. Back.

Note 18: New Labour, p.33. Back.

Note 19: The New York Times, September 12, 1997. Back.

Note 20: "The Choice for Scotland and Wales", The Economist, September 6, 1997. Back.

Note 21: "A New Brand for Britain", The Economist, August, 23, 1997. Back.

Note 22: Ibid. Back.

Note 23: The New British Airways, (London, British Airways, 1997), p.5. Back.

Note 24: New British Airways, p.7. Back.

Note 25: New Music Express, July 5, 1997. Back.

Note 26: Newsweek, November 4, 1996. Back.

Note 27: The Times, May 2, 1997. Back.

Note 28: "The Devilish Details", The Economist, June 21, 1997. Back.

Note 29: "Blair's New Patriotism", The Times, October 2, 1997. Back.

Note 30: Robin Cook, "Planning the Future of the European Union", June 15-16, 1997. This article can be found at www.fco.gov.uk/texts/1997/jun/16/article.txt Back.

Note 31: Ethan Kapstein, "Workers and the World Economy", Foreign Affairs, May-June 1996, Vol. 75, No.3, pp.16-37. Back.

Note 32: The Economist, September 6, 1997. Back.

Note 33: The Times, June 7, 1997. Back.

Note 34: Ralf Dahrendorf, "New Blair meets Old Europe - in retreat", The Sunday Times, June 8, 1997. Back.

Note 35: Linda Colley, Britons - Forging the Nation, 1707-1837, (New Haven, Yale, 1992), pp.358-359. Back.

Note 36: Judd, Empire, p.60. Back.

Note 37: Statement by Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, May 12, 1997. The statement may be found at www.fco.gov.uk/texts/1997/may/12/mspc.txt Back.

Note 38: Speech by Robin Cook on "Human Rights into a New Century", July 17, 1997. The text of this speech can be found at www.fco.gov.uk/texts/jul/17/hrspeech.txt Back.

Note 39: The Guardian, November 9, 1994. Back.

Note 40: "Speech by the Rt Hon Claire Short MP, Secretary of State for International Development: The Role and Functions of the Department for International Development", May 28, 1997. The text of this speech can be found at www.oneworld.org/oda/soas.html Back.

Note 41: FCO Daily Briefing, July 28, 1997, www.fco.gov.uk/texts/1997/jul/28/bulletin.txt Back.

Note 42: "Business as Usual", The Economist, August 2, 1997. Back.

Note 43: The Times, May 22, 1997. Back.

Note 44: New Labour, New Britain, p.39. Back.

Note 45: An amended text of Blair's speech can be found at www.fco.gov.uk/texts/1997/jun/23/ungass.txt Back.

Note 46: The Economist, September 27, 1997. Back.

Note 47: The Daily Telegraph, July 11, 1997. Back.

Note 48: William Rees-Mogg, "I have seen Britain's future: it's California", The Sunday Times, June 1, 1997. Back.

Note 49: Martin Walker, Clinton -The President They Deserve, (New York, Crown, 1996), Chs. 4-6. Back.

Note 50: The Times, September 18, 1997. Back.

Note 51: Walker, Clinton, pp.152-155. Back.

Note 52: FCO On-Line, Briefing on Transatlantic Relations. This can be found at www.fco.gov.uk/keythemes/transatlantic Back.

Note 53: Ibid. Back.

Note 54: Report on "Politico-Military Implications of United Kingdom Entry into the European Communities", E(66)8, August 23, 1966, CAB 134/2705, Public Record Office. Back.

Note 55: Michael Jones, "Blair can't wait to invade his brave new world", The Sunday Times, June 1, 1997. Back.

Note 56: Sue Cameron, "Defending our seat at top table", The Times, June 24,1997. Back.

Note 57: The New York Times, October 22, 1997, p.1. Back.

Note 58: Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, (London, HarperCollins, 1993), pp.516-532. Back.