Could 5,000 Peacekeepers Have Saved 500,000 Rwandans?: Early Intervention Reconsidered

The views expressed in this report are entirely those of the author(s) and conference participants and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, associates, or Board of Directors of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy or the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.

On April 6,1994, the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were assassinated when their aircraft was shot down as it approached the airport near Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. Within hours, violence swept the city and later spread throughout the country asmembers of the majority Hutu population began slaughtering the minority Tutsisat will.

Almost three years after this tragic onset of genocide, aninternational panel of senior military leaders gathered at Georgetown Universityto review the outbreak of violence in Rwanda and to reconsider what could havebeen done to stop it. Using General Dallaire's statement as the basis fordiscussion, the panel sought to answer these questions: What size militaryforce would have been needed to forestall the violence? How should it have beenorganized, trained, and equipped? What actions could it have taken to end theviolence? Finally, what is the relationship between the timing of interventionsand the type of force required?

The Early Violence in Retrospect

Under the command of Canadian Major General Romeo Dallaire,a 2,500-man peace-keeping force, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), was on the ground to help implement the Arusha Peace Accords. Signedby the Hutu-dominated government of Rwanda and by the rebel Rwandan PatrioticFront (RPF), composed of minority Tutsis and moderate Hutus, the Arusha Accordsended a four-year civil war. Pursuant to Chapter 6 of the United Nations Charterand UN Security Council Resolution 872, UNAMIR was directed to contribute tothe security of Kigali, monitor the observance of the cease-fire and thesecurity situation leading up to the elections, train Rwandans in the removal ofmines, investigate violations of the Accords, monitor the repatriation effort,and assist in the coordination of humanitarian relief efforts.

However, the peace process slipped away and UNAMIR'smission became endangered as the death of Rwanda's President removed anysemblance of legitimacy and order. The Rwandan Prime Minister was murdered alongwith ten Belgian members of UNAMIR who were trying to protect her. An RPFbattalion, stationed in Kigali as part of the Arusha Accords, broke out of itscompound and battled members of the Rwandan Presidential Guard. Other RPF unitsnear the demilitarized zone (DMZ) engaged units of the Rwandan Government Forces(RGF) and began to advance toward Kigali. Repeated attempts by General Dallaireand the UN Secretary General's Special Representative to curtail the violenceand restart the long-running peace process failed. The civil war had beenrenewed in earnest.

With UNAMIR weakened by national capitals unwilling to risktheir forces already on the ground, and by the withdrawal the Belgiancontingent, the situation quickly spun out of control. Within three months,UNAMIR was reduced to a rump force of 450 personnel; roughly 500,000 to 800,000Rwandans, mostly Tutsi, were dead; and over two-million Rwandans, mostly Hutu,had fled to surrounding countries. More human tragedy was compressed into threemonths in Rwanda than occurred during four years of war in the formerYugoslavia.

For the Want of 5,000 Troops

The panel members generally agreed that General Dallairewas right--a force of 5,000 peacekeepers could have interrupted the violence.Moreover, his appreciation of the situation at the time has been substantiatedby subsequent scholarship. The initial violence was confined to a "politicaldecapitation" of moderate Hutus and Tutsis located in and near Kigali. Thekillings, directed by extremists within the deceased President's own party, weredesigned to permanently disrupt the tenuous peace process. The extremistscarried out a systematic plan to attack opposition targets by spreading terrorand inciting Hutus to kill Tutsis over the state radio; by uprooting the entire"target" population through local murder and intimidation; and by "straining"the refugees through a sieve of intermittently established roadblocks, selectingindividual Rwandans for execution. The population upheaval had an added benefit:extremist leaders were able to secure themselves within the mass of refugees andultimately seize control of the refugee camps in Zaire.

In retrospect, a capable force of 5,000 troops inserted during April 7 to 21 could have significantly squelched the violence, prevented its spread from the capital to the countryside, and removed the RPF's pretext for renewing its fight with the RGF. This force, however, would have required significantly different and enhanced capabilities than Dallaire's original peace-keeping contingent -- one with more firepower and mobility. A regular infantry brigade, with all of its organic weapons and helicopters for in-country transportation, should have formed its core. Tanks would not have been necessary -- armored personnel carriers (APCs) could have intimidated any opponent. Some panelists argued that artillery would also have been needed, but most modern infantry units carry mortars, which would have been adequate. In addition, compatible, secure communications and a robust logistics and support system would have been essential. In contrast, UNAMIR's communications were provided by contractors; it never had more than three to five days of supplies on hand; and its twelve APCs lacked spare parts, mechanics, tools, or operator training. When the fighting started, only six were operational.

It should go without saying that this force would have to have been well trained and cohesive, much more so than UNAMIR--a totally ad hoc unit drawn from several disparate countries. Its sub-units and soldiers would have to have been capable of large-scale, integrated combat operations; small-unit peacekeeping; and confidence-building and security operations. More critically, the soldiers and their leaders would have to have been able to shift rapidly along the spectrum between combat and peacekeeping--as the situation required. Simply put, complex and dynamic operations require personnel who canassess the situation rapidly, anticipate developments, and adjust plans to prevent setbacks and exploit opportunities.

Had it been deployed, about 60 percent of this hypothetical force could have been devoted to direct intervention, with the remainder committed to aviation, logistics, communications, staff, and security functions. Self-sustaining at the tactical level, and supported by forces operating from Entebbe, Uganda, or other staging areas, a reinforced brigade of 5,000 troops, operating under a robust mandate, could have subdued the killers and returned some semblance of order to the country.

For the Want of a Mission

While the panelists generally agreed that this force could have made a difference, they could not agree on its mission. One panelist thought that preventing the militia and government sympathizers from killing fellow Rwandans would have removed the RPF's rationale for conducting offensive military actions against the RGF. The force would not have needed to interpose itself between the RPF and RGF units in the field, but would have instead concentrated on keeping the population in the rear areas safe and on ensuring the flow of humanitarian aid. In his estimation, ending the mass slaughter would have been a sufficient first step in ending the civil war and prompting a resumption of the peace process.

Other panelists were concerned that such a limited mission and sequential plan would have generated perceptions of partiality, endangering the force and its mission: First, any attempt to stop the killing of the Tutsis and moderate Hutus would have been interpreted as de facto support for the RPF. Second, the ability to discriminate precisely between acts related to the civil war and those associated with the genocide is beyond the capability of any intervening force. Instead, these panelists proposed the simultaneous imposition of a cease-fire, a freeze on all military movements, and an end to the killings in the rear areas. After achieving these military goals, the peace negotiations between the RPF and the Rwandan government could have hypothetically then resumed.

In hindsight the RPF became increasingly reluctant to submit to a cease-fire as it moved toward victory on its own terms. Therefore, for this reason, humanitarian concerns, and military requirements, early intervention -- within two weeks of the initial violence -- would have been necessary.

The Issue of Political Mandates

The rapid introduction of a peace-keeping force presumes adefinable, achievable political end and the will to realize it in a reasonableamount of time. The panel members thought that political mandates, without thecommitment of troops and resources, are more expressions of moral outrage thanof political will. In the spring of 1994, several factors combined to preventthe generation of the national and multinational political will required forearly, effective intervention in Rwanda.

First, the early intervention of any peace-keeping forcewould have required the sophisticated transportation and logistics capabilitiesmaintained by a select few states. The panelists believed that for thishypothetical operation, U.S. participation would have been critical. However,the United States and other major countries were trying to cope with theaftermath of the UN action in Somalia, particularly the consequences of thechange in political goals, from humanitarian relief to nation-building, and theUnited States withdrawal after sustaining casualties. Second, the UN,particularly the permanent members of the UN Security Council, and regionalorganizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and theEuropean Union, were struggling to devise a solution to the ongoing wars in theformer Yugoslavia. Third, the strategic outlook of the major powers was, as somepanelists observed, characterized by peace-keeping fatigue, outright caution, orfear of over-stretching their military resources.

The panelists also lamented the UN's role in Rwanda inparticular and its role in peacekeeping and peacemaking in general. One panelistassessed the problems with the UN on both conceptual and practical dimensions:The UN, formed at the end of World War II, developed two major aims: (1) to endcolonialism and (2) to prevent a direct confrontation between the United Statesand the Soviet Union. Respect for national sovereignty--a key, inviolableconcept--and the open airing of differences became two of the UN's chiefcharacteristics. Its institutional construction, according to this participant,has been aimed at preventing, where possible, a precipitous deterioration ofevents and crises into war. Today, however, even in the eyes of UN officials,respect for territorial and political integrity are no longer the psychologicalimpediment to intervention that they once were. Indeed, the UN now finds itselfprimarily engaged in disputes within countries. This shift in the UN'sconceptual framework requires a corresponding structural adjustment; however,the UN in the post-Cold War world remains ill-equipped to make or implementquick decisions that require rapidly establishing a physical presence on theground in a crisis. The political machinery and the logistical and financialstructure necessary to make things happen quickly currently do not exist.Transportation, communications, and supply functions are contracted out througha competitive, laborious, and time-consuming system. (It takes three weeks toprocure an aircraft and six weeks to obtain sealift.) Crisis staffing is ad hocand drawn from standing organizations within the UN. Members of the staff mustbe recruited, either as volunteers or for differential compensation.

Getting It Right in the Future

The problem faced by current UN policymakers is how tobridge the gap between Chapter 6 missions, classical peacekeeping, and Chapter 7missions, peacemaking and peace enforcement. What should be the response when aChapter 6 mission, like UNAMIR, begins to go wrong? The answer obviously lies ina "force in being," which presupposes the political will to devote theresources to counter situations that may be unclear or not yet in existence. Theparticipants discussed three possible answers to this question. One option wouldbe the creation of a standing UN force. While the UN has a military staff ofabout 145 officers, it is neither permitted to field such a force nor capable ofit, and it probably won't be for the foreseeable future. The sovereign concernsof the member states continue to preclude its development.

A second option--and an alternative to a standing UNforce--might be found in regional forces, such as NATO or the recently proposedAfrican Crisis Response Force. The advantages of a regional force are itsinherent knowledge of regional problems, linguistic compatibility, andacclimatization; the general interest of the regional participants in successfuloutcomes; and the synergy that comes from working with allies bound by sharedeconomics, culture, and interests. Secondary benefits include regular trainingand interoperability of weapons systems and staff procedures.

There are significant obstacles, however. First, thedifferent stakes that regional participants might have in the outcome of anearby conflict may lead either to misuse of the force for one country's agendaor to other obstacles to its effective use. Disinterested, and perhaps distant,parties sometimes make better peacekeepers. Second, building and training amilitarily meaningful regional force is a costly undertaking. Buildingconfidence and interoperability take significant effort to achieve--NATO is afifty-year work in progress that requires constant political maintenance, andyet, in the case of Yugoslavia it is subject to major internal strains. Third,few regions have the military capability to deploy or sustain a peace-keepingor peace-making force for the significant time it takes to generate stability onthe ground, and such an effort may be viewed by some as an excuse by thedeveloped world to wash it hands of the problems in less-developed regions (manyof which originated during colonial rule). The final paradox, pointed out by onepanelist, is that the very regions where a force may be required are comprisedof countries in dire financial, social, and political straits, which would behard pressed to participate without outside assistance.

The third option--and one solution to the problems facingthe establishment of regional peace-keeping forces--is to create a "regionalplus" force, one with a clear division of responsibility between the richand poor nations. The regional forces can be trained in peace-keeping and combatskills. They require transportation, intelligence, logistics, and communicationscapabilities that could be furnished by a major power. Thus, the on-the-groundresources would be provided by those who stand the most to gain from regionalstability, while technical support would be furnished by other countries (someof which may be former colonial powers) that could maintain a discrete distancefrom any hostilities.

Yet, the regional-plus option contains its own set ofdifficulties. The countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, where suchforces are proposed, look at "regional plus" as a way for thedeveloped world to shift the risk of casualties onto poor countries or tomaintain a de facto veto over the use of regional forces through the retentionof certain key capabilities. Evidence fueling this perception resides at the UNheadquarters, where, for lack of resources, developing countries cannot affordto maintain personnel in New York City to work on the UN military staff. Thus,the staff remains populated by Western and Northern officers, and as a result,it may lack the perspective of the countries in the regions where it is mostlikely to implement its plans.

Ultimately, the force that was required in Rwanda may bethe purview of a "lead country." If questions of operational goals,force generation, deployment, employment, and engagement require a majormilitary actor to answer them in sufficient time to make a difference, thencountries like the United States, France, and Great Britain must recognize thattheir services will be in demand. This is not to say that only Westerndemocracies can, should, or will perform the bulk of future operations like theone retrospectively proposed for Rwanda, only that their capabilities areindispensable. To be certain, peace-keeping forces that incorporate wideparticipation send a strong message to their intended audience that the worldcommunity has a stake in successful outcomes. But "somebody must be incharge," and those who call the shots generally have to put up a largeshare of the resources.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the panel made the following observationsand recommendations:

• A force created along Dallaire's lines could have made asignificant difference in Rwanda in April 1994. It would have required at least 5,000 personnel (depending on the method of employment) armed with all the weapons, equipment, and capabilities necessary to employ and sustain a brigade in combat.

• There was a window of opportunity for the employment ofthis force during April 7-21, 1994. During this time, the targeted killing hadnot spread much beyond Kigali, the population was relatively stable, and the RPFhad not yet made its final push on Kigali. The opportunity existed to preventthe killing, interpose a force between the conventional combatants, reestablishthe DMZ, and place the peace negotiations back on track.

• Generation of a capable force requires the participationof a modern, sophisticated national military force--in this case, U.S.participation would have been essential--to marshal the resources, providecritical functions, and achieve mission goals.

• For the foreseeable future, "lead countries"will provide the best arrangement for determining and achieving peace-keepingmission goals. These lead countries should operate under the mandate of a UN Security Council resolution, but retain command authority to determine immediate goals, objectives, and methods.

• The role of the UN needs better definition. It is nowinvolved in internal conflicts. Static Chapter 6 and 7 definitions do notaddress the "gray areas" where dynamic situations can shift along aspectrum that may require peace-keeping capabilities one day, peace-makingsavvy the next, and peace-enforcement prowess the day after. Capabilities forgenerating forces, mandates, and political will require new study andarticulation. If the UN is going to be involved in crisis situations on anoperational basis, its decision-making apparatus requires overhaul.

• The creation of a standing peace-keeping force and thedelineation of capabilities, responsibilities, and parameters surrounding theuse of force in Rwanda-like situations is a legitimate and necessary area forfurther inquiry.

About Chapters 6 and 7 of the UNCharter

Chapter VI of the UN Charter, "Pacific Settlement ofDisputes," enjoins the parties to an international dispute to "firstof all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation,arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements,or other peaceful means . . ." The UN Security Council can recommend orimplement supportive actions, such as UNAMIR, when one or more of the partiesreport failure in their peaceful efforts to resolve the dispute in question.Chapter VII, "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of thePeace, and Acts of Aggression," offers a basis for greater action. Inparticular, Article 42 provides that the Security Council "may take suchaction by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restoreinternational peace and security."

About theConference

On January 23, 1997, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and the CarnegieCommission on Preventing Deadly Conflict cosponsored a conference to assessMajor General Dallaire's statement that 5,000 troops could have saved hundredsof thousands of Rwandan lives.

Bringing together a distinguished international panel ofmilitary leaders with experience in multinational peace-keeping efforts,representing both national and international perspectives, the sponsors hoped toanswer a set of questions regarding the situation in Rwanda in 1994 andpeace-keeping forces in general. The remarks of the conference participants weremade on a not-for-attribution basis.

The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy would like tothank the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict for its involvementin the conference and its generous support. This ISD Report was made possible bya grant from the Pamela Churchill Harriman Trust.

An expanded version of this report will be published by theCarnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict in July 1997.

About the Author

Col. Scott Feil is an Army War College Fellow who is studying the relationship between force and diplomacy at the Insitute for theStudy of Diplomacy during the 1996-97 academic year. His twenty-four years inthe United States Army have been evenly divided between serving in armoredcombat units and studying and teaching international relations. He served as aregimental operations officer during the Persian Gulf War and later commanded atank battalion. At the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York,he taught advanced international relations courses during the mid-1980s. Beforejoining ISD, Col. Feil was the chief of the U.S. Military Liaison Team to theRepublic of Slovenia. Col. Feil graduated from the United States MilitaryAcademy in 1973. He received his M.A. in Political Science from Stanford University in 1984.