|
|
|
Email this citationCIAO DATE: 5/99
The European Union and the 21st Century
The story of post-World War II European integration had started before integration theory gained popularity. One has to bear in mind, however, that the idea of European integration was launched with modest objectives in the 1950s. Except for some visionary statesmen, like Jean Monnet and some others, both the subject matters to be covered by integration and the geographical scope was limited. Six countries aimed at establishing a free trade zone and not much else was on their plate when they signed the Rome Treaty on 25 March 1957.
Since then it has been a success story of Europe in many senses of the word. It has deepened economic interdependence among the member states, their trade relations and investments are directed to each other to a much larger extent than before. 1 It is another aspect of the same matter that the difference between the level of economic development of the member countries has diminished through a central redistribution mechanism. Its scope of activity has extended to related areas which facilitate further economic integration. The free movement of persons, services, the introduction of common currency and the future reduction of agricultural subsidies, though the interpretation of those steps may vary, serve for the global competitiveness of the EU and its members. It has also expanded to areas which only indirectly affect the core of the integration process, like cooperation in home (primarily police) affairs, and the concept of common foreign and security policy. The number of member states has increased from 6 to 15 in 38 years and plans exist to continue the process. It is of similar importance that no state of Europe can avoid defining its relations with the EU any longer. The Union has become one of the centers of gravity of the evolution of Europe.
The achievements of the EC/EU in the last four decades are remarkable and reflected in the fact that the EU can no longer be described with the categories which are traditionally used for international organizations. The supranational nature of the EU helps explain the institutional relations between the Union and its members. No doubt, in certain areas supranationality is resented by certain members. Again in other areas one can conclude that the EU starts resembling a confederation. The introduction of the common currency and later the plan to harmonize some tax levels suggest a move in that direction. But this tendency can formally still be denied as the major decisions of the process are taken by the Council where heads of states and governments assemble at the meetings. Consequently, member states decide on the strategic issues. The activity of the European Central Bank is moving in the opposite direction, however. On the basis of the process one can deny the supranational character of the European Union but at least as far as its first pillar is concerned supranationality is undeniable as far as the substance is concerned.
The European Economic Community/Union has evolved unevenly throughout the last decades. Ideas appeared and remained to be put into practice for years, sometimes decades. Many of those ideas which are to be put into practice nowadays have been floating around since the 1950s or the 1970s. The idea of common defense belongs to the former, common currency to the latter. It is important to see clearly, however, that prosperous activities have concentrated in those areas which are more closely linked to the original economic objectives of the EC. 2 There is no reason to doubt that emphasis will continue to be put on those areas which are closely related to the economic development of the Union or at least belong to the periphery of economic activity. This results in a situation familiar in history that the “strong leg” of the European Union gets even stronger whereas the weak ones do not grow muscle.
Considerations for the Future
The European Union has practically expanded the four freedoms on which it has been based to all its member countries by the late 1990s. The free movement of goods, persons, capital and services are guaranteed among the fifteen, the transition periods have expired. Consequently, the Union can look ahead and focus its attention on its most important agenda points. They are only indirectly related to the external political role of the Union, though certain aspects of EU foreign policy are high on the agenda. Bearing in mind the heavy workload the issues on the priority list represent, it is likely that there will be issues, among them some controversial ones, which will be put on the back-burner. One can take it for granted that the deepening of coperation in the area of common foreign and security policy will be among them.
On the priority list the following topics will certainly appear: (1.) The continuation of institutional reform and the reduction of the so-called democratic deficit. (2.) The introduction of the common currency, completing the development agreed upon in the Maastricht Treaty. (3.) The reform of the budget of the EU including the new financial perspective, the reform of the agricultural policy, and (co-) financing the development of the future members of the Union. (4.) The definition of the role of the EU in the world at large, including enlargement, pre-accession strategy, the transatlantic dialogue, the relationship with countries neighboring the Union, and the exchange initiated not long ago with Asia.
In the traditional sense of the word those matters have not much to do with security. One can, of course, start out from a broad, nearly all-embracing definition of security like the OSCE does and then nearly all the above matters gain relevance in international security. It is necessary to remind of the uneven evolution of European integration. There are periods when European integration moves forward very quickly and there are years when the achievements are stabilized, or some identified as blind alleys.
Since the Maastricht Treaty it seems not much happened in treaty-making. The norms adopted in the Amsterdam Treaty reflected much more that the “parties agreed to differ” on some major issues than anything else. The evolution of the Union in the last seven years or so took place primarily in the implementation of the economic and monetary union, in the consolidation of the movement of foreigners in the territory of the EU and its contribution to the stabilization of the area adjacent to the member states.
1. The centrality of the EMU in the evolution of the EU. Since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty the timely introduction of the common currency has gained central importance in the Union. It has become a symbol of the further deepening of integration. The decision about the introduction has been taken though it has remained clear that the position of the parties about some of the fundamental issues will have to be sorted out at a later stage in practice, such as the function of the central bank in time of recession. In that respect the French and the German economic philosophy is different. Assuming on that basis that there will be a major conflict between the two decisive powers of the EU is a little bit far-fetched and seems not particularly well founded. 3 It may cause a severe problem, however, that the first years of the functioning of the European Central Bank and the Euro proper will take place at a time of recession or at least a major slow down of growth A conflict with the world at large, including the United States, seems even less likely. The fact that the Euro-zone of 11 states will have a nearly equal share in world trade with the US and the industrial output of the former will not be much smaller than that of the latter does not automatically mean rivalry. The currency reserves of the world will in less than 20 per cent be held in currencies of countries which join the Euro in the beginning. It equals with approximately one-third held in US dollar. A change may come gradually or the increase of the share of the Euro as a reserve currency will remain insignificant also in the long run. The same goes for capital investment as the European capital markets remain substantially smaller than that of the US. 4 One also has to take into consideration that the Euro from the outset cannot be judged on economic grounds exclusively and unambiguously. On economic grounds one can only state “... that economics does not provide us any neutral, technical information about the costs and benefits of the project, nor does it support EMU unequivocally”. 5 As a logical continuation of the single market one can only conclude that EMU, and then are necessary even if they are not without risks either economically or politically.
It is more important that the member countries, and the periphery of the Union (candidates for membership) readily accept the necessity of financial discipline imposed by the Maastricht criteria. The combination of low inflation rate, no excessive deficit, and the observance of normal fluctuation margins, i.e. no devaluation against the currency of any member state on its own initiative, and the durability of the average nominal long-term interest rate taken together offer the chance of global competitiveness.
No doubt the Maastricht criteria have mixed consequences. On the one hand, it creates the financial discipline necessary. 6 On the other, however, it offers one more point of reference to the executive branches of the member states to refer to the EU in order not to compromise in certain economic matters. It furthermore does not in any manner address the problem of unemployment. It rather aggravates unemployment as it excludes the competitive devaluation of the currency in order to generate demand and thus create jobs. Weakening thus the power of the state in order to increase long term global economic competitiveness is a means in relation to states who have been unable to create the necessary financial discipline on their own.
It seems in the next century we will enter the phase when major economic or trade blocks will compete and cooperate with each other. There will be some exceptions based on the size of the national economy (Peoples Republic of China) on the richness of natural resources (some oil and gas producing countries) or on traditions (Switzerland). In sum, European Union unifying further joins the global trend. It furthermore sets an example to those members that are reluctant to join the inner circle of EU members and the candidate countries which have already started to measure their economic performance by meeting the Maastricht criteria, in spite of the fact the Union has persistently emphasized that meeting the Maastricht criteria are not conditions of membership. The further unification in Europe symbolized by the common currency may be regarded as a challenge by other trade blocks, or their leading members.
2. The European Union as Stabilizing Factor in Europe. The existential threat that dominated the security agenda of Europe has vanished rapidly. The “high risk, high stability” era has been replaced by a “low risk, low stability” one - as perceived by most countries of the continent. The conflicts that have emerged since the beginning of the 1990s are on the periphery of the continent, particularly on the territory of the former Soviet Union. They are regarded of peripheral importance by the rest of Europe. This perception has been reinforced by the fact the conflicts have had no tendency to escalate horizontally. The peoples of the former Yugoslavia, though engaged in civil war, except for rare exceptions, had no intention to extend their operations to neighboring countries. The developments in Russia and on its periphery were more worrying for the nations of the post-Soviet republics than for any other country. It is for those reasons that the importance of security in the traditional military sense has declined in Europe.
At the same time the doubling of international institutions (EC - CMEA; NATO - Warsaw Treaty) came to an end. The value system of many East Central European countries has become similar, and even identical with western values. It has become a task for both the European Community and the former socialist countries to redefine their relations. It was easier for the latter than for the former. There was a region next to them which has been democratic, stable and far more developed than the countries of the region proper. The reassessment was much more complex for the West and its evolution went through different phases.
It has to be stated briefly that there are at least three distinct phases among which one has to differentiate when dealing with the evolution of the role attributed to East Central Europe. The first one was reflected in a largely uninformed West as in the preceding forty years or so the countries of the region were regarded unimportant. Thus the professional knowledge of the countries of East Central Europe diminished to zero. The western discussions remained on a very low professional level and were dominated by some U.S. experts who, at best, had spent some holidays on the coast of the Adriatic Sea. They recommended: “... the West should try to isolate the relatively healthy Western half of the European order, where the effects of anarchy have been partially mitigated, and nationalism and militarism controlled, from Europe’s increasingly volatile Eastern half.” 7 Not much later the level of familiarity with the region increased, though the concerns of the West were also on the rise. As the outbreak of the war in Yugoslavia and the Moscow coup of August 1991 demonstrated that the dangers were real, western experts increasingly focused their attention on ethnic conflict as the most dangerous evil of the region. The West was concerned about the spread of the disease of ethno-nationalism in the region. The worries extended not only to the spread of violence but also the side-effects, primarily the uncontrolled mass migration induced by violent conflicts. “A good argument can be made that many of these erroneous assumptions were understandable. After more than four decades of separation, a period of accommodation was required; that this has lasted only a few years and involved no irretrievable mistakes is a source of pride for many Western governments today.” 8 Interestingly enough, Yugoslavia was more deterring for the countries of East Central Europe. It had not only a salutary effect on Romanians and Bulgarians, but also influenced relations between the Czechs and Slovaks during their ‘velvet divorce.’ Hence, a few years after the end of the East-West conflict the West has been deprived of the basis of its policy of rejection on the ground that the countries of the region carry the danger of ethnic violence. Other points of reference concerning a broad array of issues ranging from the civilian control of armed forces to their military compatibility with NATO standards, the share of private property in the economy and the ability of the economy to stand the competition with other market economies have remained relevant, however. It is a fact, however, that the years have passed and the region has proved remarkably stable. Jonathan Eyal is right to say that “bombs continued to explode in Belfast and Bilbao, not in Bucharest or Bratislava”. 9 Even though since then detonations have occurred in some capitals of East-Central Europe, it was the sign of the disquieting spread of organized crime rather than that of political violence. The time that has passed since the end of the East-West has been conflict largely uneventful, or one would say without any major conflict, and the performance of the countries together resulted in a situation that the West gradually reassessed East-Central Europe. The idea to integrate the region also institutionally was no longer opposed philosophically.
The East Central European countries had certain difficulties in arguing their case in the West. In the beginning some believed that the western integration was vital to stability would encourage the West to integrate the region early. 10 Instead it deterred the West. It was, however, fairly difficult to present a positive picture as it took time to provide solid arguments why it would be beneficial to the West to open its institutions to East Central Europe. It was still easier to demonstrate the importance of the region for the West as far as security and political stability were concerned than in economic terms. The contradictions of the system were demonstrated by an assessment of the early years of miscommunication: “One day the audience is confronted with a vision of domestic anarchy and foreign aggression. Another day the same politicians describe their country as exceptionally stable and surrounded by peaceful neighbors. In East-West encounters the latter vision is usually presented to Western bankers and investors; the former to security experts.” 11 It took a few years to sort out the problem and eliminate the inconsistency of the messages communicated by the East-Central Europeans.
It was unpredictable how long the allegiance with the West could be maintained without imbedding the region into western security institutions. The de facto buffer role could only be consolidated through institutional arrangements. As a Hungarian politician, arguing in favor of the independence of Ukraine, said: “We feel that the Ukraine ... will absorb the larger shocks which might emanate from the Soviet Union.” 12 Not to mention that the biggest successor state of the Soviet Union started to be assertive internationally again. The Russian President in his letter to his US counterpart in September 1993 offered the following: “... we would be prepared, together with NATO, to offer official security guarantees to the East European states with a focus on ensuring sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers, and maintenance of peace in the region. Such guarantees could be stipulated in a political statement or cooperation agreement between the Russian Federation and NATO.” 13 As Russia was the single most important common concern for many countries of East-Central Europe it was obvious the countries of the region would object to the offer of President Yeltsin. Of course, Moscow was not addressing the countries of the region. Russia spoke over above the head of its former allies, demonstrating time and again it has no policy on the region, and more broadly on small states, apart from containing the aspirations of the countries to join NATO. Then Hungarian foreign minister Jeszenszky commented on the Russian offer by stating: “Nations in Central and Eastern Europe do not want to become a kind of condominium, guaranteed by our western and eastern neighbors. We cannot accept the idea of another ‘Grand Alliance’ this time between NATO and Russia, the creation of an umbrella under which we all must find cover. That would smack of the attitudes of the Second World War or of the later phase of the Cold War.” 14 In sum, both positive (the prospect of stability) and negative (the danger of sliding into a so-called security vacuum 15 ) reasons argued in favor of engaging the countries of the region.
The situation was different economically. The region had little to offer, as the words of then Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel illustrate: “We have the chance to take a string of European countries that until recently were colonized by the Soviets and that today are attempting the kind of friendship with the nations of the Soviet Union which would be founded on equal rights, and transform them into a definite special body, which would approach Western Europe not as a poor dissident or a helpless, searching amnestied prisoner, but as someone who has something to offer .” 16 One could of course argue that a market of more than one hundred million people could be important for the West. Acquiring the benefit of exporting to these markets freely was not, however, made dependent upon integrating the countries of East Central Europe into the EU. This benefit was taken by the EU in the so-called association agreements which have gradually established free trade between the member-states and the associates without membership. 17 Thus, it does not require any further “concession” of the West to dump the markets of the associates. At the same time the association agreements stopped short of those freedoms which would be regarded dangerous by some in the Union, like the free trade in agriculture or the free movement of (cheap) labor.
Bearing in mind the significant difference between the level of economic development of the average EU member state and that of the average associated country and consequently the huge financial needs to maintaining the cohesion of the Union after eastern enlargement there are very severe interests against early or hasty expansion of the Union. Particularly those countries may oppose an early enlargement which benefit from the redistribution system of the Union. On the other hand, another concern has also appeared in the member states of the European Union. Some are increasingly worried about the competitiveness of some East Central European countries. The most developed countries of the region which have already started their accession talks with the Union are increasingly attractive to host foreign direct investment and to relocate some labor intensive industries from Western Europe. Other countries (primarily Portugal, Greece and also Spain) are concerned about the cheap and qualified labor in East Central Europe, particularly in countries like Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. It is these two factors - the cost of enlargement and the concerns due to the increasing competitiveness of some countries of the region - taken together which may hinder the integration of East Central Europe at least for another 7-8 years or so.
The West made its utmost to avoid conflicts stemming from differentiation. Three methods have been pursued in this respect. (1.) Delaying tactic: To keep the aspirants together as long as possible and not to announce prematurely that differentiation will take place. This was pursued both by NATO and the EU until 1997. In December 1996 the NATO Council issued a vague formulation saying that the Madrid summit of July 1997 will invite “one or more countries which have expressed interest in joining the Alliance to begin accession negotiations”. 18 (2.) Non-differentiation: Contemplate the option to provide every candidate with the same status beyond the beginning of accession talks. This idea was nurtured by some members of the European Union, those that advocated the so-called “regatta approach” between the publication of the avis of the EU Commission in July 1997 and the Luxembourg Council in December the same year. (3.) Verbal reassurance: Guarantee that non-priority candidates will have the opportunity to join the respective institution later, or at least, that the process of enlargement remains open. This was the case with respect of Romania and Slovenia in the Madrid declaration of NATO: “We will review the process at our next meeting in 1999. With regard to the aspiring members we recognize with great interest and take account of the positive developments towards democracy and the rule of law in a number of south-eastern European countries, especially Romania and Slovenia.” 19 The elements of this tactic have certainly helped to avoid the drawing of sharp dividing lines in the enlargement processes of the EU and NATO.
Nine years have passed since the revolutions of East Central Europe. In spite of the understandable efforts of western institutions not to create dividing lines, some “self-differentiation” has appeared.
International politics has become fairly uninteresting in East Central Europe. The agenda is dominated by “go West.” It seems most countries of the region have reached a phase of development when they do not only pay lip service to the objective of western integration but are also ready to sacrifice to attain membership in the two major western institutions. The importance attributed to accession to western institutions means the West gained significant leverage in the region. The importance is also part of the problem, however. The West has to be particularly careful in communicating the message of differentiation in the region. Those countries which conclude that despite their declared efforts their “integration locomotive” has not been set into motion may feel betrayed and may consider modifying their political orientation. This danger is particularly real when the integration efforts and the sacrifices made are heavily contested domestically and when there are influential political forces that contemplate alternative routes of international relations.
One may, of course, ask, “where else do the countries of the region have to go?” 20 Bearing in mind the important benefits integration may offer, the question might carry an element of truth. Nevertheless, such cynical statements can easily have severe counter-productive consequences in the region.
In the coming decade or so the European Union will face different challenges in its relations with East Central Europe. (1.) How to avoid political tension while awaiting the wave of eastern enlargement, which will not take place before the middle of the next decade. Some countries of the region are of the view that their level of development would make a much earlier accession possible. The group of six which currently negotiates its membership will become the group of eight, or if the assessment of Slovakia is also reconsidered the group of nine, soon. This will sharpen the contradiction between those countries which are of the view they should not wait for other countries in the group. 21 (2.) How to provide the necessary amount of money in the framework of the pre-accession strategy when the bigger amounts of support are put forward after accession. (3.) It will be the single most difficult problem to keep those countries of East Central Europe motivated to follow the line of the Union which in light of a slow down of EU expansion see a remote possibility only to join the prosperous West. This is the problem of those countries which cannot join the first wave of eastern enlargement due to their poor economic performance, like Bulgaria and Romania. The same will appear as an even more worrying factor in case of countries whose political performance prevent them from qualifying for membership, like Croatia which has not been in the position to conclude an association agreement. Not to mention countries, like Serbia or Albania. The Union started the process of eastern enlargement which will dominate its “foreign policy” agenda in the decades to come.
It is difficult to define to what extent the Union has contributed to stability in East Central Europe. If one would extend the analysis to its member states it would be obvious the contribution ranges between important and essential. It has extended to providing a model to follow, to very concrete forms of assistance, like the so-called Phare program 22 through which support and assistance has been provided to the countries of the region to modernize their economies. Despite the problems the European Union faces in the enlargement process under the current conditions when most countries of East Central Europe do not face any identifiable military threat, its contribution to stability and prosperity is the singe most important contribution to the East Central European transition countries.
The enormous and lasting task of eastern enlargement can be illustrated by the fact that if the first eastern enlargement takes place in 2006, 23 it will be the second longest period without enlargement in the history of the EC/EU. 24 It is another major task to create adequate relations with Turkey, Ukraine and Russia, countries which have indicated their willingness to join the Union. Even though their desire is entirely one-sided their closer integration is a task which will be on the agenda for several decades. The problems are, of course, basically different in case of Turkey, on the one hand and the two Slavic states on the other. Whereas the former has a functioning market economy, a high GDP growth and a steadily growing population, the two others have practically none of them. They have one in common, namely they are all large countries whose integration would be extremely costly. Bearing in mind that according to modest estimates the acquis communautaire equals approximately eighty thousand pages one can hardly expect any of the three countries to approach the Union for many decades to come.
3. In Decline: The Common Foreign and Security Policy. Everything depends on the expectations. One cannot assume that the European Union will be a major actor of international politics on its own and the “independent” institutions will formulate its foreign policy. Foreign policy is in the hands of the Council of the member states and the presidency. It is an area where the member states do not intend to relinquish their full control. In the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 certain modifications have been adopted though the basic provision that the “Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common foreign and security policy” has been retained. The idea to outline “common strategies” was inserted in the treaty. It can only be established by the consensus of member states. 25 Among the confines of the treaty there is a low profile foreign policy in the European Union. If we lower the expectation towards the common foreign and security policy there is something, namely a harmonization of the positions of the member states. If one takes a look at the major international crises ranging from the war in the former Yugoslavia to the early-1998 conflict in Iraq it can be concluded that the CFSP suffers from severe constraints.
In relation with defense matters, the Maastricht Treaty declared that the common foreign and security policy will include the eventual framing of a common defense policy. Of the two mechanisms established by the treaty, common action cannot be taken with respect of to issues having defense implications. (Article J.4, paras 1 and 3.) It stems from this fact that only the systematic cooperation of EU member states was set forth with respect of issues related to common defense policy, which might lead to a common defense. It is necessary to differentiate between three categories, namely those of common security policy, common defense policy, and common defense. Common security policy is part of the development of the EU, though with the important caveat that it is the task of the WEU to “elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications”. (Article J.4, para. 2.) When taking a closer look, the conclusion can be drawn that issues with defense implications form part of defense policy as common defense will be developed at a later stage. If common defense policy is to precede common defense, then the latter is in a less advanced stage of integration. 26 This is underlined by the statement that “common defense policy ... might in time lead to a common defense”. (Article J.4, para. 1.) The Amsterdam Treaty only slightly modified the text in that respect.
The Maastricht Treaty codified the institutional separation of security and defense. Whereas the former is an integral part of the EU, the latter was tasked to the WEU. It is clear the EU aimed to integrate the WEU without eliminating the separate structure of that organization. There were reasons to maintain this separation: First of all, not each member of the EU belongs and wants to belong to the WEU. Since the enlargement of the EU on January 1, 1995 only two-thirds of the 15 EU countries have membership in the WEU. As all members of the WEU are members of the EU, this creates an asymmetric relationship between the two organizations, where the latter is in the position to dominate the decisions (and decision-making) of the former. This has been reflected in practice as seen in cases when the Union failed to approach the WEU in matters concerning defense. This is contrary to the letter of the Maastricht Treaty that does not say that the Union “may request”, it rather says that the Union “requests” the WEU. 27 If such a benign neglect of the WEU becomes the practice of the EU, the former institution may fall asleep again and regain its long held role of the Sleeping Beauty of European security. Even though the Amsterdam Treaty modified the text, the importance of security has not increased, and bearing in mind the diversity of interests of the EU member countries it is unlikely that the tendency will change in the future.
In the previous parts of the paper I intended to indicate that matters other than the common foreign and security policy will dominate the agenda of the Union in the foreseeable future. More precisely put the second pillar will primarily focus on common foreign policy in the sense of defining the relations between the EU and its periphery, the applicants for membership and some other countries. The legal framework to move from common foreign policy to common defense policy and later to common defense exists. However, the will of the 15 member states is missing. The possibility that the trend will change is reduced by the reluctance of some members for different reasons. Some do not want to challenge the priority attributed to NATO; others are hesitant or even reluctant to depart from their neutrality or non-alignment. The weakness of security policy is exacerbated by a public relations problem. The EU/WEU does not get recognition for its international security activity even when it is of undeniable significance, like in the de-mining in the Gulf following the Iraq-Iran war in the late 1980s or the monitoring of sanctions implementation in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania before the Dayton agreement.
Conclusions
The European Union has the best performance in areas which are related to the economic integration of its member states and Europe as a whole. Its scope of activity has broadened gradually and now extends also to areas which contribute to general economic performance, like the free movement of persons, cooperation in home affairs, etc. It has also established the technical conditions for the functioning of the Union as a highly integrated economic area, ranging from standardization to the mutual recognition of diplomas and other degrees.
With the introduction of the Euro a major step has been taken in the direction of a multi-speed Europe. As the institutional and decision-making system is conceived currently those countries which will not join the Euro-zone forthwith will be highly motivated to get from the periphery to the center of the Union.
It has successfully integrated one and a half times more countries than the original number of member states. Some countries which have not joined regard some regulations of the Union as examples and adopt “mirror legislation.” With its more than 370 million population, combined GDP and an increasing number of European countries willing to join it has become the center of gravity of European economy and politics. Its contribution to European security is dependent upon the definition of the term “security.” It has certainly contributed to stability in Europe during the first thirty years of its existence in Western Europe and it has started to project it to the eastern half of the continent in the last decade. Bearing in mind the number of countries which aspire for membership, their historically weak democratic traditions and, more importantly, their relative economic backwardness and low per capita GDP this process will be of decisive importance for the evolution of the EU in the coming decades. Enlargement and the introduction of the common currency will be the two decisive projects of the EU in the coming decade or so. This will soon be followed by the harmonization of direct tax levels.
The European Communities/Union has always evolved unevenly. This will not be different in the future either. Bearing in mind the complexity and the demanding character of the projects above the EU will remain in a phase of consolidation and not launch major new projects. It is likely that the contradictions between different member states on major issues like enlargement, the financing of the Union, including the size of central redistribution through the EU budget, will get sharper. This is a side-effect of the slowing pace of growth as well as of the fact that the third phase of the EMU, the introduction of the common currency and the power of the ECB, weaken the economic sovereignty of those member states which join the Euro-zone. Thus they will have to find some “compensation” by reducing the central redistribution through the EU budget. It is particularly unlikely that the EU would move ahead in areas which are not related to the major projects, like the introduction of a high profile common security policy or common defense. Its contribution to European security will continue to focus on the stability of the continent in the broad sense of the word. Bearing in mind the character of some recent domestic conflicts and crises in Europe it is clear that not only ethnic tension may undermine stability. There is no long-term stability without some prosperity and peoples can react violently if they are deprived of the prospect of prosperity. The Union and its member countries through spreading the methods of effective governance and macro-economic management may make a subtle though essential contribution to the stability of Europe.
During the period of consolidation of the achievements of the Union there will be voices in the EU which give priority to the approach of subsidiarity that would reduce the power of the Union and increase that of the member states. This will reduce the prospect of a major development of common security and defense policy. The member states continue to remain sensitive about relinquishing their influence in the perceived core of sovereignty, foreign policy and defense.
Endnotes
Note 1: It is difficult to document the volume of trade inside the Union as it functions as a trade block and only trade with the “outside world” is documented in statistical data precisely. Back.
Note 2: I do not intend to deal with the widely known argument, according to which the objectives of the European integration process were clearly of political/security character, as then one should argue why the nearly four decades of economically dominated integration has represented a detour in the evolution. Back.
Note 3: Cf. Martin Feldstein, “EMU and International Conflict”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 6, November/December 1997, p. 61. Back.
Note 4: See C Randall Henning, Cooperating With Europe’s Monetary Union, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997, pp. 12-13. Back.
Note 5: Petri Minkkinen - Heikki Patomäki, “Introduction: The Politics of Economic and Monetary Union, in: Minkkinen and Patomäki (eds.)”, The Politics of Economic and Monetary Union (Boston: Kluwer, 1997), p. 9. Back.
Note 6: Heading to balanced budgets, in order to use the US terminology. Back.
Note 7: Jack Snyder, Averting Anarchy in the New Europe, International Security, vol. 14, no. 4, Spring 1990, p. 13. Back.
Note 8: Jonathan Eyal, “NATO’s Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision”, International Affairs, vol. 73, no. 4, October 1997, p. 697. Back.
Note 10: It is memorable that the foreign minister of an East Central European country when interviewed before the first meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council why his country joins the forum said: We are surrounded by instability, violence may erupt any time in the region we expect NATO to prevent that scenario. Back.
Note 11: Jan Zielonka, “Security in Central Europe”, Adelphi Paper 272, pp. 33-34 Back.
Note 12: Tamás Katona, “The Foreign Policy of the Antall Government - the First Nine Months”, Current Policy, no. 5, 1991, p. 2. Back.
Note 13: Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s Letter to US President Bill Clinton, in: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 250. Back.
Note 14: Géza Jeszenszky, “The Lessons of Appeasement”, Current Policy, no. 2, 1994, p. 6. Back.
Note 15: As was mentioned by then Czechoslovak President Havel. See President Havel’s Address to the NATO Council, NATO Review, vol. 39, no. 2, April 1991, p. 33. Back.
Note 16: President Vaclav Havel’s Speech to the Polish Sejm and Senate, 21 January 1990, East European Reporter, vol. 4, no. 4, 1990, pp. 56-57. Back.
Note 17: It is memorable that free trade will not extend to agriculture under the association agreements. That exception is certainly in favor of the EU rather than the countries of East-Central Europe. Back.
Note 18: Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Final Communiqué, point 2, Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (96) 165, p. 2. Back.
Note 19: Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation Issued by the Heads of State and Government, 8 July 1997, Press Release M-1 (97)81, point 8. Back.
Note 20: This point was made to the author by an official of the European Commission in December 1996. Back.
Note 21: It is clear that Poland represents the single biggest problem in this respect. A country with 38.3 million people, huge poor rural areas is simply too large to be prepared for accession quickly. Not to mention the negotiation strategy of Poland and the recent problems with the use of Phare money. If other countries, like Slovenia, Estonia, Hungary and Cyprus, have to wait for Poland they will feel somewhat alienated by the EU. Back.
Note 22: Originally it stood for Poland Hungary Aid for the Reconstruction of the Economy that was extended later to other countries of the region. Back.
Note 23: Even though there is no point to speculate about the date of next enlargement, the author was informed about this year as realistic by a member of the EU Commission. Back.
Note 24: The longest period passed between 1958 and 1973, before the first enlargement (Denmark, Ireland, UK). The second would last 11 years between 1995 (Austria, Finland, Sweden) and 2006. Back.
Note 25: Treaty of Amsterdam Articles J.3, para. 2 and J.8. Back.
Note 26: John Roper, “Defining a Common Defense Policy and Common Defense in Martin and Roper (eds.)”, Towards a Common Defense Policy, Paris, WEU ISS, 1995, p. 7. Back.
Note 27: Jacques Santer, The European Union’s Security and Defense Policy, NATO Review, vol. 43, 1995, p. 6. Back.
