The Effects Of Enlargement On Bilateral Relations In Central And Eastern Europe

Pál Dunay

The European Union: Institute for Security Studies
Western European Union
Chaillot Paper Series, No. 26
June 1997

Contents

Preface

Introduction  (Monika Wohlfeld)

Hungarian-Romanian relations: a changed paradigm?   (Pál Dunay)

Polish-Lithuanian relations: the complexities of geopolitics   (Wojciech Zajaczkowski)

Ukrainian-Polish relations: a pillar of regional stability?   (Oleksandr Pavliuk)

Conclusions   (Monika Wohlfeld)

Preface

In recent months the Institute has been particularly involved in studying the concerns of countries that are candidates for membership of European security organizations. Seminars organized by the Institute and its participation in conferences have been mainly directed at that very topical aspect of the reform of European security institutions. While closely linked, and complementary, questions of institutional deepening and widening need to be analysed separately. Two seminars have been held at the Institute, in November 1996 and February this year, the latter in the form of working groups, with the aim of analysing the effect of these reforms on relations between neighbouring countries, whose bilateral relationships will remain central to European stability, independently of institutional solutions that will concern them.

The results of this work, which are presented in this chaillot Paper, will, we hope, be a useful contribution to the political thinking and debate that may soon take place in the countries concerned, as well as in WEU, EU and NATO.

 

Guido Lenzi
Paris, June 1997

Introduction
Monika Wohlfeld ₁

This chaillot Paper aims to assess the effects of the enlargement processes of European and transatlantic organizations (EU, WEU, NATO) on prospects for stability in Central and Eastern Europe.

While it has never been announced which countries will make up the first group of new members of NATO/EU, and whether and how many subsequent 'waves' there will be, a number of countries will have to cope with a rebuttal of one of their major foreign policy ambitions. Even countries that have no illusions about their early membership are concerned about the consequences of selective enlargement - that is the political effects of admission of a few countries only. Many of them have voiced their concern that this could result in a new division of Europe, which would negatively affect their own security and the stability of the European continent as a whole.

Regional stability and cooperation in Central Europe are important for Euro-Atlantic organizations and their members, for the Central Europeans themselves and for Eastern Europe. The end of the Cold War left Central Europe facing rediscovered tensions, but with little training in cooperation. Bilateral and subregional cooperation, both at the intergovernmental (top-down) and trans-frontier (bottom-up) levels - for example, between the Benelux or the Nordic countries - has been an integral part of the process of European integration since 1945, ₂ but is so far relatively underdeveloped in Central Europe. Bilateral and subregional forms of cooperation in Central Europe will have to be strengthened, if only in order to cope with the forthcoming enlargement of the EU, WEU and NATO.

This project by the Institute is based on three case studies of bilateral relations: Poland/Ukraine, Poland/Lithuania, and Hungary/Romania. They focus on the relationship between the presumed new members ('haves') and their immediate neighbours for which, for various reasons, assurances of membership of Euro-Atlantic organizations currently seem less forthcoming (possible 'have-nots' ₃ ). This assumption relates to the transitional phase to a broader European security architecture, and therefore in no way implies that certain countries will remain 'outsiders' indefinitely. It should be noted that, if enlargement processes develop other than in the manner assumed in this study, the cases still provide valid information on the behaviour of neighbouring countries faced with the possibility of selective enlargement. The three cases have one thing in common: despite historical problems in the relations between these pairs of countries, they can all be considered as positive examples of rapprochement between Central and East European countries. There are, however, also disparities between them: primarily the geopolitical, but also the political and economic aspects of the situations of Ukraine, Lithuania and Romania are very different.

The selection of case studies has omitted other, possibly more critical or problematic examples. The three cases chosen, with their particular relevance, both historical and contemporary, can however be seen as significant and constructive examples in view of forthcoming enlargements of NATO and EU. Russia, although an important factor in all respects, is not at the focus of this analysis, and the quality of Central European-Russian relations or Western European-Russian relations is beyond the scope of this paper.

Enlargement Scenarios

Both the European Union and NATO have more of less firmly committed themselves to accepting new members from Central Europe. These two processes of enlargement are conceptually and politically linked, and it is generally recognized that they should be pursued in parallel and coherently. Although the congruence of membership of EU, WEU and NATO is considered ultimately as the best scenario for European security, a flexible approach is imposed by the different accession requirements of the various organizations, and there may be differences in when and which countries will be admitted in the first 'wave'.

NATO

The decision to invite some countries to begin accession negotiations with NATO is expected for the Madrid summit set for 8-9 July 1997. Negotiations with 'certain' Central European countries on NATO membership could begin in the near future, and membership for the 'first-wave' countries could be granted around the year 1999 or 2000 (possibly on the occasion of NATO's fiftieth anniversary in April 1999). While it has never been clearly stated which countries will be in the first wave, they are widely understood to be Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Slovenia and Romania (after the 1996 election results made it a more attractive candidate, and France and Italy support its membership) have also been mentioned. The Baltic countries, whose bids for membership are supported by vocal lobbies both in Europe and in North America, have not given up hope: the new government of Lithuania has for example announced that it would expect to enter NATO together with Poland (but not necessarily with the other two Baltic republics). ₄ Other countries may not be able to join or, like Sweden, Ireland and Austria, have not expressed a wish to enter the organization.

The exact conditions of membership for those countries that will join NATO are currently under debate. It has been stated, however, that while they will be covered by Art. 5 guarantees, it is not foreseen that nuclear weapons will be positioned on their territory. ₅ The enlargement of NATO will also be accompanied by a NATO-Russia agreement, possibly containing assurances to Russia.

EU

Most Central European countries have applied for EU membership, and 10 of them have signed so-called Europe Agreements (EU association agreements). ₆ Like NATO, the EU has so far not decided firmly 'who and when'. A number of Western European countries sees the matter of EU membership for Central European countries as more significant and pressing than NATO membership. EU enlargement negotiations are expected to begin six months after the end of the IGC. That could imply membership for some countries around the year 2000 or 2002, with transition periods for adjustments. ₇ Neither the EU itself, nor any of its member countries have so far specified which countries will be included in the first wave of enlargement and whether, unlike in NATO, negotiations will begin initially with all candidates (the so-called 'starting line' principle) or only with selected countries. Here, too, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are expected to be in the forefront, although some do not rule out the possibility of offering EU membership as compensation for countries which may not be invited to join the first group of new NATO members (for example, Romania, the Baltic countries and Slovenia have been mentioned).

WEU

For institutional reasons, WEU has up to now linked the status that it grants non-full member countries to their position within EU but also within NATO. WEU has thus no joining criteria other than this. Currently, alongside Associates and Observers, ten Central and East European countries with EU Association Agreements have WEU Associate Partner status, which allows them to be party to consultations on European security and to be involved in the planning of operations, but falls short of granting them WEU's Article V guarantees.

Dissociating WEU from other Euro-Atlantic organizations is a concept occasionly discussed by analysts. ₈ While such an option has no formal endorsement by member countries, it could permit WEU to enlarge without taking into account the processes taking place in EU and NATO. For the moment, WEU cannot be at the forefront of the enlargement processes, but may nevertheless be of value as a forum for the European security debate for the twenty-eight countries that participate in its Council meetings in spite of their different statuses in NATO and the EU.

Hungarian-Romanian Relations: A Changed Paradigm?
Pál Dunay ₉

The Evolution Of Hungarian-Romanian Relations

Both nations have a turbulent history and fundamentally different visions of their past. A good portion of the territory of Romania once belonged to Hungary when it was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. That era is remembered by Hungarians as one of economic boom and a certain level of democracy, whereas nations living under Hungarian domination most probably share the view that 'for the Slovaks, Romanians, Jews, Gypsies and others under Hungarian domination, it was a period of often acute national persecution.' ₁₀ There is a significant Hungarian minority, whose numbers are put at between 1,620,000 (official census) and two million, ₁₁ in Romania, whereas the figures for ethnic Romanians living in Hungary are only 11,000 and 25,000 respectively. ₁₂

More recently, the so-called era of socialism was not free of largely invisible divisions either. As the political paths followed by Budapest and Bucharest became increasingly divergent, particularly as far as their interpretation of democracy, however limited, was concerned, cooperation between them, despite their common membership of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, was not particularly intensive. It was regrettable that Romania, which pursued a largely independent course in international relations between the late 1960s and the 1980s, was unable to gain the support of Hungary, which gradually and very cautiously also distanced itself from Moscow after 1982. In the second half of the 1980s, Romania became more and more dictatorial, while at the same time Hungary's introduction of certain democratic reforms, among them limited respect for human rights, including freedom of speech and the press, was recognized. Under these conditions, a section of the Hungarian intelligentsia, mainly writers and historians, began to voice their concern over the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Romania, resulting in a certain amount of tension between the two states.

Hungary and Romania have taken the same path towards European integration in the past few years. Hungary has usually taken the lead and Romania has followed. ₁₃ It is assumed here that this pattern will persist, if only because Hungary started its reforms, however limited, earlier than Romania and, following the so-called 'system change' in 1989, the new Hungarian leadership was more determined than its counterpart in Bucharest to carry out a major reform of society and the economy. The question is now whether Romania will show the determination to meet the requirements laid down by Western institutions for entry in the first wave. At the same time, relations between the two countries following the collapse of the Eastern bloc have continued to be marred by differences.

In December 1989, when, during the revolt, Hungary indirectly supported the Romanian armed forces and later sent food, blood plasma, and medicines, a historic opportunity existed to improve relations between the two countries. Hungary was the first state to recognize the National Salvation Front as the sole representative of Romania. On 29 December 1989 the then Hungarian foreign minister Gyula Horn visited Bucharest and, following negotiations with his counterpart Celac, left the Romanian capital with a feeling of having achieved 'an accord of historic significance.' ₁₄ There seems to have been every reason for optimism, as in January 1990 the Front declared its intention 'to realize and guarantee the individual and collective rights of national minorities.' ₁₅ This period was illuminating, as it seemed that the parties would be able to surpass the most important factor that divided them, namely that of minorities, but proved to be short-lived. It would be a gross simplification to say that relations deteriorated solely as a result of the bloody ethnic clash between Romanians and ethnic Hungarians in Tirgu-Mures in March 1990, but the incident highlighted the fact that deep-rooted national tensions cannot easily be relieved, despite the efforts of governments.

In the period 1990-92, Romania's foreign policy objectives were not clearly determined. Its implementation of commitments that would result from the country's accession to European and Euro-Atlantic institutions did not go beyond rhetoric. The Romanian leadership was of the opinion that regaining the country's status of middle-ranking power, possibly through unification with Moldova (Bessarabia) was sufficient to make the stability of the country attainable and provide for its development. The alternative view of Romanian foreign policy gave a more European colouring to the above objective, starting from the assumption that it could be achieved through the country's involvement in a multilateral cooperative system. Implementation of the latter can be identified with the term in office of foreign minister Teodor Melescanu (1992-96), for whom the three main directions of Romanian foreign policy were: (1) Romania's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, especially NATO and the European Union. (2) The establishment of good relations with all of the country's neighbours. (3) The establishment of pragmatic subregional relations in accordance with the country's strategic options and its membership of NATO and EU. ₁₆ Others, like Antonella Cappelle-Pogácean, think that Romania's unambiguous Western orientation began to develop only later, following President Iliescu's visit to Washington in September 1995. ₁₇

Members of the conservative leadership in Budapest believed that a bargain could be made on the basis that Romania guarantees the collective rights and autonomy of the Hungarian minority, and that in return Hungary would be ready to guarantee the borders between the two states. ₁₈ Connecting the two issues did not provide a clear guarantee to the international community that Hungary did not want to change borders and proved self-defeating. It provided Romania with excellent arguments about revanchism in Hungary, quite apart from the fact that the international community was able to conclude that Hungary was not contributing to stability in East Central Europe but rather that it was undermining it. High-level contacts between the two countries were rare. ₁₉

It is difficult to apportion responsibility for the tension between Hungary and Romania. Many critical observers believe that even if the Hungarian authorities had been more flexible concerning the treatment of Hungarians in Transylvania, and had expressed their readiness to cooperate with the Romanian authorities more clearly, things would not have improved fundamentally. The relationship of the two countries as it emerged between 1990 and 1994 was that of a moderately nationalist state (Hungary) and an assertive, intolerant one (Romania). The course taken by Romania has been described as a special Romanian version of 'post-totalitarian nationalism'. ₂₀

With the coming to power in Hungary of the Socialist Party and the Alliance of Free Democrats in 1994, with 72 per cent of the seats in the Parliament, a new era in relations between the two countries could begin. The new government, which was committed to concluding the long awaited basic treaty, started out from the assumption that both countries were equally (un)important in the eyes of most members of the international community, and that consequently neither side was in a position to blackmail the other by clouding the international atmosphere or by not maintaining close contacts. As the Hungarian foreign minister said, 'For if there are no high-level meetings held between two countries and the relationship becomes clouded by uncertainty and suspicion, we have no chance of pressing successfully for improvements in the situation of the Hungarians there or enforcement of their rights. What is more, Hungary's reputation would suffer in the eyes of the Euro-Atlantic community.' ₂₁ However, the Hungarian government declared: '. . . we emphasize as before the government's view that there must inevitably be a mention in the basic treaties of the two sides considering their borders inviolable and of them having no territorial claims on each other.' ₂₂ Moreover, not long after the socialist-liberal coalition came to power, Hungary made the unconditional commitment that the basic treaties would have to contain 'the recognition of borders and the mutual denunciation of territorial claims . . .' ₂₃ Realization that the de facto priority given to the treatment of Hungarians living outside the country was counter-productive led to a restatement of the main directions of foreign policy: 'I would like respectfully to draw the attention . . . to the fact that this government is going to complete the process of accession to the EU and accession to NATO, or creation of the opportunities for this. The government will subordinate everything else to this.' ₂₄ This statement by the prime minister was not to the liking of the conservative opposition.

The results of this reorientation were quickly apparent. Unlike previous years, when the West had regarded Hungary as an element of instability, there was increasing recognition that Hungary was making sincere efforts to come to terms with its neighbours, beginning with those where the biggest number of Hungarians live. With the change of government in Budapest in 1994 and the coming to power of forces that take a pragmatic stance on the minority issue, one condition for reconciliation between Hungary and states with a significant ethnic Hungarian population has been met. The first reflection of this effort was the signing of the basic treaty with Slovakia in Paris in March 1995 in the framework of the Stability Pact. Romania and Slovakia closely coordinated their positions concerning the treaties to be concluded with Budapest. Romania took a tougher stance shortly before their signature, and was left isolated, or, rather, left behind by Bratislava. The situation was quite delicate for Romania afterwards. Bucharest on the one hand wanted to demonstrate its commitment to the values shared by democracies but on the other hand was unwilling to pay the price domestically for reorientation of its international relations. ₂₅

The two countries' relationship changed substantially following the November 1996 elections in Romania, with a new leadership in Bucharest that was ready to go beyond lip service in responding to some of Hungary's concerns. Similarly, significant changes took place in the relationship between the Romanian establishment and the Hungarian minority with the election of Emil Constantinescu to president and the formation of the new government. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR), whose candidate gained the fourth largest number of votes in the presidential election, was ready to share governmental responsibility. This is an eloquent demonstration of reconciliation between Romanians and the Hungarian minority in Romania, although its participation in government deprives the DAHR of some of its room for manoeuvre. It seems the major changes that occurred between 1994 and 1996 - the formation of a non-nationalist government in Budapest and later in Bucharest, and the conclusion of the basic treaty - have been promising signals of a new beginning.

The coming to power of Mr Constantinescu and the formation of the new government provided confirmation of the new direction of Romanian policy. The Euro-Atlantic commitment, including membership of NATO and the EU in the first wave, has become a priority, confirmed by the fact that Romania seems willing to conclude its long awaited basic treaty with Ukraine, though not yet with Moldova and Russia. The basic treaty between Hungary and Romania was signed by their prime ministers on 16 September 1996.

Stagnating economic relations during recent years have not been a spill-over effect of political problems, but have been due much more to the economic decline experienced in the early 1990s. Consequently, a boom in bilateral economic relations following improvement on the political front cannot be expected. Trade between Romania and Hungary is comparatively small. ₂₆ The economic performance of the two countries does not differ substantially. Three major differences should be mentioned, however. Industrial output in 1995 exceeded its 1989 level by 56.6 per cent in Romania and 83.2 per cent in Hungary. Whereas Romania's foreign exchange reserves amounted to $1,523 million in 1995, Hungary's were $11,968 million. Cumulative direct foreign investment in Romania was $967 million, and in Hungary $11,394 million. ₂₇ Per capita GDP in 1995 was $1,140 in Romania, and $3,350 in Hungary. ₂₈ 'More than $15 billion in foreign investment has poured into Hungary since 1990. In neighbouring Romania, which has more than twice the population, only $2 billion has come in . . . Inflation in . . . Hungary declined last year . . . in . . . Romania it soared.' ₂₉

In addition to the clear division reflected by such data, there is the psychological factor reflected in the fact that Western newspapers publish articles about the new dividing line across Central and Eastern Europe, placing Hungary on the prosperous side of the divide and Romania on the other.

Did Romania have any reason to be concerned about Hungary? It did not in any military sense. There was neither the intention nor the capability on either side to escalate the conflict into a military one, and a military solution to the two countries' differences was not envisaged in any political circle. Consequently, either Romania's perception of Hungary was mistaken, or there were other, non-military reasons, or conceivably the whole bilateral problem was the result of manipulation. Among other things, both countries want to join Western institutions and know that even a remote danger of violent interstate confrontation would provide the West with very convincing arguments for keeping them out. Moreover, military relations between Romania and Hungary have traditionally been better than those in some other fields. ₃₀ Despite this good cooperation with the Hungarian armed forces, however, there may be some outmoded thinking in the Romanian forces when it comes to purely domestic security matters. ₃₁

One may conclude that the differences between the two countries remained strictly political, neither side considering the use of other - military or economic - means, and did not spill over to other areas, and that even this limited dispute could not have a lasting effect on relations generally. The problem is largely an artificial one that has been used by politicians to score political points; as far as the people themselves (the Hungarian minority in Romania) are concerned, there is not really any major problem, for a number of reasons. First of all, most Hungarians living in Transylvania do not want unification with Hungary, being more concerned to secure a decent standard of living in Romania. Second, as a result of the policies pursued by the former Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu, the population of Transylvania is now ethnically mixed, and the overwhelming majority of ethnic Hungarians do not live in the vicinity of the Hungarian border. Across the border, the majority of the population of Hungary have shown no interest in any kind of border revision, ₃₂ and as social tensions and the number of unemployed in Hungary have reached a fairly high level, ₃₃ the country's readiness to accommodate masses of refugees from Romania (or any other country) has diminished significantly. ₃₄

The Implications Of Enlargement

The most dramatic illustration of the impact of the enlargement processes was the conclusion of the long awaited basic treaty between the two countries. Neither side expected any dramatic change in the relationship between Hungary and Romania when the basic treaty was concluded. Indeed, the most important objective was to demonstrate the two countries' ability to resolve outstanding issues. 'The conclusion of the bilateral treaty aimed first of all at confirming their chances of Euro-Atlantic integration', writes a French analyst. ₃₅

The dispute between Hungary and Romania continued to centre on the minorities issue, highlighting once again the fact that the political conflict that persisted between the two states was confined to that issue, and did not affect other areas of cooperation. The Hungarian government hoped at least for recognition of certain legally non-binding international norms. For years the debate had centred on matters of principle, such as individual versus collective rights, rather than addressing the minorities' real concerns. While Romania was not prepared to make concessions, other than on the autonomy of minorities, the Hungarian government was also hampered by its regard for the domestic political situation. Major constraints on its action included the close scrutiny of the Hungarian conservative opposition, which put the issue of Hungarian minorities at the centre of its foreign policy programme, and the activities of the DAHR, which had played an indispensable role in determining the relationship between the two countries by shaping the policy followed by the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. Its leaders, particularly Bishop László Tõkés, were understandably more satisfied with the conservative coalition, which regarded the minority issue as a main focus of its policy and gave a prominent role to the leaders of the DAHR.

In the summer of 1996, Hungarian minority leaders from Romania and several members of the Hungarian government held a summit. The resultant declaration confirmed that 'the fundamental condition of the preservation of the identity of Hungarians living beyond the borders, their survival and development as a community, and their survival in their homeland is the creation of self-government and autonomy in accordance with the current European practice and in the spirit of international standards. Coordinated support is to be given to the autonomy endeavours . . . of the Hungarian communities beyond the borders, as [a] means to settle their situation based on the equality guaranteed by the constitution.' ₃₆ Not only were those neighbours of Hungary with significant Hungarian minorities concerned, but some major Western powers, including the United States and the Federal Republic, ₃₇ also expressed their reservations. The Foreign Ministry felt that it was in a quagmire: 'The Horn government was suddenly in danger of seeing its previous successes disappear overnight.' ₃₈ This feeling certainly intensified Budapest's readiness to reach a compromise solution. This is one of the decisive factors that prompted those members of the Hungarian leadership who understood the importance of solving the dispute and demonstrating the achievement to the world at large to conclude the treaty before President Iliescu's term of office expired.

A window of opportunity existed, as the leadership in Bucharest also wanted to demonstrate a breakthrough before the autumn 1996 elections. Finally, Hungary was ready to consent to a solution that eloquently demonstrated its readiness to give up its support for Hungarian minorities' autonomy of two months earlier. Accordingly, the relevant paragraph of the basic treaty referred to those documents which 'apply as legal obligations' listed in the annexe to the treaty, ₃₉ which included the highly controversial Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. ₄₀ A footnote adds that 'The Contracting Parties agree that Recommendation 1201 does not refer to collective rights, nor does it impose upon them the obligation to grant to the concerned persons any right to a special status of territorial autonomy based on ethnic criteria.' ₄₁ It is for this reason, among others, that some observers are of the view that the treaty 'seems to favour the Romanian side.' ₄₂

The treaty was signed on 16 September 1996, and was swiftly ratified by both houses of the Romanian legislature. Most probably the deputies wanted to complete legislation on the treaty before the elections and also wanted to ratify it before the Hungarian parliament did so. ₄₃ Those parliamentarians in favour of ratification emphasized that, according to the treaty, 'national minorities constitute an integral part of the society of the state where they live', ₄₄ and that the protection of minority rights formed part of guaranteeing universal human rights. The Romanian nationalists opposed ratification, condemning the legalization of Recommendation 1201, the free use of the Hungarian mother tongue and the prohibition on changes to the proportions of the population in areas inhabited by persons from national minorities. As a protest measure, radical nationalist MPs did not participate in the vote. The deputies of the DAHR abstained from voting, as they regarded the guarantees of implementation of the treaty as insufficient. In the end the chamber of deputies adopted the treaty with an overwhelming majority. ₄₅

The Hungarian parliament was divided three ways on the issue. The government coalition argued that the treaty was one that served Hungary's long-term interests, including the country's endeavours to join Euro-Atlantic organizations. Moreover, it was declared that no better treaty could be achieved with Romania under the current conditions. ₄₆ On the day the legislative held a preliminary debate on the treaty, the government coalition liberal free democrat chairman of the parliamentary foreign relations committee argued: 'One has to understand finally that it is primarily the domestic policy of Romania that determines the destiny of the Hungarian minority.' ₄₇ The conservative opposition was dissatisfied with the way the question of autonomy had been treated in the treaty. They thought that Hungary was giving up a historic opportunity to influence Romania in exchange for Hungarian minority rights and autonomy some time in the future. Finally, the populist right-wing Smallholders Party went even further, declaring that the treaty codified 'the peace dictates of Trianon and Paris', and thus could be regarded as 'treason'. ₄₈ In the end the treaty was ratified on 10 December 1996 by 249 votes to 53, with 12 abstentions. ₄₉

Prior to these decisions, in the summer of 1996, in the light of the forthcoming enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance, the Western partners increased pressure on both countries formally to resolve their outstanding difference. The United States took the lead in trying to convince the parties they should conclude the basic treaty in order to focus on the main task. The high-level, forceful, frank interference attained its objective. The US ambassadors to Bucharest and Budapest, without alluding to the role they had played, later recognized that: 'The heart of the treaty reaches the heart of post-Cold War Europe's security challenges: reconciling the rights and responsibilities of minorities and majorities when peoples and borders don't match . . . Both sides are committed because they know that the treaty clears an important hurdle to an even more historic goal: integration with the West.' ₅₀ Yet one cannot expect fundamental changes to occur overnight. As was correctly noted: 'The test . . . will come with implementation, but the overwhelming support for the treaty in both countries is reason for optimism.' ₅₁ Initial attempts by each government to undermine the other's efforts to join Western institutions proved counterproductive, ₅₂ and at first Hungary but later also Romania realized that it would be more advantageous to concentrate on representing its own national position, without criticizing its neighbours. For Romanian policy-makers, this was not of itself sufficient, as they were concerned about the adverse consequences of the admission of Hungary but not Romania into NATO: 'There are three solutions. Either Hungary and Romania integrate together into NATO, or Hungary enters on its own, or neither of them will be adopted. The latter two solutions are catastrophic for Romania. But what can be done?' ₅₃ In the autumn of 1996, the then Foreign Minister Melescanu said: 'Romania is worried . . . if Romania and Hungary were to be put on two sides of an imaginary line during the expansion of NATO. Bucharest would not like the historic reconciliation of the two countries to be upset by events and occurrences outside Romania and Hungary.' ₅₄ His successor, Adrian Severin, stated that he was in favour of the 'simultaneous NATO accession of states belonging to the same geopolitical area', adding that he would not be in favour of 'phased admission', though this would not affect the two countries' relations. ₅₅

In the basic treaty, therefore, the two countries included a statement that 'They shall mutually support each other's efforts aimed at integration to the European Union, NATO and the Western European Union.' ₅₆ With this sentence, the issue that had preoccupied the political establishment in the two countries for some time was neutralized. Different interpretations of this short paragraph are, however, possible, and the narrow one is most likely to be correct. In the broader interpretation, neither country would join either the EU or NATO unless the other was also admitted, but that interpretation is not shared by either of them. 'Support' does not imply that either side should wait until the other becomes mature for integration, but that it should provide as much political support and assistance to the other as is available both before and after accession.

The Way Forward

Today, relations between Hungary and Romania give every ground for optimism. This result has not been achieved primarily as a result of the attention paid to it by the West, though that played a part. Without belittling the importance of external influence, the development of democracy and ethnic tolerance in the two countries are the most important factors affecting their future relations, bearing in mind that disagreement between the two countries has never gone beyond the issue of the Hungarian minority. There are, however, significant political forces in both countries that would like to gain the upper hand and oppose the parties' current determination to cooperate. In 1998 elections will take place in Hungary. The socialists, who gained more than 30 per cent of the votes at the last election and have held 54 per cent of the seats in the Parliament since 1994, could today, according to opinion polls, count on only 15 per cent of the votes. Their lost votes would possibly go partly to the moderately conservative party of young democrats (FIDESZ) and the populist right-wing Smallholders Party (FKGP). ₅₇ The outcome of the elections is, however, of course unpredictable. It seems certain that no party will be in a position to form a government on its own, and that the current coalition of socialists and liberals will require some support from the conservatives. It is also feasible that the Smallholders could be the biggest force in the legislature, and would try desperately to find coalition partners. One would then have to expect some nationalist rhetoric, and with it an increased 'commitment' to the Hungarians living in neigbouring countries. The current problem-free situation would in any case come to an end and be replaced by one in which there was some limited tension. It is unlikely, however, that any future government would seek to revise the treaty concluded by Hungary and Romania.

In Romania the government was formed in late 1996 and therefore has a long term of office before it. Given its enormous tasks of consolidating the economic situation, managing the postponed economic transition and cracking down on corruption, the government's popularity will probably be shaken. There is thus some danger that nationalistic rhetoric will reappear in Romanian politics. It would therefore be desirable to make the process of cooperation irreversible.

As shown above, the most significant changes have been brought about by changes of government in both countries. The upper hand gained by forces that feel less strongly about the nation and more strongly about the state's performance has been decisive. The West can help by putting any force coming to power under pressure in the years to come and thus encouraging cooperation between the parties. In emphasizing the important role of domestic politics in the two countries' international relations, it is important to point out that tension could reappear in the Hungarian-Romanian relationship if extremist nationalist forces were returned to power or gained significant political influence in both countries at the same time. The danger of that will, however, remain limited, partly because the parties have accumulated experience in managing their differences, and because both are affected by the moderating force of the EU and the Atlantic Alliance: neither country wants to jeopardize its prospects of integration.

In addition to domestic politics, the Hungarian-Romanian relationship, if one country but not the other joins Western organizations, will be affected by several other factors. The first will be how international organizations in general tackle the problem of differentiated membership. Will they be able to find ways of keeping temporarily 'rejected' countries interested in gaining membership later? Will subregional cooperation play a useful complementary role in maintaining close relations between the new members and the others that have to wait longer? Last but not least, how will the governments of the respective countries react in order to maintain the momentum in their cooperation?

It seems that the current Romanian leadership gained sufficient credit at the November 1996 elections to manage the problem if not invited by the Alliance to be among its first new members. It is important that postponement of Romania's admission to NATO should be accompanied by straight language concerning continuation of the enlargement process, in which Romania should certainly be involved. However, there is no reason to foresee any major problems if Hungary joins either NATO or the EU, or both, earlier than Romania - particularly not if adequate attention is paid to Romania's interests as an important neighbour of Hungary. In the case of NATO enlargement, there is a greater likelihood that the opposition will attempt to manipulate the Romanian public by saying that a new dividing line has been drawn than in the case of EU enlargement. This would be unfortunate, as there is every reason to assume that Romania would continue its march towards NATO membership, which would further improve the already excellent relations between the two countries' armed forces. A more intensive 'PfP-plus' cooperation programme with Romania and other 'outs' might be considered. The type of measures to be taken in order to help Romania prepare to join the Atlantic Alliance in the next wave should be considered. Last but not least, it will be necessary to make countries that are not admitted early understand that there is a wide spectrum of politico-military forms of cooperation between membership and non-membership. The West should continue to encourage Bucharest to resolve its remaining differences with Moldova, Ukraine and Russia. These are just as important for the integration of Romania as was agreement on the basic issues of its relations with Hungary.

The accession of Hungary to the Atlantic Alliance before Romania will not have major military repercussions. Even though the modernisation of the Hungarian armed forces will have to be speeded up, no bilateral arms race seems to be in sight. Redeployment of Hungarian armed forces has already taken place since the end of the East-West conflict in order to eliminate the uneven distribution of troops and reduce the westward (and southward) orientation of the forces. ₅₈ As Hungary will, for the time being, not have any neighbour that is a member of NATO, a basically even distribution of forces would be an adequate posture. Land-locked Hungary would for strategic reasons be very much interested in having one or more neighbours in the Atlantic Alliance. The number of credible candidates is limited, and Romania ranks highly among them.

The only subregional organization that Romania has not been able to join, though willing, is the CEFTA. Accession has to be agreed upon and talks concluded in the near future. The accession of Romania to CEFTA will create some problems in the longer run. A free trade regime such as this will have to be terminated if some members of the group join the EU. As Romania will probably become a member of the EU later than Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia or Hungary (four of the other five members of CEFTA), cooperation in this framework will remain a temporary phenomenon. It is for this reason exclusively that I have not been in favour of further expansion of CEFTA. Another framework that both Hungary and Romania were strongly encouraged to join is the US-backed South-east European Cooperation Initiative (SECI). ₅₉ Though neither country wants to be regarded as a South-east European country, and even less a Balkans country, both gave in to US pressure. It remains to be seen whether the SECI will acquire any importance or remain a hollow shell like some other subregional frameworks.

If Hungary joins the European Union first, however, certain practical problems in the bilateral relationship have to be resolved. First, if a visa obligation, following implementation of the Schengen regime, has to be imposed on Romanian citizens, some special measures will have to be considered. The reopening of the Hungarian consulate general in Cluj and the opening of new border crossings, partly with the assistance of the European Union, may prove to be helpful. The kind of special measures that could be introduced in order not to erect a wall between Hungary and Romania have to be explored. The solution might lie in the fact that Hungary will not qualify for the entirely free movement of persons immediately after its EU accession. By the time it does, Romania may also be close to membership. It is undeniable that the Hungarian border guard will take on the role of 'filter' on the Romanian-Hungarian border (and elsewhere), serving the common interests of the EU as well. If the bilateral free-trade agreement to be concluded between the two countries soon has to be terminated, or if the same happens regarding CEFTA due to the EU membership of one of the partners, bilateral economic and political relations may suffer. However, the full integration of a new member of the Union will not occur immediately, so it is particularly important that economic cooperation become far more intensive before that point is reached. As the political constraints have largely vanished, there is reason to hope that trade relations between the two countries will intensify in the years to come. As both states have Association Agreements in force with the EC that provide for the free movement of goods, with the exception of agricultural products, one must not count on any major change in trade relations following either country's accession to the EU. Consequently, if bilateral trade increases in the years to come, the tendency will not change drastically later.

The consequences of not being invited to join NATO in the first wave, or not meeting the requirements to begin negotiations with the EU on accession are well kept secrets in every Central and East European capital. If a Central European government were to announce that it would continue on its current political path even if not invited to join the EU or NATO, the motivation of the West to please the less successful candidate would disappear. On the other hand, if a Central European government were to declare that, if it were not among the first new members, extremist forces would gain the upper hand and political processes would go out of control, this would present a picture of the country's stability such that nobody would want it to be among the members. There is therefore a thin line for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to navigate in the years to come.

Polish-Lithuanian Relations: The Complexities Of Geopolitics
Wojciech Zajaczkowski ₆₀

Developments In Relations

Throughout the 20th century, the relationship between Poland and Lithuania has been a peculiar one, due to the fact that it has involved two nations which, for a few hundred years prior to the end of the 18th century, had been united as one state. The development of a modern, national consciousness in both societies at the turn of the 19th century proved to be a major obstacle to the reconstruction of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth in its previous form. Furthermore, it had a negative impact on the mutual relations of these two nations in the period between the two World Wars, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The policy of Vilnius and Warsaw implemented in the 1990s has oscillated between arguments arising from differences in the interpretation of their common history, on the one hand, and attempts at developing common solutions to social, economic and political problems facing both countries in the period following the Cold War on the other. Initially, the first of these two tendencies prevailed; it was only later that it was superseded by mutual cooperation and also collaboration in a wider regional context.

The difficulties hindering the development of Polish-Lithuanian relationships in the first half of the 1990s were caused not only by residues of the past, but also by the issue of the Polish minority in Lithuania. According to estimates, there are approximately 20,000 Lithuanians living in Poland (about 0.05 per cent of the total population), ₆₁ whereas the number of Poles in Lithuania, mainly in the Vilnius Salceninkai regions, is estimated at 258,000 (7 per cent of the total population). ₆₂

Lithuanian fears of Polish cultural and territorial expansion were reflected in the authorities' distrust of the Polish minority, which had not supported Lithuanian aspirations to independence in the crucial years 1989-91. The attitude of the Polish minority was determined mainly by anxieties caused by the national policy of the independent Lithuanian state. ₆₃ However, the argument between the Lithuanian authorities and the Polish minority did not affect Warsaw's attitude towards Lithuanian attempts to regain independence. In 1990 and 1991 the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that the independence of the Republic of Lithuania was an undisputed foreign policy objective. ₆₄

Over the following years, this situation changed. Because of the emergence of the independent Lithuanian state, Poland's main foreign policy objective towards it in 1990 and 1991 ceased to exist, while various minority issues and historical arguments have remained and affected the character of the mutual relations of Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania was the last of Poland's neighbours to sign an inter-state treaty with it (on 26 April 1994). Until then, mutual relations had been regulated by the Declaration of Friendly Relations and Good-Neighbourly Cooperation, signed by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of both countries on 13 January 1992.

The following statement by the previous Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrzej Olechowski, aptly characterizes the attitude of Warsaw towards Vilnius during that period:

'In the relationships between Poland and the Baltic states, an important role is played by actions stressing the subjectivity of these countries, fostering their gradual inclusion into European structures . . . We will watch attentively the issues concerning national minorities there, including the Polish minority . . . Poland advocates the civic integration of ethnic minorities with the preservation of the autonomy of their languages and cultures, although without political and economic autonomy, and at the same time, full respect for the rights of these minorities, in keeping with the standards of the OSCE and the Council of Europe.' ₆₅

The character of the relationship between Poland and Lithuania during the years 1992-94 can be best described as one of deadlock. It was apparent that there were no significant incentives that could have made either party change this situation. At that time, neither the development of economic relations nor the aspirations of both countries to join the European structures prompted either country to alter its stance.

In 1993, the Lithuanian Minister of National Defence, Audrius Butkevicius, described NATO, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and WEU as the most important partners in the area of security, ₆₆ further quoting the following countries as partners in the process of 'strengthening the mechanism of regional security':

- Latvia and Estonia (in the coordination of foreign and economic policies);

- Scandinavian countries (the consolidation of relations);

- the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (the expansion of relations);

- Belarus and Ukraine (the promotion of economic relations).

That classification did not change after a formal application for membership of NATO was submitted by Lithuania in 1994. In a report prepared in 1995, the Deputy Head of the Multilateral Division of the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Eitvidas Bajarunas, indicated the same partners in the identical order. ₆₇ At the same time, however, he expressed Lithuania's concern that it would be isolated from other Central European states which are nearer to achieving their aim of admission into the European structures.

In 1996, a change of tone in the debate in Lithuania on foreign policy and state security became very evident. Initially, the tendency was manifested in pessimistic opinions published in the daily press, with doubts expressed concerning possible integration into NATO and a questioning of the West's goodwill towards the Baltic states. ₆₈ The main criticism levelled at the West were of its proposed solutions to the problem of security of the Baltic states, which did not include their membership of NATO, such as security guarantees furnished by Nordic countries (with Sweden playing the key role) recommended in the RAND report, ₆₉ or the 'Baltic Action Plan' put forward in September 1996 by the United States. A certain amount of criticism could also be found in official statements.

Most revealing in this regard were documents approved by the presidents of the three Baltic states on 26 November 1996. Among other things, these contained a demand 'to design an accession process involving a framework for consultations between NATO and countries that have expressed their interest to join the Alliance and share common values', and 'to urge an active consideration of a comprehensive and transparent enlargement process, one that would include all countries.' ₇₀ In another document, ₇₁ the three statesmen added: 'an obscure perspective of the Baltic states in the process of Atlantic integration could destabilize the Baltic security environment.'

In 1996, the results of actions undertaken with a view to admission to the Atlantic security structures, the priority issue during 1993-95, were thoroughly discussed and criticized. So in fact were two others: cooperation with the Scandinavian countries and cooperation among states in the Baltic region. In the case of the former, encouragement to develop contacts with Sweden and Finland, who are not members of NATO, was generally perceived in Lithuania as an attempt to suggest and recommend alliances other than NATO. Finland, in fact, expressed its objections to the inclusion of the Baltic states in NATO in a statement made on 28 October 1996 by its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tarja Halonen. This was to a large extent the result of an argument with Latvia concerning sea shelf boundaries and oil deposits located in a disputed area (the main issue was ratification by the Latvian Parliament of two agreements with an American and a Swedish company, AMOCO and OPAB), as well as attempts made by Estonia to outstrip its partner Baltic states, who were less advanced in terms of economic reform. Of considerable significance was also the fact that both Estonia and Latvia became involved in debates with the Russian Federation over the status of their Russian-speaking citizens and ownership of certain border areas. This involvement was often criticized, especially in the statements made by opposition leaders Vytautas Landsbergis and Algirdas Saudargas, who after the elections became the President of Parliament and Minister of Foreign Affairs respectively.

Immediately after having won the elections, former opposition politicians confirmed their willingness to continue the ongoing process aimed at Lithuania's membership of NATO and the European Union. At the same time they stressed that Lithuanian foreign policy had reached a critical point. Vytautas Landsbergis stated: 'With the forthcoming 1997 decisions and the selection of candidate states from Central Europe for talks on membership of NATO, Lithuania will witness growing intimidation and anxiety tensions.' ₇₂ In order to alleviate the effects of the difficult political position of Lithuania, in an attempt to find new ways of achieving strategic goals, Minister Saudargas initiated a switch in Lithuanian foreign policy. Having expressed the hope that the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997 would bring about a 'transparent and continuous process of enlargement', he said: 'partner states should not only take part in consultations, humanitarian, peacekeeping, search and rescue missions. Partnership for Peace (PfP) states should also provide for a greater partner involvement in the PfP decision-making and planning process.' ₇₃

The most important aspect of changes in Lithuanian foreign policy at the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997 concerned the hierarchy of partners. The efficiency of cooperation with the Baltic states was questioned, and the development of relationships with Poland was indicated as being of primary importance. During his visit to Warsaw, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister stated: 'Poland is a strategic Lithuanian partner, as both countries have sought to integrate into the European Union and NATO; therefore, integration via Poland [sic] would be easier.' ₇₄ A few days later, Minister Saudargas declared that viewing the Baltic states as a whole might not always be useful when it came to seeking membership of the European Union and NATO. 'Lithuania's strategic partnership with Latvia and Estonia was agreed long ago, however such cooperation may sometimes not seem beneficial.' ₇₅

That change of attitude was received favourably in Warsaw: it was by no means obvious, taking into account the fact that in the first half of the 1990s Polish policy towards Lithuania was basically passive and dominated by the issue of the Polish minority in Lithuania, as well as the treaty on friendship and good-neighbourly relations.

During the visit of Minister Saudargas to Warsaw in January 1997, even though the problems of national minorities were still a matter of considerable interest for politicians, particular prominence was given to the future prospects of political cooperation. The Polish Foreign Minister, Dariusz Rosati, said that Poland would do its best to facilitate the inclusion of Lithuania in the first group of countries to begin negotiations for membership of NATO and the EU; the Polish side accepted Minister Saudargas's proposal to harmonize decision-making on bilateral issues and common actions.

The political coming together of Poland and Lithuania, on a scale unseen since 1991, was preceded by actions inspired by the PfP programme, aimed at military cooperation. From 1993 to 1996, several decisions were made resulting in the establishment of a Polish-Lithuanian peacekeeping battalion, a common airspace control system, and the organization of joint military exercises. ₇₆ Furthermore, Poland handed over five Mi-2 helicopters as well as a number of lorries, armoured vehicles and munitions to the Lithuanian armed forces; in 1996, a decision to transfer nine radar systems was made. At present, servicemen of both countries take part in joint training programmes hosted by the Polish National Defence Academy and the Lithuanian Military Academy.

There are no major differences between Vilnius's long-term political aims and those of Warsaw; however, domestic factors determining the shape of foreign policy connected with Polish-Lithuanian relationships before 1939 and national minorities proved to be serious obstacles to the development of bilateral relations. Any long-lasting compromise in these two areas will have to be preceded by profound changes in public attitudes in both countries, something that is by its very nature a time-consuming process.

Several common concerns have contributed to closer cooperation between Poland and Lithuania, notwithstanding historical prejudice. It has been stimulated firstly by their common aim of joining the EU and NATO, and by the PfP programme connected with it. Second, proposals to reconstruct the European security system were put forward by Russia, aimed at preserving the current form and membership of NATO, making OSCE the major security organization in Europe, and persuading the West to acknowledge Russia's special interests in Central and Eastern Europe and recognize the former Soviet republics as an area of Russian influence. Third, the Russian Federation does not seem inclined to limit its military presence in the areas bordering Lithuania and Poland. There are no reasons to expect that the Kaliningrad district will cease to be one of the most militarized regions of Europe. Similar concerns apply to Belarus, with which Moscow has signed a 'non-agreement' significantly upgrading their military cooperation, ₇₇ and where it already has two military bases. The fact that there are no direct transport and communication links between Belarus and the Kaliningrad enclave has prompted the Russians to put pressure upon Lithuania and Poland to take into consideration Russian interests in this respect (this concerns, in particular, the so-called communication corridor through the territory of Poland, which provides a convenient link with Kaliningrad that bypasses Lithuania).

Polish-Lithuanian cooperation will certainly also be affected by what happens to Belarus. It seems most likely that in the near future there will be no change in the situation in which Belarussian foreign policy is subordinated to objectives determined by Russia, and in which the country's economy is dependent on its eastern neighbour. Warsaw and Vilnius will continue the policy launched in Autumn 1996 with the joint statement by the presidents of Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, condemning the unconstitutional disbanding of the Belarussian parliament by the president Alexander Lukashenko. Only if there is a change in the domestic situation and as a result Belarus abandons its criticism of its neighbours for their efforts to join NATO will Lithuania and Poland possibly become important partners for that country in the economic and political sphere as well as in security matters.

Each of the above factors has its significance; there is no doubt, however, that Russia is of major importance, which prompts various questions concerning not only NATO itself, but also numerous problems that are fundamental to the shape of European policy as a whole, such as respect for the sovereignty of Central and East European states and the influence of Russia's geopolitical approach in its foreign policy on the new shape of the European security system.

The Implications Of Enlargement

In order to answer exhaustively the question what the effect on the relationship will be if one of the two countries joins NATO, one has to take into account a number of factors. The first is decisions taken by NATO concerning its future membership and form. The member states may decide that the Treaty should not be changed, or, surrendering to demands voiced by Russia, accept certain amendments. It is not known whether NATO will make any declarations concerning the termination or suspension of the enlargement process after the first wave of Central European states have joined, because that would depend on the extent to which it wished to take into account Russian concerns and interests. Secondly, Russian misgivings leave no doubt whatsoever that neither the admission of the Baltic states to NATO nor their close cooperation with its member states will be welcomed. An agreement (charter) on a special relationship is to be signed by NATO and Russia, giving the latter the right to extensive consultation with the Organization, although not the right to veto the admission of new members. The agreement may be accompanied by certain concessions during the re-negotiation of the CFE Treaty.

The evolution of Russian political thought to reflect on principles other than geopolitics and military considerations could contribute significantly to the easing of political tensions in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe. In that case, Polish-Lithuanian cooperation could develop, being no longer in opposition to Russian interests as defined today by Russia's political élite. Thirdly, even if Poland's policy towards the East remains basically unchanged, its priorities and preferences may vary once it has joined NATO and/or EU. The fourth factor is Lithuanian policy: at present it seems to be the easiest to define.

Bearing in mind the fact that the above issues remain unclear, we can none the less distinguish two ways in which Polish-Lithuanian relations might develop in the area of security following enlargement.

An Optimistic Scenario: Greater Cooperation

Irrespective of the chances of Lithuania becoming a member of NATO, Poland will continue its political cooperation with this country as an important partner with similar views on the principles governing its European policy. Undoubtedly, Warsaw will continue its support for the aspirations of Lithuania and the other Baltic states to join European institutions. In practice, this may take the form of cooperation between Poland and Lithuania within the framework of various regional arrangements, including the Central European Initiative and CEFTA.

As the nature of NATO-Russian relations remains unknown, it is hard to state unequivocally what the larger context of Polish-Lithuanian security cooperation will be. However, in this 'optimistic scenario' it is possible to distinguish its most important dimensions, given below, which will differ from each other mainly in the level of Western involvement.

- Polish-Lithuanian cooperation could remain largely bilateral, with no significant support from outside. Its practical importance would be rather limited, essentially for political and financial reasons, but it would be difficult to overestimate its symbolic importance. ₇₈

- Regional cooperation could involve more countries. In this case, Polish-Lithuanian relations would be an element of some larger mechanism including Baltic and Scandinavian states first of all. The Baltic Action Plan or the Baltron project ₇₉ are the best proof that such ideas are taken seriously. They will play a more important role if the following conditions are fulfilled: Poland pays more attention not only to its closest neighbour, Lithuania, but to the other Baltic states as well; Lithuania treats neither cooperation with Latvia and Estonia nor regional security cooperation as factors that diminish its chances of being admitted to NATO. Recent contacts between countries of the region (the Polish-Lithuanian example is not the only one; Denmark, Germany and especially Sweden are also showing a stable interest in the Baltic countries) prove that the idea of more intensive regional security cooperation has serious chances of being implemented. In addition to Poland, members of NATO participating in this cooperation (Denmark and Germany) will play an important role.

- Cooperation could take place within a programme initiated by WEU. Currently, this is a theoretical variant only, because of lack of clear prospects of joint activities by WEU, and because the countries applying for membership of the EU are at the same time only Associate Partners of WEU. However, the military and political structures of WEU have developed considerably since 1983-84 and have been linked to NATO's military structure. This enables WEU to initiate cooperative programmes in view of possible admission of new members in the first decade of the next century. This would create a good opportunity for Warsaw and Vilnius to give their security cooperation a real European dimension, which would become an integral part of the whole range of security mechanisms, including bilateral, regional and transatlantic.

- Cooperation could take place within programmes launched by NATO (the modified Partnership for Peace or the Atlantic Agreements). ₈₀ If the path to NATO for countries in the second wave states is not closed, a mechanism for cooperation between member and applicant countries will certainly be established. In this situation, Poland and Lithuania could take part in activities aimed at preparing the next candidates (joint military exercises, peacekeeping operations and closer cooperation between different parts of the armed forces). Such a programme would certainly facilitate the development of the Polish-Lithuanian peacekeeping battalion.

Any concept for developing Polish-Lithuanian security cooperation and making it a part of more complex mechanisms should take into consideration the geopolitical environment, which means the Russian and Belarussian factors. The rapprochement between Vilnius and Warsaw should not be seen as being directed against neighbouring countries, so confidence-building measures to soften possible tensions will be very important. These could include purely military matters (Belarussian and Russian observers attending joint Polish-Lithuanian military exercises, for example) as well as other issues (the fight against crime, protection of the environment, development of communications and transportation networks).

The chances that the above option will be successfully implemented will increase with cooperation between Poland and Lithuania in other areas, especially economic exchanges. Also of extreme importance will be the easing of tensions arising from historical and national minority issues. Greater political and military cooperation is hardly possible unless an awareness of the need for such cooperation is deeply rooted in the consciousness of both nations.

A Pessimistic Scenario: A Passive Polish Policy Towards Lithuania

While membership of NATO is recognized by all significant political parties in Poland as an important goal, views on relations with Russia are divergent. The enlargement of NATO could in fact be accompanied by tensions in Polish-Russian relations. These tensions would be viewed with dismay by some political groups in Poland, especially the post-communist left. The advisability of joining NATO is not and, in all likelihood, would not be questioned, although protests over military cooperation with Baltic states may be voiced for the sake of maintaining good relations with Russia. Other arguments against closer cooperation between Poland and Lithuania may be raised: along with largely conceptual issues, economic factors (for instance the adverse effect on trade with Russia) or, more importantly, the question of the Polish minority in Lithuania, may be of some relevance. Conflicts between the Polish minority and the Lithuanian authorities may prove an efficient argument in the hands of Polish opponents of the coming together of Poland and Lithuania, and at the same time be used by Lithuanian opponents of cooperation with Poland. This issue may also be manipulated by other countries that are interested in showing that Poland and Lithuania, a state recently admitted into NATO and a state aspiring to membership, are not able to organize their relationship in a civilized manner.

The Way Forward

One can hardly say that Polish-Lithuanian relations are of decisive importance for Central and Eastern Europe, as is the case with relations between Poland and Ukraine, but they will none the less play an important role as regards subregional stability, albeit on a somewhat smaller scale. This applies to both the 'optimistic' scenario, in which the development of multilateral relations among the states around the Baltic Sea would be facilitated, and the 'pessimistic' one, in which the process would encounter obstacles.

The crucial security problem facing the entire region will no doubt be the process of NATO expansion and the mechanisms of cooperation between it and non-member states. From that point of view, the south-eastern part of the Baltic will become an extremely complex area where the interests of the Atlantic Alliance, Russia and the countries under its control (such as Belarus), neutral countries (Sweden, Finland), and finally, former Baltic republics, which were always accorded special consideration by some of the Western states, will converge. It is indicative of this complexity that even the Council of Baltic Sea States established in 1992, that is, at the time of least tension between Moscow and the West, assumed in its programme that it would not be addressing security issues.

The question of Russia's attitude is of course paramount. There is a real danger that regional mechanisms for international cooperation that do not take into account the Russian point of view will produce an effect that is quite the opposite to that intended: instead of becoming an instrument for the coordination of interests and peaceful coexistence, in practice they could become a source of tension that would negatively affect stability in the eastern Baltic. In theory, this could only be avoided if NATO declared that the Baltic states would not be admitted to the organization, or abandonment of such intentions by Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn. A practical alternative would be to propose observer status in such regional security programmes to the Russian Federation or to ensure a large measure of openness in cooperative mechanisms; this should apply first and foremost to armed forces, including navies. It seems that the institution most likely to play an important role in involving Russia in regional mechanisms is NACC.

Looking further ahead, the Kaliningrad district, situated between Lithuania and Poland, where the headquarters of the Russian Baltic Fleet is located and armed forces comparable in size to the entire Polish army are stationed, will pose a serious problem. There are two main, contrasting views on the area's future (leaving aside various ideas envisaging a change in Kaliningrad's national status). One foresees a continuation of the enclave's military status, while the other puts the emphasis on economic development and limitations on the now predominant military. At present there are few reasons to think that the latter is more likely. Developments in Russia's federal system in recent years have resulted in some areas gaining considerable autonomy, in particular Kaliningrad, where the Jantar Free Economic Zone has been set up. The significance of this accomplishment is limited, as the barriers to transportation and communications that survived the disintegration of the USSR are hindering its integration into the Baltic economic exchange area. However, development of economic contacts could to an extent offset political consequences resulting from increased cooperation between the Baltic states and Western security systems.

Also, the nature of economic relations in the Baltic region will depend on the political decisions taken in Russia at the national level. Starting in 1993-94 there has been a discernible trend to use economic instruments with a view to maintaining the Russian Federation's dominant position on the territory of the former USSR. This applies not only to the CIS member states but also to the Baltic countries, where Russia's presence has been felt especially strongly in the power industry (Lithuania) and the banking sector (Latvia).

Lastly, the problem of energy security has become a topic of animated discussion in Poland, which in 1993 signed a contract with Russia for natural gas supplies and construction of a pipeline from the Jamal peninsula to Germany. Criticism of Russia's exclusive status as supplier of natural gas to Poland has prompted the Polish government, in negotiations with Denmark, to take up the idea, which dates back to the first half of the 1990s, of an 'energy belt' surrounding the Baltic. If extension of the pipeline network to allow the importation of natural gas from sources other than Russia's Gazprom were to include the Baltic states too, one could expect Russia, which would interpret this move at least as a demonstration of aggressive economic competition, to take a hostile stance.

On the one hand, as can be seen from the above, the participation of Poland and Lithuania in wider cooperative programmes in the area of security and certain economic programmes could carry the risk of increased tension in their relations with Russia. On the other hand, it is appropriate to ask what the consequences would be of an absence of cooperation between Poland and Lithuania, either as a repercussion of decisions by Western countries or an unwillingness on the part of Vilnius and Warsaw to cooperate with each other (the pessimistic scenario). Satisfying Moscow in an ad hoc way would not resolve any of the security problems of this part of Europe. The uncertainty and anxiety would certainly not be conducive to the development of economic relations, and this would affect Vilnius, Riga, Tallinn, St Petersburg and Kaliningrad. Nor would genuine concessions to Russia necessarily persuade the Belarussian authorities to carry out reforms in their country. And last but not least, Polish-Lithuanian security cooperation would be reduced to small-scale, bilateral contacts with no regional dimension.

What does the above suggest would help most to cope with the consequences of the non-admission of one the two countries to NATO? First, NATO should remain open to new members. This is the key issue for Lithuania and other Baltic states that cannot assure their independence and sovereignty if they remain outside larger security structures. Second, a subregional programme of security cooperation should be launched by NATO directly or through NACC. Third, further bilateral cooperation is desirable, including not only security but economic and cultural matters as well; due to the fact that both countries wish to join the same security and economic structures, Western assistance in enabling Poland and Lithuania to meet EU and NATO standards will play an important role. Fourth, intensification of regional economic cooperation should be endorsed by the Council of Baltic Sea States and EU. It should aim first of all at development of communications and transportation infrastructures in the area south of the Baltic Sea (it should include development of energy and raw materials supply system). Lastly, measures will be needed to attract Russia and Belarus to all the above-mentioned aspects of subregional security and economic cooperation.

Finding a solution to the problem of the conflicting interests of NATO, Russia and neutral countries in the Baltic region which would be satisfactory to all the parties will be very complicated and may turn out to be quite lengthy, so that it would be prudent to initiate action in other areas. For instance, huge quantities of chemical weapons (between 300 and 500 thousand tons) dumped in the Baltic after World War II, mainly near the islands of Bornholm, Klaipeda and Lepai, pose a formidable challenge that will become increasingly pressing. It is an issue that all should rally around, regardless of political divisions. The other area that offers a chance for dialogue is no doubt the economy, which has for a couple of years now been at the centre of various regional institutions' interests, especially those of the Council of Baltic Sea States. ₈₁ In the context of NATO expansion, an initiative that is of vital importance not only for the further development of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia but also Russia's Baltic coastal area (Kaliningrad and St Petersburg) is the Via Baltica, a motorway which, skirting the east and southern Baltic, would speed up road traffic between Finland and Germany.

It is very probable that after the first phase of NATO enlargement the economic ties between Poland and Lithuania will play an increasingly important role. Economic contacts between two countries have developed rapidly since 1994. Trade between them has increased, and in 1995 it was estimated at $256 million. ₈₂ Preliminary data for 1996 confirm this tendency. Poland is actually one of the most active investors in this country, although the volume of Polish investment in the Lithuanian economy is quite small. ₈₃ To stimulate development of economic ties between them, Warsaw and Vilnius have signed agreements on the avoidance of double taxation, protection of investments and free trade. Future prospects for Polish-Lithuanian economic cooperation are linked with Lithuania's access to CEFTA and in the longer term with both states' access to the European Union.

It is hard to assess exactly how the membership of one or both countries to the European Union will affect their economic relations. If Poland and Lithuania are admitted at more or less the same time, the amount of economic cooperation will certainly increase. If only one country joins the EU, the situation will be more complicated. ₈₄ Fortunately, recent economic indicators such as inflation and budget deficit give Lithuania very high ranking compared with other Central European states, and this means that Poland and Lithuania might be able to follow a similar agenda. This trend may be strengthened by grants from the PHARE programme or by credits from the European Investment Bank or the EBRD for unification of the legal system, transport, communications and development of the border infrastructure, so that EU enlargement will not mean a deepening of differences between the two states already caused by NATO enlargement.

Poland and Lithuania intend to intensify their bilateral economic (and not only economic) cooperation and contacts with two other neighbouring countries (Belarus and the Russian Federation), by creating a Niemen Euroregion, composed of Suwalki voivodeship (administrative division - Poland), Marijampol and Alytus districts (Lithuania), Hrodna region (Belarus) and part of Kaliningrad (Russian Federation).

Any Polish-Lithuanian cooperation following NATO expansion should envisage actions aimed at changing the Kaliningrad district from a military base into a prosperous trading centre. (An obstacle to Polish-Lithuanian cooperation in this area may be the concern felt in Gdansk, Gdynia and Klaipeda over competition from the port at Baltijsk. Lithuania could face a very difficult choice between the prosperity of its single major port and its well understood security interests.) Unfortunately, both Vilnius's and Warsaw's power in this domain is limited, and not only for material reasons. The status of Kaliningrad and St Petersburg and their chance to participate in international economic contacts depend only in part on their inhabitants and the local political élite: progress made in the decentralization process throughout Russia will be much more decisive here.

Implementation of these proposals would contribute to the stabilization of the northern part of Eastern Europe and prevent a gap from developing between the safe and relatively prosperous Central European states, like Poland, on the one hand, and Lithuania and other Baltic countries facing an uncertain future, with potential political and economic troubles, on the other. The best basis for these plans will certainly be good relations between Warsaw and Vilnius but, as certain data concerning the international context of Polish-Lithuanian relationships are not yet known, such as the future structure of NATO and the Russia-NATO agreement, it is difficult to make any predictions concerning their final shape. Undoubtedly there are sufficient reasons to think that a change in attitudes, initiated by military cooperation followed by the re-orienting of Lithuanian foreign policy, is creating a new perspective for the development of the relationships between the two countries. However, a great deal will depend on the maturity of both societies and their ability to treat the issue of security not only as a subject of international agreements, but also as a challenge to be met.

Ukrainian-Polish Relations: A Pillar Of Regional Stability?
Oleksandr Pavliuk ₈₅

The Development Of Relations

Since medieval times, the histories of Ukrainians and Poles have been closely interrelated and interdependent. For centuries, both peoples lived within the same political entity - the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, and the Polish Republic of the interwar period - thus nurturing and developing strong historic, cultural and personal links, and exerting reciprocal influence. This mutual enrichment and cohabitation has, however, almost always gone hand in hand with mutual misperceptions, protracted political tensions, national confrontation and even armed conflicts. The two countries' inability to find understanding and establish a mutually beneficial political relationship has frequently been exploited by their powerful neighbours, with catastrophic results for both peoples, including the loss of their national independence. ₈₆

During the four decades of the Cold War, Ukrainian-Polish relations were limited, and developed mainly through Moscow. Only the political changes which came with the collapse of communism and the demise of the Soviet Union were able to open up new opportunities by allowing increased direct contacts between the two nations. Relations between Ukraine and Poland had begun to develop and assume an interstate nature even before Ukraine formally gained its independence. As early as October 1990, a joint Declaration on Basic Principles and Directions of the Development of Ukrainian-Polish Relations was signed. Since then, bilateral relations have undergone a significant evolution.

Poland became the first foreign state visited by an official delegation from independent Ukraine two weeks after its independence was proclaimed by the Ukrainian parliament on 24 August 1991. On 1 December 1991, Ukrainians overwhelmingly supported their independence in a national referendum. A few hours after the referendum's official results were announced, Warsaw became the first capital to recognize this independence, thus paving the way for wider international recognition of Ukraine. Mutual interest and frequent contacts at various levels were characteristic of the Ukrainian-Polish relationship in 1992-93. As early as 1992, the two countries signed a bilateral Treaty on Good-Neighbourly and Friendly Relations and Cooperation in which they renounced mutual territorial claims, recognized the inviolability of existing borders and guaranteed the rights of national minorities, thus setting a positive example for handling bilateral relations in the region. The following year, a Ukrainian-Polish Presidential consultative committee was created to analyse bilateral relations and make practical suggestions for their further development. Polish ideas of 'NATO-bis' and miedzymorze ('between the seas'), as well as the related Ukrainian concept of 'a zone of stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe', envisaged close subregional cooperation in which both Ukraine and Poland would have major roles to play. ₈₇

The logical sequel to this promising start, however, did not materialize. The delay in implementing economic and political reforms in Ukraine widened the gap between it and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and led to increased political and social instability in the region. As a result, in 1993-94 Poland and other countries of the region became increasingly concerned about internal instability in Ukraine, as well as its stance on nuclear weapons, and the possible implications of an unstable Ukrainian-Russian relationship. In addition, mutual misunderstandings and even suspicions were growing regarding the issue of NATO enlargement. While Poland and other CEE countries, encouraged by the prospect of quick integration, clearly stated their intention to become full members of NATO, Kyiv emphasized the need for an 'evolutionary approach' to NATO expansion, reflecting concerns that the process would lead to considerable deterioration in Ukraine's strategic position. This was often interpreted as a veiled objection to NATO enlargement.

Mutual misunderstandings were exacerbated by the fact that Ukrainian-Polish relations were almost frozen in the second half of 1994 and the beginning of 1995. ₈₈ Ukraine's new President Leonid Kuchma, elected in July 1994, focused his attention primarily on ensuring Western sources of financial support for his economic reforms besides seeking to normalize relations with Russia; he consequently paid little attention to Poland and other CEE countries. Even the Presidential Consultative Committee was not convened for almost a year. Ultimately, however, the economic reforms launched by President Kuchma and Ukraine's accession to the NPT helped to draw security assurances and financial assistance from Western governments and international institutions, and this in turn laid the necessary foundations for a more stable Ukrainian-Polish relationship.

Since mid-1995, relations between the two countries have become the most dynamic and promising among Ukraine's relations with any of its neighbours. The victory in Poland of the socialist leader Aleksander Kwasniewski in the presidential elections in November 1995 caused some initial uneasiness in Kyiv in view of the new President's policy towards the East, and Warsaw has in fact begun to pay greater attention to its relations with Russia. However, President Kwasniewski quickly demonstrated that closer ties with Moscow would not be established at the expense of Ukraine, stating that Ukraine's partnership was of equal importance to Poland as Russia's. ₈₉ As a result, four meetings of the two presidents have taken place since early 1996, and the Presidential Consultative Committee has become a regular and productive forum. The Polish Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati recently noted that Polish-Ukrainian relations 'have never been as good as they are now'. ₉₀ Mutual recognition of the need to develop a true strategic partnership is steadily growing. ₉₁

At present, Ukrainian-Polish relations are based on more than 70 bilateral agreements, signed during the past five years. Some experts believe that military cooperation is developing the most dynamically, based on the 1993 agreement promoting such forms of cooperation as the organizing of military exchange programmes and the sharing of military training facilities. Poland has also shown much interest in getting spare parts from Ukraine for much of its Soviet-made military equipment. In October 1995, this cooperation reached a new qualitative level when a joint Ukrainian-Polish peacekeeping battalion was created. Aside from military contacts, both states have been actively involved in transfrontier cooperation within the Carpathian Euroregion (together with Hungary, Romania and Slovakia) and the recently created Buh (or Bug) Euroregion, encompassing Volyn' oblast in Ukraine and four border provinces of Poland.

The two countries have also clearly expressed their readiness to give each other mutual support in their efforts to integrate into Europe. Kyiv has modified its position on NATO enlargement, publicly endorsing this process and thus easing the way for Poland's accession to the Alliance. In 1996, Ukraine for the first time declared its strategic goal as integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, with priority given to membership of the EU. As to its relationship with NATO, Ukraine has expressed a desire to seek a 'special partnership'. In turn, Warsaw has eagerly assumed the role of 'advocate of the independence, and democratic and Euro-atlantic aspirations of Ukraine.' ₉₂ Poland successfully lobbied for Ukraine's admission to the Council of Europe in 1995 and to the Central European Initiative (CEI) in 1996, and has become increasingly supportive of Ukraine's intention to join the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). At various international forums and during bilateral meetings with Western officials, Polish leaders never fail to stress the importance of addressing Ukraine's security concerns and the need for a special partnership, not only between NATO and Russia but between NATO and Ukraine as well. ₉₃

This recent Ukrainian-Polish rapprochement is in the national interests of both countries. As stated in a joint declaration signed by the two Presidents in June 1996: 'The existence of an independent Ukraine helps to consolidate Polish independence, while the existence of an independent Poland helps to consolidate Ukrainian independence.' ₉₄ This interdependence is explained not only by geographic and historical considerations, but also by the geostrategic interests of both countries. As Belarus merges with Russia, bilateral cooperation is becoming even more significant to both Warsaw and Kyiv. Poland wants to secure stability on its eastern borders and to see in Ukraine a democratic and friendly neighbour that is supportive of its desire to join NATO and the EU, while Kyiv needs Polish experience and advocacy in its own efforts to integrate into European and subregional institutions. In addition, both countries share common interests in assuring the rights of their national minorities still living within each others' territories, despite the Communist resettlements and deportations.

Official Ukrainian-Polish contacts are being further stimulated by conservative elements in both countries. Also in June 1996, a number of their prominent representatives, including ex-Presidents Walesa and Kravchuk, signed a joint memorandum on 'Strategic Partnership between Poland and Ukraine,' which stipulated that the two countries should support each other diplomatically, step up bilateral intergovernmental contacts (including biannual summits), create a joint committee on European integration within their foreign ministries, and hold more joint military exercises. ₉₅ The recently created Polish Council of Foreign Policy chaired by the former Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski insists that Poland's 'relations with Ukraine should be further intensified'. ₉₆ On the whole, practically all major political forces in both countries recognize the importance of close bilateral cooperation. More obscure is the position of Ukrainian leftists, who in general favour stronger ties with Russia rather than with the West. In this context there is some risk that if a candidate of the left wins the 1999 presidential elections, this may provoke an eastward turn by Ukraine, and consequently lead to the weakening of its links with the West in general and Poland in particular.

The recent rapprochement of Ukraine and Poland is increasingly viewed by many as a crucial test for subregional stability and security, and a testing ground for the future relationship between the 'ins' and 'outs'. If successfully developed further, this rapprochement of the two largest countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Ukraine with a population of almost 52 million, and Poland more than 38 million), would certainly play a major role in strengthening stability and security in the region and in Europe as a whole. Ukrainian-Polish cooperation is especially important given the burden of the history of bilateral relations. Just as successful French-German cooperation since the end of World War II has laid the foundation for stability in Western Europe, so current Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation and cooperation could well become a pillar of stability in Central and Eastern Europe.

Implications of Enlargement

The evolution of Ukrainian-Polish relations in 1991-96 is a good example of the close interrelationship between cooperation among CEE countries and the larger process of European integration. While in 1991-92 the West's 'regional' approach to integration facilitated cooperation among CEE states, the shift to a more 'individual' approach in 1993-94 significantly damaged that cooperation as the more politically and economically advanced CEE countries began to view subregional cooperation as an obstacle to their eventual membership of the EU and NATO; but the recent Western emphasis on the need for subregional cooperation as a supplement and precondition for European integration has revitalized the process. In this regard, the enlargement process has already exercised a positive impact on bilateral relations in Central and Eastern Europe, as seen, for instance, in the recent Ukrainian-Polish rapprochement.

Given the complexity of economic and political transition in the ex-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and especially of the former USSR, as well as internal transformation of the Western integrated structures themselves, and considering the variety of changes which may occur in the region and on the continent as a whole - especially by the time the first Central and East Europeans join the EU - it is difficult to discuss all possible scenarios for the development of Ukrainian-Polish relations after enlargement. At present, there are some grounds for both a sceptical and an optimistic view.

An optimistic scenario for the future of Ukrainian-Polish relations would be based on the two countries' complementary political and economic needs, and on the assumption that even after accession to NATO and later the EU, Poland would remain interested in developing ties with Ukraine, especially in the further growth of trade and economic cooperation. In the past few years, the growth of trade between the two countries has been quite dynamic: $280 million in 1993, $550 million in 1994, and more than $1 billion in 1995. Last year, the volume of Ukrainian-Polish trade further increased by almost 50 per cent and stood at about $1.5 billion, ₉₇ not including a lively cross-border 'shuttle trade' in consumer goods. As a result, Ukraine has become Poland's third largest trade partner (after Germany and Russia), while Poland is one of Ukraine's most important trading partners. ₉₈ Given the generally low quality of most Ukrainian and Polish products in comparison with EU standards, and consequently their low competitiveness on Western markets, the two countries find it easier to sell many goods to each other.

Yet the importance of these figures should not be overestimated. On the whole, bilateral trade, seen as a share of the total trade volume of both Ukraine and Poland, is still at quite a low level. Ukraine remains heavily shackled to Russia - which accounts for 41 per cent of Ukraine's foreign trade - and to the CIS as a whole (60 per cent of Ukraine's total import and 54 per cent of its export), ₉₉ while Ukraine's share of Poland's total trade volume is less than 5 per cent . Furthermore, the structure of Ukrainian-Polish trade is heavilydominated by mineral products: the major portion of Polish exports to Ukraine consists of coal (40 per cent of Poland's total exports to Ukraine) and agricultural products and consumer goods (16.6 per cent), while 54.5 per cent of Ukrainian exports to Poland are ore and various metals. At the same time, mutual intra-industry links are practically non-existent, and it was only recently that the two governments agreed in principle on joint production of 'Bizon' Polish combine harvesters in western Ukraine. Even less significant is the level of mutual investment, despite the recent growing interest shown by Polish investors towards Ukraine. All Polish investment in the Ukrainian economy account for only about $25 million (which is less than foreign investment from the United States, Germany, Russia, UK, Netherlands, Cyprus, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, or Ireland), while Ukrainian investment in Poland's economy stands at just $260,000. ₁₀₀ About 500 joint Ukrainian-Polish ventures have been registered in Ukraine, yet not more than 350 of them, mainly in trade, are actually working.

A second ground for optimism on the future of Ukrainian-Polish relations stems from the assumption that, as a member of NATO and the EU, Poland would become stronger economically, more stable politically, and hence more confident and dynamic in its foreign policy. Consequently, its Eastern policy should become more active as well. After accession to Western integrated structures, Poland may not only remain interested in further securing its eastern border but also become more capable of projecting stability further east, whereas today its resources are limited and the country is still relatively weak for an active Eastern policy. All this should have direct, positive repercussions on Ukrainian-Polish cooperation. Mirroring the role of Germany in Polish-German relations at present, Poland may use its wider access to the EU's financial resources for developing infrastructure at the Ukrainian-Polish border, intensifying trans-border cooperation, and supporting more joint Ukrainian-Polish projects. In this scenario, Polish membership of NATO and the EU will help further to strengthen Ukrainian independence, broaden Ukraine's international capabilities and link it more strongly to the West. This, in turn, should enhance Ukraine's interest in and support for more comprehensive cooperation with Poland.

Nevertheless, despite the above-mentioned positive trends and achievements in the development of Ukrainian-Polish relations, there are grounds for concern about their future. First of all, while the need for close mutual cooperation is now generally recognized among the Ukrainian and Polish political élite and intellectuals, the public at large remains ignorant and uninvolved in the process. As a result, there is a gap between the perception of the élite and the population in both countries, and on the whole bilateral cooperation lacks a solid grass-roots foundation. Many stereotypes of the past are still alive among both Poles and Ukrainians, especially those in western Ukraine. While eastern Ukrainians have traditionally been inclined more towards Russia and remain largely ignorant of Ukrainian-Polish relations, Ukrainians in the west of the country, which before 1939 was a part of Poland and a cradle for Ukrainian radical nationalism directed to a large extent against Poland, still harbour strong anti-Polish feelings. At the same time, a significant segment of Polish society (up to 48 per cent according to some public opinion polls ₁₀₁ ) continues to perceive Ukrainians negatively. In this regard, the two peoples still have to go a long road to achieve the desired reconciliation.

Poland, like most other CEE and Western states, seems to have realized that a Ukraine left isolated and unstable, or drawn into the 1992 Tashkent Agreement on military cooperation with Russia, would create a serious source of tension in the region. Hence the persistent desire to support Ukraine's transition to democracy and market economy and keep it out of the Russian orbit. Unfortunately, most states to the west of Ukraine still do not view it as an equal and potentially full member of all European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, seeing the country instead as a buffer between themselves (as a part of an extended NATO) and Russia and its possible allies.

It is true that despite Ukraine's recent statements on its desire to be integrated into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, Ukraine itself is not ready today to be a full and equal part of the European integration process either politically, economically or psychologically. This 'conceptual division' between Ukraine and other CEE states not only fails to help bridge the already existing political, economic and cultural gap between them, but rather widens it. First-wave enlargement may aggravate this problem by further differentiating Ukraine from its Western neighbours. The essential difference between German-Polish cooperation in recent years and Ukrainian-Polish cooperation after enlargement will lie in the fact that Poland has been seen for years by Germany and others as a future full member of all European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, while Ukraine has not. After joining the Western organizations, Poland would objectively view Ukraine from a pan-European perspective or from a new qualitative level, characterized by the different standards of interstate relations among the EU members and between them and other countries. The current, albeit high level of Ukrainian-Polish relations may fail to compensate for this 'conceptual division'.

In their military doctrines, Ukraine and Poland clearly do not regard each other as potential enemies. The fact that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are still concentrated mainly in the Western part of the country is largely a legacy of the Soviet past, when Ukraine comprised the westernmost border of the USSR. It is also a result of the limitations imposed by the CFE Treaty, as well as of Ukraine's financial constraints.

NATO enlargement is unlikely to have a negative impact on Ukrainian-Polish military cooperation if relations between the two states continue to develop and mature further, and larger issues such as the deployment of nuclear weapons and NATO military infrastructure on the territories of new members are properly addressed.

In the past, former Polish Minister of Defence Zbigniew Okonski stated that, as a NATO member, Poland would be prepared to accept the stationing of foreign forces and nuclear weapons on its territory. ₁₀₂ Kyiv expressed concern over the possible deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of new members, including Poland, and criticized those countries' willingness to agree to nuclear deployments, and the Ukrainian Government even put forward the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe. The idea, however, caused some irritation in Warsaw. ₁₀₃ Recently, Ukraine has downplayed this initiative. The final decision on this sensitive issue will depend on NATO itself.

Ukraine has also expressed concern with the planned CFE Treaty revisions, especially changes in the Southern flank limitations, which would increase the concentration of Russian troops in the Black Sea region and indirectly legitimize their presence in the Ukrainian Crimea.

The eastern expansion of NATO is likely to affect Ukraine more than any other country in the region, both in terms of the extent of its common borders with new NATO members and its exposure to increased Russian pressure, which has already started to mount in recent months. Ukraine's situation will be especially difficult if the Russian position on NATO expansion remains negative, reviving the old 'bloc'- style confrontation, and/or insisting that the first wave of enlargement should also be the last one. On the other hand, even if NATO succeeds in reaching an agreement with Russia that addresses its security and political concerns and 'cushions' its position, the first wave of enlargement may oblige NATO and later the EU to concentrate chiefly on internal challenges connected with the 'absorption' of newly admitted members, the exact costs of which are very difficult to estimate at this stage. Consequently, NATO's and EU's resources and attention could be diverted away from the continuation of partnership schemes and assistance programmes to Ukraine (as well as to other 'outs'). The possibility can also not be excluded that after joining the Western integrated institutions, Poland itself would have to focus mainly on strengthening its position within these institutions and on its own adaptation process, and consequently might turn its back on cooperation with Ukraine, which would be bound to damage Ukraine's security.

As a result, a situation may arise in which a disappointed, demotivated and insecure Ukraine finds itself in a 'grey area' between the new, larger West and an unstable (and probably alienated and more assertive) Russia. Ukraine's instability and the parallel weakening or even failure of Ukrainian-Polish cooperation would damage the fragile regional environment, decreasing the security of every neighbouring country including Poland. Such a scenario would be on the cards especially if Ukraine were to continue to be treated as a country 'in-between' the new Europe and Russia, while at the same time Ukraine failed to overcome its considerable economic and social difficulties. Conversely, if Poland and - what is more important - the West as a whole make clear that they see Ukraine as a Central and East European state and a potential candidate for full participation in the integration process, subject to its ability to meet the necessary criteria for membership, this will certainly encourage the Ukrainian leadership to go ahead with painful reforms, and will provide favourable conditions for further improvement of Ukrainian-Polish relations after the first wave of enlargement.

It is EU rather than NATO enlargement that will present the greatest problem for Ukrainian-Polish relations. The emergence of 'economic' or 'human' dividing lines in Central and Eastern Europe should be of no less concern than the implications of a new security dividing line: the new EU boundary could become a dividing line potentially more dangerous than any created by NATO. The development of closer Ukrainian-Polish cooperation is also significantly complicated by different levels of systemic transformation in both countries, especially as regards economic reforms. Poland's accession to the EU would almost certainly result in a further widening of the economic gap between itself and Ukraine. In addition, Poland would have to adjust to the EU border regulations and to the obligation to apply the EU external tariffs policies, and would be likely to show strong interest in joining the Schengen Agreement. In this connection the prospects for Ukrainian-Polish relations will depend greatly on whether Poland is able to keep its border with Ukraine reasonably open or whether it adapts to its new circumstances by putting new restrictions on the movement of people and goods from Ukraine.

Ukraine was the first 'eastern' country with which Poland signed an agreement on a visa-free border regime. The agreement, however, has not yet been ratified by the Polish parliament, and opposition in Poland to such agreements with its eastern neighbours has arisen (especially since the Polish government signed a similar agreement with Russia) because of concerns that they may impede Poland's accession to the EU. Fighting organized crime and illegal immigration at the Ukrainian-Polish border is a problem, yet its solution must not lead to the decrease of bilateral ties and contacts between people. These contacts are already limited, due to the difficult economic situation on both sides, especially among most Ukrainians, and because of the underdevelopment of the Ukrainian-Polish border infrastructure. It should suffice to contrast the number of border-crossings on the Ukrainian-Polish border (4) with the traffic on the German-Polish border (26). Any new barriers introduced as a result of EU membership could thus seriously impede bilateral contacts, especially at the people-to-people level, and damage the growth of economic cooperation, thus widening the economic and psychological gap between the two nations.

If not addressed in an effective and timely way, all these potential factors of strain in Ukrainian-Polish relations - which might be aggravated by NATO and EU enlargement - could seriously undermine or even ruin bilateral relations, as well as weakening existing subregional cooperative networks in the region. This in turn could negatively affect the process of further enlargement and European integration, making each successive wave more expensive (politically and financially) for both the West and the applicant states. In the worst-case scenario, the first wave may turn out to be the last one, thus leading in reality to a new division of Europe.

The Way Forward

The question of whether Ukrainian-Polish cooperation will decline or will be intensified after the first wave of enlargement remains largely open. Just as the deterioration of bilateral relations should not happen automatically, their improvement will not be automatic either. To assure continuing, mutually beneficial progress in the relationship between Ukraine and Poland, and the consequent strengthening of security and stability in the region, considerable efforts are needed from both countries.

Primary responsibility for the success of Ukraine's participation in European integration and in CEE subregional cooperation rests with Ukraine itself. Ukraine's involvement in both processes depends primarily on the country's economic performance and its ability successfully to carry through the market reforms launched more than two years ago. Only Ukraine's economic recovery could bridge the existing gap between it and Poland. Despite the progress referred to earlier, Ukrainian-Polish economic cooperation is still far from matching the economic needs and potential of the two states. Polish small and medium businesses, in particular, are increasingly interested in the vast Ukrainian market. However, without elimination of the existing barriers - the inadequacy of Ukraine's national legislation, underdevelopment of its banking system, and the lack of proper mechanisms for mutual guarantees of credits and small investments - small businesses will find it extremely difficult to work and expand. Ukraine should speed up the harmonization of its legislation with Europeans norms and standards, and the country's foreign trade has still to make a volte-face from east to west or, for the time being, at least to strike a balance. It would be beneficial to learn from the Polish experience (both positive and negative aspects) more actively in carrying out market reforms.

It is also essential that Kyiv demonstrate strong political will and a commitment to follow steadily on its declared course of European integration. This strategic goal should not only be declared, but pursued concretely on a day-to-day basis, building up a 'critical mass' of cooperation between Ukraine and all European and Euro-Atlantic institutions - as well as CEE subregional groupings - so that Ukraine's partners to the West can start seeing Ukraine as a future equal member of a united European family. In addition, Ukraine has yet to confront the dilemma of whether it should be entering Europe gradually as a 'special case' that is different from the rest of the CEE states, or whether it should try to synchronize its progress with the latter as much as possible. The latter would be a difficult task, yet it is the course that would also render Ukrainian-Polish cooperation most natural and lasting. In terms of domestic politics, having declared its foreign policy goals and priorities, the President and government should pay more attention to consolidation of the country's national identity and formation of a public consensus on the country's role and place in Europe so that, regardless of which political force comes to power, Ukraine's foreign policy course can remain coherent. This task becomes particularly important in view of the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential election campaigns in Ukraine, when foreign policy issues are likely to appear more often on the political agenda.

For Poland and other CEE states, the experience of the past several years should prove that by operating as part of a dynamically developing and cooperating region, they are likely to maximise their chances for early integration - and for success and influence once within the Western integrated structures - while unnecessary competitiveness among themselves would damage the future standing both of the region as a whole and of each particular CEE country. Another conclusion is that if Ukraine is weak and unstable, the security of other states of the region is bound to be damaged, even after they have joined NATO and the EU. On the other hand, Ukraine's stability and security depend significantly on its relations with its Western neighbours, especially Poland, which is Ukraine's main CEE partner.

Poland, in particular, will be much more valuable to the organizations it joins if it is able to bring with it a successful and comprehensive 'Eastern policy.' As regards Ukraine, this policy should include the active promotion of political, diplomatic, economic, military and other forms of bilateral cooperation; various joint Ukrainian-Polish programmes and actions, including those within the broader field of security (joint military training and exercises, exchange of officers, joint combating of organized crime and illegal immigration, addressing environmental issues, etc.); regular meetings at various levels, including bilateral summits; the assurance of maximum 'openness' of the Ukrainian-Polish border for commercial and human purposes (including a special visa regime, the construction and development of new border crossings, and the implementation of a bilateral agreement on joint customs control); regional confidence-building measures in continuation of the idea of creating a joint peacekeeping battalion; and further advocacy of Ukraine's interests in the EU and NATO. In a certain sense, Poland should serve as a link between its new allies and Ukraine.

As a first-wave new member of the Western integrated institutions, Poland should continue to pay special attention to the maintenance of CEE subregional cooperation, with the active involvement of Ukraine. In particular, this should include continued Polish support for Ukraine's membership of CEFTA - which Kyiv has officially declared to be one of its priorities. Ukraine's accession to CEFTA would certainly encourage further economic reforms in Ukraine, help the adjustment of its economy to European standards and regulations, and smooth the economic differences between Ukraine and Poland. It is very likely, however, that most (if not all) current members of CEFTA will be among the first CEE states to join the EU and will therefore almost certainly have to leave CEFTA as such. This could result in CEFTA ceasing to exist as a separate free-trade entity, unless by that time the association itself has been enlarged through the admission of new members, and/or is transformed into something more than a free-trade area, covering other forms of economic cooperation. In the latter case, CEFTA could play a crucial role as a cooperative framework uniting those CEE countries that are temporarily left behind in the process of EU enlargement. Moreover, Poland and other first-wave entrants and former participants in CEFTA could well (ideally with the EU's blessing) preserve a kind of 'special relationship' with the remaining CEFTA members - their former 'class-mates' - and in this way further link the latter with the EU itself.

On this reasoning, Ukraine's accession to CEFTA prior to Poland's gaining full membership of the EU would further strengthen Ukrainian-Polish relations by giving the two countries an opportunity to cooperate at least briefly within the same free-trade area. Membership of CEFTA is conditional upon a candidate's membership of the WTO, the signing of bilateral free-trade agreements with all CEFTA members and an Association Agreement with the EU (which implies recognition of Ukraine's candidacy for EU membership). During President Kuchma's visit to Warsaw at the end of January 1997, the two countries signed a memorandum on trade liberalization, which should become an important first step towards the conclusion of a free-trade agreement between Ukraine and Poland, and towards Ukraine's membership of CEFTA. Now Ukraine needs to speed up the necessary preparations for joining the WTO.

Both countries may want to explore the additional potential for mutual consultation and possibly coordination of some of their steps on the international scene, which could include joint statements and agreed positions on certain issues of regional and international politics. A good example of such an approach has been a joint statement by the presidents of Poland, Ukraine and Lithuania expressing their concern over internal political developments in neighbouring Belarus. Further coordination of Ukrainian-Polish (and probably Lithuanian) approaches to Belarus would not only enhance subregional cooperation and security, but should provide the necessary alternative model for Belarus's own development and prevent this country's isolation and alienation in the longer term.

There is a special need for more academic and cultural contacts and exchanges to promote better understanding between individual Ukrainians and Poles. Both governments should find resources to stimulate the work of joint historical commissions. Such commissions could agree and elaborate joint, balanced approaches (to be incorporated into school textbooks) to some controversial issues in the complex history of Ukrainian-Polish relations, since historiography in the two countries up to now has not been free from mutual recriminations. The first attempt was made in 1994 when a group of Ukrainian and Polish historians issued a joint communiqué addressing a number of sensitive issues taken from the history of bilateral relations in the period 1918-48. ₁₀₄ An act of mutual reconciliation, if signed by the two presidents, should both summarize the recent achievements in bilateral relations and also open new horizons for the development of a true Ukrainian-Polish strategic partnership. Regular exchanges of information, periodicals and historical literature should also become a norm of bilateral cooperation. More than three years ago, an agreement was reached on the need to open a Polish national-cultural centre in Kyiv and a similar Ukrainian centre in Warsaw. The idea, however, has not been realized until now, due largely to the financial constraints experienced by both countries. Further development of trans-border cooperation should become an important task for both national and local governments so as to facilitate contacts between people living in the border areas.

It may, nevertheless, transpire that not even the combined efforts of Ukraine and Poland are enough to deepen further bilateral and subregional cooperation. The experience of the past few years has proved that the success or failure of CEE subregional cooperation and the development of bilateral relations in the region depend very much on the position taken by Western integrated institutions and national governments. Relations between Ukraine and Poland, in particular, could hardly have been as successful as they are if they had not been recently encouraged by such external factors. Left to themselves, the Central and East European countries have often lacked either the political will or sufficient capabilities and resources to find solutions to complex problems in interstate relations and promote rapprochement. Warsaw, for example, has been in favour of supporting Ukraine since the latter's independence, and Polish leaders have constantly raised the issue of Ukraine's strategic role in Europe at their meetings with European and, especially, American policy-makers. ₁₀₅ Yet when in 1993-94 the West largely ignored Ukraine's interests, Poland simply lacked the resources and strength of its own to conduct an active policy on Ukraine. It is therefore difficult to predict the successful evolution of Ukrainian-Polish strategic partnership in the longer run if the West does not realize and live up to its own responsibility.

At present, the West is in fact paying considerable attention to relations between Ukraine and Poland. Nevertheless, both the existing and new Ukrainian-Polish cooperative links should be further encouraged, and a more explicit Western position regarding the relationship between the two countries after enlargement will certainly facilitate their cooperation. The same applies to various joint programmes, exercises and other activities linking both Ukraine and Poland with various Western countries. Special attention should be paid to Ukraine's active involvement in the 'Weimar' process, which involves Germany, France and Poland. The latter, as the country most interested in further development of the Weimar triangle, could take the initiative on Ukraine's permanent inclusion in the process, and on the possible evolution of the triangle into a quadrangle. The Weimar interaction seems helpful not only for enhancing European stability, but also as a way for both Kyiv and Warsaw to apply the lessons of German-French rapprochement .

The West should specifically encourage more extensive CEE subregional cooperation, in particular within the CEI (of which both Poland and Ukraine are members) and CEFTA. NATO and the EU should explicitly state that multifaceted, multifunctional subregional cooperation is an essential complement to European integration and should be maintained even after the first CEE countries are admitted to Western institutions. As such, subregional cooperation could serve as a way of cushioning the impact of the possible new dividing lines, as a 'school for integration' for those left out of the first wave, and as a factor of further enhancement of stability and security in Europe. Subregional cooperation will not provide security assurances to Ukraine or other 'outs'. Yet it could link them more closely with their luckier neighbours, as well as with the Western integrated structures, thus decreasing their feeling of isolation and insecurity and contributing to the indivisibility and transparency of European security as a whole. It also seems beneficial to encourage the development of new subregional cooperative patterns, one of which may well include Poland, Ukraine, and Romania.

It is important that a future new EU geographic and technical border does not become a political border. The EU could already start to draw up special visa arrangements for a future EU-Ukraine border. Western governments and institutions, primarily the EU itself, ought to consider what practical help - including financial assistance - they might be able to offer CEE subregional groupings and Ukrainian-Polish cooperative schemes. Further efforts will be needed to overcome bureaucratic divisions between the EU's TACIS (Technical Assistance to the CIS) and PHARE (Action Plan for Coordinated Aid to Poland and Hungary) programmes (as is already happening to some degree in northern Europe) to eliminate artificial barriers to EU support for bilateral and subregional joint Ukrainian-Polish undertakings. In general, the EU and the United States should try increasingly to view Ukraine as a CEE rather than a CIS country, which would correspond to Ukraine's interests as well as to the broader aims of CEE subregional cooperation.

It is also important to note that Ukrainian-Polish bilateral and multilateral subregional cooperation will only be able to develop strongly after the first wave of enlargement if it is paralleled by enhanced direct links (both formal and informal) between Ukraine and Western institutions and governments. In this context, the West needs to consider policies that would meet Ukraine's concerns and provide extra reinforcement for developing subregional ties against the background of NATO and EU enlargement. Such direct Ukrainian-Western links could include the following.

- A NATO-Ukraine agreement on a special partnership, which it is expected will be signed during the July 1997 NATO summit in Madrid. For Ukraine, such an agreement would serve both as a reassurance of her security concerns and as a certain guarantee for its future integration into Europe. This would not give Ukraine any more practical advantages than are enjoyed by disappointed CEE applicant countries remaining within PfP, but it should also include enhanced consultation and joint policy-making arrangements in areas that reflect Ukraine's special strategic position and role in the de-nuclearisation, non-proliferation, arms control and export control processes. NATO should also be particularly attentive to Ukraine's interests and the possible side-effects on Ukrainian/Russian security relations when determining its position on the 'Southern flank' provisions of the revised CFE Treaty.

- Serious consideration by WEU of Ukraine's request for Associate Partner status; at the least, WEU could look for a formula for formalization of its relations with Ukraine along the lines of the NATO-Ukraine partnership.

- The full and timely implementation of the EU-Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, and the consequent arrangements for a EU-Ukraine free-trade agreement, which should permit wider access to the EU market for Ukrainian goods. It is important to note in this regard that the possibility of Ukraine's membership of CEFTA, and its formal eligibility for WEU Associate Partner status, are also bound up with the signing of a EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.

- Further economic and security-related assistance from Western governments and international financial institutions, including possible facilitation of the solution of remaining problems in relations between Ukraine and Russia. In the short term the signing of a Ukrainian-Russian basic political treaty guaranteeing mutual territorial integrity and the inviolability of their common border (the treaty was initialled two years ago) is a very high priority.

These links will not only help assure the success of reform in Ukraine, encourage its reform-minded leaders and enhance the country's security, but will contribute to a strengthening of Ukrainian-Polish cooperation, and in this way will indeed be able to help to make this emerging partnership a pillar of regional stability.

Conclusions
Monika Wohlfeld

Countries that will not or may not be in the first wave of EU, WEU and/or NATO enlargement, for various periods of time and for various reasons, have voiced their concern that a new division of Europe might be created, which would adversely affect both their own security, bilateral and subregional (between two or more states in the immediate geographical proximity) relations, and overall continental stability. ₁₀₆ Fears of a possible worsening of bilateral relations between new 'ins' and 'outs' cannot be discounted easily. It is however also possible that the new 'ins' will be able to pursue a truly dynamic policy aimed at neighbouring 'outs' and 'pre-ins'. Such a policy would reflect the realization that they now bear an increased responsibility towards other countries which will not initially, or never, join EU and NATO, and that the door of these organizations must be kept open to further eligible candidates. What, therefore, will be the impact of enlargement on bilateral relations in Central and Eastern Europe?

Current Trends

The three case studies examined here tend to indicate that the period leading up to the first round of enlargements has not produced the negative side-effects often evoked. These three cases present positive trends in bilateral relations, despite the continuous relevance of historical problems, including minority issues. The countries of the region have already explored a number of means available, independently of the Euro-Atlantic organizations, to maintain and improve their own and subregional stability in preparation for the forthcoming enlargements.

The growth of trade between the pairs of countries in the last few years has been quite dynamic, particularly in the case of Poland and Ukraine, two large countries. Transfrontier cooperation is developing in all three cases, but the economic data suggests that social and economic dividing lines (of different strength) exist between the neighbouring countries. Pál Dunay indicates that what he calls the 'psychological factor' of the Western press, placing one of the two on the prosperous side of a dividing line and the other on the poor, is even more significant. The authors warn that trade relations are still relatively fragile, and that mutual investment is weak.

In all three cases, bilateral agreements of various kinds have been signed, at least partly in view of forthcoming decisions on enlargement. In addition, countries such as Poland have emphasized their readiness to support the integration of other Central and East European countries, whereas countries such as Ukraine have changed their position on the integration of neighbouring countries and now are more supportive of it. Hungary and Romania have signed a basic treaty which contains an article assuring mutual support for the countries' efforts to qualify for integration. The rapprochements taking place in all three cases are positive, but are happening largely at the level of élites only.

Inspired by programmes such as Partnership for Peace and by experience of multinational peacekeeping operations, military cooperation in all three cases is developing positively. Joint peacekeeping training programmes and joint peacekeeping battalions are being developed.

Looking Ahead

It is more difficult to assess the future impact of decisions regarding enlargement, such as the composition of the first wave of enlargement and the decision on whether there will be further waves and if so how many, and the actual effects of the first round of enlargement. Selective enlargement decisions will put pressure on bilateral links: membership of organizations such as EU and NATO will imply administrative commitments and, most importantly, financial burdens which may divert new members' attention away from neighbouring countries. The authors foresee that an economic and social gap between the countries making up each pair will grow if only one of them joins the EU. The authors' assessment of the future of economic cooperation is cautious. Selective EU enlargement and the obligation to accept the acquis communautaires by new members may - at least initially - affect or even interrupt the developing economic links, and care will have to be taken to ensure that this is not reflected in political relations. For the countries which will not be among the first new members of the EU, the possible deterioration of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) (as EU members will not be able to continue their involvement in this framework) will imply that economic but also political relations may suffer. Zajaczkowski warns in addition that the nature of economic relations in the Baltic region will depend on decisions taken on a national level in Russia. This may apply also to some degree to Ukraine.

The authors of the studies all point to the problems that some Central European countries' membership of EU will pose for the cross-border movement of people, particularly where minorities are present (for example in the case of Polish ethnic groups in Lithuania or Hungarians in Romania). Protection of the EU's external borders and visa regimes may present serious problems for the development of relations between 'ins' and 'outs'. The authors indicate that special solutions within the framework of the EU may be needed.

However, the authors also point out that full integration of new members will take time, during which economic cooperation with neighbouring countries will be able to develop. Therefore, the positive economic trends may not be affected drastically by enlargement processes.

It is occasionly asked whether the bilateral agreements signed, at least to some degree, under the pressure from the West, will be implemented if only one partner joins EU and/or NATO. The authors of the studies suggest that in fact one can already observe a change in the conceptual framework of relationships that may last and survive any enlargement decisions. Much will depend on whether ways of involving larger sections of the population in the processes of rapprochement will be found in Central and Eastern Europe. This is particularly pertinent, since all authors warn of the possibility of domestic political shifts following forthcoming elections in Central and Eastern Europe. changes in domestic political climate could result from a number of developments, including EU and NATO decisions on enlargement but also domestic, primarily economic factors. If nationalist political forces were to come to power, this would create obstacles to good-neighbourly relations among the region's countries.

Much will also depend on Russia. Russia may find in selective enlargement a pretext for engaging in a policy of intimidation of countries such as Lithuania or Ukraine. In these two cases in particular, Russian foreign policy will have a direct impact, but, more generally, subregional stability in Central Europe will be affected by developments in Russia and by its relations with the West, particularly the content of the expected NATO-Russia agreement. An additional unknown in the relations of Lithuania and Ukraine with Poland is the future of neighbouring Belarus and the intensity of its links with Russia.

Significantly, all three authors indicate that military cooperation among the candidates will develop positively, despite the problem of insufficient funds for ventures such as joint brigades. They do not foresee that possible changes of military postures or defence spending which could follow decisions on NATO enlargement will lead to any serious problems for relations between new members and their neighbours to the east and south. However, Dunay points to the problem of outmoded thinking in some countries' military establishments.

What are the possible means to counter the potential negative side-effects of selective, step-by-step enlargement of Euro-Atlantic institutions on sub-regional stability? The range includes bilateral, subregional means, and, finally, those available to EU, WEU and NATO, as well as OSCE.

Bilateral Means

Bilateral programmes and actions should focus, among other things, on easing trade and freedom of movement, which could be affected by EU requirements. Common infrastructure schemes will be of significance. Pavliuk suggests that economic recovery must take place in countries such as Ukraine if they are to become viable economic partners. The countries' economic performance will be the most important factor in the development of economic links. Existing barriers to trade and investment such as problems in national legislation and banking systems must be eliminated unilaterally or in cooperation with West and Central European partners.

Countries that are invited to join NATO and EU in the first wave of enlargement must accept the additional responsibility that this implies by implementing a foreign policy directed at easing the transition for their neighbours. Their special position will imply not only the need to keep the doors of international organizations open to further candidates, but also meticulous implementation of bilateral agreements. Projects aimed at increasing transparency, dialogue and cooperation will be needed.

The continuation and development of national initiatives aimed at easing the problems that countries left out may encounter, through security and military cooperation (joint military training and exercises, the exchange of officers, and joint action against organized crime and illegal immigration), can be expected to prevent the emergence of any military tensions in the Central European region. Financial support may be needed for joint endeavours, such as bilateral peacekeeping brigades.

Subregional Means

This somewhat underrated dimension of security cooperation in Central Europe could acquire a new meaning and importance in the context of the enlargement processes. ₁₀₇ It is telling that there is less enthusiasm for this form of cooperation among countries that can be expected to be in the first wave of enlargements than among countries which are so far not able to participate in CEFTA.

Free trade agreements may be difficult to maintain between new members and their neighbours. One possible action, which would however only temporarily maintain economic links between prospective new EU members and 'outs', would be to assure the continued existence of CEFTA by admitting members to the framework before new EU members withdraw from it. This may require a redefinition of CEFTA's criteria for admission. It appears feasible to give CEFTA a more political dimension by consciously treating it as a possible framework for preventing any negative impact of EU enlargement on the economic relations of 'outs'.

The Central European Initiative (CEI), with its project-oriented function, could be used to pursue joint infrastructure schemes aimed at overcoming gaps in the various bilateral relations. Involvement of organizations such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the programmes of the EU in projects aimed at increasing economic cooperation of 'ins' and 'outs' would also be useful. A promising example of support for a subregional framework for cooperation which should be strengthened is the involvement of the EBRD in CEI. Also, the European Commission is a member of BEAC (Barents Euro-Arctic Council) and CBSS (Council of Baltic Sea States), and has been invited to attend CEI and BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation) meetings.

Groupings with differentiated membership (involving EU, WEU and NATO member countries, prospective members and non-members), such as the Baltic Sea Cooperation Council or the CEI, may exert the greatest influence on the enlargement process, as promoters of the indispensable links between 'ins' and 'outs'. Informal groupings such as the so-called 'Weimar Triangle' (France, Germany and Poland), particularly if it were to be joined by Ukraine, could also be extremely valuable.

However, Zajaczkowski warns that cooperative programmes that do not include Russia but do include countries which it considers to be in its sphere of influence, may carry the risk of tensions with Moscow. Transparency measures are thus required.

The most useful examples of subregional military cooperation that will play a role in the context of enlargement are the various initiatives which NATO members such as Denmark and Germany are developing with US support, and which bring together Poland, the Baltic states, Finland and Sweden, while leaving room for Russia to join.

EU, WEU, NATO and OSCE

The European Union should recognize the special links between new members and neighbouring countries which are not in the first wave of enlargement. The regime along the EU's new external borders should be eased, allowing countries such as Hungary or Poland to for example apply the Schengen requirements without damaging their links with their neighbours, particularly with ethnic minorities beyond their borders. Stronger EU programmes aimed at overcoming economic differences, particularly in border regions, support for transborder programmes, and infrastructure programmes linking members and non-members will be needed. Support for the development of the economies of 'outs' will contribute to the development of viable trade links between neighbouring states.

While developing programmes of cooperation with countries which will not be in the first wave of enlargements, international organizations should stimulate rather than substitute endogenous efforts to ensure subregional stability in Central and Eastern Europe. Euro-Atlantic organizations should continue to emphasize that enlargement is an open-ended process, and that after the first wave of new members, other countries will follow. But it is equally important to encourage close or even institutionalized links between countries that join in the first wave and those that will, at least for the time being, find themselves outside such organizations.

With the exception of the EU, which does not follow a subregional agenda in its enlargement decisions, but which became involved in subregional cooperation frameworks and promotes them in its pre-accession strategy, and the OSCE, with the Stability Pact, no other organization directly supports the concept or the practicalities of this form of cooperation. In addition, programmes such as Partnership for Peace (but not the WEU's concept of Associate Partnership) are based on bilateral links with individual countries. The concept of organizations as exclusive or semi-exclusive clubs in itself has a negative impact on any efforts at cooperation between members and non-members. Hence, a clear position in support of such cooperation, at the bilateral and subregional levels, on the part of organizations such as EU, WEU and NATO, combined with practical support and incentives, may be necessary.

NATO is designing an enhanced programme for cooperation with 'outs' in which new members should have a particularly important role to play. The bilateral nature of NATO's links with Central and East European countries must be supplemented by cooperative approaches.

WEU provides a multilateral framework which could be used to exchange information on subregional cooperation. Integration of WEU into the EU, or close links, may give it an important role to play in subregional organizations which choose to have a security or defence dimension. Concrete proposals should come from countries involved in the various subregional groupings, which are currently not interested in cooperation with an organization such as WEU which has a security and defence role.

WEU's Petersberg tasks (military tasks short of territorial defence) already provide a framework in which currently ten Central and East European countries can cooperate in multilateral endeavours with other WEU countries. In this context, however, it will be necessary to draw in Ukraine and establish closer links with Russia, as these two countries do not so far have any formal status within the organization. At present, the status of a country within WEU is closely linked to its membership of other organizations, especially the EU but also NATO.

It will be necessary to make countries that are not admitted early understand that there is a wide spectrum of politico-military forms of cooperation that lie between membership and non-membership. While none of them provides 'hard' security guarantees, 'soft' measures may be equally important.

While direct economic and military aspects may be dealt with by organizations such as EU, WEU and NATO, cooperation, and encouragement for subregional cooperation may also take place under the OSCE umbrella, although, symptomatically, this dimension has not been mentioned in the three papers by the authors from the region. The idea of applying the provisions of the Stability Pact in the OSCE framework deserves attention in the context of enlargement. Agreements reached within the EU's Stability Pact initiative have been given to the OSCE as 'repository', but there has been little follow-up, as it was not clear what the task of the organization would be in this context. While experts agree that the OSCE could try to revive the concept of regional 'Round Tables', many of the latest subregional initiatives have come from outside the OSCE. Nevertheless, the OSCE could play a coordinating and repository role for bilateral agreements, for which it contributes guidelines. ₁₀₈

Assessment and Recommendations

One of the conclusions to draw from the debate on enlargement is that evolution of the European security environment requires that all the countries involved must contribute explicitly or implicitly to European stability as much as they benefit from it. Accession thus implies security benefits but also greater obligations, particularly towards neighbouring countries. When institutional reform and enlargement occur, they will not in themselves provide the solution to all post-Cold War security concerns. They must be supplemented by specific arrangements on several levels, particularly in bilateral and subregional cooperation.

The authors of the three case studies differ in their assessment of whether NATO or EU membership may prove more traumatic for bilateral relations. The situation that would create the most tensions, however, would be one in which only one of the two countries in a given pair was admitted to both EU and NATO. Social, cultural and economic developmental differences between 'ins' and 'outs' may create an even wider gap and thus jeopardize bilateral relations among Central and East European countries. Significantly, among the countries discussed here, although potential 'outs' warn of the possible negative impact of EU or NATO decisions not to let them join, none actually questions the concept of enlargement.

It is therefore clear that the behaviour of Western partners will play a great role in this delicate equation. The open question is whether EU, WEU and NATO and their members will provide sufficient encouragement, support and even pressure on states that join to implement meaningful cooperative programmes and intensified bilateral relations with their neighbours.

Thus the primary conclusion is that NATO, EU and WEU will have to pay more attention to the impact of enlargement on bilateral relations. The need to support countries which may not be part of the first group of new entrants is acknowledged by prospective Central European members, but pursuing the strategy of 'patronage' and rapprochement necessary to underpin subregional stability is in fact a difficult and demanding process. Well-meaning declarations may not be put into practice, not only because of a lack of funds but also owing to domestic pressures or inadequate support from international organizations. Moreover, the implementation of a first wave of enlargements may modify the behaviour and policies of both new members and those remaining outside. Western organizations should influence developments in the Central and East European region by using conditionality and the prospect of further enlargement as a stimulant for the countries whose ambitions are initially frustrated. EU, WEU and NATO could reward subregional cooperation in the same way that the Stability Pact was regarded as a step towards membership of the EU. However, subregional cooperation groups should not be imposed as 'anterooms for European integration', a prescription that could create resentment.

Western organizations can facilitate subregional initiatives in Central Europe as part of the general process of a 'return to Europe', as they can play a role in confidence-building measures and non-military forms of security cooperation, conflict prevention, and support for their members' aim of integration. The emphasis that both EU and NATO place on good-neighbourly relations among candidate countries is a step in the right direction, as it accentuates the relevance to the process of integration of bilateral issues.

Ways of involving the public in the processes of rapprochement among Central and East European countries must be considered. Here the Franco-German and German-Polish rapprochements may provide insights into the myriad political and cultural programmes which can be set in motion. Applying these policies in the Central European context requires, however, the support, in terms of both know-how and finances, of Western European and transatlantic organizations as well as of their individual members.

Bottom-up approaches may also be useful in this context. Domestic democratization and decentralization, as well as development of NGOs, can facilitate bottom-up cooperation. European integration may imply devolution of power to local levels, which is of significance particularly in border regions, ₁₀₉ and could contribute to the rapprochement of countries with difficult historical backgrounds.

One final question must be asked here: are the lessons of these case studies applicable generally? There are cases of bilateral relations in Central and Eastern Europe that are more complicated than those examined here. However, the countries discussed here differ significantly in size and geopolitical position (particularly their proximity to Russia) and do not have the same prospects for integration, so that it seems valid to draw general inferences from them. The three cases chosen, with their relevance, both historical and contemporary, can be significant and constructive examples of how bilateral relations may be dealt with in view of the forthcoming enlargement of NATO, EU, and WEU. Recent events, such as the initialization of a treaty of friendship between Romania and Ukraine in May 1997, point to the positive impact that the enlargement process has had so far.

Notes

Note 1: Monika Wohlfeld is a research fellow at the Institute for Security Studies of WEU. Back.

Note 2: Alyson Bayles and Andrew Cottey, 'Multi-Layered Integration : The Sub-Regional Dimension. An Interim Report with Recommendations addressed to the chairman-in-Office of OSCE and OSCE Participating States', Institute for EastWest Studies, Warsaw, October 1996, p. 2. Back.

Note 3: Ronald D. Asmus and F. Stephen Larrabee, 'NATO and the Have-Nots', Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 6, November/December 1996. Back.

Note 4: 'Litauen will mit Polen in die Nato: Landsbergis kündigt Veränderungen in der Aussenpolitik an', Frankfurter Allgemeine, 24 October 1996. Back.

Note 5: Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, Brussels, 10 December 1996, para. 5. Back.

Note 6: The three Baltic Republics, the Visegrad countries (Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary), Bulgaria and Romania, and recently Slovenia. Back.

Note 7: 'Kohl beschwört die Unumkehrbarkeit der europäischen Integration', Frankfurter Allgemeine, 8 December 1995. Back.

Note 8: See for example Karl Kaiser, 'Expanding the European Security Space', in Guido Lenzi and Laurence Martin (eds.), The European security space. Working papers by the European Strategy Group and the Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 1996), p. 5. Back.

Note 9: Pál Dunay is in charge of the International Training Course on Security at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. Back.

Note 10: Adrian Hyde-Price, The International Politics of East Central Europe (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 30. Back.

Note 11: See George Schöpflin,'Hungary and its Neighbours', chaillot Paper 7 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, May 1993), p. 37. Back.

Note 12: András Inotai (ed.), Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union: Problems and Prospects of Integration (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation, 1995), p. 72. Back.

Note 13: Hungary joined the Council of Europe in late 1990, Romania in October 1993. Hungary's Association Agreement with the European Community entered into force on 1 February 1994, Romania's on the same day one year later. Hungary submitted its application for membership of the EU in April 1994, Romania following in June 1995. The only exception to this pattern is that Hungary joined the OECD in March 1996 whereas Bucharest has not yet started negotiations. In the field of security, there is even less difference. Both countries have participated in NACC since 1991 and established the same contacts with the WEU the same day under the 1992 Petersberg and 1994 Kirchberg declarations. In the case of PfP, it was Romania that signed the framework document first and Budapest followed. There is not even any major difference in the two countries' participation in regional groupings: Hungary was among those countries that established the group that later became the sixteen-member Central European Initiative (CEI), Romania joining in 1996. Hungary was also among the founders of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), and the Hungarian leadership has recently promised to do its utmost to ensure that Romania joins the group in 1997. Back.

Note 14: Gyula Horn, Freiheit, die ich meine (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1991), p. 359. Back.

Note 15: Quoted by Wolf Oschlies, ' ". . . Einheit und Solidarität aller Söhne des Vaterlands", Nationale Minderheiten in Rumänien 1990', Köln, BIOst Aktuelle Analysen, no. 59/1990, pp. 2-3. Back.

Note 16: This brief summary of the evolution of Romanian thinking on foreign policy is derived from the following manuscript: Sándor Vogel, 'A külpolitikai doktrina kérdése Romániában' (The issue of foreign policy doctrine in Romania), Budapest, 1997, pp. 1-2. Back.

Note 17: Antonella Cappelle-Pogácean, 'Hongrie/Roumanie : rivalités et synergies dans la marche vers l'Europe', Politique étrangère, vol. 61, no. 4, Winter 1996/97, p. 854. Back.

Note 18: It is striking that the security policy adopted by the Hungarian parliament in early 1993 was ambiguous on the question of borders: ' . . . we view the assurance of the rights of the Hungarian minorities as a fundamental requirement for the desirable neighbourly relations with neighbouring countries. In resolving this question, we reject both the alteration by force of existing borders and the artificial alteration of the ethnic consistency of the population by any means, not only in the Carpathian Basin, but in the whole Central and Eastern European region.' 'Basic Principles of the Security Policy of the Republic of Hungary', Fact Sheets on Hungary, no. 4/1993, point 8. Back.

Note 19: No bilateral meeting between the Romanian president and Hungarian premier was held in either capital during the four years in office of the Hungarian conservatives, and it was forty months before the Hungarian foreign minister paid his first visit to Bucharest. Back.

Note 20: Anneli Ute Gabanyi, 'Nationalismus in Rumänien, Vom Revolutionspatriotismus zur chauvinistischen Restauration', Südosteuropa, vol. 41, no. 5, 1992, p. 275. Back.

Note 21: László Kovács, 'Does a Europe-Compatible Hungary Make a Realistic Aim?', Current Policy, no. 2/1995, p. 2 Back.

Note 22: 'Opening Address by Foreign Minister László Kovács to Open the Debate on Foreign Affairs in the Hungarian Parliament on 22 February 1995', Current Policy, no. 3b, 1995, p. 11. Back.

Note 23: 'Szóvivõi tájékoztató' (Press Release), Budapest, 13 September 1994, p. 1. Back.

Note 24: Gyula Horn,'Contribution to the Debate on Foreign Affairs in the Hungarian Parliament', Current Policy, no. 3a, 1995, p. 6. Back.

Note 25: Rather than taking sincere steps in order to alleviate the concerns of the West, Bucharest started a diplomatic offensive. The best example of this effort was the so-called Iliescu initiative, one element of which was the Draft Code of Conduct Concerning Cooperation Between Romania and Hungary on National Minorities, 1.1. Back.

Note 26: During the first ten months of 1996 Hungary's exports to Romania amounted to $223.4 million and imports $116.2 million. Romania ranked fourteenth among Hungary's export partners, and twenty-second importer. Up to 15 July 1996, 1,715 Romanian-Hungarian joint ventures had been established. The amount of Hungarian capital invested in Romania was $21 million. The amount invested increased only in 1995 by $7.3 million. It is predicted that in 1997, if the spirit of cooperation persists, this trend will continue. László Holka, 'Magyar cégalapítások Romániában' (The establishment of Hungarian companies in Romania), Magyar Hírlap, 28 December 1996, p. 3. Back.

Note 27: Economic Bulletin for Europe, vol. 48, December 1996, pp. 120, 130, 151. Back.

Note 28: Statistical data vary greatly. Consequently, it is indispensable to use the same source. For the data above see IFSH (ed.), OSZE-Jahrbuch 1996 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1996), pp. 592, 595. The International Institute for Strategic Studies published different data. According to it the per capita GDP in 1995 was $6,700 in Hungary and $3,300 in Romania. See IISS, The Military Balance 1996-1997 (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1996), pp. 89, 95. Back.

Note 29: Jane Perlez,'chasm Across Eastern Europe Splits Stable Nations From Poor: While Budapest Blossoms, Bucharest Languishes', International Herald Tribune, 25-26 January 1997, p. 6. Back.

Note 30: This dates back to the cooperation in the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and was exemplified after the system change by, for instance, the bilateral Open Skies Agreement signed in 1991, frequent visits by military officers and the establishment in 1995 of a hot line between the two militaries, with US technical assistance. Most recently the parties have exchanged views on the eventual establishment of Romanian-Hungarian units, following the French-German example. Such an accord was achieved at the 12 February 1997 meeting of defence ministers Babiuc and Keleti in Debrecen. TTU Europe, no. 173, 13 February 1997. Back.

Note 31: In December 1996, a three-day military exercise was held near Vlasca in south-east Romania, based on the following scenario, which the Romanian defence ministry insists is purely imaginary. (Tibor Bogdán, 'Furcsa hadgyakorlat Romániában' (Strange military exercise in Romania), Magyar Hírlap, 5 December 1996, p. 3.) Due to unexpected events in the Balkans, certain states want to force Romania to change its borders (give up territory) and accept territorial autonomy based on ethnicity. These unidentified states press Romania to revise those treaties guaranteeing the country's borders. At the same time 'nationalistic groups in the Parliament' try to exert pressure on Bucharest, and significant forces are concentrated along Romania's borders. It seems that military planning has not always taken into account the fundamentally changed political conditions. Back.

Note 32: László Valki, 'Security Problems and the New Europe: A Central European Viewpoint', in Andrew J. Williams (ed.), Reorganizing Eastern Europe: European Institutions and the Refashioning of Europe's Security Architecture (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), p. 114. Back.

Note 33: The rate of unemployment in Hungary as a percentage of the labour force in recent years has developed as follows: 1990 - 1.7, 1991 - 7.4, 1992 - 12.3, 1993 - 12.1, 1994 - 10.9, 1995 - 10.4. Economic Bulletin for Europe (Geneva: United Nations, December 1996), p. 153. Unemployment seems to have stabilized at 10-11 per cent. The OECD estimate for 1997 is 10.6 per cent. Back.

Note 34: According to official data issued by the Hungarian Government's Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, the number of registered asylum seekers was as follows:

Year	Number of Registered Romanian Soviet/CIS Yugoslav/ Other Asylum Seekers ex-Yugoslav
1988	13,173 13,173
1989	17,448 17,365 50 33
1990	18,283 17,416 488 379
1991	53,359 3,728 738 48,485 408
1992	16,204 844 241 15,201 98
1993	5,366 548 168 4,593 57
1994	3,375 661 304 2,386 24
1995	5,912 523 315 5,046 28
1996	1,259 350 268 559 82
Total	134,379 54,608 2,572 76,090 1,109
100%	40.6% 1.9% 56.6% 0.8%

Back.

Note 35: Antonella Cappelle-Pogácean, op. cit., p. 854. Back.

Note 36: Joint Declaration from the Conference 'Hungary and Hungarians Beyond the Borders' held in Budapest on 4-5 July 1996, Transition, vol. 2, no. 18, 6 September 1996, p. 49. Back.

Note 37: OMRI Daily Digest, 5 August 1996. Back.

Note 38: Michael Shafir, 'A Possible Light at the End of the Tunnel', Transition, vol. 2, no. 19, 20 September 1996, p. 30. Back.

Note 39: 'Treaty between the Republic of Hungary and Romania on Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighbourhood', Official Translation by the International Law Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary, Article 15, para. (1) b. Back.

Note 40: Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, on minorities' autonomous authorities, was unacceptable to Romania: the wish of ethnic Hungarians to gain autonomy in those parts of Transylvania where they form a majority was regarded as an attempt gradually to detach Transylvania from Romania and annexe it to Hungary. Obviously, this perception is far from reality, but it will take a long time and persistent efforts by Hungary to change the view of the political class in Romania. Back.

Note 41: 'Annexe: List of documents referred to in Article 15, paragraph (1) b of the Treaty on Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighbourhood between the Republic of Hungary and Romania, ibid. Back.

Note 42: Antonella Cappelle-Pogácean, op. cit., p. 856. Back.

Note 43: It is noteworthy that the basic treaty concluded between Hungary and Slovakia was ratified by the legislature in Budapest on 13 June 1995, less than three months after signature, whereas completion of the ratification process took more than a year (until 26 March 1996) in Bratislava. Back.

Note 44: See 'Treaty between the Republic of Hungary and Romania . . .', Preamble. Back.

Note 45: Tibor Bogdán, 'Bukaresti villámratifikálás' (Lightning-fast ratification in Bucharest), Magyar Hírlap, 4 October 1996, p. 1. 159 deputies voted in favour, 27 abstained and only 1 voted against the treaty. Back.

Note 46: 'Kovács László külügyminiszter bevezetõ elõadása' (Introductory address by Foreign Minister László Kovács), Az Országgyûlés hiteles jegyzõkönyve 1996. szeptember 3-án kedden (Proceedings of the National Assembly on Tuesday, 3 September 1996), galleys 23380, 23382. Back.

Note 47: Mátyás Eörsi, 'Alapszerzõdés: Érvek és ellenérvek' (The basic treaty: arguments and counter-arguments), Népszanadság, 3 September 1996, p. 8. Back.

Note 48: 'Torgyán József hozzászólása' (The contribution of József Torgyán), op. cit. in note 38, galleys 23389, 23391. It is an interesting detail that the extensive debate on the treaty took place before signature. Namely, opposition MPs initiated a discussion to clarify whether the government was able to sign a treaty of such major significance without the preliminary approval of the legislature. Given that 72 per cent of the seats were held by the government coalition, the extensive and heated debate served domestic political purposes. The actual ratification debate in December 1996 was comparatively short. Back.

Note 49: Az Országgyûlés hiteles jegyzõkönyve 1996. december 10-én kedden (Proceedings of the National Assembly on Tuesday, 10 December 1996), galley 28765. Back.

Note 50: Donald M. Blinken and Alfred H. Moses, 'Good News From Central Europe', International Herald Tribune, 19 September 1996, p. 8. Back.

Note 51: Ibid. Back.

Note 52: Most short-sighted in this respect was the attempt of Hungary to block the accession of Romania to the Council of Europe in the summer and autumn of 1993. Finally, the Hungarian government, under mounting outside pressure from several countries, most evidently Germany, gave up its insistence and accepted that it had better abstain from voting. The reports sent back from embassies to the capitals indicated that the diplomatic service of the two states acted along the same lines, at least until 1994. Namely, they tried to convince their partners of the demonic nature of the other. It is somewhat amusing that in several cases they called on the attention of their partners in countries which did not even belong to the organization the other was striving to join. Back.

Note 53: Vladimir Pasti quoted by Catherine Durandin, 'Roumanie/Hongrie: peut-il y avoir réconciliation?', Politique étrangére, vol. 61, no. 2, Summer 1996, p. 386. The French original reads: 'Il y a trois solutions. Ou la Hongrie et la Roumanie sont ensemble intégrées dans l'OTAN, ou la Hongrie entre seule, ou ni l'une, ni l'autre ne sont acceptées. Les deux dernieres solutions sont catastrophiques pour la Roumanie. Mais que faire?' For other official Romanian views see in particular Gheorghe Tinca, 'Securing a Democratic Romania: No Veto on Our Choice', Security Dialogue, vol. 26, no. 2, 1995, p. 149, and Teodor Viorel Melescanu, 'Romania and Europe - A Historical Overview of Romania's Long-Standing European Vocation', Romanian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 1, nos. 1-2, 1995, p. 14. Back.

Note 54: Tibor Bogdán, 'Iliescu üzenete a Nyugatnak: Románia elsõ körben szeretné az atlanti tagságot' (Iliescu's message to the West: Romania would like Atlantic membership in the first round), Magyar Hírlap, 25 September 1996, p. 2. Back.

Note 55: Tibor Bogdán, 'Severin figyelmeztet' (Severin warns), Magyar Hírlap, 28 January 1997, p. 2. Back.

Note 56: 'Treaty between the Republic of Hungary and Romania . . .', Art. 7, para. 1. Back.

Note 57: This conclusion has been drawn among others by Antonella Cappelle-Pogácean, op. cit., pp. 859-60. Back.

Note 58: There was every reason to reduce forces along the western border, as Austria did not pose any threat. The strong military presence along the southern, former Yugoslav border was due to historical reasons: in the first half of the 1950s, when the Hungarian armed forces were at their largest peacetime strength, Tito's Yugoslavia was regarded as an enemy by all the other socialist countries of Eastern Europe, including Hungary. Given the instability in the area of former Yugoslavia, there is some reason not to reduce the number of troops in that area. Back.

Note 59: The opening meeting of SECI was held on 5-6 December 1996 in Geneva. Press Release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 December 1996, p. 1. Back.

Note 60: Wojciech Zajaczkowski is Director of the Central-Eastern European Forum at the Stefan Batory, Foundation, Warsaw. Back.

Note 61: 20-25,000 according to estimates by representatives of the Lithuanian minority; of that number, some 10-12,000 live in the Sejny and Punsk region (quoted from 'National Minorities in Poland: 1994 Information Guide', Warsaw, 1995, p. 11). Back.

Note 62: Data from the 1989 census of the then Soviet Union. Back.

Note 63: In 1989 and 1990 the Polish minority attempted moves aimed at the creation of Polish national regions in Lithuania, which were perceived by Lithuanians as a manipulation by Moscow and an attempt to affect the territorial integrity of the Lithuanian state. The Lithuanian Declaration of Independence was adopted on 11 March 1990 by the Supreme Council with six abstentions, all of them of Polish deputies. On the other hand, Poles are among the most disadvantaged national groups in Lithuania (for instance, the general level of education amongst Poles is below average), and because of that were seriously afraid of the national policy of an independent Lithuanian state, especially with regard to language. Their fears were by no means unreasonable: some Lithuanian politicians had gone as far as to question whether Poles formed a minority group in Lithuania. Back.

Note 64: J.M. Nowakowski, 'Polish Eastern Policy in 1991 ', in Annals of Polish Foreign Policy 1991, pp. 77-88; A. chajewski, 'Polish Policy towards Lithuania 1989-1994 ', Arcana, 1(7) /1996, pp. 94-111. Back.

Note 65: Lecture delivered in Krakow at the conference organized by the international Centre for Democracy in February 1994. Back.

Note 66: A. Butkevicius,' The Baltic Region in Post-Cold War Europe', NATO Review, vol. 41, no. 1, February 1993; here, the WEB edition has been quoted: http://nato.int/docu/review/ articles/9301-2.htm. Back.

Note 67: E. Bajarunas, Lithuania's Security Dilemma, in 'The Baltic States: Security and Defence after Independence', chaillot Paper 19 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, June 1995), pp. 27-34. Back.

Note 68: Przegld Prasowy No. 28 (07.07.1996), Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, an analysis of articles published from April to July 1996 in the following newspapers: Respublika, Diena, Lietuvos Rytas and Lietuvos Aidas. Back.

Note 69: R.D. Asmus and R.C. Nurick, 'NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States', Survival, vol. 38, no. 2, Summer 1996, pp. 121-42. Back.

Note 70: Common Press Line of the Presidents of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania on Concerns Regarding NATO Enlargement, Riga, 26 November 1996, http://president.ee./statement/ 261196il.htm. Back.

Note 71: Joint Declaration by the President of the Republic of Latvia, the President of the Republic of Estonia and the President of the Republic of Lithuania, Riga, 21 November 1996. Back.

Note 72: ELTA, 16 December 1996. Back.

Note 73: ELTA, 11 December 1996. Back.

Note 74: ELTA, 6 January 1997. Back.

Note 75: ELTA, 10 January 1997. Back.

Note 76: The first PfP Danish-Lithuanian-Polish military exercises were held in Lithuania in June 1995. Back.

Note 77: Among other issues, these documents focus on joint regional strategic planning by the two ministries of defence, cooperation in the field of military technology, the training of military personnel, joint air patrolling of the borders, joint use of regional groups of forces and the use of military infrastructure (SIPRI Yearbook 1996, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Stockholm 1996, p. 273). Back.

Note 78: The best example of difficulties faced by both countries is the fate of a project of the joint Polish-Lithuanian peacekeeping battalion which has not been implemented because of lack of financial resources. Back.

Note 79: A squadron to be organized by three Baltic states; some other countries, Poland among them, have already revealed their interest in this idea. Back.

Note 80: In the case of PfP the fact that neutral states like Sweden and Finland decided to join it was very important. Back.

Note 81: Programme Declaration accepted by ministers of foreign affairs of the EU and Baltic region countries in Copenhagen on 6 May 1992. Back.

Note 82: Yearbook of Foreign Trade and Statistics 1996, Warsaw, 1996, p. 108 (it was less that 1 per cent of Polish and about 4.1 of Lithuanian foreign trade). Back.

Note 83: As at mid-1996 there were 686 Polish and Polish-Lithuanian companies registered in Lithuania (putting them in third place among foreign investors) and about $8 million (2.4 per cent of total foreign investments) invested in the Lithuanian economy. Back.

Note 84: If Poland is accepted as a member of the EU a long time before Lithuania, it may even be a retrograde step in areas such as the Polish-Lithuanian visa regime. As this question also concerns Russia and Ukraine, Poland will be obliged to look for a general solution of this problem. Back.

Note 85: Oleksandr Pavliuk is Research Associate at the Institute for EastWest Studies, Kyiv. Back.

Note 86: On the history of Ukrainian-Polish relations, see Peter J. Potichnyj (ed.), Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present (Edmonton-Toronto: CIUS Press, 1980). Back.

Note 87: For more information about Ukrainian-Polish political, economic, and cultural relations in 1991-93, see Wladyslaw Gill and Norbert Gill, Stosunki Polski z Ukraina w latach 1989-1993 (Torun-Poznan, n.d.). Back.

Note 88: See, for example, an interview of Ihor Kharchenko, Director of Policy Planning Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 'Ukraina patrzy na Zachod', Gazeta Wyborcza, 25 July 1995. Back.

Note 89: From the interview by Ezhi Milewski, State Minister in the Office of the President, in Trybuna, 29 May 1996. Back.

Note 90: Dariusz Rosati, 'Ciaglosc, postep i nowe wyzwania', Rzeczpospolita, 10 September 1996. Back.

Note 91: See Holos Ukrainy,12 October 1996, and the interview with Polish Ambassador in Ukraine, Ezhi Bar, in chas/Time, 13 September 1996. Back.

Note 92: Wojciech Lamentowicz, Under-Secretary of State, Office of the President of Poland, 'Niezbedna korekta', Rzeczpospolita, 18 September 1996. Back.

Note 93: See, for example, the address by Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 'Poland and NATO Enlargement: Answers to Sensitive Questions', London, 24 October 1996, p. 5. Back.

Note 94: Joint Declaration by the President of Ukraine and the President of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw, 25 June 1996, Uriadovyi Kurier, 29 June 1996. Back.

Note 95: chas/Time, 21 June 1996. Back.

Note 96: Rzeczpospolita, 10 September 1996. Back.

Note 97: Uriadovyi Kurier, 21 January 1997; Den, 22 January 1997. Back.

Note 98: Due to the different systems of trade volume calculation in Ukraine and Poland, the figures provided by the two countries vary, and thus it is difficult to estimate the exact share of mutual trade in the overall trade volume of both Ukraine and Poland. According to some data, Poland has become Ukraine's second largest trading partner, after Russia, while according to other statistics Poland is Ukraine's sixth largest trading partner only (after Russia, Germany, Belarus, Turkmenistan and the United States). Back.

Note 99: See: Mytna statystyka zovnishniotorhovel'nykh operatsii Ukrainy (Customs Data on Foreign Trade Exchange of Ukraine), November 1996 (Kyiv:State Customs of Ukraine, 1996), pp. 5-6. Back.

Note 100: These figures were provided by the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine. Back.

Note 101: Zerkalo nedeli, 19 October 1996. Back.

Note 102: PAP News Wire, 27 September 1995. Back.

Note 103: See Dieter Bingen, Zbigniew Czachor, Heinrich Machowski, 'Country Report on Poland', in Werner Weidenfeld (ed.), Central and Eastern Europe on the way into the European Union. Problems and prospects of integration (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1996), p. 163. Back.

Note 104: Wladyslaw Gill and Norbert Gill, op. cit., pp. 114-17. Back.

Note 105: Tadeusz chabera, 'Status dla Ukrainy', Wiez, Warsaw, 10 October 1996, p. 81. Back.

Note 106: See for example Pavel Hamzik, Slovakia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, in'EU reminds Slovakia of duties under association agreement', BBC SWB EE 2742, 14 October 1996, p. C4; Andris Ozolins, 'Limits and opportunities at the Eastern edge', in Ian Gambles (ed.), 'A lasting peace in Central Europe?', chaillot Paper 20 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, October 1995), pp. 71-2. Back.

Note 107: See Laszlo J. Kiss, 'Central Europe: Heritage and Geopolitical Experiments. Sub-regional patterns of cooperation in East Central Europe', in Regional Cooperation and the European Integration Process: Nordic and Central European Experiences. International Conference, Budapest, 10-11 March 1995 (Budapest: Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, 1996). Back.

Note 108: See 'Multi-layered Integration: The Sub-regional Dimension. Summary of An Inter-Governmental Conference, Bucharest, 7-8 October 1996', IEWS, Warsaw, December 1996. Back.

Note 109: Ibid., pp. 18-19. Back.