CIAO DATE: 08/04

Iraq Reconstruction Update No. 2: The Search for Legitimacy

Dr. Michael Donovan

Center for Defense Information

September 2003

Legitimacy, or the lack there of, is a problem for everyone in Iraq at the moment. The U.S. led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) suffers from the stigma of the occupier and the fact that it represents more of an authority than a coalition. The CPA has been unable to bring an end to the almost daily attacks on U.S. targets, and intra–Iraqi violence is growing. Resentment is also growing, and Iraqis of all stripes increasingly identify the coalition with political, social, and material deprivation. As a consequence, the CPA–picked Governing Council, internally divided and invested as it is with more hope than authority, has suffered from similar image problems. In the face of this legitimacy deficit, a growing chorus of voices in Iraq and elsewhere is calling for a speedy handover of authority to Iraqis. Given the depths of sectarian and ethnic animosity in Iraq, it is unclear whether such a step would provide the poison or the cure. Put another way, “Iraqiazion” is not the same thing as a plan for success. Nevertheless, as the true scope of both the stability mission and the reconstruction project in Iraq becomes apparent, Washington appears more willing to explore a broader international role in Iraq.

The task confronting the United States is to foster and empower new, legitimate state structures rather than simply falling back upon the vestiges of the old regime. The latter consist of the “shadow state,” the informal networks that tied society to the state through coercion, patronage, and dependency. In the short–term, many of the individuals who are best positioned to act on behalf of American interests given their influence in society are the same individuals that Saddam relied on as conduits for the regime’s authority. ^[1] By contrast, the legitimate institutions that will supplant the “shadow state” in Iraq will require years to develop. Therein lies the rub. The United States can demonstrate that it is a benevolent temporary authority in Iraq by quickly handing power over to the Iraqis and leaving, presumably after a modicum of stability has been achieved and some perfunctory electoral process has been put in place. But such a move would likely lead to a reversion to the violence, corruption and patronage that characterized the former regime, perhaps with new masters at the helm. Alternatively, the United States can resign itself to the long haul and begin the difficult process of genuine political development, first at the local level, and then nationally. Such an approach would be more likely to produce political pluralism in Iraq. But it is likely to take several years, and exact a price in American lives and treasure.

Which path Washington will to take remains unclear. In an effort to allay concerns about U.S. intentions, Coalition Provisional Authority chief L. Paul Bremer spelled out his vision of “Iraq’s path to sovereignty” on Sept. 8, 2003. According to Bremer, the process of returning Iraq to sovereignty has already begun with the establishment of Governing Council and the gradual Iraqiazation of the day–to –day administration of the country. These steps are to be followed by the writing and ratification of a constitution, and then popular elections. The United States, says Bremer, will yield authority in Iraq “naturally on the heels of elections.” ^[2] Bremer’s plan, however, leaves many questions unanswered. Handing over as much authority as possible to Iraqis sounds sensible. But which Iraqis should be put in charge? Finding capable Iraqis who were not complicit in the crimes of the regime and have no nefarious agenda of their own is no easy task for the CPA, which is short on Arab speakers and intimate knowledge of Iraq’s street politics. There is no timetable mentioned in Bremer’s plan, an important oversight. Elections cannot be held until popular, moderate political parties have organized and developed. These cannot develop until moderate, responsible, individuals and organizations can be identified and fostered, and obvious mechanisms for doing so remain elusive. If elections are not delayed, Islamists are likely to be the benefactors. Solutions to these problems may be years away.

In the meantime, the insurgency in Iraq appears to have gained momentum, though it remains largely confined to the Sunni belt of central Iraq. Those comprising the insurgency are a diverse group of former Ba’athists, tribal members who supported the old regime, and Islamists. ^[3] They are united by little more than a desire to rid Iraq of foreign influence. On Aug. 19, insurgents bombed the UN headquarters in Baghdad, killing among others the UN chief representative in Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello. The message seems clear: those who are violently opposed to the occupation of Iraq have decided that, beyond exacting a toll in lives, the best target in Iraq is legitimacy, and anything that can confer it. To date, 150 U.S. personnel have died in Iraq since President George W. Bush declared an end to major combat operations on May 1 — a number that now surpasses the casualties from the invasion itself. But the violence is not aimed solely at the occupation forces. On Aug. 29, a bomb went off outside the shrine of the Imam Ali in Najaf, killing more than 100 people. The presumed target of the explosion, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr al Hakim, also died. As head of the Sacred Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Hakim was a leading opposition figure in exile and a major player in Shia religious/political circles. His assassination raises the possibility of renewed sectarian violence in Iraq, and thus, the specter of civil war. Complicating matters, most factions have formed and deployed armed militias in an effort to provide security when and where the CPA cannot.

The tempo of the violence has invigorated the controversy regarding the efficacy of the invasion as it relates to the broader international campaign against terrorism. The Bush administration’s admission that Jihadits from other parts of the Middle East have migrated to Iraq has led to charges that Washington created a terrorist threat where one had not formerly existed. ^[4] The veracity of such criticism is likely to grow in the future if evidence of Iraq’s supposedly formidable weapons of mass destruction programs or links to international terror fails to materialize. The administration also claims that Ansar al Islam, a shadowy Jihadist group once based in northern Iraq, has transplanted itself to Baghdad to take up operations against American targets. If true, the group’s agility and ability to move operatives and equipment half way across Iraq may be at odds with the Pentagon’s assertion that current U.S. force levels in Iraq are adequate.

Concerns over legitimacy are also central to the question of who will assume financial responsibility for rebuilding Iraq. It has become increasingly clear that Iraqi oil revenues will not be sufficient to cover the multi–billion dollar cost of reconstruction. But Washington’s unwillingness at this stage to surrender some of its authority in Iraq in favor of a greater international role has fostered hesitation among potential donor nations. It now appears that the donor’s conference scheduled for October in Madrid is unlikely to yield the kind of international financial support the Bush administration is hoping for. As of late August, the United States had raised only $3 billion internationally; a far cry from the tens of billions that Bremer says Iraq will require in the next year alone. Looming reconstruction tasks include major infrastructure projects such as the electrical grid and the water system.

On Sept. 7, Bush said he would ask Congress for $87 billion in funding for military and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, with a fraction earmarked for Afghanistan. For the immediate future, the financial burden of Iraq will apparently have to be borne by the United States. Indeed, Washington may prefer it that way initially. The $87 billion proffered is probably designed to shame donor states into stepping up to the plate. But it also delays a donor crisis until 2005, and postpones the necessity for Washington to cut unpleasant deals with potential contributors. Still, the United States cannot afford such a commitment indefinitely. And without an enhanced international mandate, many would–be contributors are likely to maintain a “you break it, you buy it” stance towards reconstruction costs.

Confronted with a deteriorating security situation in Iraq and the meager financial outlook, the Bush administration returned to the United Nations in early September in search of just such a mandate. Unfortunately for Washington, the belated decision to do so combined with what some see as an obstinate refusal to cede any meaningful authority in Iraq has significantly weakened the U.S. bargaining position. Before and immediately following the invasion of Iraq, a host of analysts argued that UN support for reconstruction was necessary to gain assess to financial resources and to impart international legitimacy. Though the administration now appears to agree, its approach to allies and the international body is confused. Washington could search for the kind of common ground that would allow for the internationalization of the reconstruction project in Iraq while allowing the United States to a guiding voice in stabilization mission. Such a compromise would represent a division of labor more in tune with both U.S. and UN capabilities and experience. Instead, the administration simply reiterates it view that other nations should contribute to Iraq’s security and reconstruction while acquiescing to unilateral American authority. It is a bargain that is unlikely to satisfy allies reluctant to appear to be simply propping up an American occupation.

American critics of the United Nations point out that the organization has, as often as not, brought bloated bureaucracy and unhelpful agendas to the field along with its expertise in state building. It is not an unfair remark. Moreover, they point out that even the Europeans acted without a UN mandate in Kosovo in 1999, largely because the situation demanded action. If the United States wants its intervention legitimized, the argument goes, it will have to earn it not in the Security Council, but in Iraq, with the creation of a liberal democracy. This will serve not only America’s interest, but also those of the free world, and legitimacy will follow. ^[5] The problem, of course, is that Washington requires the help of the international community if it is to succeed in the improbable task of creating a unitary democracy in Iraq. And getting the international community on board requires legitimacy now, not retroactively.

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Endnotes

Note 1: Toby Dodge, “U.S. Intervention and Possible Iraqi Futures,” Survival, vol. 45, no. 3, Autumn 2003, p. 106.   Back.

Note 2: L. Paul Bremer III, “Iraq’s Path To Sovereignty,” Washington Post, Sept. 8, 2003.   Back.

Note 3: Ahmed S. Hashim, “The Sunni Insurgency in Iraq,” Middle East Institute Perspective, Aug. 15, 2003.  Back.

Note 4: Jessica Stern, “How America Created A Terrorist Haven,” New York Times, Aug. 20, 2003.  Back.

Note 5: Robert Kagan, “Looking for Legitimacy in all the Wrong Places,” Foreign Policy, July/August 2003.  Back.