CIAO DATE: 08/04

Iraq Reconstruction Update No. 3: Competing Visions

Dr. Michael Donovan

Center for Defense Information

October 2003

Occupied Iraq is not a place that encourages consensus. Competing visions about the state of affairs on the ground and what the future Iraq should look like abound among outside observers, the international community, and Iraqis themselves. Two gifted American analysts, Jessica Mathews, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, returned from the same Pentagon-sponsored trip to Iraq with dramatically different impressions. Mathews believes the security situation in Iraq is worsening and the chances of successfully reconstructing Iraq remain slim. ^[1] O’Hanlon disputes Mathews’ “overall sense of pessimism, especially in regard to security matters.” ^[2] Which vision is more accurate? It is hard to say, though the fact that the Pentagon flew its guest to Kuwait each night to sleep suggests that the Defense Department shares some pessimism about the security situation in Iraq.

Indeed, security remains a perennial problem. The opening of Baghdad International Airport, scheduled for July, has been repeatedly postponed because of the threats to air traffic. According to U.S. officials, the average number of daily attacks against U.S. forceshas climbed from 13 to 22 in recent weeks. The commander of U.S. ground forces in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, said of the increasing tempo of attacks “the enemy has evolved. It is a little more lethal, little bit more complex, little bit more sophisticated and, in some cases, a little bit more tenacious.” ^[3] In late September, unknown assailants shot Akila Hashimi, the only woman on the Governing Council. She died a few days later. Reports of foreign jihadists traveling to Iraq remain vague. But it does appear that some of these individuals have closed ranks with what the military calls FRLs, or former regime loyalists. In what was, at least officially “secular Iraq”, CDs and cassette tapes of Osama bin Laden are best sellers. Literally adding fuel to the fire, as many as 50 major ammunition dumps or weapons sites of the former regime reportedly remain improperly secured. ^[4] An ample supply of weapons has contributed to the rise of independent militias aligned with one faction or another. These gangs increasingly challenge the authority of coalition forces and draw them into the complex world of Iraqi street politics.

On Oct. 26, insurgents pulled off a symbolic coup by attacking the Rashid Hotel with rockets. The Rashid provided housing for much of the civilian and military staff of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and was well within the “Green Zone,” a high security section of Baghdad that houses the CPA. The audaciousness of the attack was underscored by the presence in the Rashid of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, one of the chief architects of the Iraq campaign. Other attacks followed, including three on police stations and a suicide car bombing at the offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which killed 15.

None of this represents, as yet, a strategic threat to the occupation authorities or their mission to reconstruct Iraq. But it does stand in sharp relief to the vision of coalition forces as popular liberators that the Bush administration painted before the invasion. In many ways, critics charge, Washington is now a victim of planning for a postwar environment that was characterized by flawed intelligence, wishful thinking, and a willful dismissal of unpleasant facts. The most ardent advocates of the Iraq intervention in the Defense Department and the vice president’s office based their positions on the assessment of prominent Iraqi exiles with whom they identified closely. This was done despite numerous warnings from the State Department and CIA that, in effect, these exiles would say anything they thought the administration wanted to hear in order to advance their cause. The Iraqi National Congress’ (INC) Kanan Makiya’s assurances that American troops would be greeted “with sweets and flowers” by the Iraqi people offers a sample of the kind of arguments that appear to have driven the administration’s thinking on Iraq.

As a consequence, Pentagon officials were ill–prepared to transition from an extremely effective and rapid military operation to the more complex tasks of pacification and political reconstruction. Belated recognition of this came in early October when the White House recalibrated the decision–making process on Iraq, apparently without the knowledge of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfled. The new interagency Iraq Stabilization Group provides for a more hands–on role for National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, ostensibly in an effort to better coordinate squabbling federal agencies. The move was widely seen in Washington as a rebuke of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld by a nervous White House as the election year approaches.

In the meantime, a chorus of critics has challenged the administration on a number of its prewar positions. Former intelligence officials continue to challenge the accuracy of assertions made by both the president and vice resident Richard Cheney regarding the nature and immediacy of the Iraqi threat. Similar concerns are being raised on an almost case–by–case basis about Colin Powell’s February speech at the United Nations Security Council in which he advance a number of allegations about Iraq. The administration’s position has not been helped by the report of its chief weapons inspector in Iraq, David Kay. After six months, Kay and the Iraqi Survey Team have uncovered no evidence of active programs for the development of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Kay characterized Iraq’s nuclear program, which was touted by the vice president as well developed before the conflict, as only “most rudimentary.” Kay reported to Congress on Oct. 2 that “information found to date suggests that Iraq's large–scale capability to develop, produce, and fill new CW [chemical weapons] munitions was reduced — if not entirely destroyed — during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of U.N. sanctions and U.N. inspections.” The administration insists that their allegations about Iraq were based on sound information, and officials refuse to retreat from the charge that Iraq was an acute threat. But investigations into prewar intelligence on Iraq is yielding charges by some current and former intelligence officials that the administration “cherry picked” only intelligence that supported its case for war regardless of its reliability.

Disputes over prewar assessments of the Iraqi threat are plaguing Washington’s efforts to enlist international support for the country’s economic and political reconstruction. Lacking a broad international mandate, a number of nations have hesitated to support what some view as an American military occupation. Consequently, even countries that were considered by Washington to be reliable sources for peacekeeping troops or financial aid have balked at making contributions. This problem may be alleviated somewhat by the passage of a new U.N. resolution on Oct. 16. The American–sponsored resolution passed the Security Council unanimously, though only after much haggling. For Washington, passage of the resolution represents an important, though not untainted, victory. At one point, it appeared as though the resolution would have to be withdrawn in the face of French and German objections regarding when political authority should be handed back to Iraqis and the primacy of the United Nations role in that process. The French in particular have been advocating for a much–accelerated transfer of power. Washington sees this correctly as far too quick and impractical. Passage of the resolution offered something of an endorsement of Washington’s approach, which calls for the Iraqi Governing Council to provide a timetable for a constitution and elections by Dec. 15 of this year. Yet, despite the unanimous vote, several countries including Pakistan, France, and Germany said the resolution was too flawed and that commitments of troops and money would not be made. ^[5] Like the U.N. resolution of November 2002 that mandated the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq this compromise has papered over differences that may return to haunt the Security Council in the future.

Still, passage the new resolution has offered those countries that are disposed to help the political cover to do so. Pledges began to trickle in to the Madrid donor’s conference (Oct. 23-24), including $1.5 billion from Japan, though they will fall way short of the $56 billion that the World Bank and the United Nations say will be required over the next four years. Washington’s appeal has been set back by a recent revolt in congress, where some have called for half of the $20 billion U.S. donation to be extended as a loan rather than a grant. The issue is now being tied to the willingness of other nations to forgive Iraq’s past debt, a figure that, according to The Economist, may approach $350 billion.

In the meantime, U.S. officials continue to press for political progress. Though they rejected French calls for an immediate transfer of power, the American timetable for sovereignty is probably also unrealistic. On Sept. 25, Secretary of State Colin Powell called upon Iraqi leaders appointed by the CPA to produce a new constitution in six months. But it appears that that six–month timeline is meant to follow the preparatory groundwork, which is to be concluded by the Dec. 15 according to the U.N. resolution. Thus Washington foresees a constitution being drafted and adopted by spring 2004, with elections to follow shortly thereafter.

Such an accelerated timetable is neither practical nor likely to produce political stability in Iraq. The groundwork for a constitutional committee will be no simple matter in itself. The individuals responsible for drafting the constitution must be identified and chosen, and this could be a contentious and lengthy process. The CPA would like the constitution to be drafted by an appointed committee. But the moderate Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, Iraq’s senior Shia cleric, issued a fatwa this summer declaring that only a popularly elected body could legitimately draft a constitution. Sistani probably views elections as a way to ensure that the United States does not simply dictate an Iraqi constitution. Kurdish and Sunni factions fear that elections for a constitutional assembly would be dominated by the Shia majority and would produce a “Shia constitution,” perhaps heavily influenced by the Islamic parties. The kind of hard bargaining and consensus building that is necessary to overcome such divisions will likely take longer than the White House or the CPA would like.

Nor are quick elections following the adoption of a constitution likely to produce a favorable outcome. The history of elections in fresh post–conflict environments is not encouraging. In Cambodia, Angola and Liberia, for instance, early elections simply encouraged new cycles of violence as the losers, still armed and uncommitted to the democratic process, rejected the results. In Bosnia, rushed elections only rewarded those groups already organized around familiar radical platforms. Put simply, it takes time for moderate, secular political organizations to organize and develop. ^[6]

For evidence of radical figures with ready–made constituencies, one needs to look no further than Muqtada al Sadr. The scion of a much revered Shia clerics, Sadr and his fellow travelers have risen as an alternative to the Coalition Authority and the moderate Shia community that accepts the foreign presence. Though Sadr lacks the religious credentials of his late father, the young firebrand has an accessible audience among the hundreds of thousands of his downtrodden coreligionists; especially in the poor Baghdad neighborhoods known collectively as a Sadr City (named after his father who was assassinated by the former regime). Sadr, backed by his own militia, has declared Sadr City off limits to the Americans, called for anti–coalition demonstrations, threatened the moderate clergy, and formed a self–described shadow government. Coalition authorities suspect Sadr of links to some of the most high profile violence in recent months, including a recent car bomb outside the Baghdad Hotel, which provides offices for governing officials.

Whatever Muqtada al Sadr’s vision of the future of Iraq is, it is a fair bet it does not include the kind of democratic equity Coalition authorities hope to instill. Sadr’s vague plans for religious rule in Iraq (including moving the capital from Baghdad to Najaf) may, as yet, command more curiosity than support. But a clear strategy for how to deal with him has yet to materialize. One will need to be formed soon. American troops have already clashed with the cleric’s militia, and Sadr seems intent on either assassinating or intimidating moderate Shi’ites cooperating with the CPA. But a heavy–handed approach by the CPA may simply enhance his prestige and credibility. Another approach would be to co–opt Sadr, bringing him under the umbrella of the Governing Council. Such a move, however, would likely displease Sadr’s Shia rivals, especially those on the council. It would also likely be seen as rewarding a vision of Iraq that has more in common with Tehran than Washington. If quick elections are likely to favor men like Muqtada al Sadr, then what is the correct course in Iraq? Again, little consensus exists. Many Iraqis, and some in the international community, simply want the occupying forces out. Others insist that the United States is trapped, and will have to remain for years. But there is a third alternative – internationalizing the reconstruction effort and the stability mission, and patient root–and–branch development of civil society and moderate political institutions. Little constructive progress can be made until the security situation in Iraq improves. Giving the international community a meaningful role in the Iraq would reduce the profile and image of the United States as an occupier. It could also mean the addition of badly needed foreign troops in militarily significant numbers. Under the guidance of the United Nations, elections could be held to produce an interim government of national unity, which could then begin a more thoughtful long–term process of consensus–building and constitution–writing. ^[7] Such an approach would require Washington to surrender its ultimate authority in Iraq, a concession that the Bush administration appears unwilling to make. But the current level of violence is producing casualty figures at a level verging on unsustainable and making political progress impossible to achieve. In the long run, Washington will find that achieving its vision of a peaceful and prosperous Iraq means embracing the very international institutions and multilateral thinking it once derided.

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Endnotes

Note 1: Jessica Mathews, “Iraqis Can Do More,” Washington Post, September 29, 2003, p. 19.   Back.

Note 2: Michael O’Hanlon, “Turning Of The Tide?” Washington Post, October 7, 2003, p. 25.   Back.

Note 3: O’Hanlon, “Turning Of The Tide?”   Back.

Note 4: Dan Murphy, “Iraq Awash In Military Weapons,” Christian Science Monitor, October 20, 2003.   Back.

Note 5: Felicity Barringer, “Unanimous Vote By U.N.’s Council Adopts Iraq Plan,” New York Times, October 17, 2003, p. 1.   Back.

Note 6: Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, “The Right Road to Sovereignty in Iraq,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief, October 27, 2003.   Back.

Note 7: Ottaway and Carathers Carothers, “The Right Road to Sovereignty in Iraq.”   Back.