CIAO DATE: 08/04

Iraq Reconstruction Update No. 4: Crossroads

Dr. Michael Donovan

Center for Defense Information

January 2004

Iraq is at a crossroads, a fact that is changed but little by the Dec. 15, 2003, capture of Saddam Hussein. The good news is that Saddam’s capture will encourage some of those Iraqis who have thus far sat on the fence to declare their colors without fear of the dictator’s return. The bad news is that the same correlation of opposition forces that existed in Iraq before Saddam’s arrest is likely to continue after his capture.

Iraq’s majority Shia population appears willing to continue to tolerate the U.S.–led occupation as long as it is capable of suppressing any Sunni resurgence, provides some measure of stability, and does not impede the Shiite’s sense of destiny and ascendancy. It remains to be seen whether this bargain can sustain itself. Meanwhile, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has done little to demonstrate to Iraq’s Sunnis population that they have a place in Iraq’s future. Saddam’s capture may only reinforce their sense of isolation and resistance. Together with other Iraqi nationalists, regime loyalists, and foreign jihadists, Sunni elements are likely to continue to fight against the occupation, especially if they cannot be convinced that they will have a stake in the new system. Beyond these divisions, the secular middle class remains wary of the burgeoning power of the Shia Islamic community, and the Kurds hope to retain some measure of the autonomy they have enjoyed for over a decade.

Incorporating these fractious and disparate groups into a new Iraqi state would be difficult under the best of circumstances. But a spate of bad decisions by Washington has ensured that the circumstances will be anything but the best. Washington recently endorsed a sophisticated plan that may go along way towards building consensus among Iraqis. But Washington and the CPA continue to struggle with almost every aspect of reconstruction: physical, political, and military. The capture of Saddam has bought the CPA some time. But if progress on every front is not made soon, Shia Iraqis could quickly revoke their tacit support — a prospect that could lead to sectarian conflict and civil war. Iraq can go either way.

The security situation in Iraq remains tenuous. November was a bad month for coalition forces. A record total of 111 coalition fatalities seemed to indicate that the insurgency was achieving unprecedented levels of success. Voices in the United States and international media speculated with fresh vigor that the U.S.–led coalition might have waded into a quagmire akin to the Vietnam conflict of four decades earlier. However, mitigating factors suggest that the level of fatalities in November, while tragic, may be artificially high. The collision of two Black Hawk helicopters in Mosul, the crash of a third near Tikrit, and the shooting down of a Chinook near Fallujah account for 39 of the overall fatalities. Presumably, argues Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution, flying transport helicopters over hostile urban environments in the now famous Sunni triangle during the day is a tactic that will be adjusted to avoid further casualties. Likewise, says O’Hanlon, the killing of 17 Italian Carabinieri and eight Spanish intelligence officials may have been an avoidable tragedy had non–American coalition allies understood from the outset that they would be targeted along with the Americans.

In mid–November and December 2003, the U.S. military responded to the continuing violence with a number of high profile and aggressive raids (Operation Iron Hammer and Operation Ivy Cyclone) against insurgents in the triangle. The operations were characterized by tactics such as entering hostile populated areas to engage the enemy, aerial bombing, and aggressive search and seizure missions. The operations culminated in an engagement in December in Samarra where U.S. forces claim to have killed 54 insurgents. It remains to be seen whether these raids have enhanced security or bred greater resentment towards the occupation. Nevertheless, military officials in Iraq cite some encouraging figures. Attacks in the triangle in the first half of December stand at less than half of those for the same period in November.

Still, the overall efficacy of the military strategy in Iraq remains questionable. The wounding of 60 U.S. troops from the 101st Air Assault Division in a suicide truck attack near Mosul on Dec. 9 illustrates the conundrum the military faces as it tries to achieve a balance between force protection and its stability mission. The combination of anti–blast barriers and the quick reaction of the guards on duty prevented the bomber from penetrating the base and causing more serious casualties. However, analyst Ken Pollack of the Brookings Institution believes U.S. forces are obsessed with force protection to the detriment of their overall mission. Pollack, who recently returned from a visit to Iraq, argues that American forces remain cloistered in fortified bubbles that prevent them from interacting with the general population, adequately collecting intelligence and providing security. Far from a pervasive presence, U.S. patrols are conducted from armored vehicles moving through neighborhoods at a brisk pace before disappearing.

The consequent failure of the U.S. forces to impact the general lawlessness that characterizes much of the county may be wearing on Iraqis already ambivalent about the presence of foreign forces. While the occupation is generally unpopular, there is a segment of the population, especially among the Shia, that prefers these forces remain until a greater measure of stability can be cultivated. The tacit support of this group may be eroding as the perception that U.S. forces are incapable of bringing security grows. If the security situation continues to deteriorate, groups that have hitherto cooperated with the coalition may abandon it.

In an effort to stave off such a collapse of support and mollify international critics, on Nov. 15, the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush adopted an accelerated timetable for the return of sovereignty to the Iraqi people by June 2004. The plan will unfold in a number of stages. In the first, a set of fundamental laws will be adopted for the protection of minority rights and to define a broad federal system. In the meantime, provincial caucuses will be chosen by a combination of local notables and the current Governing Council. In stage two, these caucuses will elect a transnational assembly in May 2004, which will act as a provisional government and assume sovereignty the following month. The idea is to ensconce a government in Iraq that will have the broad legitimacy lacking in the U.S.–appointed Governing Council. In the third stage, the CPA would be dissolved, though coalition forces would stay on to ensure the security, stability, and presumably the behavior of the provisional government. Under the auspices of the provisional government, a constitutional assembly will draft a permanent constitution. In the final stage following the drafting of a constitution, national elections will be held for a new, permanent, Iraqi government.

It is a complicated and nuanced plan, but it has a number of advantages. The plan allows for a quick transfer of power to a government more representative of the Iraqi people. It also avoids the winner–takes–all aspect associated with early elections and consequently lessens the risk of social and political conflict. Perhaps most importantly, it defers the big decisions regarding the permanent constitution, the role of religion, and the form of government in order to allow time for consensus building and reconciliation. ^[1]

Time is needed. The task of political reconstruction will involve not just the creation of a new political system, but the creation of a new cultural and political Iraqi identity on the ruins of decades of repression and violence. ^[2] For almost a century, the Sunni minority (20–25 percent of the population) have enjoyed a position of preeminence relative to the Shia majority (60–65 percent of population). This order was established under Ottoman rule even before the modern state of Iraq emerged. During the British Mandate of the 1920s and 1930s, Iraq’s colonial masters perpetuated Sunni administration of the country in the face of often–violent Shia resistance. The Sunni bureaucratic class came to dominate the state’s institutions, relying on coercion and patronage to govern their sectarian rivals until the fall of Saddam Hussein. It is a history that offers little foundation upon which to build a pluralist successor state.

Looking forward, whatever the outcome of efforts at political reconstruction, it is clear that the political landscape in Iraq has been altered permanently. Saddam will not return triumphant and the Sunni position atop the Iraqi food chain is not merely threatened, it is dead. Iraqi Shiites now appear content that history should rhyme rather than repeat. In contrast to the days of the British occupation, it is the Shiites who for the most part appear willing to tolerate the American–led occupation while U.S. forces and Sunni insurgents attempt to exhaust each other. Though the Shia community is deeply divided, parties within it are well organized, especially the Islamists, and imbued with a sense of destiny. Their power will continue to grow as Sunni influence wanes under the twin pressures of counterinsurgency and de–Baathification. Iraq’s Shia majority would like to dominate the political future of the country in one guise or another.

Oddly, it is the United States that now represents the Sunnis minority’s best hope for a peaceful and prosperous future in Iraq. America’s vision of Iraq as a unitary, functioning democracy may be far–fetched. But fashioning such a political system that is inclusive and respectful of minority rights is a goal that Iraq’s Sunni population would be wise to adopt. Codifying these ideals in a future Iraqi constitution and political process will require outside tutelage and guidance, even if a Western style democracy is not the result. It is an irony that appears to be lost on the Sunni insurgents. If the insurgents triumphed and coalition forces were forced to retreat from Iraq tomorrow, civil war would likely follow, perhaps with Shia Iran quietly supporting its coreligionists in Iraq. It is a conflict the Shiites would probably win, and the ensuing social and political environment would not favor the old Sunni elite or the greater Sunni minority.

The challenge for the CPA then is to entice the Sunni minority back into the fold of Iraqi politics without being perceived as betraying the Shiite community’s sense of liberation and political ascendancy. It is a balancing act made all the more difficult by the insistence of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the senior Shiite leader in Iraq and the figure with the largest following, that even the provisional government should be popularly elected. For Sistani, who has thus far supported the occupation, elections are a way of securing Shia prevalence in the new government. But acquiescing to the ayatollah’s demand would be a mistake on a number of levels. A new political system that is disproportionately populated by the Shia would likely be heavily influenced by Shia religious parties. It would further alienate the Sunnis, whose participation will be needed in the future, if only to dilute such a system. And the secular middle class, whose skills will eventually be needed to run the country, wants to see some limits placed upon the dictates of Sistani and the senior Shia religious establishment (Hawza). However, without the support or at least the acquiescence of the Hawza, the position of the coalition in Iraq would become untenable. The contours of a compromise between Sistani and the CPA are difficult to see, but desperately needed.

In the meantime, the Bush administration continues to issue mixed messages to the international community. In December, the administration dispatched former Secretary of State James Baker on a multi–capital lobbying trip intended to get other countries to forgive Iraq’s foreign debt. As the argument goes, Saddam Hussein ran up this debt (reportedly as much as $120 billion) not for the benefit of the Iraqi people, but to enrich himself and attack his neighbors. Forgiving some or all of this debt would go a long way towards setting Iraq on the path of future prosperity and stability. But Baker’s mission came on the heels of a Pentagon announcement declaring that only member states of the Iraq coalition would be considered for lucrative commercial reconstruction contracts. France, Germany and Canada (all three nations participated in operations in Afghanistan) view the decision as a punitive measure. The move will complicate Baker’s job. But in the end, some measure of debt forgiveness is likely. Faced with a choice between cutting a deal on Iraq’s debt or getting nothing at all if Iraq should default, most countries are likely to opt for the former. Saddam’s capture undercuts their bargaining position still further as it makes it more difficult to suggest that the United States is accomplishing little in Iraq. But here too, the euphoria surrounding Saddam’s arrest may be disguising a more sober long–term assessment of the forces at play. Given the hurdles mentioned above, the situation in Iraq could easily get worse before it gets better. The goodwill of the international community may yet be seen as a valuable commodity in Washington.

End Notes

Note 1: See Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, “Avoiding the Dangers of Early Election in Iraq,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief, Oct. 27, 2003.   Back.

Note 2: Phebe Marr, “Saddam’s Past, Iraq’s Future,” New York Times, Dec. 15, 2003.   Back.