War and Peace in Cambodia

Between the 23rd and the 28th of May, 1993, the citizens of Cambodia voted in a long-awaited election run by the United Nations. For Cambodia, a land that has seen war, devastation, national massacre and foreign invasion all in the last generation, the election was the culmination of years of peace talks as well as fifteen months of peacekeeping by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Yet the news from Cambodia over the preceding months seemed uniformly bleak--massacres of ethnic Vietnamese, attacks on UN soldiers and civilians, harassment of opposition political parties, and incidents of renewed fighting. Journalists had been drawn to the setbacks, and many had written off off UNTAC as a failure. But once the election was successfully completed, an opposite pattern was set in the reporting. All the problems that plagued the conduct of the 18 month operation were swept aside by the glow of a successful week of elections.

In the three years since the national election, Cambodia has continued to confound any straightforward assessment. Southeast Asia is at peace. Cambodia is again a recognized sovereign state. King Sihanouk, who embodies Cambodia's traditional legitimacy, again reigns. A coalition government of the two predominant factions rules and the Khmer Rouge, who abandoned the peace process, are increasingly marginalized. But the human rights supposedly embedded in the agreement on "pluralist democracy" are proving fragile barriers to corrupt and arbitrary government policy. Some observers charge that the minority faction of the ruling coalition is staging a rolling, "silent coup" against the majority royalist faction, and the royalist prime minister calls himself a "puppet." ₂ Cambodia's borders with Vietnam and Thailand are yet to be demarcated and are the subject of acrimonious accusations of bad faith. The spread of economic reconstruction beyond the "casino capitalism" boom in the capital is proving much more difficult than anticipated as corruption and violent strife undermine the order that investment, whether domestic or international, requires.

In light of the theoretical literature on civil wars, Cambodia's semi-peace also appears exceptional to the current generalizations about how difficult it is to resolve civil wars (I and 2) and about how to resolve them (3 and 4):

1. Civil wars are much harder to resolve, we are told, than are international wars because enforcing agreed bargains is so much more difficult when one or both parties are required to disarm before the peace is complete. Both sides continue to suffer "security dilemmas." International peace agreements, in contrast, allow both sides to preserve their defenses. ₃

2. Civil Wars driven by preemptive incentives are even more difficult to settle than those characterized by defensive incentives. One powerful hypothesis focuses on the differences between ethnic and ideological conflicts. Ethnic strife occurs among parties whose identities are transparent and fixed, while ideological conflicts tend to be more flexible. Ideological adherence is opaque and adherents can change their minds. Ethnic conflicts thus engender powerful offensive, preemptive, incentives to seize (and "cleanse rival territory, because once "cleansed" and a community destroyed, territory is permanently lost. Ideologies, on the other hand, are less spatially dependent than ethnic communities; hearts and minds can be won and re-won. Ideological wars--such as Cambodia's four way conflict among Maoist and Leninist Communists, republican and monarchist oligarchs---should be thus much easier to resolve than ethnic wars. ₄

3. Because of the insecurities, resolving civil wars require supranational enforcement in order to persuade the parties to abide by a peace agreement. ₅ (The most promising solution to ethnic wars is partition.)

4. Unfortunately, enforcement is one thing the UN does not do well. United Nations peacekeeping doctrine differentiates operations that implement an agreed peace--UN Charter "Chapter Six" peacekeeping--from operations that rollback aggression or enforce law and order--"Chapter Seven" peace enforcement. Peacekeeping, such as occurred in El Salvador or Cyprus, relies on principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force; peace enforcement, such as was attempted in Somalia, relies on compellence, collective security and, where needed, force. ₆ The UN is capable of succeeding in the first if it sticks to the principles of consent and the non-use of force. It fails in enforcement because it cannot effectively compel, "when there is no peace to keep." ₇ Hence the UN will be ineffective in helping to resolve civil wars.

The Cambodian "war in civil peace" is an exception to all four of those generalizations. One case cannot disprove any generalization; and, indeed, the wider record of civil wars lends considerable support to those generalizations. The Cambodian case also confirms aspects of the logic underlying each of them. Cambodia's exceptionalism also reveals in an oblique light what the generalizations mean: both what the average, rule-making case misses or reflects and what the forces underlying the average case (presumably) override.

As I shall first illustrate, the Cambodian civil war was partially settled. Second, even more strikingly, the Cambodian factions continued to harbor offensive intentions and these were largely responsible for the war-like tension that continued into the resulting "peace." Victory in a civil war/peace is a very profitable outcome, offering security of bureaucratic place and substantial and assured private income. Third, even though no external supranational enforcement guaranteed the interim security of the parties, peace was made and held between the two predominant factions (the Khmer Rouge later abandoned the peace). Fourth, the UN did succeed in bringing a partial peace to Cambodia, but only by innovating and in one important instance in exercising force. The negotiation of the Paris Peace Agreement of 1991 and consequent construction of the United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC) under Chapter Six contributed essential legal capacities to the conduct of the operation, but it did little to establish a framework of continuing consent or, in the end, avoid the need for the UN to provide political entrepreneurship and exercise impartial, but non-neutral enforcement. The peace became a continuation of war "by [to adapt Clausewitz] other means."

1. A Peace Made in Paris

The Agreements on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian conflict ₈ (signed at the second Paris Conference on October 23, 1991) were a revolutionary blueprint for a comprehensive settlement. The unique quality of the Paris Agreement lies in the fact that settlement process concerned what the UN secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali refers to in the Agenda for Peace as "peace-building ₉ in addition to peacemaking and peacekeeping. The international community charged the UN--for the first time in its history--with the political and economic restructuring of a member of the UN, as part of the building of peace in which the parties would then (it was planned) institutionalize their reconciliation. The roots of the conflict lay in the collapse of the legitimacy of the Cambodian state. The strategy of peace embodied in the Paris Agreement lay in the UN's stepping in to help rebuild the legitimacy of the state, after the parties had failed to achieve a reconciliation of their own.

The parties to the Agreement created two institutions in order to implement the peace: the Supreme National Council (SNC) and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia(UNTAC). ₁₀ The Agreement defined a transitional period running from the entry into force of the Agreement, October 23 1991, to the time when an elected constituent assembly established a new sovereign government of Cambodia (September, 1993). During that period, the Supreme National Council, a committee composed of the four factions, was to "enshrine" the legal sovereignty of Cambodia; and UNTAC, an authority established by the Security Council in February 1992, was to implement the agreed upon peace. ₁₁

The Paris Agreement granted extraordinary power to the UN during the transition period. UNTAC was required:

• to monitor the cease-fire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces, and to supervise the cantonment and demobilization of military forces,

• to control and supervise crucial aspects of civil administration, ₁₂

• to organize and monitor the elections, as a first step to a "system of liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism,"

• to foster an environment in which respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is ensured,

• to coordinate with UNHCR the repatriation of more than three hundred and fifty thousand refugees living in camps on the Thai side of the border,

• to help plan and raise funds for the social and economic rehabilitation of Cambodia.

Although the UN had experience in some of these areas through past peacekeeping operations, it was the combination of these tasks that made UNTAC the largest UN peacekeeping operation ever, requiring over 15,000 troops and 7,000 civilian personnel, and costing over an estimated $2.8 billion during the span of eighteen months, the calculated transition period.

The Paris Agreement provided UNTAC with broad legal authority to enforce its mandate. Indeed the Agreement specifically gave the UN "all powers necessary to ensure the implementation of the Agreement." UN sensitivity to charges of colonialism may have hindered the UNTAC mission from interpreting the Agreements aggressively. But the determinants of the success and failure of UNTAC lay elsewhere--in the fierce political contest among factions. The Paris Agreement was the opening salvo in a new phase of the Cambodian War, to be waged by other means.

Successes

Considering that the nun antagonists in Cambodia--the Vietnamese--installed government and the radical Khmer Rouge---were pressured by their big-power sponsors to sign the 1991 Paris Peace Accords and did not cooperate fully with the UN, UNTAC's accomplishments before and after the May elections were remarkable. ₁₃

First, although the country was temporarily subject to the UN's "transitional authority," it also enjoyed for perhaps the first time the prospect of true independence from the control of any foreign power. Having endured French and Japanese colonialism before 1954 and American, Chinese, and Vietnamese competition for influence thereafter, Cambodia experienced national self-determination (and South East Asia, regional self-determination). The United States supported the Lon Nol coup of 1970, the Chinese back-stopped the Khmer Rouge, and the Vietnamese installed the Hun Sen regime in 1979 (finally withdrawing their military forces in 1989). Some disturbing foreign presences continued to complicate Cambodia's future. Thai generals in the west and Vietnamese interests in the east participated in the illegal export of Cambodia's logs and gems. Many thousand Vietnamese entered the country to take advantage of the economic boom created by the UNTAC presence. But as of October 1993, for better or for worse, Cambodia was in the hands of the Cambodians. (This is what the UN "transition" was supposed to transition to.)

Second, the mere presence of UNTAC had an impact. Its arrival signaled the end of full scale civil war. The country became mostly peaceful. Some provinces were very tense, but skirmishes were limited in duration and the pitched battles of 1990 and earlier ended. The UNTAC presence also opened up the political system, helping opposition parties to compete against the incumbent regime. They acquired offices, held meetings and had access to the media. Harassment continued, but not enough to undermine the electoral process. The jails once crammed with political prisoners, held a vastly reduced population of inmates, all of whom seem to have had some (sometimes trumped up) criminal charge laid against them. While UNTAC did not exercise the control over the Phnom Penh regime envisaged in the Paris Accords, it made a dent in the most blatant corruption.

Third, 365,000 refugees were peacefully repatriated from camps in Thailand, despite dire prognostications from experts a year earlier. The Repatriation Component of UNTAC (staffed by UNHCR) organized this massive undertaking with the cooperation and support of the Military Component, the Cambodian Red Cross and other humanitarian and relief organizations. ₁₄

Fourth, UNTAC organized an election in a country with a shattered physical infrastructure. The UN has monitored and supervised many elections but Cambodia's was the first election that the UN directly organized from the planning stages through the writing of an electoral law to registration and the conduct of the poll. Hundreds of foreign volunteers in nearly every village registered voters and spread information. Voters walked considerable distances and braved threats to hold on to their registration cards. UNTAC persuaded the Supreme National Council to pass a comprehensive electoral law (over the initial opposition of the Supreme National Council). It began to educate Cambodians about human rights and elections, employing an imaginative range of techniques that included traveling acting troops performing skits, Khmer videos, public rallies organized by UNTAC, debates among candidates, and extensive radio coverage. ₁₅ Nearly all eligible Cambodians--almost 5 million---registered to vote.

The May 1993 election rewarded all their efforts, and most of all affirmed the determination of the Cambodian people to have a voice in their future. Despite months of attempted intimidation by some of the parties, more than 90% of the registered electorate turnout to vote. The Khmer Rouge had vowed to stop the election altogether. SOC waged a pitched battle against it main rival, FUNCINPEC, which included assassinations of FUNCINPEC party officials. According to the Human Rights Component of UNTAC, more than 200 died during the campaigning period between March the 1st and May 14th, and this included a major attack launched by about 400 Khmer Rouge and 300 hastily recruited youths on Siem Reap on May 3rd and 4th. Despite threats from the government that people's votes would not be secret, UNTAC ensured they would be and apparently convinced Cambodians of that. UNTAC's Military Component took the measures necessary to guarantee the security of the polling and counting process.

Failures

If we look at UNTAC's official, initial mandate, we can see three major areas of failure. The first lies in control over civil administration; the second in the failure to achieve a cease-fire and then canton, demobilize, and disarm the military forces (70%) of the four factions. ₁₆ The third followed from the first two: a failure to reform the institutions of state control and start what will be a lengthy process of economic rehabilitation.

First, the Paris Agreements specified that UNTAC would control five essential areas of administration and do so over each of the four factions. By controlling them--so it was anticipated--UNTAC would be able to ensure that the political environment was neutral, no faction (and especially the predominant faction of the State of Cambodia) would be able to employ sovereign resources to tilt the electoral contest in its favor.

UNTAC had the apparent authority to control the factions, including the right to insert its officials within the factional administrations and to remove factional officials who did not respond to its directive. Yet, in fact, what UNTAC was supposed to control, it did not. What UNTAC seemed to control--e.g. expenditures in the ministry of finance of SOC---on closer examination was a mere "front" for decisions taken elsewhere. Much of the SOC administration had collapsed and effective control had slipped to provincial governors and generals, so that "controlling" ministries that themselves did not control their nominal areas of responsibility meant very little. But, even in Phnom Penh, in the areas of policy making where a central administrative apparatus was still functioning, the SOC administered around UNTAC. The Cambodian People's Party (the political party of the state of Cambodia) thus enjoyed the service of officials on the public payroll and access to public assets, while obtaining revenue from sales of those assets.

Second, the failure to achieve a cease-fire (Phase 1) and then canton, demobilize and disarm 70%, of the military forces of the four factions (Phase 2) had an equally devastating effect on e successful operation of the original mandate. As initially planned, the May elections were supposed to take place in a secure--cantoned and disarmed--political environment in which the relative military weight of the factions would play little direct role in either the electoral campaign or the voter's choice. During the campaign, armies tilted all the electoral contests. Indeed, SOC attempted to coerce the opposition and the voters. At the same time, an atmosphere of violence raised its "popularity," since it had the only military force capable of containing the Khmer Rouge.

The Khmer Rouge refused to canton in June 1992, saying that UNTAC had failed to control SOC (which was true, but neither had it controlled the Khmer Rouge in its much smaller zones) and that Vietnamese "forces" remained in Cambodia (Vietnamese military formations had withdrawn in 1989) ₁₇ . When the Khmer Rouge refused to canton, SOC and other factions that had partially cantoned almost 55,000 soldiers, refused to demobilize and disarm; and then most of the cantoned soldiers went on "agricultural leave." ₁₈

Third, as product of the previous two failures, very little rehabilitation (peace building) occurred during the eighteen month operation. Cambodia's massive reconstruction needs were postponed until after a legitimate government had been formed.

UNTAC thus achieved many successes, but it also missed some significant opportunities to reform and assist the Cambodian state. UNTAC achieved significant successes in establishing a peace over most of the country and in restoring key features of Cambodian civil society. It helped the return of refugees, encouraged the formation of Cambodian NGO's, engaged in human rights education and, most significantly, helped give Cambodian society a sense of participation in politics through the national election, and thereby helped secure legitimacy for the state. But it failed to demobilize the armies or control the SOC civil service. In 1993, the coalition of the two lead factions, CPP and FUNCINPEC, making up the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) inherited the continuing war with the Khmer Rouge, still well armed and ready to fight. The RGC, furthermore, had to accommodate both the existing SOC (CPP) civil service and add to them the newly enrolled FUNCINPEC officials. The results were a bureaucratic stalemate in which the two parties blocked each other, thus eroding overall government ineffectiveness and increasing tension. Threats of coups and counter-coups have disturbed the politics of Cambodia since 1993.

2. Accounting for a Semi-War

This leads to the central question of how the Cambodian peace failed and what role UNTAC played in helping or hurting the peace process? I begin an answer by considering whether the parties experienced defensive "security dilemmas" that had to be solved. I will argue that they would have had security dilemmas, but that the peace was undermined more by a second factor: the parties held offensive preferences beyond their security interests.

Security Dilemmas

There is good reason to suspect that civil wars may be particularly difficult to settle because of the special significance that security dilemmas have in domestic conflicts. International conflicts can be settled and leave both parties fully armed, capable of guaranteeing their own security Civil wars, by contrast, presume disarmament, perhaps before some new entity sufficiently effective and national in scope can guarantee the security of formerly warring factions. In these transitional circumstances there can arise a dilemma: "defensive" efforts to enhance individual factional security can make other parties less secure. ₁₉ Parties fully preferring the peace settlement may doubt that other parties also supporting the peace settlement truly do so. Uncertainty alone may lead to defections--hidden arms caches, covert external alliances--which undermine peace. This is conventionally called (after an argument of J.J. Rousseau) a "stag dilemma." Factional preferences are CC, DC, DD, CD The faction truly prefers the peace agreement (CC), but rather than be caught as the only sucker (CD) abiding by the peace another faction has defected (DC), will choose to defect (DC) if it (mistakenly) thinks that the other faction will defect. The result can, but should not be, DD. Another possibility is the "prisoner's dilemma," in which the preference ordering is DC, CC, DD, CD. Even though both factions prefer peace (CC) to war (DD), each also prefers to exploit the peaceful cooperation of the other (DC) to a situation in which both cooperate (CC)

There are a number of standard solutions to these dilemmas Traditional, or "first generation," peacekeeping is a solution to stag dilemmas The UN, or other international force, interposes itself among the actions and objectively certifies compliance, thus providing the transparency that all parties are indeed living up to the commitments they made (and indeed prefer, CC) ₂₀ Prisoner's dilemmas are more problematic, requiring that preferences be altered (for example reducing the cardinal gap between the value of DC and CC, DD and CD) But here too standard solutions exist. Graduated disarmament is one. Step by step (division by division) disarmament serves to iterate the problem, allowing the parties to develop trust through repeated interactions while each is still secure and able to sanction defections ₂₁ Power-sharing is another as each faction retains the ability to veto the acquisition of sovereign power and the entire resources of the state by any other faction. ₂₂ A peacekeeping force, even one that merely defends itself, assists this process by its very presence. The international legitimacy that it carries lowers the net value (by raising the costs of defection) for the parties by internationalizing what heretofore had been a settled domestic conflict. ₂₃

Pertinent as these insights may be to the average civil war, they do not account for what went wrong in Cambodia after the signing of the peace in October 1991. By this remark I do not wish to exonerate UNTAC from its failings. Indeed, one of the problems of current UN peace management is that even if factions have preferences equivalent to the cooperative structure of the stag dilemma, excessively slow deployment of peacekeeping operations can undermine the transparency function that peacekeeping is designed to achieve. ₂₄ Some of the UN battalions, moreover, were incapable of defending themselves. And one, worse still, exacerbated the ambient level of communal violence by its misbehavior.

The deeper problem, however, is that only the weakest factions seemed to have the preference structures of the stag dilemma or the prisoner's dilemma. Of course, no one can either read minds (either of individuals or, a fortiori, of factions) or infer preferences from the outcome an unstable mix of peace and war (CC and DD). ₂₅ But related evidence does reveal the factions preferences as well as the complex character of the conflict. I turn to the conflict first and then the preferences.

The Conflict

The challenge of peace lay in the complex, multiple character of the Cambodian conflict. Following the devastating bombing Cambodia suffered during the Vietnam War and the holocaust of more than one million Cambodians inflicted by the Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian conflict entered a new stage in December 1978 when, responding to repeated Khmer Rouge provocations, Vietnam invaded Cambodia. The Vietnamese invasion and the installation of the Heng Sarnrin-Hun Sen regime in 1978-79 gave rise to a guerrilla movement of the three major resistance groups: Prince Sihanouk's party, - National Union Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), Son Sann's - Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK or the Khmer Rouge).Each of the four, including the Heng Samrin-Hun Sen (later called State of Cambodia, SOC) regime itself, contested the claims of the other to legitimate authority over Cambodia. In 1982, at the urging of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China, the three groups opposing the Hun Sen regime formed the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

The complexities of the conflict were evident. Like the most severe of ethnic civil wars and like the Holocaust, in the Cambodian conflict nearly every family lost a close member--father, mother, sons and daughters--in the slaughter that followed from the Khmer Rouge cultural revolution. But the Cambodian civil war also resembled an ordinary interstate war---an occupation by Vietnam to be "resolved" simply by a withdrawal. For the Hun Sen regime and its Vietnamese and Soviet backers the conflict was a counter-insurgency war waged against a genocidal opponent (the Khmer Rouge). For the CGDK and its ASEAN, UN, and US supporters the conflict was a case of international aggression by Vietnam and the occupation of a sovereign country. Conflicting claims to authority between CGDK and the Hun Sen government thus created problems of recognition for the international community. While the UN recognized the CGDK as the legal government of Cambodia, the State of Cambodia controlled more than eighty percent of the country.

The Cambodian civil war also resembled the international proxy wars of the Cold War. Each of the factions depended on a foreign patron which waged war against the other patrons over Cambodian soil. The US had backed the republican forces (now become KPNLF); Russia backed the SOC; China the Khmer Rouge; the Europeans, the princely faction, FUNCINPEC. To a significant extent, the civil war was an international war; and the international war was "civil"--a war among ideologies to determine, not just who, but what "way of life" would govern Cambodia. The international community which is seen as the solution to the security dilemma's of civil wars, was here also its cause.

The Cambodian factions began to demonstrate a willingness to discuss peace only in December, 1987, when Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen informally met, in Paris. With Sihanouk's advancing age, Hun Sen's desire to obtain international recognition for his regime, and military exhaustion as spurs to action, regional actors, and particularly Indonesia's foreign minister, Ali Alatas, began to take the lead, organizing two Jakarta Informal Meetings in 1988 and 1989. After nine years of front-line opposition to the perceived Vietnamese threat, ASEAN states were now ready for the right kind of reconciliation. Thailand's booming economy and its search for markets and investments made Cambodia and Laos and even Vietnam look more like business opportunities and less like strategic threats. Vietnam, for its part, seems to have become eager to shed its Cambodian burden. Its ten years of occupation had imposed heavy costs, both financial and human. ₂₆ The occupation had barred Vietnam's full access to the world market, extended a dangerous strategic confrontation with China and inflicted an embarrassing level of dependence on the USSR. Together, these precluded Vietnam's normalization within Southeast Asia. Indonesia was eager to display its capacities for regional leadership by brokering a regional peace. For Indonesia, rivalry with China meant that Vietnam was an ally it wished to cultivate, provided it could do so within an ASEAN context. Indonesia's good offices succeeded in identifying the need for an international control mechanism to supervise the transition to a peace, but they could not reach an agreement on how it would operate.

Perceiving what it thought was an opportunity to break the deadlock that had emerged at the regional level and concerned that Vietnam's prospective (September 1989) withdrawal of its forces from Cambodia would harden Hun Sen and Vietnam against a comprehensive solution, ₂₇ French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas joined with Ali Alatas to co-sponsor a (the first) Paris Conference on Cambodia in July 1989. Progress was made in defining agreement on the withdrawal of foreign forces, neutralization, the return of refugees and other matters, but again the crucial sticking point proved to be the interim control mechanism. Disappointing the expectations of the co-chairs, the Cambodian factions flatly rejected the proposal that national reconciliation be achieved through an interim quadripartite government. ₂₈ With the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and the failure of the peace process, war resumed in Cambodia. The CGDK tested Hun Sen's independent staying power and Hun Sen demonstrated that his regime, though losing some territory, could hold on to the vast bulk of Cambodia.

The warning of the Cold War now began to make possible the active, cooperative involvement of the three key global powers: Russia, China, and the United States. For Russia, the existing conflict (together with Russia's support of Vietnam and Hun Sen) was a continuing bar to a rapprochement with China and it enhanced the influence of both China and the US in Southeast Asia. Russia, nonetheless, was not prepared to abandon Hun Sen. Throughout the negotiations, it thus sought to maximize Hun Sen's room for maneuver by minimizing the control the UN placed over the SOC. For China, with the end of the Cold War and China's determination to achieve rapid economic development, the BR began to appear an unwelcome burden. Seeking access to the world market, appreciating the emergence of a less threatening, indeed exhausted, Vietnam and beginning to build a close relationship with Thailand, China was prepared to settle for a peace, provided that it permitted BR participation throughout the negotiations, as a way to open political space for the BR, it sought to increase the control over the SOC that the UN would exercise. For the United States, the opportunity to encourage a market-oriented Southeast Asia free from the hegemony of either China or Vietnam and to take Cambodia off its foreign policy agenda was double bonus. Secretary Baker, moreover, feared that if the fighting continued, it would inevitably escalate, forcing the US into the dilemma of supporting either a Vietnamese "surrogate" (the Hun Sen State of Cambodia) or Khmer Rouge genocide. And perhaps, most importantly, if the war escalated, Southeast Asia would again become an American domestic problem, stirring up all the dissension of the Vietnam war period. The Administration, therefore, sought a comprehensive solution that transcended both the genocidal BR and the Vietnamese "surrogate." It was prepared to gamble that Sihanouk, if he had sufficient UN backing in a transitional regime, would find a way to establish a "pluralist democracy" presided over by himself. ₂₉

Working with drafts from Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and the papers of the UN Secretariat, the Permanent Five members of the Security Council steadily crafted the outlines of a comprehensive peace featuring a strong controlling role for a United Nations in Cambodia (UNTAC). By August 27, 1990, at their sixth meeting, the Five announced that they had reached a consensus on a Framework. They asked the co-Presidents of the Paris Conference (France and Indonesia) to convene an informal meeting of the four factions in Jakarta at which, on September 10, the four accepted the framework and announced the formation of the Supreme National Council, consisting of all four factions and embodying Cambodian sovereignty during the transition process. But that was just the beginning of an eleven month negotiating process in which the P5 actively persuaded the four factions to turn the Framework into a workable peace agreement.

Preferences

Thus, although the Cambodian parties were willing to sign a peace treaty, it is far from clear that they were willing to abide by one. In part, as well-formed participants at the Paris peace-negotiations speculate, the parties had no real option. Their international patrons had cut them off. Vietnam and the PRC, patrons respectively of the SOC and the Khmer Rouge, had normalized relations in 1991, ending a bitter rivalry that had provoked a war in 1978 and Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1979. Another interpretation suggests that perhaps the parties did want the Agreement--but only to the extent that they were able to exploit it. All were exhausted by war, falling apart internally; and so each may have sought Paris as the final nail in the coffin of their rivals. The BR may have wanted to use the provisions of civil control over the five areas in the Paris Agreements as the means to destroy the SOC. Functioning administration over almost the entire country was the g at advantage that the disciplined bureaucracy of SOC possessed over the other factions. Observers argue that the BR probably judged that no centralized Leninist-style bureaucracy could sustain itself under a regime of effective even though partial outside control. (Significantly, perhaps, it had been the PRC, the Khmer Rouge's one-time patron, that had written these provisions of the Paris Agreement). The SOC, on the other hand, may have sought the cantonment and demobilization provisions of the Paris Agreement as the vehicle through which to destroy the Khmer Rouge's single most vital asset--its disciplined army of 10,000 or so soldiers. Consequently, the BR was determined not to disarm, but hoped that UNTAC would succeed in controlling and thus gutting the SOC's administrative apparatus. The SOC was prepared to cooperate in cantonment and disarmament in hopes that a disarmed BR would dissolve, but were determined to prevent any effective control of their administrative assets.

FUNCINPEC and KPNLF--the two very lightly armed factions at the border wanted peace---"Paris"---perhaps principally in order to have the elections, and this because they had no other asset apart from their popularity with the mass of the Cambodian population.

The preferences appeared thus to be the following. For the BR and SOC: DC, DD, CC, CD; for FUNClNPEC: DC, CC, DD, CD; and for some of the minor parties (KPNLF and the very aptly named "Buddhist Liberal Democrats" ₃₀ ): CC, CD, DC, DD. Given the fact that both the BR and SOC signed the Paris Peace treaty and that FUNCINPEC was widely regarded as its most enthusiastic adherent, evidence of what their actual preferences might have been needs some additional elaboration.

I have explained how both the BR and SOC preferred to manipulate the peace to their own advantage: DC over CC. Let me suggest evidence for how they preferred war to peace: DD to CC. First, let us examine SOC. Just after the signing of the Paris Peace, the Khmer Rouge sent representatives to Phnom Penh to sit on the Supreme National Council. On the way from the airport they were set upon by a large and well-organized crowd, who mobbed their vehicle and attempted to lynch them. They took refuge--after being severely beaten--in the Royal Palace. SOC later excused the outbreak as an outburst of spontaneous mass revulsion at the return of the BR to the capital. While the revulsion may well have been justified, more impartial observers noted that in Phnom Penh at this time nothing happened without the acquiescence of the SOC which continued to rule Cambodia with a heavy had. Second, confidential memoranda of the SOC disclosed that they had no intention of complying with the "control" provisions of the Paris Peace and that they were systematically attacking FUNCINPEC, the opposing party that had no substantial military force with which to threaten SOC's security. ₃₁ Similarly with regard to the Khmer Rouge, one can note that whatever the legitimacy of their complaints concerning the failures of UNTAC "control" of SOC as a justification for their own failure to canton, they themselves refused all access (much less cooperation or "control") with UNTAC during the peace process. The BR, moreover, openly acknowledged that their ultimate aims, far from being the implausible "liberal pluralist democracy" outlined in the Paris Agreements, were a retaliation of the Angkha--the utter ruralization and communalization of Cambodian society that they had attempted in 1975-78. ₃₂ Lastly, even military weak FUNCINPEC expressed a temporary preference for exploitation (DC) over compliance (CC) with the peace when it organized with French assistance an effort to forestall the May 1993 elections for a constitutional convention with a preemptive referendum for a Sihanouk presidency.

One cannot eliminate the possibility that Paris (CC) represented a true reconciliation and an acceptance of peace through pluralist democracy by the four factions; it is just that it is very difficult to find evidence in their previous or later actions to support it.

Aggressive Incentives

As noted in the beginning, recent scholarship has offered plausible reasons for identifying ethnic conflicts--in opposition to ideological conflicts such as those in Cambodia ₃₃ --as particularly prone to create preemptive and preventive incentives for "cleansing" territory or monopolizing state sovereignty.

But ideological conflicts can also generate preemptive, aggressive incentives. The first factor at work is the economic value of monopoly control of the state in a developing economy, particularly one undergoing a transition from socialism to capitalism, as was Cambodia. The state in these circumstances owns the vast preponderance of productive assets--natural resources, urban property, the authority to license their use and the practical capacity to alienate (sell) those assets outright. Unless there is an agreement to share control, first come is first serve. In Cambodia today ( 1996-97) there is a tacit sharing of what has come to be called "casino capitalism." Each of the two parties in the governing coalition (SOC's CPP and FUNCINPEC) profits from the alienation of public property and the license of regulated industries, the most profitable of which are the two main casino's--one Hun Sen (CPP) and the other FUNCINPEC. ₃₄ Current power sharing is an accidental outcome of the vote in 1993, which required power-sharing in order to form a governing majority. The parties had failed to agree on power-sharing in the Paris Peace negotiations. There is no guarantee it will continue, and this creates continuing preemptive incentives and a widespread spirit of enrichissez vous.

The second factor is the extreme character of some ideologies. The BR concept of pure, rural community--untainted by any unsupervised division of labor or exchange--was and is incompatible with a open market economy and pluralist society envisaged in the compromise peace the parties negotiated at Paris. "Liberal pluralist democracy" is distinctly alien corn in traditional Cambodia, but it was the only alternative to no agreement at all when the parties proved incapable of forming a power-sharing arrangement. But the BR could not openly operate in an environment in which their peasants would be free to seek employment or to sell their crop where they wished. Like the notorious ethnic entrepreneurs of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the BR too, had to preemptively cleanse and autarkically isolate its territory.

3. Accounting or a Semi-Peace

A semi-peace was achieved and settling civil conflicts requires, it is argued, coercive enforcement. But, corresponding to the third generalization, did the UN overcome the barriers to settling civil wars by guaranteeing to enforce the peace? In this section I argue that it did not and then conclude by focusing on how the semi-peace actually was made. According to the fourth generalization, traditional peacekeeping does not work in these circumstances and the UN is incapable of effective peace enforcement. The UN, I thus conclude, achieved the unexpected by employing a new form of enhanced peacekeeping, one that relied both on traditional consent to mobilize local forces and, in the end, on a discrete, impartial (but non-neutral) use of force.

Third Party Enforcement

Average civil wars may require third party enforcement, but that is not what UNTAC was prepared to do. UNTAC seemed to have the legal authority under the Paris Agreement to enforce the mandate over the opposition of one or more of the factions. But it did not enjoy the political support of the Permanent 5 or the contributing countries to employ forcefully the military capacity it did have. In January 1993, Gerard Porcell, chief of the Civil Administration Component, saw this as a crucial failure of UNTAC will. He explained: "we don't have the will to apply the peace accords. This absence of firmness with the Khmer Rouge was a sort of signal for the other parties who saw there the proof of UNTAC's weakness towards the group that from the start eschewed all cooperation." ₃₅

UNTAC, it seems, did lack the will to enforce the mandate. A number of the countries contributing troops to the mission were unwilling to engage in enforcement and let their views be known to Mr. Akashi and General Sanderson. ₃₆ Reasons for this constraint are, of course, speculative. Most countries, almost certainly, were also (naturally) reluctant to suffer the casualties that a more intrusive role would have generated. They may also have preferred a coalition government in the future of Cambodia to one constructed after a more radical democratic transformation.

Some countries shared UNTAC's official assessment that enforcement would have backfired. UNTAC did not have the military capacity to enforce the mandate and still maintain the security of the international presence, both governmental and non-governmental. UNTAC could have pushed through Khmer Rouge lines, beginning with the incident in the spring of 1992 at Pailin and the "bamboo pole" that bat Ted the way of Special Representative Akashi and General Sanderson. (Though we should recall the mighty Vietnamese Army was incapable of defeating the BR after more than ten years of warfare.) But UNTAC could not protect the thousands of civilians and representatives of non-governmental organizations fin BR reprisal. ₃₇ These civilians, moreover, were essential to the success of UNTAC's political mission. (When the French deputy force commander, General Loridon, disputed UNTAC's policy, he was sent home.)

Enhanced Peacekeeping and Discrete Force

Thus, how can we account for UNTAC's semi-peace when peacekeeping is widely recognized, including by Secretary General Boutros Ghali, to be ineffective in enforcement--where there is "no peace to keep." ₃₈

Some of UNTAC's success can in large part be credited to unique role played by Prince, later King, Sihanouk in negotiating among the parties and in providing the traditional as well as charismatic focal point for national loyalties . ₃₉ Equally importantly, the willingness of the parties to sign a comprehensive peace agreement established a crucial facilitating role for the United Nations in implementing an agreed peace. The very multidimensional character of the resulting UN mandate proved to be a key when the agreement (such as it was) among the parties dissolved. With Security Council approved adjustments in the mandate, reconciliation and peace could have been achieved by disarmament, control, education and then re-negotiation. Reconciliation through national election was available if and when the other dimensions filed. Multi-dimensionality, thus, allowed for single failures and yet overall success. ₄₀

Most importantly, UNTAC's guarantee of a secret ballot rescued the peace in Cambodia. Without UNTAC's direct role in the election, it probably would have had to declare defeat, and retreat from Cambodia. The BR prevented the conduct of the election in the villages it controlled. The SOC was prepared to tolerate an election, expecting to win from it international legitimacy. But revealing the SOC's record of violent intimidation, what sort of election would have been conducted if the UN were merely in the capacity of a monitoring force? The UN would have had to withdraw from Cambodia altogether, citing SOC's intimidation during the campaign, or to tolerate the additional manipulation that would have been likely bad the SOC actually conducted the poll. ₄₁

The deeper sources of the international role in Cambodia's semi-success are as complicated as the sources of failure, and both operated at the same time. Contrary to our fourth generalization, the Cambodia operation was non-enforcing (consent-based) and yet relied on a discrete use of force. It exemplifies a UN record of success in similar multidimensional peacekeeping operations as diverse as those in Namibia (UNTAG) and El Salvador (ONUSAL). ₄₂ The UN's role in helping settle those conflicts had been fourfold. It served as the facilitator of a peace treaty among the parties; as the manager of fragile agreements supervising transitional civilian authorities; as the organizer of a new basis for peace, implementing aspects of human rights, national democratic elections and econommic rehabilitation; and as the director of discrete acts of crucial enforcement.

Facilitating Agreement

The conflicts characteristic of ethnic and civil wars result from fundamental differences of political ideology or national identity. The combatants have fundamental differences of political ideology or national identity. The combatants have compounded initial competition with reciprocal acts of violence whose memory erodes a rational calculation of advantages and generates bitterness and desire for revenge. Each party, moreover, often judges that a victory for its side can be achieved if only it displays the requisite fortitude. Leaders rarely control their followers and, indeed, fear that peace will undermine their influence. The very identity of the factions is fluid, as changes in the balance of forces raises, lowers, and sometimes eliminates parties with an effective role in the dispute. Conflicts in these circumstances are rarely "ripe for resolution." ₄₃

Achieving the peace treaty will therefore often require a difficult a lengthy process characterized by heavy persuasion by outside actors. In Cambodia, the process began in 1982 with contacts between the Secretary-Generals Special Representative, Raffeeudin Ahmed, and the Phmom Penh authorities. Ahmed succeeded in establishing an independent diplomatic identity as a Secretariat representative separate from the UN General Assembly's condemnation of the Phnom Penh and recognition of the rival Sihanoukist and Khmer Rouge forces on the Thai border. Although he explored the parameters of peace, Ahmed lacked the influence that achieving a negotiated agreement would require. Indonesia and Australia then attempted a region-wide approach in a series of informal meetings in Jakarta. They, too, though enhancing mutual understanding of each other's concerns, failed to produce an agreement. Only when the negotiations were pushed up to the global level, with the end of the Cold War, were the needed carrots and sticks made available. In the Paris negotiations of 1989 and finally, effectively, in 1991, the USSR and China let their respective clients in Phnom Penh and the Khmer Rouge know that ongoing levels of financial and military support would not be forthcoming if they resisted the terms of a peace treaty that their patrons found acceptable. The United States and France and then Japan conveyed similar messages, together with promises of substantial financial aid for economic development, to the Sihanouk faction. ₄₄

Peace treaties thus may themselves depend on prior sanctions, threats of sanctions, or loss of aid, imposed by the international community. The construction of an agreed peace, however, is more than worth the effort. The process of negotiation among the contending factions can discover the acceptable parameters of peace that are particular to the conflict. Peace negotiations can mobilize the support of local factions and of the international community in support of implementing the peace. And an agreed peace treaty can establish new entities committed to furthering peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

The UN has developed a set of crucially important innovations that help manage the making of peace on a consensual basis. First among them is the diplomatic device that has come to be called the "Friends of the Secretary General." This brings together multinational leverage for UN diplomacy to help make and manage peace. Composed of ad hoc, informal, multilateral diplomatic mechanisms that join together states in support of initiatives of the Secretary general, it legitimates with the stamp of UN approval and supervision the pressures interested states can bring to bear to further the purposes of peace and the UN.

For Cambodia, the "Core Group, or "Extended P5," played a "Friends" role in the negotiation and the management of the peace process. Composed of the Security Council "Permanent Five"--the US, France, USSR, China and the UK--and "extended" to include Australia, Indonesia, Japan and other concerned states, it took the lead in the construction of the Paris Agreements. It provided key support to UNTAC, both political and financial, and it helped organize ICORC aid (almost $1 billion), while providing special funds for various projects. But the Extended P5 lacked a fixed composition. It, of course, included the P5 but then included or excluded others on an ad hoc basis, depending on the issue and topic covered and the message" the group wished to send. For example, Thailand was excluded from certain meetings in order to send a signal of concern about its lack of support for the restrictions imposed on the Khmer Rouge. ln Cambodia, moreover, there was not a sovereign government to monitor or support. Much of the Extended P5's diplomacy was therefore directed at UNTAC itself, protecting, for example, the interests of national battalions. It also served as a back channel for Special Representative Akashi to communicate directly to the Security Council. ₄₅

Playing a crucial role in the Secretary General's peacemaking and preventive diplomacy functions, these groupings serve four key functions. First, the limited influence of the Secretary-General can be leveraged, multiplied and complemented, by the "friends." The UN's scarce attention and even scarcer resources can be supplemented by the diplomacy and the clout of powerful, interested actors. The Security Council now overwhelmed by the range of global crises benefits from the focused attention of powerful member states with a special interest in the dispute. ₄₆ The second value is legitimization. The very act of constituting themselves as a group, with the formal support of the Secretary General, lends legitimacy to the diplomatic activities of interested states that they might not otherwise have. ₄₇ It allows for constructive diplomacy when accusations of special and particular national interest could taint bilateral efforts. The third value is coordination. The Friends mechanism provides transparency among the interested external parties, assuring them that they are all working for the same purposes, and when they are doing so, allowing them to pursue a division of labor that enhances their joint effort. It ensures that diplomats are not working at cross purposes because they regularly meet and inform each other of their activities and encourage each other to undertake special tasks. And fourth, the Friends mechanism provides a politically balanced approach to the resolution through negotiation of civil wars. It often turns out that one particular "Friend" can associate with one faction just as another associates with a second. ln the Cambodian peace process, China back-stopped the Khmer Rouge, just as France did Prince Sihanouk and Russia (with Vietnam) did the State of Cambodia. The Friends open more flexible channels of communication than a single UN mediator can provide. They also advise and guide the UN intermediates, although the process tends to work best when they support rather than move out in front of the UN.

Enhancing Fragile Agreements

Even consent-based peace agreements fall apart. ln the circumstances iced by "failed states" or partisan violence, agreements tend to be fluid. In the new civil conflicts, parties cannot force policy on their followers and often lack the capacity or will to maintain a difficult process of reconciliation leading to a reestablishment of national sovereignty. ₄₈ Some of the international community even help to undermine the peace. UNTAC enjoyed extensive support from a number of countries, including Japan, Indonesia, France, Australia, Thailand and Malaysia--as well as the patient acquiescence of Vietnam and China in a considerable loss of regional clout. They provided diplomatic leadership, crucial financial support, and many of the essential battalions. Without their support and the participation of dozen. of other UN members the Paris Agreements could never have been implemented. At the same time, most observers agree that the unofficial support the Khmer Rouge received from various Thai generals on the western border undermined the peace accords. There, in violation of UN embargoes, logs and gems and ammunition flowed freely, filling the Khmer Rouge's coffers and bunkers, permitting them to disdain the carrots of economic aid and ward off the sticks of embargo that the UN had counted upon to encourage their cooperation with the peace plan. ₄₉ On the eastern, a similar but much less extensive trade in logs allegedly occurred and widespread (though unsubstantiated) rumors floated through Phnom Penh of continuing ties between the SOC's secret police and the Vietnamese intelligence service.

Peace treaties and their peacekeeping mandates thus tend to be affected by two sets of contradictory tensions. First, in order to get an agreement, diplomats assume all parties are in good faith; they cannot question the intentions of their diplomatic partners. But to implement a peacekeeping and peacebuilding operation, planners must assume the opposite--that their parties will not or cannot fulfill the agreement made. Moreover, diplomats, who design the peace treaty tend to think in legal (authority, precedent) not strategic (power, incentives) categories. Treaties thus describe obligations; they tend to be unclear about incentives and capacities. All these militate against clear and implementable mandates. Diplomats seek to incorporate in the treaty the most complete peace to which the parties will agree. UN officials seek to clarify the UN's obligations. Knowing that much of what was agreed to in the peace treaty will not be implementable in the field, the officials who write the Secretary General's report (which outlines the implementation of the agreement) contract to expand the mandate of the peace operation. ₅₀ Confused mandates are an inevitable result of this tension.

These tensions also explain how the ideal framework (both legal and political) of a treaty can dissolve in days or months, as the Cambodian peace agreements did and how the provisions of peace accords become so general, ambiguous or unworkable that many of the details have to be worked out implementation process. To be minimally effective under those circumstances, the UN must innovate. The UN thus needs a flexible political strategy to win and keep popular support and create (not just enjoy) the support of local forces of order. In a failed state, as was the case in a society subject to colonial rule, what is most often missing is modern organization.

Recent peacekeeping experience has suggested a second peacekeeping innovation in the implementation process. To be minimally effective under those circumstances, the UN must innovate. The UN thus needs a flexible political strategy to win and keep popular support and create (not just enjoy) the support of local forces of order. In a failed state, as was the case in a society subject to colonial rule, what is most often missing is modern organization.

Recent peacekeeping experience has suggested a second peacekeeping innovation: an ad hoc, semi-sovereign mechanism designed to address those new challenges by dynamically managing a peace process and mobilizing local cooperation. It has often been remarked that Chapter Vl presents the United Nations with too little authority and Chapter VII offers too much;and that Chapter VI is associated with too little use of force and Chapter VII with too much.

The value of these ad hoc, semi-sovereign artificial bodies is that they provide a potentially powerful, political means of encouraging and influencing the shape of consent. Indeed, these semi-sovereign artificial bodies can help contain the erosion of consent and even manufacture it where it is missing. Created by a peace treaty, they permit the temporary consensus of the parties to be formally incorporated in an institution with regular consultation and even, as in the Cambodian Supreme National Council, a semiautonomous sovereign will. These mechanisms have proved crucial in a number of recent UN missions. They can represent the once-warring parties and act in the name of a preponderance of the "nation" without the continuous or complete consent of all the factions. They can both build political support and adjust--in a legitimate way, with the consent of the parties--in mandate in order to respond to unanticipated changes in local circumstances.

In The Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, ₅₁ the parties agreed not only to the terms of a cease-fire and the disarming of the factions, but also to the maintenance of law and order, the repatriation of refugees, the promotion of human rights and principles for a new constitution, the supervision and control of certain aspects of the administrative machinery by a UN body and most significantly, the organization, conduct and monitoring of elections by the UN. The parties to the Agreements two institutions in order to implement the peace: the Supreme National Council (SNC) and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). ₅₂ The Agreements defined a transitional period running from the entry into force of the Agreements, October 23, 1991, to the time when an elected constituent assembly established a new sovereign government of Cambodia (that was anticipated to occur around the end of August, 1993). ₅₃ During that period, the Supreme National Council, a committee composed of four factions, was to "enshrine" the legal sovereignty of Cambodia; and UNTAC, an authority established by the Security Council in February 1992, was to implement the agreed upon peace.

During the early stages of the peace negotiation process, the Cambodian factions flatly rejected the proposal that national reconciliation be achieved through an interim quadripartite government. As an alternative to Cambodian "power-sharing," the establishment of UN administration required the creation of a legitimate sovereign entity to delegate the required authority to the UN. The Cambodian parties and the international community therefore devised the concept of the Supreme National Council (SNC), composed of representatives of the four main factions, to serve as the legitimate source of authority for Cambodia--the "unique legitimate body and source of authority in which throughout the transitional period the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cambodia are enshrined."

The actual status of the SNC as the legitimate sovereign authority of Cambodia during the transition period was problematic, both in design and practice. On the one hand, the SNC, in its capacity as a sovereign entity, has signed two international human rights conventions which will bind successor governments. ₅₄ The Agreements, moreover, authorized the SNC to act as an "advisory" body to UNTAC. UNTAC thus had to abide by a unanimous decision of the SNC, so long as it was in keeping with the objectives of the Agreements. Whenever the SNC reached an impasse, Prince Sihanouk had the authority to give advice to UNTAC. On the other hand, the Special Representative of the Secretary General was the final arbiter of whether a decision of the Council adhered to the intent and meaning of the Paris Agreements. The Agreements also gave UNTAC and the Special Representative a wide discretion, where necessary, to act independently and to make major binding decisions, whenever the SNC reached a deadlock. In practice, much influence was exercised over SNC decision-making by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and other interested states acting through their Phnom Penh support group of local diplomatic representatives accredited to the SNC (The Extended P5, Cambodian version of the "Friends" mechanism). The SNC was a part--indeed the symbolically vital Cambodian part--of the circle of authority in Cambodia, it lacked the resources or coherence it would have needed to have a decided effect.

The Council offered a chance for these parties to consult together on a regular basis and endorse the peace process. It also lent special authority to Prince Sihanouk and empowered the United Nations, represented by Special Representative Yasushi Akashi. Artificially created, the SNC thus established a semi-sovereign legal personality designed to be responsive to the general interests of Cambodia (even when a complete consensus was lacking among all the factions) and tothe authority of the United Nations Special Representative. Acting in the name of Cambodia--as a step in the implementation of the Paris Agreements--the SNC acceded to all the major human rights conventions (including the first and second Covenants on Human Rights) and it authorized the trade embargo against illegal exports of logs and gems. It was the forum which endorsed the protracted and sensitive negotiations over the franchise. It legitimated the enforcement of certain elements of the peace, absent the unanimous consent of the parties and without the necessity of a contentious debate at the Security Council. It could have exercised greater authority, perhaps even designing an acceptable scheme for rehabilitation, if Prince Sihanouk or Mr. Akashi had been both willing and able to lead it in that direction. The important point is that civil society participate in the decision-making process, at a minimum through formally recognized consultative channels. ₅₅ Semi-sovereign artificial bodies offer the possibility of mid-course adjustments and "nationally" legitimated enforcement. They artificially but usefully enhance the process of consent in the direction of the promotion of peace while avoiding the dangers associated with attempts to implement a forced peace.

Organizing a Transformation

Multidimensional, second-generation peacekeeping pierces the shell of national autonomy by bringing international involvement to areas long thought to be the exclusive domain of domestic jurisdiction. If a peacekeeping organization is to leave behind a legitimate and independently viable political sovereign, it must help transform the political landscape by building a new basis for domestic peace.

The parties to these multidimensional peace agreements, in effect, consent to the limitation of their sovereignty for the life of the UN-sponsored peace process. They do so because they need the help of the a complete consensus was lacking among all the factions) and tothe international community to achieve peace. But acceptance of UN involvement in implementing these agreements is less straightforward than, for example, consenting to observance of a cease-fire. Even when genuine consent is achieved, it is impossible to provide for every contingency in complex peace accords. Problems of interpretation arise, unforeseen gaps in the accords materialize and circumstances change. The original consent can be open-ended and in part a gesture of faith that later problems can be worked out on a consensual basis.

Traditional strategies of conflict resolution, when successful, were designed to resolve a dispute between conflicting parties. Successful resolution could be measured by: 1. the stated reconciliation of the parties; 2. the duration of the reconciliation; and 3. changes in the way parties behaved toward each other. ₅₆ But successful contemporary peacebuilding changes not merely behavior but, more importantly, it transforms identities and institutional conflict resolution, when successful, were designed to resolve a dispute between conflicting parties. Successful resolution could be measured by: 1. the stated reconciliation of the parties; 2. the duration of the reconciliation; and 3. changes in the way parties behaved toward each other. ₅₆ But successful contemporary peacebuilding changes not merely behavior but, more importantly, it transforms identities and institutional context. More than reforming play in an old game, it changes the game. This is the grand strategy General Sanderson invoked when he spoke of forging an alliance with the Cambodian people, by passing the factions. Reginald Austin, Electoral chief of UNTAC, probed the same issue when he asked what are the "true objectives [of UNTAC]: Is it a political operation seeking a solution to the immediate problem of an armed conflict by all means possible? Or does it have a wider objective: to implant democracy, change values and establish a new pattern of governance based on multi-partism and free and fair elections? ₅₇

The UN's role, mandated by these complex agreements rather than Chapter VII, includes monitoring, substituting for, renovating and in some cases helping to build the basic structures of the state. The UN is called in to demobilize and sometimes to restructure and reform once warring armies; to monitor or to organize national elections; to promote human rights; to supervise public security and help create a new civilian police force; to control civil administration in order to establish a transitional politically neutral environment; to begin the economic rehabilitation of devastated countries; and as in the case of Cambodia, to address directly the values of the citizens, with a view to promoting democratic education.

Going beyond the monitoring of a cease-fire or the interposition of a force, UNTAC undertook a multidimensional set of responsibilities in human rights, civilian administration, election organization, refugee repatriation and economic rehabilitation. The international community charged the UN--for the first time in its history--with the political and economic restructuring of a member of the UN, as part of the building of peace in which the parties would then (it was planned) institutionalize their reconciliation. The roots of the Cambodian conflict lay in the collapse of both the domestic and the international legitimacy of the Cambodian state. The multidimensional strategy of peace embodied in the Paris Agreements lay n the UN's stepping in to help rebuild the legitimacy of the state, after the parties had failed to achieve a reconciliation of their own.

The Paris Agreements granted extraordinary power to the UN during the transition period. ₅₈ UNTAC was required to supervise a military stand-down, including verification of the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and the cessation of external arms supply. It also undertook to supervise de-mining and to canton and disarm the forces of the four parties, which then would be followed by the demobilization of 70 percent of the factions' troops. But the true complexities of the security mission arose later, when the military component had to step in in order to provide security for and logistically support a faltering civilian effort to organize the national elections. ₅₉

UNTAC thus helped to create new actors on the Cambodian political scene: the electors, a fledgling civil society, a free press, a continuing international and transnational presence. The Cambodian voters gave Prince Ranarridh institutional power and the Khmer Rouge was transformed from an internationally recognized claimant on Cambodian sovereignty to a domestic guerrilla insurgency. The peacebuilding process, particularly the election, became the politically tolerable substitute for the inability of the factions to reconcile their conflicts and the unwillingness of the troop contributing countries to exercise credible enforcement.

Authentic and firm consent to a peace treaty, in the aftermath of severe civil strife such as that Cambodian endured, is rare. The international negotiators of a peace treaty and the UN designers of a mandate should, therefore, first attempt to design in as many bargaining advantages for the UN authority as the parties will tolerate. Even seemingly extraneous bargaining chips will become useful as the spirit of cooperation erodes under the pressure of misunderstandings and separating interests. The UN counted upon the financial needs of the Cambodian factions to ensure their cooperation and designed an extensive rehabilitation component to guarantee steady rewards for cooperative behavior. ₆₀ But the Khmer Rouge's access to illicit trade (with the apparent connivance of elements of the Thai military along the western border) eliminated this bargaining chip. And the suspicion of SOC's rivals prevented a full implementation of rehabilitation in the 80% of the country controlled by the SOC.

Second, the architects of the UN operation should therefore also design into the mandate as much independent implementation as the parties will agree to in the peace treaty. In Cambodia, the electoral component and refugee repatriation seem to have succeeded simply because they did not depend on the steady and continuous positive support of the four factions. Each had an independent sphere of authority and organizational capacity that allowed it to proceed against everything short of the active military opposition the factions. Civil administrative control and the cantonment of the factions failed because they relied on the continuous direct and positive cooperation of each of the factions. Each of the factions, at one time or another, had reason to expect that the balance of advantages was tilting against itself, and so refused to cooperate. A significant source of the success of the election was Radio UNTAC's ability to speak directly to the potential Cambodian voters, bypassing the propaganda of the four factions and invoking a new Cambodian actor, the voting citizen. But voters are only powerful for the five minutes it takes them to vote, if there is not an institutional mechanism to transfer democratic authority to bureaucratic practice. Now, lacking such a mechanism in Cambodia, the voters are vulnerable to the armies, police and corruption that dominate after the votes were tallied.

In these circumstances, the UN should try to create new institutions in order to make sure votes in UN sponsored elections "count" more. The UN needs to leave behind a larger institutional legacy, drawing, for example, upon the existing personnel of domestic factions, adding to them a portion of authentic independents, and training a new army, a new civil service, a new police force and a new judiciary. These are the institutions that can be decisive in ensuring that the voice of the people, as represented by their elected representatives, shape the future.

In the end, these difficulties highlight the crucial importance of risk-spreading multidimensionality itself. The UN should design in as many routes to peace--institutional reform, elections, international monitoring, economic rehabilitation--as the parties will tolerate.

Directing the Discrete, Impartial, but Non-Neutral, Use of Force.

The UN must avoid the trade-offs between too much force and too little. The dangers of Chapter Vll enforcement operations, whether in Somalia or Bosnia, leave many observers to think that it is extremely unlikely that troop contributing countries will actually sign up for such operations. The risks are far more costly than the member states are willing to bear for humanitarian purposes. But when we look at Chapter Vl operations, we see that consent by parties easily dissolves under the difficult processes of peace. UN operations in the midst of civil strife have often been rescued by the timely use of force by the United Nations, as were the operations in the Congo, when Katanga's secession was forcibly halted, and as was the operation in Namibia, when SWAPO's violation of the peace agreement was countered with the aid of South African forces. ₆₁ But both nearly derailed the peace process by eroding local, regional or global support. Given those options, "nationally" legitimated, impartial enforcement can become both necessary and effective. In Cambodia, for example, UNTAC---operating in full accord with the Paris Agreements--appealed to all the factions to protect the election. The appeal was impartial and based upon the peace treaty to which all the parties had consented. (This is now called "strategic" as opposed to "tactical" consent in UN circles.) The result was distinctly not neutral among the parties as the armies (most effectively, SOC's army) that were cooperating with the peace plan pushed the Khmer Rouge back from the population centers. This sub-contracted use of force permitted a safer vote with a larger--hence more legitimate---turnout in the last week of May, 1993. ₆₂

Thus, contrary to the third generalization what peace was achieved was achieved without the provision of credible overall enforcement by external parties, either by the UN or by individual states. Contrary to the strong version of the fourth generalization, the distinction between Chapter Six and Chapter Seven Operations emerged in Cambodia not as a simple "bright line" demarcating the safe and acceptable from the dangerous and illegitimate. Consent and force were neither completely avoided nor completely embraced. Consent needs, we are learning, to be "enhanced" if the UN is to help make a peace in the contentious environment of civil strife. And force has proved vital in certain stages of Chapter Six peacekeeping, and so it was in Cambodia.

Conclusion

There is no magic formula to eliminate the formidable challenges of making, keeping and building peace in the midst of protracted civil wars. Some crises will not find their solution. But today as the United Nations is under attack in the US and elsewhere, we should not neglect its authentic peace-making potential. Employing strategies of enhanced consent, the United Nations played a constructive role in Cambodia. With luck and statesmanship, the UN helped develop a semi-peace that is much less thorough than the hopes outlined in the Paris Peace Agreements but much better (so far) than any Cambodia has known in its independent history. This was a peace achieved over (and around and under) a civil conflict whose human costs has rivaled the worst "ethnic cleansings." It was accomplished though enhancing the process of pressured consent without a credible threat of force to solve factional security dilemmas, which persist in Cambodia today as they do in many developing countries. The Cambodian peace based on an agreed treaty and operating under the consent rules of Chapter Six and non-use of force was rescued, in the end, by a timely--non-neutral but clearly impartial---use of force. Much of what occurred was simply exceptional, a mixture of luck, statesmanship and particular circumstances. But the UN and the international community is in much need of supplementing good luck if its present challenges in Bosnia and elsewhere are going to be met. We will need to understand the Cambodian circumstances that statesmanship exploited.

Note 1: Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University, and Senior Fellow, International Peace Academy, New York. This paper draws on my The UN in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995) and parts of "The UN in Cambodia: Lessons for Multidimensional Peacekeeping, co-authored with Nishkala Suntharalingam, in International Peacekeeping, 1. 2 (Summer 1994). I am grateful to Richard Betts, William Durch, Daniel Markey, Jack Snyder, and Barbara Walter for valuable suggestions for revision. These remarks also benefited from interviews with numerous diplomats, UNTAC and UN officials. Back.

Note 2: Seth Mydans, "Cambodia's Real Boss Rules from No.2 Post," New York Times, Mar 25, 1996. I discuss Cambodia's recent experience with peacebuilding in "Peacebuilding in Cambodia," IPA Policy Briefing Series, December 1996 (New York: International Peace Academy, 1996). Back.

Note 3: Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and lnternational Security (Princeton University Press, 1993) pp. 103-124. Back.

Note 4: Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security,(forthcoming) 1996. Back.

Note 5: Barbara Walter, 'Negotiating Civil Wars: Why Bargains Fail," (Columbia University 1996). Back.

Note 6: Roberts, Adam. "The United Nations and International Security, Survival, vol. 35, no. 2 (summer 1993), pp. 3-30. Tharoor, Shashi. Peace-Keeping: Principles, Problems, Prospects," Strategic Research Department Research Report 92-93, (Newport, Rl: Naval War College, 1993). Back.

Note 7: These are the conclusions of Boutros-Boutros Ghali, "Supplement to the Agenda for Peace (1995)," in Agenda for Peace (N: DPI, 1995). And for discussion of the issue see John Ruggie, "Wandering in the Void," Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 5 (November/December 1993), p. 26-31 and Richard Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," Foreign Affairs vol. 73, no.6 (Nov./Dec. 1994), pp. 20-33. Back.

Note 8: Oct. 23 1991 - UN document A/46/608-S/23177; 31 I.L.M. 183 (1992) Back.

Note 9: An Agenda for Peace at para. 55-60. Back.

Note 10: See Steven Ratner. "The Cambodia Settlement Agreements," American Journal of International Law, 87 (1993) Back.

Note 11: For the UN to administer Cambodia temporarily, it was apparent that a special arrangement was required to vest Cambodian national sovereignty during a transitional period. A legitimate sovereign entity had to delegate the required authority to the UN, since the UN is precluded by Article 78 from adopting a "trustee" role over a member state. The Cambodian parties and the international community therefore devised the concept of the Supreme National Council (SNC). For further discussion see below. Back.

Note 12: At the suggestion of China, the areas specified for the strictest level of security and control over each of the four factions were defense, public security, finance, information, and foreign affairs. Back.

Note 13: For insightful accounts of Cambodia's recent tragic history see Elizabeth Becker, When the War Was Over (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), Michael Haas, Genocide By Proxy (Praeger, 1991 ) and David Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History (New Haven: Yale, 1991). For accounts of UNTAC see Michael Doyle, The UN in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civilian Mandate (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995) pp. 13-88; Stephen Marks, "Preventing Humanitarian Crisis through Peacebuilding," Medicine and Global Survival (December, 1994) pp. 208-219; The United Nations, The United Nations and Cambodia,1991-1995 (Y: UN/DPI, 1995). The UN Blue Book on Cambodia; comprehensive chronology and collection of documents. Human Rights Watch / Asia, Cambodia at War in Cambodia (NY: 1995) an account of current human rights abuses by all sides; Janet Heininger, Peacekeeping in Transition (20th Century, Fund, 1995). Seven Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping (Y: St. Martins, 1995); Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC (NY: Oxford, 1995); William Shaucross, Cambodia 's New Deal (Wash. USIP, 1994); the best coverage of UNTAC legacy. Dennis McNamara, "UN Human Rights Activities in Cambodia: An Evaluation, 'in Alice Henkin ed., Honoring Human Rights and Keeping the Peace; Frederick Brown, ed., Rebuilding Cambodia (Wash.: Johns Hopkins,1993). Back.

Note 14: UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees 1993: The Challenge of Protection  (Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1993) esp. pp. 104-105. Back.

Note 15: For UNTAC's role in the election see Michael Maley's, "Reflections on the Electoral Process in Cambodia," in Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future (Australian Defense Studies Centre, 1993) ed. by Hugh Smith. Mr. Salrnan Ahrned, Assistant Provincial Electoral Officer in Kompong Thom, estimated that more than half of the adults he encountered on his many visits to towns and villages followed Radio UNTAC on a regular basis (Interview, August 23, 1993). Back.

Note 16: For a valuable discussion of these problems see Jarat Chopra, John Mackinlay and Larry Minear, Report on the Cambodian Peace Process (NUPI, 1992). Back.

Note 17: Akashi's definition of "foreign forces" brilliantly parsed the ambiguities built into the Paris Accords, going beyond purely military forces to include those acting as part of foreign-directed conspiracy. Unfortunately, it would take a major investigation in each case to determine the alleged individual was in fact a member of such a conspiracy. No such investigation appears to have been conducted in the case of the three named "forces. Although each of them had at one time been members of Vietnamese military units, they had apparently resigned, settled in Cambodia and married Khmer women, with whom they had children. Back.

Note 18: The head of UNTAC's Human Rights Component, Dennis McNamara, concluded: "The exercise of 'control' in order to secure and neutral political environment and end human rights abuses would have been a daunting task even if the peace process had gone exactly as planned, given the time-frame involved and the resources available to UNTAC. With the refusal of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea to demobilize its troops and continue to participate in the process (which led to all factions not demobilizing) and related resistance to close UNTAC supervision of the State of Cambodia's security apparatus, UNTAC through its control function was hard pressed to prevent mounting political crimes." Dennis McNamara and Thant Myint-U, "Human Rights in Cambodia: What it Means?" Phnom Penh Post, May 21-June 3,1993, p. 13. Back.

Note 19: Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, vol. 30, January 1978, and the essay by Barry Posen cited above Back.

Note 20: John Ruggie, The United Nations Stuck in a Fog Between Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement," McNair Paper 25 (Washington National Defense University, 1993) suggests these points concerning traditional peacekeeping Back.

Note 21: The locus classicus for this argument is now Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation  (Basic Books, 1984) Back.

Note 22: Arend Lijphar, "Consociational Democracy," World Politics, 21, 2 (Jan. 1969) and recently developed in Timothy Sisk xxx (Washington: USIP, 1996) Back.

Note 23: Indeed, to complicate the picture with another level, one of the values of peacekeeping force is that it provides an excuse that a peacefully inclined head of state can use to explain to his or her more nationalist supporters why they are not pursuing a more militant option. Participants in the Middle East negotiation suggest that UNDOF is one of Assad's use fill excuses for not taking back the Golan. Back.

Note 24: Lt. Gen. John Sanderson, Force Commander of UNTAC, has stressed the importance of timely impact stating in March of 1993: Delays in the implementation of conditions acceptable at one point in time can allow the situation to change. While conditions for all parties to a negotiation may be considered suitable at the time of their commitment the longer the delay between signature and implementation, the more the margin for changes on the ground, which may in turn cause them to change their position." Late deployment loses the momentum derived from popular support, from the commitment of the parties, and from the psychological weight associated with a large operation moving rapidly toward an agreed goal. Back.

Note 25: If we examine indirect, long run, hypothetical consequences we could infer that all aggressive preferences are at root defensive. Henry Kissinger is said once to have remarked that paranoids also have enemies; we can safely assume that aggressors do as well. (Indeed, they manufacture them.) Back.

Note 26: It is worth noting, for example, that Hanoi acknowledged sustaining 60,000 casualties in Cambodia. For a valuable analysis of some of these developments see Mohammed Noordin Sopiee, "The Cambodian Conflict," ISlS Research Note (Malaysia, 1989) pp. 1-27. Back.

Note 27: The view was that if Hun Sen survived the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and held on to 80 or more percent of Cambodian territory, he would strengthen his claim that there was nothing to negotiate; Cambodia's conflicts would be a matter for domestic Cambodian jurisdiction. Back.

Note 28: The parties went as far as identifying five crucial ministries that should be subject to quadripartite control. But in the end, Hun Sen refused to accept Sihanouk as the executive of the transition and refused to have the Khmer Rouge on the executive committee. Sihanouk refused to allow a condemnation of "genocide," sticking by his KR allies. See Tommy T.B. Koh, The Paris Conference on Cambodia: A Multilateral Negotiation that failed," Negotiation Journal 6, 1 (January 1990) pp. 81-87. Back.

Note 29: Peter Rodman, "Supping With Devils," The National Interest," 25, (Fall 1991), pp. 44-50. The U.S., nonetheless, suffered a number of instances of what came to be called "Snooky Shock" as the ever mercurial Sihanouk danced between the Khmer Rouge and the Hun Sen forces. The British and the French played a supportive role at this stage. The French seemed eager to establish a close relationship with a Phnom Penh regime as a way perhaps to further a spread of the francophone commonwealth. Britain seemed most concerned to limit the UN's ever-increasing financial over-extension. Back.

Note 30: I should disclose at this point that I could not resist contributing a small amount of money to this party and participating in one of its rallies in Siem Reap in March 1993. Back.

Note 31: UNTAC, Report of the CIVADMIN Component, for discussion see Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate (Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 40-45. Back.

Note 32: This was explained to me at some length by a senior KR representative in February 1993. The KR counted on corruption alienating students, intellectuals, and peasantry as bankruptcy dissolved the state. Together these forced would hand over Cambodia to the KR, protected by its disciplined army in its border communes. Back.

Note 33: Cambodia's conflicts did harbor an ethnic dimension. The KR implausibly claimed that the SOC military forces harbored large numbers of Vietnamese troops (who left in 1989). It proceeded to target and massacre hapless Vietnamese immigrants wherever it could, successfully "cleansing" communities of boat people engaged in fishing on the Tonle Sap. Back.

Note 34: See the report by William Shawcross, "Tragedy in Cambodia," the New York Review of Books, November 14,1996, pp. 41-46. Back.

Note 35: Quoted in Ben Kiernan, The Failures of the Paris Agreements on Cambodia, 1991-93,"p. 14, in The Challenge of Indochina: An Examination of the U.S. Role, from the Conference Report of The Congressional Staff Conference, April 30-May 2, 1993, Dick Clark Director (Aspen Institute vol. 8, no.4) pp. 7-19. Back.

Note 36: The Australian Parliament passed a resolution forbidding the use of Australian troops in peace enforcement. Japan also was especially adamant that its engineers and police not be exposed to danger. When a Japanese volunteer was killed. Japan--over the protests of the UN--withdrew its police from the provinces. Back.

Note 37: Interview with Lt. General Sanderson, Canberra, Australia,. March 28, 1993. Back.

Note 38: Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, A/50/60;S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, p.4. Back.

Note 39: Falling in the category of geopolitical luck is that - unlike Mogadishu in Somalia -- the national capital and communication center was not itself an arena for armed factional conflict. SOC controlled Phnom Penh. Back.

Note 40: My view on this point benefited from an interview with Miss Hisako Shimura, DPKO, October 2, 1993. Back.

Note 41: There are some exceptions. Where UNTAC had the bargaining chips firmly in its own hands, there too it was able to impose its will when it came into conflict with the parties. UNTAC controlled currency because it could control access to the technically crucial prerequisite, international printing. The Civil Administration Division, for example, appears to have successfully gained control over visas and passports (Foreign Affairs area) largely because passports gain their utility through international governmental recognition. The UN as the universal intergovernmental organization could rely on its members to enforce its decree against any Cambodian faction that defied its will. So the SOC accepted the SNC-endorsed passport to avoid having all its passports de-certified. (Foreign Affairs did not of course have equivalent success in controlling Cambodia's borders or its border trade, for the simple reasons that these functions were important to the factions and some of Cambodia's international neighbors obtained great advantages through their complicity with smuggling.) One surprising case of foreign affairs "out of control" was an aviation treaty negotiated and signed by SOC with Malaysia in defiance of the Paris Agreements, which had allocated sovereign rights to the SNC during the transitional period. Back.

Note 42: Before the UN became involved, during the Cold War when action by the Security Council was stymied by the lack of consensus among the P5, the international community allowed Cambodia to suffer an auto-genocide and El Salvador a brutal civil war. Indeed the great powers were involved in supporting factions who inflicted some of the worst aspects of violence the two countries suffered. We should keep this in mind when we consider the UN's difficulties in Somalia and Bosnia. Back.

Note 43: I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, International Mediation in Theory and Practice (New York: Westview, 1985). Back.

Note 44: See for sourcer., Michael Doyle, "Making a Peace," chapter 2 of The UN in Cambodia: UNTAC 's Civil Mandate (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995). Back.

Note 45: Yasushi Akashi, "UNTAC in Cambodia: Lessons for UN Peace-keeping," The Charles Rostow Annual Lecture (Washington, DC; SAIS, October 1993) and Doyle interviews in Phnom Penh, March 1993, and New York, November 1993. Back.

Note 46: Some members of the Security Council have begun to express a concern that excessive independence by the "Friends" will undermine the authority of the Council. Back.

Note 47: For a good discussion of the UN's, and especially the Secretary-General's potential strength as a diplomatic legitimator, see Giandommenico Picco, "The U.N. and the Use of Force," Foreign Affairs, September/October, 1994, 73, 5, pp. 14-18. The "friends" mechanism seems to answer many of the objections to UN mediation expressed by Saadia Touval, "Why the UN Fails," Foreign Affairs,September/October 1994, 73, 5, pp.44-57. Back.

Note 48: See Adarn Roberts, The United Nations and International Security," Survival, 35, 2, (Summer 1993), William Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping ((N.Y. St Martins, 1993), Mats Berdal Whither UN Peacekeeping? Adelphi Paper 281 (London: IISS, 1993) and Thomas Weiss, "New Challenges for UN Military Operations," The Washington Quarterly 16, 1 (winter 1993). Back.

Note 49: See the account by Raoul Jennar, "Thailand's Double Standards Must be Stopped," Phnom Penh Post, October B- 21, 1993., p. 8. Jennar alleges not only financial but also military cooperation between the generals and the Khmer Rouge, claiming that it has continued after the May elections. Back.

Note 50: I first heard a variation on this point from Edward Luck Back.

Note 51: Oct. 23 1991--UN document A/46/608-S/23177; 31 I.L.M. 183 (1992) Back.

Note 52: See Steven Ratner, "The Cambodia Settlement Agreements," American Journal of International Law, 87 (1993) and his "The United Nations' Role in Cambodia: A Model for Resolution of International Conflicts?" in Enforcing Restraint ed. by Lori Damorsch (Council on Foreign Relations, 1993). Back.

Note 53: The new Cambodian government would be and was created when the Constituent Assembly elected in conformity with the Agreements approved the new Cambodian Constitution and transformed itself into a legislative assembly. Back.

Note 54: The SNC signed instruments of accession to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on April 20 1992. Back.

Note 55: For a model of this kind of process developed for the possible Bosnian peace process see Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, "After the End: A Preliminary Appraisal of Problems of Keeping the Peace in Bosnia If and When It Comes," in Richard Ullman, ed., The World and Yugoslavia's Wars (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996). Back.

Note 56: For a good account of traditional views of reconciliation see A.B. Fetherston, "Putting the Peace Back Into Peacekeeping, International Peacekeeping 1;2, Spring 1994, pp. 11, discussing a paper by Marc Ross. Back.

Note 57: Dr. Reginald Austin (UNTAC, 1993) Back.

Note 58: See Appendix 1 for the complete UNTAC Mandate, pp. 17-22 of Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (DPI, 1992) Back.

Note 59: For the first time, unlike UN operations in Namibia, Nicaragua, Haiti and Angola, the entire organization and supervision of the elections was left to the UN. UNTAC's responsibilities included: establishing electoral laws and procedures, invalidating existing laws that would not further the settlement, setting up the polling, responding to complaints, arranging for foreign observation and certifying the elections as free and fair. The creation of laws and procedures was a critical legislative function granted to UNTAC regarding elections. This authority to draft legislation was not a power provided to UNTAC in other areas of civil administration, and signified an innovative and intrusive roll for the UN in the internal affairs of a Member State. Back.

Note 60: This link was drawn explicitly by Deputy Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger at the Conference on the Reconstruction of Cambodia, June 22, 1992, Tokyo, where he proposed that assistance to Cambodia be "through the SNC--to areas controlled by those Cambodian parties cooperating with UNTAC in implementing the peace accords--and only to those parties which are so cooperating." (Press Release USUN-44-92, June 23, 1992.) Disbursing the aid through the SNC, however, gave the Khmer Rouge a voice, as a member of the SNC, in the potential disbursement of the aid. Back.

Note 61: William Durch, "The UN Operation in the Congo," in Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martins, 1993) chap 19, pp. 315-352. Back.

Note 62: Conversation with Lt. Gen. John Sanderson (UNTAC Force Commander) at the Vienna Seminar, March 5, 1995. On May 28, 1993, I observed this in process around the small town of Stoung, which as surrounded by the Khmer Rouge. The Indonesian battalion established an inner perimeter around the town. The CPAF (SOC army) created an outer perimeter and trucked in voters from outlying villages. Back.