Columbia International Affairs Online
CIAO DATE: 11/5/2007
Siloviki versus liberal-technocrats: The fight for Russia and its foreign policy
July 2007
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract
The window of opportunity for ensuring Russian democracy is closed or rapidly closing, at least in the intermediate term. Putin’s so-called “managed democracy” has turned the Putin-regime into an autocratic system of power where all matters of importance, be it of domestic or foreign policy concern, are decided upon by the members of the small, non-elected elite of powerful bureaucrats surrounding Putin. Elections, parties, court-decisions, major media as well as major business deals – especially in so-called “strategic sectors” of oil, gas, metals and arms – are controlled by the Kremlin, based upon a closed matrix of private, corporate, organisational and national interests. Russia is still a market-based society where property rights are generally accepted – even if they are suspect of turf wars between competing clans and well-connected business groups. But “rule of law” in Russia is at least in high-profile cases a matter of “telephone justice”, that is, rulings are decided outside and not inside the courts.
Even if Putin has secured high federal control over policies being implemented in this vast country and Russia on the surface today may be more stabile than during Yeltsin’s reign, stability is tied closely to the person Putin, rather than to the institution of the presidency. The reason for this is first and foremost Putin’s deliberate erosion of all public institutions outside of the Kremlin: the Federal Council, the Duma, the courts and the major parties. Secondly, it is because of his policy of division of power between the two major clans within the Kremlin – the so-called “siloviki”, representatives from the security services and the armed forces, and the “liberal-technocrats”, the powerful bureaucrats with strong ties to business – thus rendering Putin the only possible mediator. None of the two main successor-candidates, Sergei Ivanov, representing the siloviki-fraction, and Dmitri Medvedev, representing the liberal-technocrats, are likely to be able to control the members of the opposing clan, and each of the candidates seem unacceptable to the other side, rendering the possibility of a turf war between the clans highly likely. Without Putin as powerbroker, the two clans are likely to end up in open conflict with each other.
Concerning foreign policy, Russia is neither moving East nor West. Under Putin Russia has been moving more and more in its own direction, away from the West, but not notably in the direction of China and India. Russia and the West still have common interests, and Russia can still move towards greater “integration” with the EU concerning markets and trade – with a large weight on energy cooperation – but the West must acknowledge that it is dealing with an increasingly strong authoritarian power, which does not play along the rules of the West, but follows its own interests as defined by the inner echelons of the Kremlin.
Concerning the two leading candidates to succeed Putin, Dmitri Medvedev is cast as the more Western prone, whereas Sergei Ivanov is cast as the hawk. However, none of them are democrats, none are especially Western-leaning – and both agree that Russia should be governed by a so-called “single vertical”, a strong and centralised executive, and that democracy should be “managed”. Where they disagree is on visions of economic development. Here, Medvedev arguably is more in line with Western contentions concerning market economy, whereas Ivanov seems to be more prone towards state intervention and state control. Concerning foreign policy, Dmitri Medvedev’s foreign policy position can be considered as being framed within the foreign policy schools “pragmatists” and “neo-imperialists”. Sergei Ivanov’s position on foreign policy can be considered as being framed within the foreign policy schools “multipolarists” and “neo-imperialists”, with occasional references to Slavophile ideas from the “hard traditionalists”.
