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The Dynamics Of Negotiation Processes On International Water Disputes — The Case Of The Nile Basin _*

Ariel Dinar and Senai Alemu

Columbia International Affairs Online
November 1998

Abstract

The political aspects of the consultation process on the Nile issues is used to demonstrate the dynamic nature of a negotiating process and to explain possible outcomes in the future. By looking at the dynamics of the process, and by investigating the underlying causes for drawbacks and successes of the process over time, characteristic features of the Nile case are identified. In relative terms, both Strategic Management Process (SMP) and Political Accounting System (PAS) analyses suggest that there is more disagreement among the riparians on water allocation and out-of-basin transfer of Nile water issues, and more agreement on regional cooperation. The results also suggest that there is a trend of increasing disagreement on water allocation over time. As suggested in the analysis and based on the observed trends, it is apparent that in the short-run, and given that all other factors/conditions remain stable, the Nile negotiation/ consultation process is not progressing towards regional consensus/agreement on the three major Nile issues. Long-term forecasting is not recommended at this stage due to few observation data points and other uncertainities.

 

Introduction

Treaty-making, or negotiation/consultation processes on international water are guided usually by formal and informal rules, including international law, and accumulated experience, and are also affected by domestic politics. Generating a base-line agreement is a difficult task, which combines scientific uncertainty with political, economic, cultural and ideological issues.

The success of a negotiation process may not always be measured at the final treaty stage, but should be seen as comulative result of a continuous process. The key is to encourage individual nations to make adjustments in their policies and programs in light of what is learned about the true benefits and costs of environmental and economic issues of water sharing agreements (Susskind, 1994).

What is readily available to the scholar and policymaker in the field of international water conflicts are the results of a particular period of negotiations—usually a treaty or other agreement which allocates and regulate the resource. This tells little about the process by which the disputes were resolved. The lack of information about negotiation processes that failed to reach an agreement is even worse. No information is available why negotiations failed, what were the bottlenecks, and if the factors constituting to the failure were avoidable or not. For example, what were each side’s opening positions? Were there shifts in policies, and why? For a negotiation/consultation process still in the making, the interesting question is what can be expected, and when, from the process.

The literature on negotiations does not provide documented evidence on negotiation processes (successful or unsuccessful). Moreover, analytical framework to empirically quantify changes in parties’ positions is hard to implement because of difficulties to assign numerical values to changes in positions. Therefore, any addition to either data on negotiation processes or possible methods to measure trends in positions will be very valuable.

In recent years, the riparian states of the Nile Basin have established a process which, if not the first program of its nature, has claims to probably being among the most active and interactive of its scale. The process includes the TECCONILE and the NILE–2002 series.

The Tecconile

A ministerial meeting that convened in Uganda in December, 1992, after the end of the HYDROMET ₁ program, agreed to form the Technical Cooperative Committee for the Promotion of the Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin—TECCONILE. The short-term objectives of the TECCONILE are: to assist participating member states in developing national water master plans and their integration into a Nile Basin Action Plan, and to assist countries in developing the infrastructure, capacity building and techniques required for the management of the Nile basin water resources. Long-term objectives are to assist participating countries in the development, conservation and use of the Nile Basin water resources in an integrated and sustainable manner through basin-wide cooperation, and to assist countries in the determination of the equitable entitlement of each riparian country to the use of Nile waters.

The TECCONILE came into effect in January 1993 when six member countries — Egypt, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire convened their first ministerial meeting. Ethiopia and Kenya requested an observer status and they were later joined by Burundi and Eritrea. The TECCONILE has a permanent secretariat based in Entebe, Uganda and is governed by the Council of Ministers (COM) that convenes annually. A Technical Committee (TC) manages the activities of the secretariat in between the COM annual meetings.

The Nile–2002

The NILE–2002 conference series was initiated by the NILE–2000 Conference that was organized in February 1992 by the Water Resources Council of the Ministry of Public Works and Water Resources of Egypt. It is designed to assist policy makers, planners and specialists to explore possibilities of promoting and co-operating towards the development and management of the Nile resources. It is the professional equivalent of the TECCONILE.

The NILE–2002 conferences convene, usually at the same venues, right after the TECCONILE Ministerial meetings. One of the major highlights of the NILE–2002 conferences are the Country Position Papers through which riparian states try to promote their interests, needs and aspirations and/or voice their concerns with regard to the Nile issues.

In this paper we investigate the process of the TECCONILE/NILE–2002 meetings that took place during the last 5 years with active participation of the 9–10 riparian countries. Following this introduction we develop a conceptual framework for assessing trends in water negotiations. The third section documents the TECCONILE/NILE–2002 process, and describes the changes in the positions of the stake holders over time. The fourth section attempts to quantify the changes in the position of the riparians on key Nile issues over time, employing quantitative methods in an attempt to explain possible outcomes of the consultation process, and to predict future trends in the process.

 

Conceptual Framework for Assessing Trends in Water Negotiations

Here we attempt to describe the dynamics of the parties positions’ as the process evolves. The literature provides several tools to allow such description. Drawing on Raiffa (1982), the Nile case is one which is characterized by many parties and many issues. Generally, the stakeholders (parties) in each of the 10 riparian countries include: government agencies, business sector, and NGOs (including universities and research institutes). In addition, there are also international NGOs, and international agencies such as the World Bank and UN agencies. If the history of the negotiation/consultation processes is documented, then the interim offers (or positions) and counter offers may reveal a certain pattern from which future projections about the likelihood of reaching an agreement within a limited period can be estimated. The initial set of issues discussed may be relatively wide. However, over the course of the negotiation/consultation process, one may observe that for some parties the importance of some of the issues has changed, and some have became irrelevant.

An illustration of a case of 2 parties and one issue is presented in Figure 1. Negotiations over one issue that involve 2 parties may end in an agreement that is characterized by a set of actions that satisfies both parties. If the history of the process could be documented, then the interim offers (or positions) reveal a monotonic path. When more issues are negotiated, one could expect to have non-monotonic path since the parties could substitute one issue for another, depending on the relative importance each assigns to issues in the set. Drawing on Casse and Deol (1985), in a multi-party multi-issue situation, it is harder to predict in early stages what the results are going to look like because of the phenomena described above. Note that the time horizon of a multi-party multi-issue case might not be the same as that of a 2 party one issue negotiation. An illustration of a case of two parties negotiating more than one issue is presented also in Figure 1.

In the figure, is the value party i places on a particular negotiated issue in period t when only this issue is considered and I = 2 (I is the number of parties participating in the negotiating process). is the value party i places on a particular negotiated issue in period t when two or more issues are considered and I  2. Notice that although both cases reach, for simplicity, a solution at t=T, it is not necessarily the case and T(R) could differ from T(Q).

As was discussed earlier, data availability and the existence of very few quantitative methods that can be applied to the problem we address, make it difficult to analyze changes in negotiation processes. The analysis of the changes in the positions of the parties during the negotiation/consultation process of the Nile, are based on the data collected largely from the country papers presented in the last 5 annual meetings of the Nile 2002 conferences. ₂ As experience shows (Margesson, 1997) negotiations processes on international water disputes take years before reaching an agreement. In our case study, positions and the respective power to implement these positions reflect a one year period.

Quantitative Measures to Evaluate Changes in Parties’ Positions

Several approaches exist in the literature that measure changes in political positions and allow to explain possible outcome of negotiation processes. Endter (1987) compared cultural ideologies in values about water held by Northern Ute Indians and by Mormon ranchers in the United States. Although the purpose of Endter’s study was to show attitudes towards water project development, it also develops a basis for comparing non-market issues of water. Cultural differences towards values and beliefs regarding water may affect conservation and degradation of water ways. Endter estimated a listing of similarity measures (using the Robinson–Brainerd Coefficients of Similarity) that describe the agreement and disagreement between the Ute and the Mormon cultures regarding nine water-related issues. Dinar and Wolf (1997), and Frey and Naff (1985) applied a Political Accounting System (PAS) to water conflicts in the Nile River Basin, and in the Jordan River Basin, respectively. The PAS (Coplin and O’Leary, 1976) evaluates issue positions, power over issues, and salience attached to issues, and provides an ordinal ranking of likelihood to agree on a set of negotiated issues. Alemu (1995) employed a Strategic Management Process (SMP) developed by Nutt and Backoff (1992) to the Nile River Basin Case. The approach can examine the expected positions on a certain issue (or combination of issues) of the parties involved in the conflict/negotiation process and generalize about possible directions of the negotiation process. An approach that measures the operational codes of statements by political leaders, that is relevant to the case of data collected in the country papers in this study, is the Verbs in Context System (VICS). The VICS approach (Walker et al. 1996, as cited in Crichlow, 1997) involves the construction of indices that address the core elements of the operational code. The VICS approach was applied to compare changes in foreign policy of Israeli Prime Ministers Rabin and Peres over time (Crichlow 1997).

Among these we applied the PAS and SMP approaches at each year of the TECCONILE/NILE–2002 consultation process in order to simulate possible outcomes as they have occurred in reality. Based on the results, we make some general assessment of the parties future position over important issues. We believe that any work that resolves constraints in quantitative evaluations of positions and powers will be a significant contribution to the subject matter.

 

The Dynamic Process of Nile river basin Consultation

The governments of the 10 Nile River riparian countries are assumed to represent the interests of the majority of their population (Alemu 1995). Major stakes of the 10 riparian countries, as reflected in initial consultation processes (in 1993), based on Alemu (1995), are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. Nile Riparian Stakes and Interests in Major Issues

Country and Issues

Burundi

Wants to Develop the Kagera River. Does not expect water allocation from the Nile, but claims riparian rights on the Kagera River. Recognizes its potential benefits from regional cooperation. Interested in changing the status quo.

Egypt

Wants to maintain its “acquired right” (65.5BCM) of the Nile water. Depends entirely on Nile waters. Opposes new Nile water allocation. Wants to reclaim additional land for irrigation. Affected by water scarcity and siltation. Lowest riparian. Expect to gain much from regional cooperation. Has the power for success or failure of negotiations.

Eritrea

Wants to develop the Mereb–Gash River for irrigation and hydropower. Claims its Riparian right on the Atbara River. Benefits fro regional cooperation. Affected by floods and droughts and siltation of the Nile.

Ethiopia

Contributes about 86% of the Nile flow at Aswan. Has a strong claim for Nile water entitlement. Contributes a great deal to the siltation problem in Sudan. Plans to develop 2.4 million ha of irrigated land and more than 100,000 Gwh of hydropower capacity. Benefits from regional cooperation and is ready to cooperate once it ascertains its entitlement. Key player for success or failure of real breakthrough in Nile water negotiations.

Kenya

Contributes little to the Nile. Interested to develop its part of the basin. Never made significant claims on Nile water but expects its riparian rights to be respected. Expects to gain from regional cooperation. Supports new Nile agreement.

Rwanda

Has similar stakes as Burundi. Expects to gain from regional cooperation. Supports a new basin-wide agreement.

Sudan

Wants to maintain its prior “acquired right.” Claims 18.5BCM of Nile waters. Claims to have fully utilized its 1959 allocated share. Reluctant to upstream claims, but does not oppose new Nile water agreement. Will benefit from regional water management programs. Key for breakthrough in future negotiations.

Tanzania

Wants to exercise its “riparian right” on Lake Victoria. Interested in developing and conserving the Lake Victoria Sub Basin resources. Does not pose significant threats on water quantity/quality of the Nile River. Benefits from Regional Cooperation.

Uganda

Contributes about 15BCM to the White Nile. Interested in insuring its entitlement. Its consumptive water use and demands do not threat downstream riparians. Expects to benefit from regional cooperation. Important player in Nile negotiations.

The key Nile riparians—Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda are treated in this paper. The positions of other riparians were, either not propagated clearly (may be because of their relatively lesser stakes in the issues), or some countries did not submit position papers, as in the case of Eritrea, at all.

Scrutiny of the TECCONILE/NILE–2002 documents and other official statements during the 1992–1997 period suggests quite a large number of issues brought up by the riparian countries. Major Issues, that repeatedly appear in country papers and in various years, include (Table 2): Nile Water Quantity, International Law Principles, Previous Agreements vs New Nile Water Agreement, Availability of Alternative Water Resources, Future / Potential Nile Water Demand, Priorities / Pre-requisites for Regional Cooperation, Efficient Water Use, and Out-of-Basin Transfer of Nile Waters.

As can be seen from Table 2, the issues and underlying interests of the various parties are not the same. Also, as explained earlier, of the 10 riparian countries, four—Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda—are the most important. Therefore, we will focus on this subset of countries in our analysis, and restrict the comparison to a subset of issues, as will be explained later. The issues in Table 2, extracted from the country papers and official statements, were unified across time and the subset of riparians, and a subset of issues that are repeated over time, were selected for our analysis.

 

Measuring the Changes in Political Positions of Nile Riparians

We apply two methods—the SMP and the PAS systems, to measure the changes in the political positions of the 4 major Nile riparians vis a vis selected issues. We selected five issues that were mentioned more frequently in the NILE–2002 country papers. The selected issues are (1) Nile water allocation, (2) regional cooperation, (3) out of basin water transfers, (4) TECONILE objectives and Action Plan, and (5) Cooperative framework and Panel of Experts. In the quantitative analysis, however, we analyze only the first three issues. It is assumed in the analysis that if an issue is not mentioned in one year in Table 2, the riparian’s position of last year holds.

Table 2. Major Nile Basin Issues & Riparian Positions Between 1993 and 1997

Application of the Strategic Management Process

The strategic Management Process (SMP), was developed by Nutt and Backoff (1992) to formulate strategies with implementation in mind. The authors suggest that different strategies will be needed for different stakeholders, depending on their importance (power), and positions vis a vis a given issue. Nutt and Backoff propose a two by two matrix (Figure 2) where the vertical axis represents stakeholders’ position on supporting (0 to +5) or opposing (-5 to 0) a course of action on an issue; and the horizontal axis represents the importance (power) of the stakeholder to implement its position.

In applying the SMP to the Nile Basin, the biggest constraint is to find a rigorous method of quantifying stakeholder position values (-5  Y  +5), and especially the respective power values (0  X  +10). Whereas it is relatively easy to determine, from its position papers, to what extent one party supports or opposes a Nile Basin Issue, at least in a public forum, it is by far more complex, due to the multiplicity of factors involved in defining power, to quantify the power a negotiating party has to implement its position. This constraint somewhat loosens up when the exercise to quantify power is done in relative terms—one party’s power value with respect to those of other parties. In assigning position and power values to the different stakeholders (Table 3), we depend on our learned judgment, that are based on objective realities. ₃

The results suggest that all Nile basin parameters in SMP—stakeholders issues, priority interests, as affected by positions, and the respective levels of power do not remain static over time. A closer look at Tables 1 and 2a–d reveals though, compared to other parameters, issues and priority interests remained more or less unchanged for the five year period of the consultative process. Changes in stakeholder positions and their respective powers to ascertain their positions, though not remarkable, are traceable. The changes in each riparian’s positions are presented in Figure 3 for the period 1993–1997.

Figure 3: Changes in Individual Riparian Positions over Time

Figure 4 depicts the changes the regional SMP position value over time. Regional position value is the average of the riparian positions weighted by the relative power of each riparian. In general, in the five year consultative process, Egypt’s and Ethiopia’s positions remained more or less unchanged (except Ethiopia’s position on Out-of-Basin Transfer), while the change in their powers to implement their positions were traceable. In the case of Sudan and Uganda significant shifts in both positions and power were observed. The general trend in the five year period was that upstream countries (including Sudan) became increasingly vocal in expressing their desire for a change in the Nile basin status quo.

Figure 4: Changes in Overall SMP Weighted Average Position Values Between 1993 and 1997

Application of the Political Accounting System

Following Dinar and Wolf (1997), each riparian’s political position ( with reference to Issue, Power, and Salience) is ranked for the three analyzed topics. Position is scored between -3 and +3, reflecting strongly negative and strongly positive attitudes towards each issue. Power is ranked between 0 and 3 to reflect increasing levels of power, and may include legal strength as reflected in a water sharing treaty, as well as the more traditional military and political aspects. Salience is simply the importance of the issue, ranked also between 0 and 3. Multiplication of Position, Power and Salience scores for each issue and riparian provides the riparian’s overall position. Summation over the riparian’s totals allows the comparison between different issues. Higher numbers for all riparians reflect relatively greater agreement. The PAS values are presented in Table 4 below.

Graphical presentation (Figure 5) of the PAS total value summation of the positions of the 4 major Nile riparians over time suggests that over the last five years there was a non-negative trend in the advancement of the Basin’s consultation vis a vis water allocation, regional cooperation, and basin water transfer issues. While the incremental level of agreement about regional cooperation seems to be the greatest—at least until 1996, incremental changes for other issues seem to be marginal, however positive (Figure 5). It should be mentioned that for water allocation change in position values are the least among all three issues.

Figure 5: Changes in Overall PAS Position Values Between 1993 and 1997

Comparing SMP and PAS Results

The values for the SMP and PAS analyses reflect the authors’ interpretation of the countries’ papers, presented in the NILE–2002 meetings. It should be seen as a first estimate of the political values. For example, more regorous analyses are being sought, using an approach suggested by Crichlow (1997), and other methods.

In relative terms, both SMP and PAS analyses suggest that there is more disagreement among the riparians on water allocation and out-of-basin transfer of Nile water issues, and more agreement on regional cooperation. The results also suggest that there is a trend of increasing disagreement on water allocation over time. While the SMP analysis indicates a trend from positive towards negative values in the case of water allocation, with a change in trend in 1995, the results of the PAS analysis demonstrate non-negative trend. However, in both analyses it is possible to identify the change in trend after 1995.

 

Future Prospects

While our quantitative analysis provides results that indicate a trend in positions over time, one should not ignore additional processes and events that may affect the trend of the negotiation/consultation process. In what follows we introduce additional considerations that are essential to understanding future trends of the process.

Egypt and Ethiopia which stand diametrically opposite against one another, are consistent in their opposition or support of the two major issues—water allocation and regional cooperation, but their powers to implement their positions changed during the five year period. Note that Egypt’s power to promote its opposition to Nile water allocation was at the minimum in 1995. The biggest challenge to Egypt’s capacity to maintain the status quo came from Sudan when, in 1995, Sudan’s leaders intimidated Egypt to revoke the 1959 Nile Water Agreement. In 1995, Sudan’s support for a new Nile water allocation was at its highest, while Ethiopia’s power to implement its support for the same was also at its highest. Note that Uganda’s position and power in support of allocation increased with time and attained its current level in 1995. On the other hand, Sudan’s support for regional cooperation was at its lowest, and Ethiopia’s power for opposition of the same was at its highest, again in 1995. From these it is possible to say that, in 1995, Egypt’s opposition to allocation was at its weakest, while other riparians’ support for the same was, to the contrary, the strongest. This generalization is supported by the fact that, though Ethiopia insisted on the primary need to establish a new track, independent of the TECCONILE, to prepare a Nile basin cooperative framework that puts in place the legal foundations of major issues including water allocation, it was in 1995 when it gained the support of almost all riparian states. It is worth mentioning that the TECCONILE and PANEL OF EXPERTS are the two extensions of riparian interests through which they want to implement their respective positions in support of regional cooperation or Nile water allocation. Both tracks are in place since 1995, though at different level of performance—the TECCONILE with its Action Plan ready for implementation, while the Panel’s Cooperative Framework is just at a takeoff stage.

Therefore, while all other conditions are held constant, short-run prospects of the Nile negotiation/consultation are not very promising. According to the SMP and, to some extent, PAS, two major Nile issues lost momentum (and even display a reverse trend according to SMP). However, it would be very hard, with only five time points, and a partial analysis, to provide long-term predictions for the process.

There are two important factors one should consider while investigating long-term directions of the Nile basin consultative process: (1) the actual domestic courses of action (or inaction) of the key riparians no matter what they have been saying at international forums; and (2) the prefered diplomatic/political tracks they have been building on the international front.

In this regard it is worth mentioning the fact that the contending parties have been implementing their unilateral decisions to build water resources infrastructures. As Egypt has been expanding its land reclamation program beyond the Nile valley towards the Sinai and western deserts, Ethiopia recently has launched a campagin for micro-dam irrigation and hydro-power projects in the Nile basin catchments. Sudan, despite the economic problems it is facing because of the civil war, is persuing an ambitious plan to use Nile water resources in developing its huge potential in agriculture. Tanzania has plans to transfer water from Lake Victoria south to Dodoma to satisfy agricultural and domestic water demand. Even water-rich Uganda has begun complaining about scarcity and drought and has let it be known that it has interest in the consumptive use of Nile waters especially for irrigating its north eastern and south western regions. These are what at present are unilaterally being implemented on the ground on the domestic front.

On the international front, two separate tracks are in place — the TECCONILE and its “Action Plan” whose priorities are enhancing regional cooperation; and the PANEL of EXPERTS and its “Cooperative Framework” whose priorities are establishing the legal basis for equitable utilization of the Nile waters. As is seen from Table 2, the prime movers of these two tracks are Egypt and Ethiopia respectively. Let us note here that it is too early to say when these two tracks converge or diverge. Together with what is being done on the ground at the domestic fronts, the fact that these two tracks do exist in parallel is nothing more than as a “no peace, no war”situation.

The rate of success of each riparian in implementing its plans, and the resultant impacts on co-riparians’ water use are naturally different; but what is evident here is that there exists at present and in the immediate future a clear prevailing trend of unilateral actions versus consultations which might probably lead to confrontations. Much will depend on the expositions of non-Nile factors; such as the outcome of the civil war in Sudan, factors influencing Egypt’s power and importance in the region, the political stability and economic performance of the newly emerging East African states and their capacity to attract the international financial market to invest in infrastructures including water projects, the policies of ‘third parties’ towards the region as a whole or individually with each country or group of countries, etc.

 

Discussion

In this paper we attempted to develop and apply a quantitative framework, with which one might measure changes in a negotiation process over time. The suggested framework is applied to the TECCONILE/NILE–2002 consultation process, restricting the analysis to 4 main riparians and 3 major Nile issues. Two measurement approaches—the SMP and the PAS—were used, providing reasonably similar results.

The results suggest that there are differences in the positions of the riparians regarding the three analyzed negotiated issues. The order of agreement on the issues, from high to low, is: regional cooperation out-of-basin transfer water allocation. The analysis also suggests that position and power values do change over time for each issue and riparian. Trends of changes in regional overall positions (built in the PAS analysis, and calculated, using weighted average for riparian power in the case of SMP), indicate an unstable trends for water allocation, a negative trend for out-of-basin transfer, and a stable no-trend path for regional cooperation, when using the PAS analysis; and a non increasing trend for water allocation, and a stable-almost-no trend path for the other two issues, when using the PAS analysis.

Although there are differences in the results of riparian positions obtained from the two political measurement approachs, both SMP and PAS provide similar trends (when compared on a relative basis). As suggested in the analysis and based on the observed trends, it is apparent that in the short-run, and given that all other factors/conditions remain stable, the Nile negotiation/ consultation process is not progressing towards regional consensus/agreement on the three major Nile issues. Long-term forecasting is not recommended at this stage due to few observation data points and other uncertainities.

 

Reference

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Coplin, W. and M. O’Leary, 1976. Everyman’s Prince: A Guide to Understanding your Political Problems, Duxbury Press, New York.

Crichlow, S. 1997. Idealism or Pragmatism? An Operational Code Analysis of Yizhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, Foreign Policy Analysis Notes, 23(1):3.

Dinar, A. and A. Wolf, 1997. Economic and Political Considerations in Regional Cooperation Model. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 26(1):7–22.

Endtner J. L., 1987. Cultural Ideologies and the Political Economy of Water in the U.S. West: Northern Ute Indians and Rural Mormons in the Uinthah Basin. Ph.D. Dissertation (Univ. of California, Irvine).

Frey, F. and T. Naff. 1985. Water: An immerging Issue in the Middle East? The Annals of the Ametrican Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 482:65–84.

Margesson, R. 1997. Reducing Conflict over the Danube Waters: Equitable Utilization and Sustainable Development. Natural Resources Forum, 21(1): 23–38.

Nutt, P. C. and Robert W. Backoff, 1992. Strategic Management of Public and Third-Sector Organizations: a Handbook for Leaders. Jossey–Bass Publishers, San Francisco, CA, 1992.

Raiffa, H., 1982. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1982.

Susskind, L., 1994. Environmental Diplomacy. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

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Endnotes

*: The views expressed in this paper should not be attributed to the World Bank. Back.

Note 1: HYDROMET was a UNDP/WMO regional cooperation funded program that began in 1967 to strengthen hydrometeorological data collection and processing in the White Nile and Equatorial Lakes basins. Back.

Note 2: All country papers can be found in the NILE 2002 Conference Proceedings, except for 1997 in Addis Ababa, where proceedings have not been published yet, and we rely on the papers presented. The Proceedings references are: Proceedings Volume 2, NILE 2002 Conference, “Comprehensive Water Resources Development of the Nile Basin Getting Started”, Aswan, Egypt, February, 1–6, 1993; Proceedings, Nile 2002 Conference, Khartoum, Sudan, 1995; Proceedings, Nile 2002 Conference, Arusha, Tanzania, February, 13–19, 1995; Proceedings, Nile 2002 Conference, Kampala, Uganda, 1996. Back.

Note 3: We recently have started to develop a quantitative measure for power that is based on a vector of variables such as Economic, Institutional Stability, Military, Human Capital, Natural Resources Potential, and Geographical Position. Since some of these variables change over time, the power indices also change over time. Back.