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Email this citationCIAO DATE: 02/02
The NPT, Multilateralism and Security in the XXIst Century
Thérèse Delpech
Director, Atomic Energy Commission, France
1999 - 2000
I- The NPT is the only multilateral treaty with universal non-proliferation and disarmament ambitions. It is widely considered to be one of the major successes of arms control in the second half of the XXth century. Fewer nuclear powers emerged in this period than expected in the sixties, or even in the seventies after the Indian "peaceful" nuclear explosion. Without the Treaty, more countries would probably have acquired nuclear weapons. The nuclear succession of the USSR would also have appeared unmanageable. The Treaty has almost reached universality with 187 members and only four countries remaining unbound by its provisions. Some significant "threshold countries" have renounced their nuclear ambitions in the former Soviet Union, South America and South Africa, where major political changes have occurred in the '80s and '90s. With such a background, the NPT's indefinite extension in 1995 could have appeared as the well-deserved "coronation" of a collective international effort involving countries both from the Northern and the Southern hemispheres to prevent nuclear proliferation from spreading. Such was the feeling at the time, although three of the four states remaining outside the Treaty had nuclear capabilities, India, Israel and Pakistan, and at least two, Iraq and North Korea, had violated their Treaty obligations and safeguard agreements with the IAEA. Five years later, the 1995 nuclear pact was tested at the first Review Conference following the extension of the Treaty (14 April - 20 May 2000). Before the Conference, the forecasts for the outcome were at best cautious, and most of the delegations shared the feeling that the consequences of the Conference could be much wider than for the fate of the sole NPT. As the United Nations Secretary-General put it in his address on April 24, the meeting was taking place "at a time when it was needed more than ever". The world had witnessed a decade of unexpected disturbances and more chaos could arise if a major multilateral treaty, with so many security implications, would be challenged.
On 20 May, there was surprise and relief: the Conference had succeeded in producing a fortunate result for the Treaty - the 187 parties had adopted a final document containing consensus views on all the different provisions. Concern about the long and even medium term stability of the Treaty gave way to a measure of renewed confidence in cooperative efforts among member states. Yet, the essential question remaining today is how the Conference on Disarmament will now get down to negotiating, after a long period of disagreement, frustration and bitterness. The meetings which took place in Geneva after the Review Conference do not encourage optimism: instead of taking advantage of the momentum created in New York, the CD remains stalled, unable to agree even on its agenda and programme of work. The fragility of the consensus among states parties at the 2000 NPT Review Conference is a major problem lying ahead. Three political issues are outstanding: universality, non-compliance and nuclear disarmament. The first is not going to register further progress soon, either in the Middle East or in South Asia. Non compliance has simply not been dealt with by the Review Conference, and, finally, the "practical next steps" for nuclear disarmament, negotiated between the five nuclear weapon states and the "new agenda coalition" allow for different interpretations on key points. To mention only a few of them: the strategic bilateral reductions between the United States and Russia are tied up with the integrity of the ABM Treaty, challenged by NMD; tactical nuclear weapons, unaffected by negotiated arms control agreements so far have not been addressed by President Clinton and President Putin at the Moscow June Summit, and unilateral reductions as well as transparency are not likely in China.
It is worth asking whether the time of impasse in the disarmament field is really over. After a short and positive new start, the mood might become flat again. An essential part of the answer is in the hands of international politics. The ability of the major powers to mend their relations appears essential to collaborate in new nuclear disarmament initiatives, whether unilateral, bilateral or multilateral. More trust among them would be required. To diminish the current unpredictability is a major strategic goal in a world where three (as opposed to two) major nuclear powers might either cooperate or compete: Russia, China and the United States. During the Cold War, only the United States and the USSR had to find agreements on arms control, confidence building measures and reliable communications. Today (even without taking into account the specific problem posed by new proliferators), every measure has to be assessed in its three dimensions. NMD is a good example: even if a US/Russian agreement is eventually reached on the ABM Treaty, both countries would still face a backlash against missile defence from China. Beijing has already warned that it will undertake a significant expansion of its nuclear forces.
Apart from nuclear weapons, the threat posed by biological and chemical weapons has increased with recent advances in science and technology, and the ability of more states to master the technological challenges of developing these weapons. The regime put in place in 1987 in order to control the ballistic missile proliferation (MTCR) is widely perceived as insufficiently effective. The potential growth in ballistic missile range in additional countries is a legitimate source of concern. Cruise missile acquisition and development is also emerging as a real capability in a number of new countries. These developments are to be taken into account in any serious assessment of the non-proliferation regime. Increasingly, as the Tokyo Forum rightly underlined in its July 1999 Report, WMD and means of delivery have to be assessed in connection with each other.
Finally, the result of the NPT's Review Conference notwithstanding, the fate of multilateralism in world affairs at a time when multipolarity is becoming a new international reality will have a major impact on the practical consequences of the meeting. The prospects in this respect remain somber. The emergence of weak and collapsing states, unable to fulfill international commitments because of internal conflicting forces, will also intervene in the wide international security picture. Their potential for destabilization is wide and spreading with globalization. Non-NPT parties, which have played such a decisive role after the NPT Extension Conference in challenging the potential universality of the Treaty, could disturb the outcome of the Conference in the coming years, particularly if a new conflict erupts. And new rivalries over positions and dominance in the XXIst century have to be taken into account. The lines will be drawn again in many regions. This will also contribute to determine an essential part of the strategic landscape in the coming decades.
At the brink of the XXIst century, a time of considerable challenge in international relations, the world finds itself at a watershed in more senses than one. Different factors could be identified to justify the major concerns.
First, whatever consensus the P5 have come to during the NPT Review Conference, the content of the agreed text presented at the very beginning of the Conference does not address any of the most sensitive issues, notably the NMD/ABM heated debate. The United States and Russia knew that the real negotiation on this point would take place bilaterally. In addition, disagreements among the Five remain over the importance of multilateral negotiations and security priorities to retain for the next decades. Cooperation within the Security Council to prevent proliferation has decreased at a time where the opposite trend was needed. Some of the P5 are even suspected of significant non compliant behaviour either regarding their non-proliferation commitments under the NPT concerning non nuclear weapon states, or their pledge to renounce certain categories of weapons (particularly BW).
A second complication is the result of unilateralism, that has been a distinct feature of US foreign and security policy in the decade following the end of the Cold War (even if the US remains eager to build coalitions for external military operations whenever possible). The damaging consequences on arms control and disarmament, more accentuated than before because of the lack of a peer competitor, are only too well known. Manifestations of this trend include the withholding of US dues to the UN, the imposition of sanctions against Iran and Libya, the use of military power against an alleged chemical plant in Sudan, continuous air strikes in Iraq, but also the American habit to brief more than consult and to work bilaterally more than multilaterally. In this atmosphere, the rejection of the CTBT by the US Senate as well as the National Missile Defence initiative are interpreted by many states and observers as part of a more general pattern of behaviour that worries US allies and adversaries alike. The fear is rising that America will escape the roles and obligations it has taken on. The US has been for a long time the main driver for multilateral treaties. Reluctance to continue ensuring this role would have major consequences, particularly at a time where no other driver is apparent on the world scene.
Thirdly, the remaining problems on the non-proliferation and disarmament agenda are the toughest to solve. Among non-parties to the NPT or other multilateral treaties one finds the most reluctant countries to accede. Very delicate tasks related to verification are emerging with the improvement of deception tactics, such as underground construction and decoys of all kinds. Problems of non compliance and enforcement have come to the forefront; effective implementation is the only way to foster trust and openness that permits further arms control progress. Compliance challenges generate increasing concern. There are no accepted multilateral processes for assessing and enforcing compliance. Increasingly complex methods of concealment and sources of supply are used. As far as nuclear disarmament is concerned, the apparent abandonment of the most radical and unrealistic measures concerning the total elimination of nuclear weapons in a phased manner should in principle facilitate the process. The more reasonable approach suggested by the 2000 Review Conference (largely inspired by the New Agenda Coalition, the only group with a strategy at the meeting) contains "practical steps", more than just rhetoric. But as stated above, some of the most important measures are subject to diverging interpretations and risk to be rejected by the main parties when words will have to turn into action.
Finally, the pace of change in international relations appears to be too significant to be mastered by current leaders. And since weapons of mass destruction are the theme of this paper, it is essential to recall that, by their very nature, such weapons exacerbate not only regional but also global tensions. Particularly in huge and volatile regions still lacking preventive mechanisms, unsuspected events could dramatically alter the security situation without much warning. The international community has been taken by surprise again and again in recent years, whether in the strategic or economic areas. Consequences were analysed subsequently, but were not foreseen by either experts or (even less) by governments. Such is one of the reasons why the stress on prevention, whether preventive diplomacy or preventive defence, is currently so fashionable.
Instead of fulfilling hopes raised in the '90s by the end of the Cold War, the new century may bring with it increased risks of actual use of weapons of mass destruction, coupled or not with better defences, ballistic or otherwise. Would a "defence dominated world" be more secure than a "deterrence dominated world"? The question was posed already in the '50s by Oppenheimer (thick air defences against strategic bombers) and the answer is not easy. More defence could indeed come with more use or more risk of use. How has the world come to face such a dilemma?
II- If there is one firmly established fact about the Cold War which prevailed in Europe for nearly fifty years, it is the prominent role played by nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons. In the period of most intense stockpiling, US and Soviet arsenals contained at least 70,000 nuclear warheads, and tens of thousands tons of chemical agents, which must now be (partially or totally) destroyed at great cost. While the US abandoned its BW program in 1969, the Soviet BW empire flourished until at least the end of the Cold War - a fact recognized by Boris Yeltsin in 1992. After such a period, during which the most destructive weapons came to define the Cold War in many respects, it is hard to understand why the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction at the turn of the century should be such a matter of concern. Actually, in comparison with Cold War realities, present risks seem much more limited. Post-Cold War conflicts have been mainly civil wars in which the prevailing armament was light conventional weapons. They were essentially "low intensity conflicts", an ambiguous concept which appeared in the eighties to designate conventional conflicts of all kinds. Their toll on human life could hardly be described as low, especially as regards civilian population, whose extermination was sometimes an actual war aim, as exemplified by the Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo tragedies. However, the range and intensity of the threat they pose for international security is of a significantly more limited nature.
Yet, as stated previously, there are good reasons to address urgently the issue of weapons of mass destruction and their correlation to the security of the XXIst century. The risk of use could be growing. Years of unrelenting arms control and disarmament efforts have not eliminated the clandestine programmes of the most determined proliferators. The current mechanisms to manage crises serious enough to put WMD on the stage could well prove insufficient. If weapons of mass destruction are actually used in future conflicts (through blackmail or on the battlefield), it might change world security in a dramatic fashion, particularly if they are successfully used and risk becoming "normalized". Current leaders are not necessarily prepared to deal with such difficult situations. And the decline of multilateralism, if such a decline persists, can eventually lead to a decline in respect for international norms concerning WMD. The reasons for concern are therefore serious and diverse. Among them, one can address the following:
1 - More than ten years after the end of the Cold War, US-Russian relations are marked by ever greater imbalances in economic and military power. Even worse, Moscow's relations with the West have degenerated from a near alliance (during the Gulf War) to alienation as the second Chechnya war is prolonged. The policy chosen by President Putin is still unclear. One commentator from the Moscow Institute of International Relations, Andrei Melville, declared in March that the current official foreign policy doctrine of "multipolarity" could be replaced with a new concept of "pragmatic selectivism". Whatever that means, one of the possible interpretations is the absence of any defined foreign policy, coupled with ad hoc decisions according to differing interests at different times. In short, some form of opportunism, which could lead Moscow to continue asking Western money while selling arms to China and proliferating in the Middle East. This pattern of behaviour, already in place for years, could become worse.
Values governing both sides are increasingly at odds. The new regime in Moscow underlines internal stability as the major goal for Russia. This is hardly surprising. But when that leads to massive attacks on civilians as well as restrictions to the freedom of the press and the independence of justice, misunderstandings, as well as clashes of policy and values, could widen between Russia and Western countries. Internal stability, far from being opposed to freedom, openness, accountability and the rule of law, very often depends on them. Significant Russian security problems (corruption, drug trafficking, illicit arms sales, non compliance with international commitments, failed states and non-state actors...) are related to political failures in ensuring the rule of democratic laws and institutions. A widening perception gap, or more fundamental differences, between Russia and the West have been revealed. An era of new confrontation is far from certain, but the common wish to engage in collaborative efforts in non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives is now lacking. Irritation on both sides could lead to unknown reactions in times of crises. In a context where American conventional superiority is growing, the Russian Federation now considers nuclear weapons to be an increasingly important element in ensuring its security and maintaining its prestige. On the US side, managing the decline of Russia, as a major military power, through focused assistance programmes, has been one of the major concerns for the United States since 1991 (approximately 3 billion dollars have been allocated for non-proliferation and disarmament in the former Soviet Union). Whether it will continue to be so with a Republican administration is unsure. These programmes have been under significant criticism. President Clinton has called upon Congress to continue funding the "Expanded Threat Initiative" but the additional funding (4.5 million dollars) is far from guaranteed.
The destruction of the chemical weapons programmes is not an easy task in either the United States or Russia, but while the US is ahead of schedule in meeting CWC commitments, the lack of adequate funding in Russia brings into question whether it will be able to meet its commitments under the CWC, even with years of extension. The fate of the Russian biological military programme, whose existence has been largely disclosed by defectors, but also formally recognized by President Boris Yeltsin in 1992, is still far from clear, and will remain so as long as on site inspections are not allowed on four suspected facilities (Zagorsk, Kirov, Sverdlovsk and Strizhi). After the demise of so many empires throughout history, this is the first time history has recorded the collapse of a nuclear, bacteriological and chemical empire, and recipes for dealing with this unprecedented situation are lacking. Managing the nuclear, bacteriological and chemical legacy of the Cold War is a task of such a magnitude that governments are confronted with radically new problems. On the American side, the dismantlement of the facilities comprise a large number of complex situations and problems indeed. But, for a number of reasons, they appear light in comparison with the Soviet legacy. The problem posed by the Soviet legacy is not limited to the well-known questions related to the security of fissile material stockpiles, nuclear warheads or to the possible redeployment of scientists and technicians in third countries. It also includes huge amounts of weapons sold to third countries. Significant among them was the proliferation of SCUD missiles in Third World countries during the Cold War. Improvements made locally by the recipients (notably in Iraq, Iran and North Korea) are now a major source of concern and one of the official justifications in the US of the NMD programme. In addition, as a result of such early Soviet proliferation, the conduits of trade have been changing. The flow is as much South-South as North-North. If the ballistic missiles developments were run jointly with clandestine programmes of WMD, such developments could enable vectorizing of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological warheads. The same countries having benefited from technology transfers during the Cold War, now occasionally sell their technologies. This is the case of North Korea, which declared openly that such exports would continue. With the end of the Cold War, the problem of ballistic missile proliferation has therefore become more acute. More countries are trying to acquire long range ballistic missiles. Technological progress, dual use items and international openness are rendering efforts to contain ballistic missiles proliferation very difficult indeed. A debate over the importance of ballistic missile proliferation deserves attention: some observers emphasize that manned aircraft are more effective delivery systems because of greater accuracy; others contend that the ability to hit distant targets with almost no warning is decisive, particularly with warheads carrying WMD. Long and medium range rockets will allow strikes on the best defended cities and while fears are probably exaggerating the threat, they undoubtedly encourage the tendency to improve defences, particularly in regions of tension (Middle East and East Asia notably).
In a context of distrust between Russia and the United States, it is particularly significant that the place of arms control and disarmament in the strategic agenda has been downgraded with the end of the bipolar confrontation. The US-Russia nuclear disarmament process, the centerpiece of the bilateral relations between the two superpowers for more than twenty years, has been stalled for seven years, with consequences for the whole disarmament field. Even the Russian ratification of START II (consent might be a better word, since ratification might not occur until and unless conditions are met) and the CTBT in April 2000, welcomed worldwide ten days before the opening of the NPT Review Conference, could be unable to restart this process which began in 1969 despite deep difficulties in the bilateral relationship. In a nutshell, strategic arms controls no longer seem capable of succeeding in much more favourable circumstances: the collapse of the Soviet Union and some years of political and economic reform in Russia. The ratification vote in Moscow was accompanied by a stern threat to pull out of arms negotiations altogether if the US proceeds with the planned development of its missile defence system. It remains to be seen whether the ratification of the START II Treaty and the so called "demarcation agreements" is evidence that President Putin is ready to work with the West on a broad agenda on security issues. But America should also find a sound management of the bilateral relationship and is now expected by Russia to ratify the CTBT and the 1997 demarcation agreements modifying the ABM Treaty. When Presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin signed the START II Treaty on 3 January 1993, it was thought to be a grand achievement, the second in a series of steps towards further radical reductions. Who would have bet on START III conclusion so soon when the strategic bilateral relations have so much improved?
The reluctance of the US Administration to draw the necessary consequences from the increasing gap with Russia, in conventional but also in nuclear terms, prevents any serious initiative for the necessary change in disarmament policy. The abandonment of MAD (mutual assured destruction) as well as of the idea of parity is now the most sensible path. On the Russian side, the new emphasis placed on the role of nuclear weapons, and in particular of tactical nuclear weapons in the military doctrine, is not compatible with the marginalization of nuclear weapons in international security. The focus should now turn to non-strategic nuclear weapons in an attempt to increase crisis stability and reduce the possibility of "loose nukes". A negotiation between Russia and the US to limit these weapons could become increasingly imperative. The new military doctrine published in April 2000 incorporates the first use of nuclear weapons, and analysts have noted a strikingly anti-Western tone in the document. In addition, the Russian non-proliferation record in recent years is reportedly questionable concerning: dealings with Iran; whether to counter a "pan-Turkish" threat in Central Asia; to create an anti-American front in the Middle East; or simply to sell materials, technologies and know-how. In the new Russia, non-proliferation policies have suffered from chaotic economic reforms, privatization, underfunding of the military-industrial complex and disintegration of central power. This is certainly a dangerous trend, and one to contain, whenever possible. But to limit US-Russia dialogue on those issues to debates on Russian deals with third countries is unwise: what is needed is the resumption of talks on strategic stability in the XXIst century. After all, NBC and ballistic missile proliferation also means increased direct threats to Russian territory, located in a highly uncertain geopolitical environment.
2 - China is considered by many observers to hold some of the keys to the new century's stability or instability. In 1962, Chairman Mao told President Richard Nixon that a multipolar world was emerging, where China would have a major role. The nations identified then as threats to China were Russia, America, Japan and India. Whether this scenario will materialise is subject to question and the emergence of China itself as a major power will depend partly on China's ability to manage its own domestic problems (economic reforms, unemployment, minorities, political control...). The cooperative or the confrontational policy Beijing will choose to adopt vis-à-vis its own neighbours will also have a major impact on the evolution of its strategic environment. The US military commitments in the region are too big to be ignored. The US-China relationship is unstable, as it has always been, but now more important diverging interests are surfacing concerning the role both countries will have in Asia in the coming decades. Relations between Russia and China will also remain largely unpredictable, beyond simply rhetoric, since they lack common strategic interests, but they could converge on tactical agreements in order to limit American power in world affairs. In the nuclear area, China's policy is of major interest both to the US and to Russia. China is undergoing a major ballistic missile and nuclear modernization, which is now acknowledged by Beijing and "justified" by the US NMD project. On 10 May 2000, China's chief arms negotiator, Ambassador Sha Zukang, declared that the American proposal to build an antimissile defensive shield posed an unacceptable threat to China's security and could force Beijing to expand significantly its own nuclear forces in response. In any case, Beijing remains unconstrained by strategic arms reduction treaties, in particular to forgo land based multiple warhead missiles, and this could well turn out to be a major part of the Chinese nuclear modernisation. China is reported to have been developing two new long range ballistic missiles for quite some time: the Dong Feng 41, with a range of 12,000 kms (which will succeed the currently deployed Dong Feng 5) and the Dong Feng 31, a three-stage solid fuel mobile ballistic missile that can carry multiple warheads and has a range of 8,000 kms. A smaller underwater variant of the DF31, the JL2, with an estimated range of at least 8,000 kms is under construction for the Chinese navy. According to American experts, the JL2, like China's intercontinental surface-to-surface DF31, could be equipped with technology adapted from the Trident D5. This point is still subject to discussion among experts. Up to now, China saw its nuclear force as lacking survivability and reliability, but this might change with the new missiles now tested and about to be developed; both objectives are essential in the new plans. The new ballistic missiles will give China a significant second-strike capability in the next decade. Beijing itself has announced that the Chinese government is devoting the equivalent of almost 10 additional billion dollars to give the country a second-strike capability. This is one of the priorities of the current leadership. Finally, nuclear capable cruise missiles have also reportedly been produced, possibly with the help of Russian specialists, and advanced countermeasure programmes might be underway in order to defeat missile defenses.
China will be a more important nuclear power in the XXIst century than it was in the XXth. How Beijing exercises its power will have a direct bearing on stability in Asia and beyond. While Russia and the United States have sought to reduce their nuclear arsenals since the early 1990s, and France and the United Kingdom have significantly cut down their forces unilaterally, China has yet to begin similar steps and appears to adopt openly the opposite of such a policy. This is coupled with a deliberate audacity, creating unease particularly among Chinese neighbours. China has put in place few transparency measures and has effective information denial policies. The implementation of openness would help dispel regional and global concerns. Taking into account the situation prevailing in Asia, not only regional but international security is at stake in this part of the world. Unlike the situation which existed in the 18th and 19th centuries, Europe's security is no longer a matter of concern to the entire world, whereas Asia's security is. The reason is not so much that half of mankind lives there, but all the major world powers are present in Asia (the US, Russia and China), which includes several areas with highly acute potential for crises, with the likelihood of some world powers being involved. China, even when it favoured the vision of a multipolar world, appears unwilling to share the top position in Asia with any contender.
Japan's relations with China have deteriorated in the '90s partly for that very reason. Japan's fears are largely founded on the rise of China as a nationalistic power. Fifty years after WWII, China is seeking to prevent Japan from returning to normal and keeps up memories of Japanese militarism in the region. It must now choose between a major power's role, with the attendant responsibility to help maintain peace and security, and a nationalist policy, coupled with a still insufficient responsible export policy in the field of sensitive technologies, using reportedly the North Korean channel for some deals. China should in particular recognize that interest in ballistic missile defence systems, notably in East Asia, may be a function of ballistic missile proliferation. The permanent threat from Beijing to eventually use force in the absence of a peaceful resolution of disputes is a powerful incentive for new states to seek protection. Along the coast of the mainland, in front of Taiwan, 200 short-range missiles are reportedly deployed. No major country wishes to witness a deterioration of the already tense situation between Beijing and Taipei, which is considered one of the hottest spots in today's world. A clear statement from China putting aside any nuclear threat against Taiwan would be essential to obtain.
Between China and the United States, high level visits in recent years have not reconciled differences, and bilateral talks on non-proliferation have been suspended for one year after the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. When resumed, in June 2000, no progress was registered on the major issues (including proliferation in Pakistan and the Middle East). On major security issues in East Asia, American policy concerning China could generate dangerous misunderstandings in the Chinese leadership, particularly concerning Taiwan, which is now looming very high in the security field. Like most opponents of the US, China makes the mistake of forgetting that Americans have a particular propensity to move quickly from inaction to massive intervention (1917, 1941, 1950, 1991, 1995, 1999). Finally, it appears essential to encourage the democratization of the Chinese regime. The link between the murderous nature of the XXth century and the success of totalitarian regimes should not be forgotten in the XXIst century: they used to take more risks than democracies, to be prompter to war, and less sensitive to human casualties.
3 - The US, which has been at the center of non-proliferation efforts for decades, shows an increasing reluctance to rely on multilateral treaties. The dismantling of ACDA within the State Department has been seen worldwide as the bureaucratic symbol of this new trend. But there is more than bureaucracy: the US seems to forget that multilateralism provides legitimacy on the basis of a broad consensus. Without it, the rule of international law itself could be under threat. For decades, there has been in America an important group of people skeptical of agreements aimed at regulating armaments (overlapping with another important group of people with a world view based on American exceptionalism). According to them, when agreements were most useful they were unattainable, and when they were most attainable, they were least useful. While these views have always had a constituency in America, it appears that they have gained some additional strength recently, not only because of the extraordinary situation of the power of the United States, leading Washington to dismiss negotiations, but also because the threat perception has evolved in the US.
The paradoxical feeling of being increasingly vulnerable, at a time when American power has never been so great, is a major factor in this change in perceptions. The fear of irrational actors obtaining weapons of mass destruction is becoming a significant component of US foreign policy. The bipartisan Rumsfeld report has played a central role in this respect, underlining that the ballistic missile threat to the United States is "broader, more mature, and emerging more rapidly" than previously thought. Intermediate range ballistic missile tests carried out by Pakistan, India, Iran and North Korea in 1998 seemed to confirm this statement. The controversial National Missile Defence Act (passed by the Senate on 17 March 2000, the House on 21 May and signed by President Clinton on 2 July), followed - although the decision to deploy is still pending and will most probably be delayed by the failure of the last NMD test on 7 July 2000. The thin NMD system supported by the current administration is supposed to provide insurance against the failure of deterrence regarding states like North Korea (supposed to be "undeterrable" or to envisage rational situations in which they might use missiles against the US) and preemptive conventional counterforce options. It is also aimed at denying such states an ability to imagine that they could coerce the US into not honoring its commitments to allies and security partners. It would require substantial modifications of the ABM Treaty (of at least five different articles). The US attempt to renegotiate further changes to the ABM Treaty with Russia that would preserve stability did not succeed. Most experts have been skeptical of such efforts. The Joint Clinton-Putin Statement on Strategic Stability (June 4, 2000) recalls the existing provision of the ABM Treaty "to consider possible changes in the strategic situation" but fails to contain any substantive agreement on the possible amendments of the Treaty. It is unlikely that President Putin will accept any bargain with the current administration this year. On the US side, Congress has already dismissed any possible deal presented before the elections.
If attempts to amend the treaty fail, will the US withdraw unilaterally from the ABM Treaty in order to deploy NMD, with the conviction that unilateral measures will best protect American interests? Even a Republican President might hesitate before taking this path, because it would launch massive disapproval, including among allies. The big blow would be not only to the ABM Treaty as such, which does belong to a different period and was the basis for Mutual Assured Destruction, but also to the most powerful symbol of great powers' respect for negotiated constraints. It could therefore be a threat to other bilateral agreements (the START process in the first place), and to multilateral treaties (the NPT, the CWC and the BTWC). It could result in an aggravated military imbalance between the US and Russia and in added justification for China's prior decision to modernise its ballistic missile and nuclear arsenal. On 24 November 1999, Ambassador Sha Zukang warned in China Daily: "If such a balance and stability were shattered, the nuclear disarmament process would grind to a halt or even be reversed". Possible international reactions to US BMD programmes are not only important and diverse, many may be unintended and unforeseen. Up to now, defensive technology has proven no match for offensive missiles. Is this going to change? Are we actually entering a defence dominated world? At which cost? Whether in Russia, in China, in the Middle East, in East Asia or in Europe, this remains difficult to predict. The consequences are likely to be different according to regional specificities. They might avoid very costly responses in regions of great tension like the Middle East and East Asia. But among major powers, it is far from certain that defensive systems will promote stability in a crisis, even more if they are considered to be easy to saturate. The irony is that, designed to deal with countries like North Korea or Iran, the main consequences may affect essentially the major players. It is Russia and China that will shape the debate on this subject with the United States, along with the allies.
Only ten days after the US tested successfully an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle over the Pacific Ocean in October 1999, providing further (even if temporary) momentum for an NMD, the US Senate voted to reject American ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The effort to get a comprehensive test ban treaty had a long history and the treaty had acquired considerable symbolic value. The vote against the CTBT in the US Senate further undermined the future of arms control. The feeling that international treaties would not provide for sufficient verification (another old tendency with a large constituency in America) reemerged with new strength. For some analysts, like Joseph Cirincione, "the battle over the test ban is part of a larger war over the future of the non-proliferation regime". What to expect from international law, how it will (or will not) be used as a major tool to prevent violence from spreading and developing, and whether the United States will choose to replace multilateral approaches by more bilateral work are major questions ahead. The latter temptation is permanent in Washington and may be even more tempting in the current position of extraordinary power, where multilateral agreements are seen as showing major deficiencies in terms of compliance. Yet, the need for international cooperation to ensure security has become more obvious in a multipolar world than during the Cold War, and America should accept that with power comes responsibilities and international involvement, not protectionism and complacency.
4 - To make things worse, military means often lead the way in America, a tendency that appears at odds with the Charter. It is true that America has almost always sought partners to generate the domestic consensus to use force, and that diplomacy has often exhausted its possibilities before action was taken (as in the case of Kosovo, following the Rambouillet failure) but the temptation to use force unilaterally is also growing and represents a worrisome trend for America itself. Even if, as Ashton Carter puts it, "the American military is the envy of the world", the monopoly on advanced military technologies is now ending. General supremacy is also over. The West's vision of the future can be increasingly challenged. More, better, smarter weapons by those craving for more protection from what they believe to be mounting threats are not the answer. Both allies and adversaries of the United States are puzzled by what they consider as a misreading of the current international situation, which threatens to make things worse. The combination of neglect for multilateralism, lack of clear strategy (the "conceptual vacuum" frequently lamented by defence analysts since the end of the Cold War) and perceived need for new weaponry is likely to lead to crises testing stability and even deterrence, particularly if fundamentally new security threats do emerge in the next century.
In a world where American commitments abroad are growing, and perhaps reaching beyond what the United States can actually afford, stretching its own forces, these are not minor problems to tackle. It appears increasingly difficult in the current world, including for the United States, to achieve one's objectives without the authority and support which only international institutions can provide. Total freedom of action as a perfect amplification of national power has always been a dream, and is becoming a complete fiction. Restraint is also the only way of ensuring comparable moderation in the actions of others. It is therefore not only for small or medium size states that multilateral institutions are major assets; no state can afford to be oblivious of multilateral institutions, even the most powerful ones, even the United States. If the dynamics of today's world are multipolar, with a strategic fragmentation of the world, and with local and regional conflicts acquiring their own logic, only renewed interest in multilateralism can prevent the century from being ruled by the use of force. Experience in recent years has shown how difficult it was to contain conflicts within traditional borders. This trend will only increase in the future. Finally, even when military options appear necessary (and the Europeans will remain more reluctant and "slow" than the Americans in this respect), the prominent role played by multinational military operations across the entire spectrum of warfare indicate the centrality of coalitions and multinational dialogue more than the desirability of unilateral missions and actions. Major powers should not only pay attention to local crises before they reach a critical point, but they should also do so in a cooperative manner as much as they can. The asymmetry of power, which makes the West and in particular the US so powerful, should not obliterate diplomatic as well as military wisdom.
Is the situation better on the Russian side concerning the use of military power? It only appears worse; last year's manoeuvers "West 1999" included first use of nuclear weapons (and even for some commentators "early first use"). Second and foremost, the ways and means used by Moscow during the second Chechnya war were disproportionate in relation to the necessity to fight terrorism, an objective not challenged abroad in itself. As a result of the invasion, in a military action which had major electoral results but no concrete outcome on the ground, hundreds of thousands of civilians were forced to leave their homes and tens of thousands were killed. After almost a year of fighting, Russia controls most of Chechnya, and Vladimir Putin won the elections. But the losses are important and the political solution is more difficult to achieve. The commander of Russia's military forces in Chechnya urged politicians in June 2000 to find such a solution. It is telling to note that at the time, officials in Moscow threatened to do what the US had done two years earlier: bomb the training camps in Afghanistan, because of reported Taleban support for Muslim rebels fighting in Chechnya. How the Russian President will deal with the military is uncertain; insecurity within the Federation and at the borders go along with a sharp decline of resources, which in turn lead the military-industrial complex to sell abroad without other priority than mere survival. A good explanation of many controversial deals in recent years is to be found there. To increase control over the military-industrial complex should therefore constitute a priority as well as the reform of the current export control system.
5 - The survival of the multilateral treaties, which were concluded at the cost of so much effort in the second half of the XXth century, is uncertain in the next decades. The challenge today is to ensure the full implementation of all the provisions of the treaty by all the States Parties. Universality is not ensured, technologies are spreading, verification is more and more demanding, and non-compliance is not encountering adequate responses. The case of the NPT is perhaps the most significant. Since 1995, universality of the treaty has appeared as an even more prominent problem than in the past. The target of the 1995 Extension Conference was mainly Israel, suspected of holding an arsenal of between 100 and 200 nuclear warheads, some of which are said to be highly sophisticated and able to be fitted to ballistic missiles. There is little temptation for Israel to depart from the consistent and cautious policy that neither confirms nor denies the country's nuclear capability. But there is, on the Arab side, the feeling that it will be increasingly difficult for Arab governments to maintain the commitments made under the NPT if Israel continues to be reluctant to engage in any further move concerning the Treaty. This does not necessarily mean that Arab countries will withdraw from the Treaty, but that they may weaken their support to it as well as continue investing in chemical and/or biological weapons program.
After the NPT Extension Conference, the surprise did not come from Israel, but from India and Pakistan. The NPT was considered to be in grave danger, with nothing at hand to replace it. The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan heralded in many respects the difficulties of the non-proliferation regime. They have significantly altered the picture and might reveal as much as the fall of the Berlin Wall about the prospects for international security in the next century. The tests are cause for concern on five counts: their military nature has been clearly underscored; the region is disturbed by a permanent conflict in Kashmir; the borders are not settled; China-Pakistan long-standing cooperation is reportedly still alive and the China-India rivalry is introducing a third high-ranking player in the region. The tests have also raised questions in countries having signed the NPT with the belief that there would be only five nuclear powers, with the ultimate elimination of the nuclear weapons according to the article VI of the Treaty. At the same time, the geostrategic relations are being altered in the region. Pakistan is challenging both the US and Russia with its support to the Talebans. India still keeps significant ties with Russia, but US-Indian relations, freed from their Cold War constraints, have steadily improved in many areas, as President Bill Clinton's visit to India in March 2000 has shown. Even if US-Indian differences on nuclear issues will not be easy to settle, a strategic dialogue has begun on wider issues. Such is the case with a number of European countries as well. Finally, the tests should compel analysts to devote more thought to Asia which takes them by surprise too often, indicating probably that their image of it is somehow distorted.
Besides the issues related to the universality of treaties, the problem posed by the actual or threatened withdrawal of certain states at some future time is another matter for concern. Are we entering a "second nuclear age" as some experts already predict? Which countries are more likely to follow suit? In which circumstances? And how should this be addressed?
6 - The diversification of the threat is another new and worrisome factor. Two different elements could be taken into consideration here. First, the diversification of the weapons and disarmament measures related to them. Concerning nuclear weapons, it is remarkable that the issue of tactical nuclear weapons, which has been almost absent in international negotiations, is now attracting significant attention. Despite accounting for more than half of the global stockpile of nuclear warheads, they are still not covered by agreements. This long-neglected issue has begun to receive more attention with: the re-evaluation of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Russian military doctrine; uncertainties concerning the Chinese nuclear arsenal; and China's declaration in July 1999 of its acquisition of neutron bomb capability. At the last 2000 NPT Review Conference, the need to address the issue of tactical nuclear weapons was acknowledged by a large number of countries and the final document mentions it as one of the most important to deal with in the coming years. Increased transparency is a necessary first step, leading to a programme for their elimination. The potentially destabilising role of these weapons, which are easier to deploy and to use, and the US-Russia dialogue on arms control, could make public the results of the 1991 unilateral initiatives and add pressure for further commitments. From a European point of view, it is not surprising that countries like Finland call for such weapons to be brought under a regime of contractual disarmament obligations with the objective of lowering their operational readiness and eventually eliminating them from military options. Ways to increase transparency, withdrawal and dismantlement of short-range nuclear weapons should be explored as a matter of priority.
Secondly, the diversity of the countries involved. Besides making crisis management more difficult, multiplicity also increases the risk of nuclear weapons being used. The more players there are, the harder it is to control the game. In the bilateral confrontation of the Cold War, nuclear weapons have most probably encouraged settlements short of war. While nuclear deterrence has never been fully tested, the possession of nuclear weapons no doubt induced caution among the major adversaries. Deterrence might have been a system of abstract logic, but it was understood on both sides that restraint was a common interest. There is no indication that the new players will follow the same rules. Also unknown are their motivations for pursuing such programmes: is it last resort, a desire to implicate a powerful ally in case of conflict, or an instrument of regional domination? Lack of information on possible adversaries has always been a genuine concern to generals, strategists and statesmen. Almost complete ignorance of the new players' doctrines (assuming they have any) adds to the international concern. How effective deterrence will be among new nuclear powers is debatable. Although nuclear weapons will probably continue to induce caution, proximity, small arsenals, lack of good communication and, in some cases, the absence of accepted boundaries or clear lines of influence, they could open the way to new and more dangerous behaviours. A number of crises, if mismanaged, have the potential to grow into serious nuclear threats. During the Cold War, there were many attempts to address not just credibility but also stability during any potential crisis. With increased vulnerability (small forces or fixed-based systems) the "use it or lose it" impetus increases during a crisis situation. How should this concern evolve in the Middle East, South Asia, with the India-Pakistan-China nuclear triangle, or East Asia, with the most dangerous Taiwan issue likely to involve two asymmetric nuclear powers?
Up to now, the non-use of nuclear weapons has been the result of a combination of two factors: successful non-proliferation policies, and successful deterrence policies (including extended US deterrence). Continuous success of nuclear non-proliferation is not certain - the catalysts for proliferation are still present. US precision-guided munitions and conventional superiority may heighten the military interest in WMD for potential adversaries. Prevention or detection on time might become more difficult because of new concealment strategies. Safeguarded nuclear material from civilian nuclear power plants have not been so far diverted for weapons, but such a strategy might be tempting, taking advantage of the so-called "material unaccounted for" by the IAEA. It is a long process, unlike the Iraqi "crash programme", but it is safer from the point of view of international scrutiny. The IAEA is developing within its strengthened safeguards system new techniques to deal with undeclared facilities. How effective the new system will be with determined proliferators remains to be seen. Secondly, continuous success of deterrence (and extended deterrence) policies is also under threat, as stated above. One cannot dismiss the possibility that more states will look to independent deterrents if the US security policy appears less credible.
The public sense of diminished danger, widely shared after the end of the bipolar confrontation, might be not only misplaced but part of the problem.
7 - The recent past has disclosed a novelty in armed conflicts: regional wars with the possible use of WMD. Such was one of the main lessons of the Iran-Iraq war, where extensive use of chemical weapons was undertaken from 1984 to 1988. Such was also a major lesson of the Gulf War in 1991, and of the US-North Korea crisis in 1992-1994. Both events have shown how a regional conflict could have global implications. The international community seems unable to deal successfully with the most determined proliferators, who are also the most dangerous. Neither the Gulf War confrontation, nor the numerous inspections conducted in Iraq, or the cooperation initiated by the October 1994 Agreed Framework between United States and North Korea, have succeeded in halting those programmes. UNSCOM's outstanding successes notwithstanding, disarmament is still an unfinished task in Iraq. Uncertainties remain as regards the chemical programme, notably the extent of production and possible weaponization of VX, the material balance of CW production equipment and the consumption of special munitions during the Iran/Iraq war. In the biological area the suspicions are even stronger and more difficult to dispel: no satisfactory "Full Final and Complete" disclosure has ever been produced by Iraq since 1995. This conclusion has been shared by independent experts twice, in March and September 1997 (and again in 1998, at additional meetings taking place in Vienna and in Baghdad, with the presence of Iraqi experts, making the conclusions more significant). It is assumed that Iraq has produced large quantities of anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin, but questions remain concerning the past programme, as well as the ability of the Iraqis to restart a biological programme. Since inspectors left Iraq in December 1998, the Security Council is not in a position to assess the evolution of prohibited activities. The international community now discovers how useful the verification regime was, implemented in Iraq at a time when it is no longer operating. To terminate past programs and prevent further developments is the objective of UNSC resolution 1284, but Iraq so far has rejected the text and reiterated this position in July 2000. As for North Korea, according to some sources, it may have rebuilt clandestine capabilities, in violation of the October 1994 agreed framework, but the extent of this effort is unknown.
Such an effective resistance from two determined proliferators, after six or seven years of uninterrupted efforts and pressure, shows that the Gulf War was not won so quickly, contrary to widespread belief, and that the Agreed Framework might have been the best solution available in 1994, but certainly not the end of the story. A "strategic abscess" remains in the Korean Peninsula with serious regional implications for Japan. What has been achieved during the North-South Korea Summit in June does not contradict this analysis: no substantive results could be presented in the WMD field or were even looked for. The picture of the two leaders shaking hands, in the absence of any firm security agenda, can be a step to more productive talks or symbolism devoid of substance. The difficulty to deal with determined proliferators is not a failure of arms control. The failure has been of the major powers and in particular of the Security Council to respond in a united and decisive manner for a sufficient period of time. Blaming arms control misses the point. But it is also worth noting that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction might not be everywhere devalued as the currency of power. Such is the case mainly in the West and in particular in the United States, where other technological dreams have taken shape in the military sphere. Terror remains a good tool, particularly in regions of tension or of non status quo.
Finally, the two cases raise the issue of non-compliance in a more acute way than before. It was assumed for a long time that, when a nation signed an international treaty or agreement, and ratification by the appropriate body was completed, compliance with that agreement was not open to question. Iraq and North Korea have since revealed that the issue of non-compliance with commitments freely undertaken is a crucial issue. Lessons can be drawn from the recent past: the first is to react quickly to avoid being saddled with these problems for years and decades on issues where time is on the proliferator's side. The second is to make the best possible use of on-site inspections, they are less risky than military operations. They are also more effective, when intrusive inspections are allowed. The third is to combine specific responses with multilateral assessment and support in order to avoid double standards. The fourth is that the threat to use force might be necessary for a diplomatic solution to succeed, something the UN Secretary General himself has acknowledged. Lastly, it is crucially important that non compliance not be tolerated by any party to a given treaty. Laxity encourages unilateralism and creates division among members at the expense of the non-proliferation norms of behaviour. But thorny issues arise in the case of non-compliance: Who is to determine non-compliance? Who enforces the rule? What are acceptable safety margins of error concerning a clandestine programme? How to ensure a coordinated response by the major powers, who have not always impeccable records concerning non-proliferation themselves?
8 - The effectiveness of the United Nations and the Security Council has been undermined in recent years. At the end of the Cold War, the Security Council adopted a number of measures showing its determination to take seriously the issue of WMD proliferation. One of the most spectacular declarations in this respect was the one adopted by the Security Council at the suggestion of its President in January 1992. The unity of the Council concerning Iraq during Desert Storm was also remarkable. The situation began to unravel, however, in 1993, with the reluctance of North Korea to open two suspected sites to the IAEA. China was opposed to sanctions, along with Russia, and no permanent member wanted to risk a war. Later on, the Five were increasingly divided on Iraq. The division culminated in 1998, when three crises (February, August and October) preceded the US and British air strikes in December. After operation Desert Fox, it became clear that it would be difficult to get the inspectors back to Iraq unless sanctions were suspended and eventually lifted. The Security Council restored, partially at least, its unity with the adoption of resolution 1284 in December 1999, but the level of agreement is still fragile. Yet, in case of blatant violation, however perfect the implementation of any verification regime might be, success will depend on the political will of the major powers to act and the backing of the Security Council will remain essential. If non compliance with arms control treaties is to be deterred, cheaters should have no doubt that they would face serious consequences. If lack of unity and will becomes the rule, permanent membership and veto rights might be challenged and, for many, rightly so. There is no natural society of nations and the prevention of a gradual collapse of the international global order requires a constant effort and a permanent vigilance, with special responsibilities for the permanent members of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security.
It would be a significant help if the Five Permanent members would recognize transparency as a major concept of XXIst century security. This would require some additional steps from Russia, at a time when the new leadership can have the opposite temptation, and a complete change of the Chinese policy. China has significant reservations concerning transparency "per se". In some areas, China has made a selective use of transparency measures, but most of the time as a show of force, more than as a CBM. Why is transparency such an important concept in the future? Transparency is a step in the direction of further openness. It is about information, access to it, how that access is obtained, and the reliability that can be associated with that information. It is a good recipe particularly for regions of tension. Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali elaborated on the role of openness and transparency some years ago by declaring: "Openness and transparency are crucially important as part of the process of building confidence. Their significance must be emphasized, particularly at regional and subregional levels, in order to make military behaviour more predictable and to reassure concerned states of the 'non-threat' of potential rivals. Openness and transparency can also be useful early warning instruments in the process of preventive diplomacy".
The Millenium Summit in September 2000 will provide for a major opportunity to reflect on the role the UN should perform in the XXIst century and the kind of United Nations the Member States are prepared to support. Among the most important questions is the persistence of the authority of the Security Council in the next decades. Will it persist? With its current composition? With the increased reluctance of major powers to act collectively? With the current lack of public accountability? Only multilateral cooperation and international law can solve problems related to WMD, unless one believes in the combined merits of counterproliferation and protection. But the normative framework cannot be maintained only through efforts to save treaty processes if this is carried out against a background of deteriorating political relations between states. Arms control agreements will continue to play a key role as long as they are perceived to increase security. One of the merits of the Tokyo Forum Report was precisely that it faced up to regional and international security, recognizing that international relations should take precedence if the recommendations made are supposed to have any genuine impact in the real world. If the Security Council does not deliver what it is expected to deliver, other bodies (or indeed other methods) will take over.
9 - Technological developments also complicate the task of those who want to put up an effective fight against proliferation. This is abundantly illustrated by a set of different examples: first, almost every weapon system, with very few exceptions, can be acquired in the global marketplace. The small therefore have caught up with the strong: size matters less than it did until now. This is true even in some areas concerning WMD; chemical plants have been acquired from Europe, biological research equipment from the United States, and missile technology from the two former superpowers. Information warfare and new forms of terrorism are also available options to countries, whatever their size. Number, size and distance are no longer decisive elements. Secondly, the growing development of dual use technologies poses a serious challenge to verification measures of WMD programmes, it makes export controls an increasingly difficult task. While slipping more easily through export controls, these technologies are also easier to conceal on site, final destination is difficult to check. The remarkable work done on nuclear issues in the early '90s (Warsaw, April 1992) has not yet its counterpart in the biological and chemical areas. This should be one of the major tasks ahead if any significant import/export control is to be performed in the BCW area in the coming years. Thirdly, accelerating missile proliferation is transforming the offense-defence relationship in a significant manner. Missiles are increasingly becoming a symbol of power and a possible source of pressure. Even if the trade in complete rockets appears to be a thing of the past, sales of related ballistic missile technologies are on the increase and domestic developments as well. Since only WMD can guarantee the military or the psychological effectiveness of ballistic missiles, ballistic missile proliferation has become one of the most serious security themes. To some extent it shapes the process of proliferation itself. Finally, the idea that verification can be performed "from above", with satellites and aircrafts, can provide a false sense of confidence; ordinary intelligence and surveillance techniques cannot prove the existence of a biological warfare programme. Even the highest resolution satellite imagery cannot distinguish between a large pharmaceutical plant and a weapons complex.
10 - Last, political violence is taking an increasingly worrisome turn and some social developments are justifiably a cause for concern; non-state players can now acquire WMD and even use them in terrorist actions, as tragically demonstrated in Japan. The new forms of terrorism are alarming because perpetrators are difficult to identify, making response problematical. At the very time when political violence is increasing in some regions (and terrorism is only one manifestation of this trend), complaints concerning the lack of leadership are now commonplace, making the threat even more acute. In this context, the increased relevance of rules of conduct and international law is self-evident if an increasingly unstable and dangerous world is to be avoided. The rules of the game as laid down by the UN Charter, by international law and by international fora, should be respected. Institutionalized collaboration is what is needed to face the challenges of the new century. Western technological superiority will be even more unacceptable if it is not supplemented by legitimacy and respect for international rules and institutions. Such is one of the most powerful reasons why there is no serious alternative to multilateral treaties, even if they should be supplemented by other preventive measures at the bilateral or regional levels.
III- A Russian doctor told the ambulance driver to take his patient directly to the morgue. "Why?" cried the patient, "I am not dead yet". "Shut up" said the doctor, "we are not there yet". Few could have imagined that ten years after the end of the Cold War progress in the control and reduction of nuclear weapons would be endangered. Before the NPT Review, experts have predicted not only the slowing down, but the death of arms control. This is probably an over-dramatization, but the success of the NPT Review Conference in reaching an agreement on the final document does not solve any of the toughest issues which were there before April 2000. To prevent pessimistic assessments from becoming true, greater effort will be needed to articulate a wide range of policies. They should be aimed primarily at reducing the risk of arms control unraveling and of actual use or threat of use of WMD in future conflicts. The existence of growing capabilities and possible threats are to be given consideration, in a context where such weapons could provide for a response to conventional technological superiority, with unpredictable strikes, difficult to counter, even with increasingly sophisticated conventional forces.
Some of the lessons of the XX century's conflicts should be borne in mind. One of the century's most noteworthy warnings to the next is the use of more and more destructive weapons, with disregard to the restraints which had, in the past, limited the use of the most destructive ones. The very concept of human actions being subject to limitations or rules, in war time, may well disappear. Minds have gradually been prepared to accept the use of such weapons. A current trend is to make mass murder commonplace by regularly showing grisly television reports about Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Timor and Chechnya. In this context, even though the hardware involved was cold steel or small arms, rather than chemical or biological weapons, the use of WMD in future conflicts might insidiously be viewed as less shocking. The great, dreadful novelty is indeed the potential use of these weapons against civilians, as in Iraq against the Kurds. In a world where the global urban population will double during the next generation, the concentration of people in cities makes the possible threat of use of WMD against them a daunting danger.
One of the main goals in international relations since the end of World War II is to organize the relations between major powers in ways that minimize the risks of war. The very nature of WMD makes them risky for all states and people and therefore justifies collective responses. At the end of the XIXth century, one great philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, attributed much of the disasters to come to a profound illness of the European will. Lack of will, or even the loss of will, due to a major moral and value crisis, after a dramatic and bloody century, is a remarkable explanation of the current state of international affairs, particularly in the security field. One can only hope that a major catastrophe will not be necessary to reverse this dangerous trend.
Finally, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements are not the preserve of Western powers, or even the Permanent Five, even if they bear special responsibilities in this respect. They are based on a contract involving all parties because all parties benefit from the international security they help ensuring, and all would suffer from their unraveling, particularly the poor and defenseless. The agreements therefore need concerted multilateral action to reduce the dangers involved in the spread of those weapons and in the non compliance of a small number of actors. Understanding the stakes is the first important step for all of us, particularly the following element: in case of use, innocent civilians will pay the highest price.
