CIAO DATE: 08/04

Rumsfeld’s Strategy: Fine for the War; Now What About the Peace?

Marcus Corbin

Center for Defense Information

April 2003

The military strategy in Iraq won a resounding, if risky, victory. Once more, U.S. forces have shown that they can soundly defeat a conventional enemy force in battle. But although Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's strategy of emphasizing air power instead of "boots on the ground" and focusing on technology over people may have worked for heavy combat, the recent outbreak of looting across Iraq indicates that the strategy is far less suitable for missions like peacekeeping and the occupation of Iraq.

In late February, Gen. Eric Shinseki, the head of the Army, told Congress that “something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers” would probably be required for the occupation of Iraq. In a rare public rebuke of a top general, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz shot back that the estimate was “wildly off the mark.” While it is still early to discern the number of troops needed eventually to re–establish security, it is clear that the administration could have used far more troops right now than the 125,000 stretched across Iraq. How did it come about that the civilian leaders at the Pentagon found themselves on the wrong end of an argument with military commanders over required military forces?

The difficulties in preserving order in Iraq are a symptom of the broader efforts of Rumsfeld and his aides to impose their view of military “transformation,” particularly on the Army. In Rumsfeld’s view air power and new high–tech targeting and communications gear should substitute for larger ground forces. According to leaks from military sources, Rumsfeld repeatedly cut the number of U.S. troops that could be deployed to invade Iraq, by as much as half (he denies having done so).

The course of the war indeed indicates that this view of transformation is half right: Smaller forces worked — for the heavy combat side of the operation. The emphasis in Iraq on using fewer, speedier forces at the tip of the spear was on track. (It must be noted for the record, though, that the average speed of the 3rd Division’s initial armored “charge” toward Baghdad was only six miles per hour.)

Although the strategy undeniably worked in the end, even in strictly military terms it was risky. At the low point in the middle of the campaign Rumsfeld suffered a lot of criticism from retired military officers such as Gens. Wesley Clark and Barry McCaffrey who dared to suggest that the number of troops was too low. The failure of the “shock and awe” bluster gave a dangerous boost to the other side. When a quick surrender did not materialize, the vulnerabilities of long supply lines and the costs of not securing territory along the way loomed large. If the Iraqi forces had been more capable, cohesive and willing to fight, there might have been far more serious problems for the operation.

The lack of troops now, in the post–invasion phase, is emblematic of Rumsfeld’s focus on raw force. Rumsfeld may understand modern combat but doesn’t seem attuned to the more complex, difficult and political challenges of nation–building, peacekeeping and occupation missions. His inexplicable comments on the looting and chaos in many Iraqi cities illustrates a troubling lack of appreciation for the difficulties and requirements of this occupation, and of modern political conflicts more generally. On Friday he argued it was merely some “untidiness” that you might find “in any city in America,” or “some boy walking out with a vase,” dismissing it with the phrase “stuff happens.” Yet for two days, Baghdad’s National Museum of Antiquities — one of the world’s richest repositories of Mideast treasures — was ransacked, with 170,000 irreplaceable artifacts destroyed or stolen, while U.S. troops reportedly ignored pleas of the museum's staff to stop it.

The administration has defended its handling of the collapse of civil order by saying that the U.S. troops are not in Iraq as police officers. This betrays a continuing unwillingness to accept the requirements of “nation–building” and begs the question of why the troops trained and equipped for peacekeeping are not there already. In contrast to high–tech combat, establishing security and pacifying territory is simply better done with a lot of troops — “overwhelming force” in the language of the allegedly discredited doctrine promoted by Secretary of State Colin Powell back when he was a general in the 1980s.

Military transformation has been too narrowly thought of in terms of high-tech targeting and communication gear. The nearly completed "shooting war" in Iraq indicates that the long efforts in developing this hardware have already delivered benefits. The occupation of Iraq suggests that military transformation now needs to be thought of as better preparation for peacekeeping and security–building missions, for unconventional wars, and for the important political dimensions of modern conflicts. To do otherwise will mean our armed forces will be ready for the wars of the 20th century, not the 21st.