CIAO DATE: 07/02

Defending America: Redefining the Conceptual Borders of Homeland Defense
Homeland Defense: The Current and Future Terrorist Threat

Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair for
Strategy Center for Strategic and International Studies

The Center for Strategic and International Studies

September 2000

Introduction

There is a wide spectrum of potential threats to the American homeland that do not involve the threat of overt attacks by states using long-range missiles or conventional military forces. Such threats include covert attacks by state actors, state use of proxies, independent terrorist and extremist attacks by foreign groups or individuals, and independent terrorist and extremist attacks by residents of the US. These threats are currently limited in scope and frequency. No pattern of actual attacks on US territory has yet emerged that provides a clear basis for predicting how serious any given form of attack will be in the future, what means of attack will be used, or how lethal new forms of attack will be if they are successful.

As a result, there is a major ongoing debate over the seriousness of the threat and how the US government should react. A GAO report on terrorism summarizes the various views within the US government regarding these uncertainties as follows: ₁

. . . there are three schools of thought on the terrorist threat: (1) some believe the threat and likelihood of terrorist attack is very low and does not pose a serious risk; (2) others believe the threat and likelihood of terrorist attack is high and could seriously disrupt the U.S. national and economic security; and (3) still others believe assessments of the threat and vulnerability to terrorist attack need to be accompanied by risk assessments to rationally guide the allocation of resources and attention. The expert further stated that such risk assessments would include analyses of vulnerability and susceptibility to terrorist attack and the severity of potential damage. According to U.S. intelligence agencies, conventional explosives continue to be the weapon of choice for terrorists. Although the probability of their use may increase over time, chemical and biological materials are less likely terrorist weapons because they are more difficult to weaponize and the results are unpredictable. Agency officials also noted that terrorist's use of nuclear weapons is the least likely scenario, although the consequences could be disastrous.

It is difficult to predict how these threats will evolve in the future. Potential attackers have good reason to fear American military power, and most are unlikely to launch such attacks without considering the risks. At the same time, America's very strengths create an incentive to attack it using asymmetric forms of warfare. The US homeland is vulnerable. Waging asymmetric warfare against the US offers both the greatest chance of success and the least risk of retaliation, and some key technologies are evolving in ways that aid the attacker. For example, biological warfare and information warfare will inevitably make the potential threat from both foreign and domestic attackers more serious over time.

It is equally difficult to predict whether attackers will emerge with both the capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction. It is not difficult to predict that such attacks are possible. Attacks involving very large amounts of high explosives or chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks have long been technically feasible, and the "globalization" of chemical and biological technologies and production facilities is making some weapons easier to develop or acquire. Nuclear proliferation continues and the levels of control over weapons, fissile material, and radioactive material are uncertain. Attacks using such weapons can involve a wide range of different levels of casualties, but they can involve attacks that could kill well over 10,000 to 100,000 Americans, with economic, physical, psychological, and political effects that are radically different from any covert, terrorist, or extremist attacks that have occurred to date.

These risks help explain why the US has steadily refined its policy toward terrorism and the risk of such attacks since Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism issued a report in 1985 which highlighted the need for improved, centralized interagency coordination of the significant federal assets to respond to terrorist incidents. The US response to potential threats from covert attacks by state actors, their proxies, or independent extremists and terrorists has changed even more since the mid-1990s.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Public Law No.103-160, Section 1703 (50 USC 1522) mandated the coordination and integration of all Department of Defense chemical and biological (CB) defense programs. As part of this coordination and integration, the Secretary of Defense was directed to submit an assessment and a description of plans to improve readiness to survive, fight and win in a nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) contaminated environment.

The bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City led to the issuance of Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) in June 1995. PDD-39 built on the previous directive and contained three key elements of a national strategy for combating terrorism: (1) reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks and prevent and deter terrorist acts before they occur; (2) respond to terrorist acts that do occur - crisis management - and apprehend and punish terrorists; and (3) manage the consequences of terrorist acts, including providing emergency relief and restoring capabilities to protect public health and safety and essential government services. This directive also further elaborates on agencies' roles and responsibilities and some specific measures to be taken regarding each element of the strategy. ₂

These policies have since been further developed by two key Presidential Decision Directives, PDD-62 and PDD-63, which were issued in 1998. PDD-62 reaffirmed the basic principles of PDD-39, but clarified and reinforced the specific missions of the US agencies charged with defeating and defending against terrorism, and created a new and more systematic federal approach to fighting the emerging threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This includes programs to deter terrorist incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, and to manage the consequences if such incidents should occur. PDD-63 called for a national effort to assure the security of critical infrastructure. It covers both critical infrastructure protection and cyber crime, and the security of both government and private sector infrastructure to ensure national security, national economic security, and public health and safety.

New legislation has also shaped US policy. "The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act," contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (title XIV of P.L. 104-201, Sept. 23, 1996), established the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program. This act made the Department of Defense the lead federal agency for implementing the program, and is to work in cooperation with the FBI, the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. ₃ Equally important, major new funds have been spent on federal programs to deal with these threats, and federal spending increased by at least 43% between FY1998 and FY2001.

At the same time, there is no way for federal, state, and local governments to predict what attackers will actually take the risk of launching attacks on the US, or to predict the kind of event or crisis that could suddenly change their willingness to use any given means and level of attack. There are no clear boundaries that separate one form of attack from another, or that allow the US government to predict where and how it will have to attack to defend against an attack or to respond to one.

While it is tempting for governments to plan for the kind of cleanly defined single incident with which governments can best cope, there is no reason to assume that an attacker must follow such rules. Multiple attacks can greatly complicate defense and response and use different means of attack. A single attack can use a variety of weapons ranging from a mix of biological agents to a mix of chemical and information warfare. One attacker can piggyback on the attack of another, and attacks on the US homeland can be linked to attacks on Americans overseas or our allies. The very threat of an attack can be used to try to deter the US from attacking or exercising its diplomatic or military power, or it can be used to try to force a domestic political agenda on federal, state, or local governments.

Equally important, homeland defense must respond to a constantly changing threat. Many of the actions necessary to defend the American homeland will take years - sometimes well over a decade - to fully implement. In many cases, research and development is required, and the end result must then be transformed into deployed and effective capabilities at the federal, state, and local level. Such action can only be cost-effective, however, if it has a reasonable life cycle or period of effectiveness.

As a result, the US must make decisions now to shape programs that will affect its capabilities as much as a quarter of a century in the future. It must do so knowing that it cannot predict what new threats will or will not emerge, and that grave uncertainties exist regarding the emergence of new methods of attack and defense, and the balance of technology between them. The world can evolve in radically different directions, and is almost certain to do so. The level of foreign threats can vary sharply by region, and the level of domestic threats can change strikingly. Santayana's warning that those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it is as valid as ever, but those who ignore the uncertainty of future change may well face far more serious problems.

These uncertainties have polarized part of the debate over the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and attacks producing mass casualties. There are those who believe passionately that such attacks on the US homeland are inevitable. There are those who believe the threat is unreal, and its an exaggeration that has grown out the search for new threats following the end of the Cold War. There are debates over how the threat should be categorized and prioritized, what response measures are needed, if any, and what kinds of attack are most likely. So far, these debates have provided many insights as to what may happen, but no basis for resolving the many uncertainties involved.

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Endnotes

Note 1: United States General Accounting Office, GAO Report to Congressional Requesters, "Combating Terrorism, Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy," GAO/NSIAD-97-254, September 1997, p. 15.Back

Note 2: GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, "Combating Terrorism," April 23, 1998, P. 3.Back

Note 3: GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, "Combating Terrorism," April 23, 1998, P. 4.Back