CIAO DATE: 07/02

Weapons of Mass Destruction in India and Pakistan

US Department of Defense Estimate of Indian Actions and Intentions Involving Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons

Objectives, Strategies, and Resources

In his speech to the UN General Assembly on 24 September 1998, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee noted that while India hoped to fully participate in international arms-control negotiations, it had no intention of scaling back its nuclear weapons program. He stated that, "Mindful of its deteriorating security environment which has obliged us to stand apart from the CTBT in 1996, India undertook a limited series of five under-ground tests. These tests were essential for ensuring a credible nuclear deterrent for India's national security in the foreseeable future." He also declared that "in announcing a moratorium (on further nuclear tests), India has already accepted the basic obligation of the CTBT. In 1996, India could not have accepted the obligation, as such a restraint would have eroded our capability and compromised our national security." India's goal of indigenous production for all its pro-grams is another element of New Delhi's strategy to demonstrate its technological and military achievements and to help it to establish independence from foreign suppliers and outside political influence. The Indian economy will continue to grow moderately, with the real GDP expected to grow at an aver-age annual rate of 5-6 percent for the next few years, assuming India avoids major conflicts, pursues eco-nomic reforms, and has reasonable weather. Despite the announced 28-percent nominal increase in the 2000 defense budget, some of which reflects inflation and definitional differences, military spending is expected to increase by about 2-3 percent annually in real terms over the next ten years. Future defense bud-gets likely will include a focus on investments for long-term military production self-sufficiency, including those for nuclear and missile forces, in keeping with India's overall goal of achieving independence from foreign suppliers.

Nuclear Program

On 11 and 13 May 1998, India conducted what it claimed were five nuclear explosive tests. According to Indian officials, the 11 May tests included a fission device with a yield of about 12 kilotons, a thermonuclear device with a yield of about 43 kilotons, and a third test with a yield of about 0.2 kilotons. An Indian spokesman stated that the first set of tests was intended "to establish that India has a proven capability for a weaponized nuclear program."

India claimed that its 13 May tests had yields of about 0.5 and 0.2 kilotons, which were carried out to generate additional data for computer simulations. According to the Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission, the tests enabled India to build "an adequate scientific database for designing the types of devices that [India] needs for a credible nuclear deter-rent." The tests triggered international condemnation and the United States imposed wide-ranging sanctions against India.

The tests were India's first since 1974, and reversed the previously ambiguous nuclear posture where Indian officials denied possession of nuclear weapons. Indian officials cited a perceived deterioration of India's security environment, including increasing Pakistani nuclear and missile capabilities and perceived threats from China, to justify the tests. India has a capable cadre of scientific personnel and a nuclear infrastructure, consisting of numerous research and development centers, 11 nuclear power reactors, uranium mines and processing plants, and facilities to extract plutonium from spent fuel. With this large nuclear infrastructure, India is capable of manufacturing complete sets of components for plutonium-based nuclear weapons, although the acquisition of foreign nuclear-related equipment could benefit New Delhi in its weapons development efforts to develop and pro-duce more sophisticated nuclear weapons. India probably has a small stockpile of nuclear weapon components and could assemble and deploy a few nuclear weapons within a few days to a week. The most likely delivery platforms are fighter-bomber air-craft. New Delhi also is developing ballistic missiles that will be capable of delivering a nuclear payload in the future.

India is in the beginning stages of developing a nuclear doctrine. In August 1999, the Indian government released a proposed nuclear doctrine prepared by a private advisory group appointed by the government. It stated that India will pursue a doctrine of credible minimum deterrence. The document states that the role of nuclear weapons is to deter the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons against India, and asserts that India will pursue a policy of "retaliation only." The draft doctrine maintains that India "will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail." The doc-trine also reaffirms India's pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against states that do not possess nuclear weapons. It further states that India's nuclear posture will be based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based systems, and sea-based plat-forms to provide a redundant, widely dispersed, and flexible nuclear force. Decisions to authorize the use of nuclear weapons would be made by the Prime Minister or his "designated successor(s)." The draft doc-trine has no official standing in India, and the United States has urged Indian officials to distance themselves from the draft, which is nor consistent with India's stated goal of a minimum nuclear deterrent. India expressed interest in signing the CTBT, but has not done so. It has pledged not to conduct further nuclear tests pending entry into force of the CTBT. Indian officials have tied signature and ratification of the CTBT to developing a domestic consensus on the issue. Similarly, India strongly opposed the NPT as discriminatory but it is a member of the IAEA. Only four of India's 13 operational nuclear reactors currently are subject to IAEA safeguards. In June 1998, New Delhi signed a deal with Russia to purchase two light-water reactors to be built in southern India; the reactors will be under facility-specific IAEA safeguards. However, the United States has raised concerns that Russia is circumventing the 1992 NSG guidelines by providing NSG trigger list technology to India, which does not allow safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities. India has taken no steps to restrain its nuclear or missile programs. In addition, while India has agreed to enter into negotiations to complete a fissile material cutoff treaty, it has not agreed to refrain from producing fissile material before such a treaty would enter into force.

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