CIAO DATE: 2/99

Despite Past Errors, Hope Remains for Kosovo

The winter of 1999 is hardly over and the Kosovo Liberation Army (“KLA”) and Yugoslav police have already renewed fighting in Kosovo. Interestingly, although events in the Serbian province have been brewing for over ten years, every new event there presents a crisis for U.S. policy makers. Indeed, shortly after Milosevic ascended to power in Yugoslavia, and stripped Kosovo of its constitutionally pledged autonomy, it became a key issue. In the Bush Administration, it was evaluated as having the potential to be the worst situation in the Balkans. However, the current Administration, rather than being well prepared to cope with current events, has clearly dropped the ball. The failure of policy makers to prepare for intervention in the region has left them, much as policy makers of other member states of NATO and the international community, unable to formulate appropriate responses to recent actions of the parties to the struggle. This does not mean, however, that the door must be shut on the search for an effective policy approach and a resolution that would be acceptable to all sides. Through a quick review of recent missteps and failed efforts on Kosovo, components of an appropriate policy approach and a peaceful resolution to the situation become apparent.

U.S. negotiators in Belgrade never should have allowed their efforts on Kosovo to move them from the position of an impartial third party assisting the people of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in resolving a succession crisis, to a party whose policy aims have moved closer to the goals of the Albanian separatists. Moreover, negotiations are presently couched within issues of conflict and chaos and not coexistence and cooperation. Under these conditions, the United States will never be able to drive the situation in a positive direction. Acting solely as a third party mediator, the United States instead should have brought Albanian political leaders, the KLA, and Yugoslav authorities together to focus on issues concerning the development of civil society within Kosovo and perhaps elsewhere in Yugoslavia. The goals of the Albanian community should have been considered in this context.

Counter-productive actions by parties on the periphery of the province, such as shipping arms and establishing training bases, should have been met with appropriate force. Arms coming into Kosovo, in particular, allowed for a rise in KLA activities, and provided Yugoslav authorities with a reason to use police and military forces in the province. Stronger efforts should have been made, especially among the Albanian separatists and their supporters, to isolate the issue of Kosovo from ethnic and other issues related to Bosnia, Albania, and Macedonia. Perhaps this could have been achieved through diplomatic efforts, and some form of “psychological containment” among the people in the region through counter-incitement. Once Kosovo became established as a concern beyond the borders of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the only option available was to forge an agreement before the entire environment was poisoned by outside intervention.

Given the failure of policy makers to confine the issue of Kosovo within the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, military action could hardly be taken by the international community in Serbia without a reasonable expectation that it would result in some form of retaliation in the region. Consequences could include attacks against military personnel and humanitarian and development assistance workers from the United States and the rest of the international community. During the October 1998 negotiations on Kosovo, when the issue of the use of force against Yugoslav military and police forces arose, a credible threat of retaliatory attacks was posed against U.S. troops and other members of S-FOR in Bosnia. The fear of attacks was real enough to cause the evacuation of nearly all Western humanitarian and development assistance workers and employees at Western diplomatic missions in Republika Srpska in Bosnia, as well as Serbia. Thus, as long as military or other personnel from the international community are situated on the ground in Bosnia or Yugoslavia, the likelihood of air strikes remains remote. Now that OSCE verifiers are on the ground in Kosovo, Yugoslav leaders and negotiators, themselves, will probably view any further threats of military action by the international community as suspect.

Military action against Yugoslav military and police forces is also a questionable option due to the requirement to gain consensus with European allies, particularly members of the Contact Group, as well as some understanding with the Russians, who are also part of the Contact Group, before taking any action. U.S. efforts to gain consensus have often been stymied by the ability of Yugoslav authorities to conduct bilateral discussions with the European allies, and exploit any variance in their positions by playing those states off the United States.

Regarding threats of retaliation against personnel of the international community, it must be recognized that throughout Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska, Serbs have become more concerned than ever with the situation in Kosovo due to the threat posed by the United States and NATO to bomb military targets in Yugoslavia. The Serbian people know well that any bombing would not hurt Serbian leaders, such as President Milosevic, but would harm relatives and friends serving in the armed forces and civilians living near target areas. It is difficult for the Serbian people to accept that the international community does not realize this. These, and other concerns, have essentially led them to perceive themselves as the enemy of the international community, especially the United States. “Greater Serbia” no longer takes the form of expansionist moves, but a new consciousness of unity among the Serbian people. What Serbian nationalists could not fully achieve over ten years, the international community has nearly completed in the past three. The issue of a “Greater Albania” also looms over the horizon and fears grow stronger over the spread of the conflict to neighboring Macedonia and Albania, which already is the source of arms for the KLA. However, all of this could have been expected given the international community’s record of coping with nationalist leaders in Bosnia.

For the most part, U.S. negotiators working in Belgrade have been rather weak and ineffective. Although veterans of the Foreign Service and experienced in diplomacy, two of the recent negotiators on Kosovo, Robert Gelbard and Chris Hill, were clearly inappropriate for negotiations with President Slobodan Milosevic. They lacked any real standing with the Serbian leader, except for the fact that they were U.S. diplomats. Judgment errors, such as Mr. Gelbard’s reference to the KLA as terrorists, affected their ability to negotiate successfully. Richard Holbrooke, on the other hand, is a diplomat whose standing stems with Yugoslav authorities from his work during the Dayton Process, and the fact that he formerly served as both the Assistant Secretary of States for European and Canadian Affairs and Ambassador to Germany. Mr. Holbrooke’s aggressive, yet carefully crafted approach, to dealing with the Serbian leader tends to pay off. Criticism that the October agreement which Mr. Holbrooke negotiated with President Milosevic was “flimsy” must be balanced by the fact that it was the best arrangement that any U.S. negotiator could have achieved at that moment. However, it could just be that the October agreement serves as early evidence that even Mr. Holbrooke’s standing with the Yugoslav authorities is in decline.

Apparently sensing the problem that their diplomats have had in negotiating effectively with Yugoslav authorities, as well as Albanian separatists, U.S. policy makers and NATO have turned to dispatching NATO military leaders, General Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander, and General Klaus Naumann, the Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, to discuss the situation in Kosovo with President Milosevic. In the spring of 1998, the use of senior military officials in the negotiation process may have proved effective in causing parties to recognize the relative strengths and weaknesses of their positions, and help move them from issues of military conflict to considering models for coexistence and cooperation. However, negotiations have moved far beyond the point where such issues can be brought forward by these officers. Further, the dramatic effect, that the presence of these officers in the negotiation process would have previously had, has been abrogated because NATO has twice retreated from military action against Yugoslav forces and the issue of security for S-FOR troops now renders any statements, that they may make concerning the use of force, just as questionable as those from their civilian counterparts. President Milosevic, as well as the Albanian separatist leaders in Kosovo, have benefited greatly from mistakes by U.S. policy makers. Throughout this entire process, they have clearly learned much more about U.S. policy and decision makers, than U.S. policy and decision makers have learned about them.

Steps can be taken to reverse the current trend and improve the position of the U.S. and its allies in negotiations on the Kosovo issue. The following recommendations serve as components for a new approach. The United States and its allies must reassert themselves as the player that acts in the action-reaction cycle of their engagement with Yugoslav authorities and Albanian separatists. An effort must be made to take control of the psychological environment within the region in order to contain the issue of Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. NATO allies, and others in the international community, must be urged to remain part of the Kosovo negotiation process to the extent that they support U.S. leadership in driving events forward to a peaceful settlement. All actors on the periphery of Kosovo affecting events must be confronted and halted with force if necessary. Only those parties in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the intention to establish a civil society through coexistence and cooperation should be engaged in negotiations. Parties engaging in hostile military action during negotiations must be deterred or halted through military force to the degree that such action threatens the negotiation process. Any future U.S. negotiator in Belgrade must have standing among Yugoslav authorities, and be committed to negotiating on the Kosovo issue to a successful end. The negotiator must promote efforts leading to transition, transformation, and stability in Kosovo, and move discussions away from threats to use force. Yet, the negotiator must possess the authority to threaten military action when appropriate, and requests by the negotiator for the use of force must be fully supported.

Now is the time for U.S. policy makers to reorient themselves and attack the issues at hand. The recommendations presented should lead to a results driven and impartial negotiation process on Kosovo. The main concept behind each recommendation is to allow U.S. policy makers to gain and retain the initiative. Whether the process will ever result in success remains unclear. However, it is clear that, despite all that has occurred to date, the hope for peace continues to shine through.