Illicit Light Weapons Trafficking

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CIAO DATE: 2/99

Illicit Light Weapons Trafficking: Co-ordinating International Action

Elizabeth Clegg, Owen Green, Geraldine O'Callaghan

December 1998

The International Security Information Service

Executive Summary

Light weapons are the weapon of choice in today’s conflicts. ₁ While they are not the root cause of violence, these weapons are responsible for making crime more violent and conflict more lethal. An estimated 500 million light weapons are in circulation and 43 of the last 47 recent conflicts have been fought primarily with light weapons.

The presence of vast numbers of light weapons can prolong and exacerbate conflict and frustrate attempts to secure lasting peace. These weapons are often “recycled” from one conflict to the next, feeding instability and facilitating violent conflict many times over. In the hands of former combatants with no means of securing their own future, light weapons can also fuel crime, banditry and a culture of violence. As a result, the insecurity fuelled by light weapons proliferation may trap these societies in a cycle of conflict and instability which precludes effective post-conflict reconciliation and sustainable development.

Illicit light weapons trafficking is now being recognised as a major threat to international, national and human security. Increasingly aware of the vast quantities of light weapons in circulation, a number of regional and international bodies have undertaken initiatives to control illicit weapons trafficking, including:

The European Union. In June 1997, EU Member States signed an “EU Programme on Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms”. The EU Programme outlines areas for EU co-operation, including: strengthening collective efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking, providing assistance to countries in regions affected by light weapons proliferation and assisting countries in affected regions. In July 1998, the EU Programme provided the basis for a “Southern African Regional Action Programme on Light Arms and Illicit Arms Trafficking”. The EU Programme offers a more progressive approach to illicit weapons control by arguing that light weapons trafficking undermines peace, structural stability and long term development. However, to date, no funds have been earmarked for the implementation of specific projects.
The United Nations. In addition to the ECOSOC crime-related efforts, the United Nations has addressed illicit weapons trafficking in its work on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in relation to conflict. In August 1997, the Panel of Governmental Experts published its final report documenting the problems, causes and effects associated with excessive and destabilising accumulations of small arms and light weapons. The Panel also offered detailed recommendations for reducing and preventing these destabilising accumulations of weaponry. The Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms is now reviewing implementation of the previous Panel’s recommendations and developing further proposals for international action within the UN framework.
The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The ECOSOC Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice has been examining the issue of firearms control within the context of combating transnational organised crime. The Commission published an extensive firearms survey and organised four regional workshops on firearms regulation. In April 1998, 56 countries sponsored a resolution calling for a legally binding international instrument to combat illicit weapons trafficking to be developed in the form of a “Firearms Protocol” within the Transnational Organised Crime Convention. Since the proposed instrument closely parallels the OAS Convention, it too could confine the international response to illicit weapons trafficking to law enforcement measures and more rigorous implementation of export and import controls.
The Organization of American States (OAS). In November 1997, OAS states signed an “Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials”. The 30-article OAS Convention approaches illicit light weapons trafficking as a crime problem and outlines specific practical measures, including: instituting legislative changes, strengthening import/export controls, marking weapons, providing technical assistance and increasing information exchange. The Convention is a useful model for regional co-operation, but by promoting minimum standards, it fails to advance any significant changes in attitudes or produce any commitments to prioritise controls on light weapons as a whole. In addition, the legislative changes required in many states may delay ratification for years and insufficient resources may threaten the implementation of the Convention’s practical measures.
The Group of Eight Industrialised States (G–8). Since 1994, the G–8 (formerly G–7) has been studying ways to control illicit weapons trafficking, largely within the context of transnational organised crime. They too supported the development of a legally binding international instrument, and at the May 1998 Birmingham Summit formally voiced their support for the ECOSOC initiative. However, the G–8 did not acknowledge the links between the ECOSOC initiative and the need for broader UN efforts to address light weapons proliferation, and so missed an important opportunity to extend the scope of illicit weapons controls beyond crime control.

This paper provides recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of ongoing efforts to control illicit weapons trafficking, such as: ₂

Stemming “recycling” and trafficking by:

prioritising destruction in demobilisation processes;
improving national enforcement by reviewing end-use systems in supplier states;
adopting codes of conduct on the export of light weapons;
improving domestic legislation in post-conflict societies; and
strengthening domestic gun control laws.

Eliminating the “grey area” between the legal and illegal trade in light weapons by:

registering and marking weapons; and
improving record-keeping and intelligence gathering by developing regional and/or international registers or databases on the import, export and national production of light weapons.

Providing practical security assistance by:

developing and adopting a “security first” approach; and
supporting infrastructure development and capacity building in areas such as police and customs in post-conflict societies.

Increasing the involvement of other institutions, such as NATO, by:

placing light weapons control on the Alliance agenda;
emphasising light weapons collection and destruction in peace-keeping operations; and
offering NATO candidate states economic incentives and technical assistance for destruction of surplus weaponry.

The ongoing initiatives targeting “underground” weapons trafficking examined in this paper are a welcome development and have clearly put light weapons on the international agenda. However, these must be matched by efforts of equal vigilance on the licit side. Only a comprehensive approach integrating control strategies for both licit and illicit weapons will facilitate lasting peace and sustainable development.

Introduction

Light weapons are the weapon of choice in today’s conflicts. While they are not the root cause of violence, light weapons are responsible for making crime more violent and conflict more lethal. It is estimated that there are 500 million light weapons in circulation in the world today. The sheer volume of available weaponry has been a major factor in the devastation witnessed in recent conflicts in Albania, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Somalia. Tackling the supply and demand for light weapons in regions of conflict is widely recognised as one of today’s most pressing security challenges.

The proliferation of intra-state conflicts involving rebel and secessionist groups has contributed to a shift away from the use of major conventional weapons systems to the use of man-portable equipment. Forty-three of the last 47 recent conflicts have been fought primarily with light weapons. These weapons have been responsible for heavy casualties, particularly amongst non-combatants; an estimated 90 percent of fatalities in conflicts since 1990 were non-combatants.

The presence of vast numbers of light weapons can prolong and exacerbate conflict and frustrate attempts to secure lasting peace. These weapons are often recycled, flowing from one post-conflict situation to other regions of tension where they feed instability and facilitate violent conflict. As they are very durable, require little maintenance and generally have a life span of many decades, the same weapon may be transferred dozens of times, from one conflict to the next. In the hands of former combatants with no means of securing their own future, light weapons can fuel crime, banditry and a culture of violence. As a result, the insecurity fuelled by light weapons proliferation may trap these societies in a cycle of conflict and instability which precludes effective post-conflict reconciliation and sustainable development.

The large numbers of light weapons circulating in regions of conflict have been transferred in a variety of ways. New light weapons continue to enter regions of conflict. Northern states, such as the United States and Member States of the European Union continue to export significant quantities of light weapons. However, there is evidence that transfers between Southern states constitute an increasingly large proportion of such arms flows. ₃ A fundamental challenge of light weapons proliferation is that weapons flows in regions of tension involve many covert or illicit transfers between non-state groups and arms brokers and traffickers. ₄ These transactions often involve weapons which the superpowers originally transferred to client states and insurgent groups during the Cold War.

The International Response

Over the past year, regional and international bodies have made encouraging progress in their efforts to control illicit light weapons trafficking. Echoing concerns voiced at the United Nations over the last decade, the G–8 and regional institutions such as the OAS and the European Union have begun to develop concrete proposals to stem illicit transfers. Two distinct approaches have emerged, reflecting differences in the scope of these institutions and their respective political priorities. For example, the OAS largely regards the illicit light weapons problem as a crime control issue, much like the war on drugs. In contrast, the European Union has framed illicit weapons flows as an impediment to sustainable peace and long term development.

The Organization Of American States (OAS)

For many years, a lack of political will proved an overwhelming obstacle to controls on light weapons in the Americas. In particular, despite figures pointing to the United States as the leading source of illegal weapons in the region and direct requests from countries such as Mexico to address the problem, successive US governments took little concerted action. Fortunately, a hemisphere-wide convention on illicit weapons trafficking met with much more success than previous bilateral efforts. Rather than targeting supply or demand in any particular country, the effort emphasised the close connections between illicit weapons trafficking and common regional concerns such as narcotics trafficking and transnational crime.

Under Mexican and Colombian leadership, discussions on an illicit weapons trafficking convention began in 1996. The Clinton Administration eventually lent its support, not only acknowledging the problem but actively working for the successful achievement of a regional agreement during 1997.

At the twenty-fourth special session of the OAS General Assembly convened in Washington on 13–14 November 1997, 29 OAS member states signed an “Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials”. OAS Secretary General Cesar Gaviria hailed it as “the first agreement of a regional nature that sets out clear responsibilities for States in combating these crimes through the courts, through the police and through legislation”. ₅ President Clinton even called for global action, saying that, “The illegal export of firearms is indeed not just a hemispheric but a world-wide problem, and demands an international response”. ₆ In just over a year, the process had moved from initial proposals to a regionally-agreed and signed convention.

The stated purpose of the OAS Convention is: “To prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and related materials” as well as to “promote and facilitate co-operation and exchange of information and experience among States Parties...” The 30-article OAS Convention sets out a broad set of commitments, control mechanisms, legal requirements, and co-operation procedures, including:

Instituting legislative measures to criminalise illicit manufacturing and trafficking, as well as offences deemed to facilitate such activities;
Marking firearms at the time of manufacture and import to facilitate identification and tracing;
Establishing an effective system of export, import and international transit licenses;
Strengthening controls at export points;
Exchanging information in areas such as: producers, dealers, importers and exporters; routes and techniques used in illicit trafficking; and scientific and technological information for prevention, detection and investigation;
Exchanging experience and training in areas such as identification, detection, tracing and intelligence gathering;
Providing mutual legal assistance to facilitate investigation and prosecution of illicit activities and establishing illicit weapons activities as extraditable offences.

OAS Convention As A Model

Increased co-operation on illicit weapons trafficking among regional governments is the foundation for the OAS Convention. As such it sets a precedent of agreement on minimum standards that are generally uncontentious. This simplicity allowed the OAS Convention to be developed and negotiated in less than a year and now provides a model for other regions and institutions. However, the Convention’s simplicity may also be a source of weakness. In some respects, it is narrowly focused, emphasising enforcement of existing laws and better implementation of import and export procedures rather than any significant changes in attitudes or commitments to prioritise controls on light weapons as a whole. Yielding to pressure from pro-gun and anti-federalist elements, the OAS Convention also expressly states that firearms-related national legislation “of a wholly domestic nature” will not be affected by the Convention. Such artificial divisions obscure the realities of light weapons flows and by providing an escape clause, place the commitment of certain governments in question.

Challenges Of Implementation

Insufficient resources also threaten to limit the effectiveness of the OAS Convention. According to an official involved in the negotiations, OAS governments have yet to commit the resources necessary to implement the OAS Convention. Without ample resources, agreed commitments such as improved information sharing and record-keeping are unlikely to be met. ₇ Furthermore, it appears that the ratification process will be slow. Although Mexico and Belize have ratified the Convention, and thus ensured its entry into force, ratification by most other member states will require legislative changes. For example, although Canada is a strong supporter of the convention and is equipped with significantly more resources than most OAS states, it is not expected to ratify before the year 2000 because the inclusion of ammunition and explosives in the Convention requires changes to Canadian legislation. In certain federal states, such as Venezuela, the military rather than the police has final jurisdiction over the control of firearms, thus ratification will require both constitutional and legislative changes.

The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)

Reflecting the diversity of approaches to light weapons control, the Vienna-based Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (hereafter referred to as the ECOSOC Crime Commission) has identified illicit weapons as a priority in its work. A sub-group of ECOSOC, the group has been examining the issue of firearms control for over three years within the wider context of measures to combat transnational organised crime. In May 1997, ECOSOC released an extensive firearms survey and report. ₈ As a next step, it organised four regional workshops on firearms regulation. Held in Slovenia, Tanzania, Brazil and India between September 1997 and January 1998, the aim of the workshops was to investigate the possibility of developing a “declaration of principles” on firearms regulation which could be agreed by all participating states. Although the agendas and priorities of each regional meeting varied, illicit weapons trafficking was identified as a common problem on which they could achieve considerable consensus and co-operation.

The ECOSOC Crime Commission intensified its efforts to combat illicit weapons trafficking at its seventh session in April 1998. Fifty-six countries sponsored a resolution calling for a “legally binding international instrument to combat illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition within the context of a United Nations convention against transnational organised crime”. ₉ The resolution will provide the basis for development of a “Firearms Protocol” within the Transnational Organised Crime Convention expected to be finalised by the year 2000.

Although a diverse group of countries, including all of the G–8 Member States, endorsed the resolution, it was the active political support of influential OAS member states which ensured progress on the issue and secured swift passage of the resolution. This is reflected in the final resolution which explicitly recommends that any discussions concerning the international instrument take the OAS Convention into account. Furthermore, the proposed international instrument echoes some of the OAS Convention’s main principles, most notably firearms identification and tracing and the harmonisation of import and export licensing.

Limited Focus

The political support of the OAS countries and their influence over the final Firearms Protocol may help strengthen commitment to key elements of the OAS Convention in the global instrument, such as coverage of a wide range of weapons types, weapons marking and registration and import/export harmonisation. However attaching the international instrument as a protocol to the Transnational Organised Crime Convention may not only cause delays in negotiations but, by following the OAS model, could also effectively confine the international response to illicit weapons trafficking to law enforcement measures and more rigorous implementation of export and import controls. More far-reaching proposals to address the supply and demand for light weapons as well as practical measures to reduce the number of weapons in circulation would be not covered in negotiations.

The Group of Eight Industrialised States (G–8)

Illicit firearms trafficking first appeared on the (then) G–7 agenda during the 1994 Economic Summit in Halifax, when leaders highlighted the economic and social costs of crime. A subsequent meeting in Lyon on transnational organised crime identified firearms trafficking as an area requiring further study and consultation and established a group of experts, known as the Lyon Group, to develop policy proposals. By the time of the Denver Summit in June 1997, illicit weapons trafficking had become a priority and decisions to consider a “new international instrument” and a “stronger international regime” were included in the Summit’s Final Communiqué.

In autumn 1997, in preparation for the Birmingham Summit, the US Department of State provided G–8 states with a proposed outline for a legally binding international instrument. The proposed instrument closely paralleled the central tenets of the OAS Convention. EU members of the G–8 were initially reluctant to agree to such a formulation, not yet having reached EU-wide consensus on harmonising import/export certificates or on weapons marking. However, by early 1998, a strong degree of consensus had begun to emerge in negotiations, and at the May 1998 Birmingham Summit the G–8 formally voiced their support for the ECOSOC initiative.

A Missed Opportunity

G–8 support for the ECOSOC effort, both before and after Birmingham, acknowledged the need for international co-ordination and controls on illicit weapons trafficking and significantly improved the prospects for a global convention. However, this influential group of states — which includes the world’s major arms exporters — missed an important opportunity to extend the scope of illicit weapons controls beyond crime control.

At the G–8 Foreign Ministers meeting before the Birmingham Summit, light weapons were addressed within the broader context of arms control and non-proliferation. Voicing their concern about the “potentially destabilising effect of conventional weapons in regions of tension” the Foreign Ministers communiqué stated that, “we will pursue in the appropriate fora the problem of small arms proliferation. We support the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, and request the UN to consider further action to address the issue.” However, the final Birmingham communiqué made no acknowledgement of the links between the ECOSOC initiative and the need for broader UN efforts to address light weapons proliferation.

The European Union

As EU President from January to June 1997, the Netherlands wanted to broaden and deepen EU collaboration on arms transfer restraint. However, lack of support from certain Member States soon made it clear that initiatives aimed at fostering greater co-operation to restrain legal (i.e. government-sanctioned) arms exports would be politically impossible. Matched by growing concerns over the widespread availability of light weapons in regions of conflict, these considerations led the Dutch to pursue more narrow objectives in the form of an “EU Programme on Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms” (hereafter referred to as the EU Programme).

Signed in Amsterdam in June 1997, the EU Programme marked a new departure in arms-related co-operation amongst EU Member States. The three main areas outlined for further action on illicit trafficking include:

Strengthening collective efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in arms from and through the European Union. Specific measures might include instituting more effective information exchange and improving co-ordination and co-operation amongst intelligence, customs and law enforcement agencies.
Providing assistance to countries in regions affected by light weapons proliferation. Assistance to these countries could focus on increasing the capacity of their legal and enforcement capabilities (e.g. customs, police, judiciary), using international databases and promoting national and sub-regional co-operation amongst police, customs and intelligence services.
Assisting countries in affected regions, especially in post-conflict situations and in regions with only minimal security and stability. These initiatives might aid the re-integration of former combatants and the removal of weapons from circulation through measures such as weapons collection and buy-back schemes.

Since June 1997, two main activities have taken place under the auspices of the EU Programme. Held in London in February 1998, the “European Conference on Trafficking in Arms” addressed the co-ordination of operational and enforcement mechanisms to tackle illicit weapons trafficking. Participants included officials from police, customs and Foreign and Interior Ministries as well as legal experts and Interpol representatives. They identified needs for better information and improved infrastructure, such as national databases, in order to facilitate documentation and tracking of illicit weapons trafficking. The conference’s conclusions also pointed to the possibility of follow-up meetings to review progress, although, to date, no plans for any such meetings have been made.

Action Plan For Southern Africa

In May 1998, the United Kingdom funded a seminar in South Africa on “Developing Controls on Arms and Illicit Trafficking in Southern Africa” designed to bring together relevant officials from Southern Africa and the European Union. ₁₀ Within the context of the EU Programme, the seminar was designed to explore potential forms of EU assistance to Southern Africa in the region’s efforts to tackle illicit trafficking. An agreement on a “Southern African Regional Action Programme on Light Arms and Illicit Arms Trafficking” (hereafter referred to as the Action Programme) emerged from this agreement. ₁₁ The Action Programme sets out a detailed agenda for action in four key areas:

Combating illicit trafficking;
Strengthening regulation of and controls on the accumulation and transfer of weaponry;
Promoting the removal of weapons from society and the destruction of surplus arms; and
Enhancing weapons-related transparency, information exchange and consultation in Southern Africa.

Since the seminar participants endorsed the Action Programme, relevant working groups of the EU Council of Ministers have given it a positive reception and Interpol has explicitly endorsed it. It is anticipated that the adoption and implementation of the Action Programme will be discussed at the forthcoming ministerial meeting of the European Union and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) scheduled for November 1998 in Vienna.

Prospects For Implementation

In large part, the success of the EU Programme will depend on how vigorously the Member States pursue its implementation. As yet, there is no dedicated budget line to cover implementation of specific projects, such as those involving capacity-building or weapons reductions. However, the European Commission has given a preliminary indication that it might consider mobilising funds from the European Development Fund or from an appropriate Commission budget line. ₁₂ In this regard, the upcoming EU–SADC Ministerial offers an important opportunity to articulate high-level political support for the implementation of the Southern African Regional Action Programme. Suchsupport would pave the way for dedication of specific EU Commission funds towards the implementation of the EU Programme in Southern Africa.

Another promising sign for effective implementation of the EU Programme was the European Union’s endorsement of a “proportional and integrated approach to security and development” in regions that have recently emerged from conflict, including appropriate assistance to internal police and security forces. ₁₃ This so-called “security first” approach to external assistance has been advanced by the United Nations in co-operation with Mali and other countries in the Sahara–Sahel region. In this context, several EU states, including the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium and France, are contributing to the Sahara–Sahel states and their neighbours in order to support demobilisation and re-integration programmes and to tackle light arms proliferation and insecurity. EU support for the security first approach is an encouraging development, as development aid agencies have been reluctant to integrate support for addressing internal security problems into their development assistance programmes.

United Nations Experts’ Groups

UN General Assembly resolution 50/70 B of 12 December 1995 called on the UN Secretary-General to draft, with the help of a Panel of Governmental Experts, a report on small arms and light weapons which would address:

The types of these weapons being encountered by the UN in conflict situations;
The nature and causes of excessive and destabilising accumulations and transfers of these weapons; and
Strategies for preventing destabilising accumulations and transfers, with a view to preventing conflict.

The Panel of Governmental Experts was appointed by the Secretary-General in April 1996, on the basis of equitable geographical representation. From June 1996 to July 1997, it convened three times in New York and once in Tokyo. The Panel also held three regional workshops in Pretoria, San Salvador and Kathmandu to facilitate dialogue between Panel members and high-ranking diplomats, senior administrators and academics.

Published in August 1997, the Panel’s final report provided comprehensive documentation of the problems, causes and effects associated with excessive and destabilising accumulations of small arms and light weapons, as well as the mode of their transfer to regions of conflict and tension. It also offered detailed recommendations for both reducing and preventing these destabilising accumulations of weaponry. These recommendations were endorsed by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 52/38 J, with 156 states voting in favour and six abstaining.

Reduction measures advocated by the Panel included:

Supporting post-conflict initiatives related to disarmament and demobilisation, including weapons collection and destruction;
Developing guidelines to assist negotiators of peace settlements in developing plans to disarm combatants, including plans for the collection, disposal or destruction of weapons, and to assist peacekeeping missions in implementing such programmes;
Strengthening international and regional co-operation and information-sharing arrangements among police, intelligence, customs and border control officials to combat illicit trafficking;
Collecting and destroying weapons not under legal possession which are not required for the purposes of national defence and internal security; and
Adopting a “proportional and integrated approach” to security and development in West Africa and in other regions facing similar problems of post-conflict insecurity and light weapons proliferation.

Recommended prevention measures included:

Implementing the guidelines for international arms transfers adopted by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1996;
Ensuring that national laws and regulations determine which arms are permitted for civilian possession and the conditions under which they can be used (e.g. states emerging from conflict imposing or re-imposing licensing requirements on civilian possession);
Ensuring that adequate laws, regulations and procedures to exercise effective control over legal possession and transfers of weaponry are in place in order to prevent illicit trafficking;
Exercising restraint in the transfer of small arms and light weapons for military and police use, including all surplus arms;
Ensuring that weapons are safeguarded against loss through theft or corruption, in particular from storage facilities, and considering the possibility of destroying all surplus weapons;
Intensifying co-operative efforts among states and regional and international organisations to stem illicit trafficking;
Encouraging adoption and implementation of regional and sub-regional moratoria on the transfer and manufacture of small arms and light weapons;
Initiating UN studies on a range of topics (e.g. ammunition and explosives, the feasibility of a weapons marking system and the feasibility of restricting manufacture and trade to manufacturers and dealers authorised by states and listed in a database); and
Considering the possibility of convening a UN-sponsored international conference on the illicit arms trade based on the issues identified in the Panel’s report.

In 1998, the United Nations established a Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms to review implementation of the previous Panel’s recommendations and to develop further proposals for international action within a UN framework. This Group was expanded to include representatives of 23 states, including all five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council (P–5). The Group is charged with three main tasks:

Reviewing the implementation of the recommendations in the report of the Panel of Experts;
Developing recommendations for further action to both promote implementation of the recommendations already agreed and to recommend new international measures; and
Considering the feasibility and objectives of an international conference on small arms and light weapons proliferation.

The Group held its first meeting in May 1998, and is due to report to the General Assembly in the autumn of 1999. The Group’s mandate allows it to address a wide range of issues relating to the control, removal and destruction of small arms and light weapons and combating illicit trafficking. However, resistance from some Middle Eastern and Asian states will likely prevent any discussion of relevant human rights issues and also preclude promotion of international transparency or Codes of Conduct on arms transfers. Nevertheless, the Group able has an opportunity to recommend a co-ordinated and reasonably comprehensive UN action programme for tackling light weapons proliferation. The proposed international conference could provide an important forum for developing and promoting such an action programme.

Other International Initiatives

As the plethora of measures described above demonstrate, international concern over the widespread availability and use of light weapons has led to a boom in national, regional and international control initiatives. Although the scope of this paper is limited to initiatives on controlling the illicit trade in light weapons, there are a number of initiatives which, although not specifically focused on illicit transfers, are nevertheless relevant to this discussion.

Practical Disarmament Measures

In 1996, after deliberations in the UN First Committee, Germany introduced a resolution on “Consolidation of Peace through Practical Disarmament Measures” in the UN General Assembly. The resolution established a conceptual link between disarmament and conflict resolution and stressed the importance of specific measures such as: collection, control and disposal; restraint in production, procurement and transfer of weaponry; and the demobilisation of former combatants and their reintegration into society. In September 1997, a follow-up resolution co-sponsored by 63 countries established a “Group of Interested States” which has since held a series of meetings to discuss practical measures for micro-disarmament in affected areas, particularly Central Africa, Central America and Albania.

The Group Of “Like-Minded States”

In July 1998, a group of 21 “like-minded states” met in Oslo to discuss the problem of light weapons proliferation with a view to mapping out the types of actions which could be taken by governments. The international meeting of government officials examined a series of measures to prevent illicit transfers, including enhancing transparency and improving co-operation among police, customs and intelligence agencies. They also considered steps to reduce existing stocks of weapons, such as supporting demobilisation and reintegrating ex-combatants. Less encouraging was the mixed response to a Canadian proposal for an international treaty prohibiting light weapons transfers to non-state actors, pointing to a lack of support for any far-reaching controls on the legal trade.

The group ultimately agreed a draft statement on “An International Agenda on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Elements of a Common Understanding” which was then sent back to the national capitals for review. The draft statement, formally released by Norway and Canada in August 1998, emphasises prevention of illicit weapons transfers through weapons collection and destruction, tightened border controls, co-ordinated law enforcement efforts, weapons marking, codes of conduct and strengthened international humanitarian law.

Disarmament And Development

In October 1998, Belgium will host an international conference on “Sustainable Disarmament for Sustainable Development”. It will bring together over 200 participants including government ministers and officials, parliamentarians and non-governmental organisations , with an equal representation from North and South. The conference is expected to produce and endorse a “Brussels Call for Action”, outlining a global plan of action for addressing the widespread availability of light weapons. The document will likely assert the need for concerted international action to reduce the levels of light arms currently circulating in regions of conflict as well as renewed emphasis on programmes to promote peace-building and human security.

Co-Ordinating the Initiatives

The illicit weapons problem is now receiving unprecedented attention from policy makers and the initiatives outlined above represent important progress towards controlling trafficking. While this momentum exists, it is vital that scarce resources are not wasted by unnecessary duplication. Each effort should draw on the data, expertise, and specific policy proposals generated by the others, as well as the lessons learned in the course of their development. More concrete mechanisms for co-ordination and more formal dialogue between all institutions addressing illicit trafficking would also be beneficial. Finally, efforts should be made to involve states from regional bodies which are not currently focusing on this problem, such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), in dialogue and information exchange.

While the ongoing initiatives share the same overall objective of stopping illicit weapons trafficking, it is clear that their development has been shaped by a variety of factors which motivate or constrain the various institutions. The ECOSOC, OAS and G–8 initiatives focus on firearms trafficking as a crime issue. In contrast, the recommendations of the UN Panel and the EU Programme are based on the premise that light weapons trafficking undermines peace, structural stability and long term development. Conceptually, the latter approach offers a more coherent and progressive framework for addressing the supply and demand for illicit weapons. In particular, the practical measures advocated by the EU Programme, such as reducing the number of weapons in circulation, offer a more direct approach to reducing the level of illicit arms in circulation.

On the other hand, the crime-based efforts, especially the OAS Convention, outline a clearer route from political commitments to practical measures for stemming illicit trafficking. To promote harmonisation of legislation, the OAS began with the assumption that while all countries had some form of relevant legislation, none was ideal. This highlighted the need for development of guidelines for best practice. The proposed “Model Regulations for the Control of the International Movement of Firearms, their Parts and Components, and Ammunition” developed by the OAS Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) delineate practical measures for harmonising import/export procedures.

Recommendations

The recommendations outlined below are only examples of proposals designed to enhance the effectiveness of the ongoing institutional efforts, and do not constitute an exhaustive inventory.

Stem “Recycling” And Trafficking

Direct measures designed to prevent and interdict illicit light weapons trafficking are the first element in a comprehensive control programme. Governments and regional bodies should:

Prioritise Destruction

Weapons seized or collected after a conflict or through civilian amnesties are seldom destroyed. They later return to circulation as the result of poor stockpile management, theft, or discrepancies between domestic control efforts and export policies. The most effective way to reduce the number of weapons in circulation, in both conflicts and civil society, is to destroy all illicit weapons after they are seized.

Recommendations:

Incorporate mandatory and public destruction of weapons and ammunition as an element in all weapons collection efforts (e.g. gun amnesties, seizures of illegal weapons).
Address destruction as a priority in demobilisation processes and peacekeeping mandates to prevent military weapons from entering civil society.
Develop better co-ordination between short-term disarmament programs and long-term peace-building programs.

Improve National Enforcement

Although most supplier governments include end-use certification as part of their export controls, light weapons exports are rarely monitored as stringently as heavy weapons systems. Supply to third-party traders has also been tolerated.

Recommendations:

Review existing end-use systems in supplier states and identify and adopt best practice through regional organisations and arms control regimes such as the Wassenaar Arrangement. ₁₄
Condition arms exports on the supplier state having the right to request, receive and check information on end-use delivery and to be consulted if the recipient state is considering re-export or change of use.
Exchange information on sensitive end-users and deny exports to countries with a history of systematic diversion.

Adopt Codes Of Conduct

Governments in all regions should also develop new laws and more stringent criteria to govern weapons exports, ideally through multilateral efforts such as the EU Code of Conduct agreed in May 1998. Agreement on similar Codes in the US Congress and the Wassenaar Arrangement would widen the scope of multilateral co-ordination and restraint. In addition to addressing crucial issues such as respect for human rights, such codes could also reduce diversion by creating more well-defined and transparent arms export control systems.

Recommendations:

Develop and support codes of conduct at national, regional, and international levels, particularly in groupings such as the Wassenaar Arrangement which include the major weapons suppliers.
Initiate dialogue among supplier and recipient nations to discuss the relevance and effective application of codes of conduct.

Improve Domestic Legislation In Post-Conflict Societies

In post-conflict societies, domestic legislation controlling the possession of weapons is often lax and/or “leftover” weapons from areas of conflict are not subject to adequate enforcement of existing laws.

Recommendations:

Assist post-conflict societies in the review of domestic legislation governing weapons possession.
Help post-conflict societies impose and enforce existing licensing requirements on civilian possession of weapons as part of the post-conflict reconstruction process.

Strengthen Domestic Gun Control

The global nature of weapons trafficking makes it essential that control measures address the domestic element of the trade. Around the world, national legislation on light weapons ranges from very lax to extremely stringent. Such inconsistencies can lead to situations in which lax laws in one country may fuel illegal trade into a neighbouring country with stricter gun laws.

Recommendations:

Encourage adoption and implementation of stringent domestic gun controls.
Consider implementing bans on civilian ownership of particular weapons or categories of weapons (e.g. hand-guns, military-style weaponry).

Eliminate “Grey Market” In Weapons

The lack of transparency in the international light weapons trade, together with a blurring of the distinction between the legal and illegal, makes efforts to stop trafficking much more difficult. Governments can help clarify these divisions by eliminating covert transfers, enforcing UN embargoes, and developing and enforcing international laws on trafficking and brokering. Governments and regional bodies should also:

Register And Mark Weapons

Making light weapons easier to trace through technical means can facilitate transparency and accountability in the light weapons trade. However, marking weapons at the points of manufacture and import will require co-operation and political will from both supplier and recipient states.

Recommendations:

Adopt the measures endorsed by the OAS Convention to mark weapons at the point of manufacture and import and promote such marking systems at the United Nations and other regional organisations.
Allocate resources to research and implement effective marking systems at the point of manufacture and import.
Investigate the feasibility of tagging ammunition.

Improve Record-Keeping And Intelligence Gathering

Technical improvements in weapons tracing must be reinforced by a comprehensive database, ideally at the international level. National governments, the United Nations and regional bodies such as the OAS maintain statistics and databases on light weapons issues, but the data is never collated in a central location for easy access by governments or the general public. The Interpol Weapons and Explosives Tracking System (IWETS) database, covering weapons from small arms to anti-tank missiles, is the only existing international database for stolen and recovered weapons. However, the participation in the database is patchy, with around 85 percent of participants from Europe, whilst information and co-operation from countries in the Americas is less than five percent. ₁₅

Recommendations:

Appropriate additional resources to Interpol for further development and implementation of the IWETS database in developing countries.
Promote transparency of light weapons flows through the development of international and regional registers or databases on the import, export and national production of light weapons.
Develop regional and/or global databases of authorised manufacturers, importers, exporters and carriers of firearms, as discussed in OAS negotiations.
Register all arms brokering agents and require them to be subject to licensing procedures. All brokers should be registered on a centralised database.

Provide Practical Security Assistance

Providing practical security assistance to post-conflict societies is essential in order to maximise the potential of efforts to stem illicit trafficking in those countries most affected by light weapons proliferation.

Develop A “Security First” Approach

Although the link between development and security is gaining more credence, programmes to facilitate internal security and arms control in conflict-prone regions remain poorly funded. Countries with high levels of insecurity and violence typically cannot make effective use of economic and social development assistance. A security first approach to development co-operation, which incorporates support for police training, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants into civil society, would offer a coherent approach to reconstruction and sustainable development.

Recommendations:

Encourage regional organisations and institutions to institute and fund measures designed to address illicit weapons trafficking within the broader framework of development and post-conflict reconstruction.
Allocate a percentage of bilateral and multilateral overseas aid to security assistance.

Support Capacity Building

Many countries with illicit weapons trafficking problems lack the capacity and infrastructure to implement international control agreements. If recipient countries lack the capacity to implement regional and international control programmes without outside assistance, practical support should be provided.

Recommendations:

Provide training and resources to strengthen border controls, customs and excise, police and national communications systems, particularly in areas where significant cross-border weapons traffic has been identified.
Provide resources for the establishment of local non-governmental organisations to independently monitor and publicise the impact of light weapons, especially in countries where little work has been done on this issue.
Develop and fund community education programmes to reverse the culture of weapons possession.

Increase Involvement Of Other Institutions, Especially NATO

Many regional and international institutions can play a crucial role in tackling illicit trafficking in light weapons. In particular, NATO could be a key partner in these efforts but, to date, has not sought to develop its role in this regard.

Put Light Weapons On The Alliance Agenda

In many parts of Europe where NATO has established strong bilateral military relations through the Partnership for Peace, illicit weapons trafficking represents a serious threat to security. Yet NATO has largely ignored the proliferation of light weapons, even in conflict situations such as the former Yugoslavia. It is crucial that countries supportive of controls on light weapons raise the issue within the Alliance.

Recommendations:

Develop a NATO programme on controlling illicit weapons transfers. This could involve states which greatly value their links to the Alliance, particularly in regions such as South-eastern Europe and the Caucasus.
Add controlling illicit weapons transfers to the agendas of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC).
Incorporate light weapons control into existing NATO policy and practice, especially in the area of peacekeeping.

Address Light Weapons In Peacekeeping Operations

As a major player in negotiating and enforcing peace agreements, NATO has a special responsibility to help develop and implement comprehensive disarmament programmes which cover the entire spectrum of weaponry. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the disarmament regime outlined in the Dayton Accords only addressed heavy weapons.

Recommendations:

Ensure that future disarmament programmes in peacekeeping agreements cover light weapons and ensure that all warring parties comply with the arms control agreement.
Include comprehensive light weapons collection and destruction in all NATO peacekeeping and peace enforcement mandates.
Develop co-operative border control strategies between NATO and Interpol or Europol.

Destroy NATO’s Surplus Weaponry

NATO enlargement has the potential to encourage rather than curtail light weapons proliferation. With interoperability and modernisation established as pre-requisites of Alliance membership, candidate states have initiated a flood of new weapons purchases. As they buy advanced weapons systems, potential new members may finance new acquisitions by exporting obsolete and non-standard weapons. Steps must be taken to prevent this “cascading” of older weapons.

Recommendations:

Offer financial and economic incentives as well as technical assistance to destroy all weapons rendered surplus as the result of modernisation or downsizing in candidate states.
Destroy all surplus light weapons stocks in current NATO member states. For example, the Dutch Ministry of Defence has announced that, unable to find buyers that satisfy the EU common criteria governing arms exports, it plans to destroy most of its surplus light weapons.

Conclusion

Governments and regional and international institutions are according more and more importance to illicit light weapons trafficking — an encouraging sign of progress in the effort to tackle the proliferation and unlawful use of these weapons. The challenge is now to ensure that the necessary momentum is sustained through effective implementation and co-ordination of the initiatives described above. In addition, there remains much room for supplier governments to strengthen and augment existing efforts both unilaterally and in conjunction with countries in affected regions.

The policy recommendations described above illustrate the wide variety of options available to stem these weapons flows. While some, such as weapons marking, have already gained support from various states, other avenues, such as improving domestic legislation in post-conflict societies, remain largely unexplored. In many cases, these less conventional options will require states to take more political risks. The international community must continue to press states to pursue not only those policies which are politically convenient, but also those which require them as suppliers and recipients to accept a measure of responsibility for the global flood of light weapons.

Endnotes

Note 1: There are many working definitions for small arms and light weapons. A recent United Nations report provided the following definitions: small arms includes revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns; light weapons includes heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles (sometimes mounted), portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems (sometimes mounted) and mortars of calibre less than 100 mm; ammunition and explosives includes cartridges (rounds) from small arms, shells and missiles for light weapons, mobile containers with missiles or shells for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems, anti-personnel and anti-tank hand grenades, landmines and explosives. From “Report of Governmental Experts on Small Arms”, A/52/298, United Nations , 27 August 1997. For the purpose of this report, the term light weapons is used as a general term referring to all of the aforementioned weapons and ammunition. Back.

Note 2: This paper’s recommendations, as well as the background information on the regional and international initiatives are drawn in large part from: Susannah Dyer and Geraldine O’Callaghan, Combating Illicit Light Weapons Trafficking: Developments and Opportunities, BASIC Project on Light Weapons Report 98.1 (London: British American Security Information Council) January 1998; and Owen Greene, “Tackling light weapons proliferation: Issues and priorities for the EU” (London: Saferworld) April 1997. Back.

Note 3: Michael T. Klare, “The International Trade in Light Weapons: What Have We Learned?”, presented at a workshop on “Controlling the Global Trade in Light Weapons” sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS) and the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Washington DC, 11–12 December 1997. Back.

Note 4: This paper focuses solely on illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons, not heavy weapons or nuclear materials. In this context, the United Nations has defined illicit weapons trafficking as “that international trade in conventional arms, which is contrary to the laws of States and/or international law”. See “Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36H of 6 December 1991”, reprinted in “Review of the Implementation of the Recommendations and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly at its Tenth Special Session: Report of the Disarmament Commission”, A/51/182, United Nations, 1 July 1996, pp. 64–69. Back.

Note 5: Address by OAS Secretary-General Cesar Gaviria Trujillo at the opening ceremonies of the Twenty-Fourth Special Session of the [OAS] General Assembly, Washington DC, November 13, 1997. Obtained on the internet at: http://www.oas.org/EN/PINFO/SG/1113ase.htm. Back.

Note 6: “Remarks by Presidents Clinton and Zedillo at Signing of Hemispheric Arms Trafficking Convention”, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, November 14, 1997. Back.

Note 7: Geraldine O’Callaghan interview with a Canadian Department of Justice official, 20 November 1997. Back.

Note 8: “Draft United Nations International Study on Firearm Regulation”, E/CN.15/1997/L.19, Economic and Social Council, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division, United Nations Office at Vienna, 30 April 1997. Back.

Note 9: “Measures to regulate firearms for the purpose of combating illicit trafficking in firearms”, paragraph 4, E/CN.15/1998/L.6/Rev.1, Economic and Social Council, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division, United Nations Office at Vienna, 28 April 1998. Back.

Note 10: The seminar was organised by Saferworld and the South Africa-based Institute for Security Studies. Back.

Note 11: Saferworld and the Institute for Security Studies, “Southern African Regional Action Programme on Light Arms and Illicit Arms Trafficking”, Seminar proceedings (London and Halfway House: Saferworld and the Institute for Security Studies) May 1998. Back.

Note 12: Gunther Manthey DGVIII, “Reflections on Possibilities and Challenges of the EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms”, presented at a seminar on “Developing Controls on Arms and Illicit Trafficking in Southern Africa” organised by Saferworld and the Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, May 1998. Back.

Note 13: Submission by the United Kingdom to the UN Secretary-General on behalf of the European Union on the Report of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, 29 June 1998. Back.

Note 14: The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies entered into being on 12 July 1996. The Wassenar Arrangement was set up to replace the defunct Co-ordinating Committee on Multi-lateral Export Controls, COCOM, which restricted the export of arms and related goods from member countries to the Soviet Union and her allies. Back.

Note 15: Geraldine O’Callaghan interview with Victoria L. Lester, Senior Crime Analyst, Firearms and Explosives, IWETS Program, Interpol, 4 December 1997. Back.