CIAO DATE: 04/06

Los estudios de seguridad tras el fin de la Guerra Fría

Abstract

This research paper explores whether the central-local division of power is an important institutional variable in the operation of political systems in the Americas. It develops a typology of central-local divisions of power in the hemisphere based on two specific characteristics that differentiate them (federal-unitary and centralized-decentralized), and discusses the relevance of the institutional and partisan configurations of the system in the workings of this variable. Then, it constructs a veto gates and veto players model in order to analyze the causal mechanism through which the centrallocal division of power impacts political systems in the Americas. It then presents two examples (with variations in time and space) to support the argument that the central-local division of power’s relevance depends on its type, the institutional configuration, and party composition of the system. In doing so, it analyses the Mexican federal system, arguing that renewed Mexican federalism and its consequences in terms of democratic governance and the efficient provision of public policies is a result of the concurrence of old institutions with the new political reality, that is, the intersection of the old institutional framework and the new partisan configurations of the Mexican political system. Keywords: central-local division of power, federalism, federal systems, unitary systems, centralization, decentralization, institutions, institutional system, veto gates, veto points, veto players, Americas, Latin America, Mexico, division of power, division of purpose.

Full Text (PDF, 36 pages, 359.1 K)