CIAO DATE: 04/06

The Consolidation of Democracy vs. the Price of Olive Oil: The Story of Why the CAP Delayed Spain’s Entry to the EC

Abstract

Why did agriculture, a supposedly ‘low politics’ issue area, become so salient in the accession negotiations between Spain and the EC? Why did it manage to obscure the ‘high politics’ motives of regional stability and democratic consolidation?

This article provides an institutionalist explanation of this ‘anomaly’ by pointing out three clusters of institutional ‘biases’ that operated during the negotiations and had the effect of over-representing agriculture over other interests that were more favourable to a steadfast enlargement.

First, the ‘bilateral’ format of the negotiation procedure between Spain and the EC favoured existing members, protected the acquis communautaire, and under-represented the applicant’s interest in a quick accession. Second, at the EC level, the Common Agricultural Community (CAP) exhibited great capacity to withstand the changes required by this enlargement. This was due to EC decision-making structures which insulated the ‘agricultural policy community’ from the pressures in favour of enlargement that came from other issue areas. Third, at the national level, members states’ national positions with regard to enlargement were mixed, with no clear priority and conflicting sectoral views.

The concrete operation of such biases is illustrated with a historical review of the process of reforming and negotiating with Spain its adoption of a key regime: olive oil. Thus, it will be shown that, in this context, Spain’s accession was only made possible after 1983, when fresh budgetary resources were made available for new redistributive policies in the Mediterranean that would compensate those Community farmers who were to lose out from the Iberian enlargement. By then, Spain was already a consolidated democracy.

Full Text (PDF, 31 pages, 266 KB)