CIAO DATE: 10/03

Political Islam: The Challenges for US Policy Iran (and Turkey)

Shahram Chubin

June 2003

Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Introduction: Religion, Democracy and Security

 

Why is "democratization" critical in terms of security policy in the Middle Eas, (an area recently dubbed a "failed" region by Carl Bildt)? We are all familiar with the economic trends, the static or declining growth, the demographic pressures on states, the weak legitimacy, and predilection for repression characteristic of the regimes there. We are also aware of the radicalization of the Muslim world with its potential for civilisational clashes and widespread violence and disorder. And the obvious difficulty states have had in creating effective, legitimate government or a moderate political culture. All too apparent is the difficulty of sorting out what the role of an all-too-pervasive Islam should be in society and government. Against the strong pull exerted by Islam as a faith, culture, set of values and focus of identity, is another "ideology", not necessarily antithetical or opposed, but also attractive: democracy.

Once tasted democracy is rarely rejected and not easily suppressed. While democracy may not be the wave of the future in the Middle East, it holds out hope for the region in terms of its stabilization, a prerequisite for development. Whether Islam and democracy are compatible is an important question and Iran and Turkey are two cases worth considering. In Iran’s case especially, the fact that there is a debate along these line is, in itself, momentous for it stems from indigenous sources (unlike Iraq, or indeed the new US policy about spreading democracy in the region as a whole).

Why/how would democracy contribute to security in the region?

* Democracy would lead to more moderate, predictable behaviour and the region would be less prone to war;

* Democracy, debate, transparency and accountability might see the reversal of decisions taken on WMD;

* By its nature a democratic state would be less alarming/menacing (even with WMD).

Any and all of these propositions are reasons to promote and welcome democracy in the region, quite apart from its intrinsic value. However several caveats are in order:

* Democracy in the Middle East is may well be qualified and limited rather than "liberal". Given the political culture time will be needed to change this.

* The process of democratization may itself be destabilizing.

* Democracy may lead to unwelcome decisions (nationalism on security issues perhaps including WMD)

Though democracy has no obvious historical antecedents in the region, and may appear foreign as an "ideology", its content, individual rights and accountable/representative government, strikes a deep chord in the region today. While democracy is not imminent, it is an idea whose time has come. Political Islam appears to be the dominant discourse among opponents of current regimes (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq ,Saudi Arabia), but this is not the case in Iran and Turkey.

Iran, political Islam has manifestly failed, democracy is the subversive alternative now being contested. In Turkey democracy is not in question, but rather the balance between secularism and the space permitted for Islam as a cultural, religious and political force.

 

Turkey and Iran

 

Turkey is a secular state and democracy seeking to bring Islam back into its life. At times it has appeared that democracy and secularism might be on a collision course. Getting the balance right between Turkey’s Islamic identity and its secular system based on democracy has been difficult. No other Muslim Middle East state has come close.

Iran is an extreme case. Mobilizing people in the name of religion led to the establishment of an "Islamic republic" under clerical control. Within a decade, Iran as a revolutionary model proved a bust: today Iran as a self-proclaimed Islamist regime has also proven bankrupt. Like Sudan and Afghanistan, Iran is a stark reminder that political Islam has no magic recipe for governance. As Iran’s religious system has become discredited a debate within the country has raised questions about the very foundations of the regime: how to reconcile "republic" with "Islamic": how to balance accountability to the people with that to "Islam" and who is to judge? In essence Iran today raises the most fundamental issues relevant to all Muslim states: how to bring representative, adaptive government able to perform in a competitive world, while maintaining the distinctive religious, cultural and identity dimensions of Islam.

The difficulty of reconciling religion and politics is uniquely difficult in Muslim states for several reasons:

* Islam is a total way of life, with injunctions for all aspects of life;

* Some Muslims believe that the basic tenets of the religion are immutable, not open to interpretation, and that any change is a threat to Islam;

* Some also believe that no system of law can be permitted apart from the religious (Sharia) law;

* This often implies that only religious authorities can interpret this law (but they may disagree);

* Islam puts greater emphasis on the community than the individual and his rights.

Separating "church and state" as other religions have done, is thus difficult in Islam. Most Muslim states try not to confront this issue head-on as Turkey has done.

 

The Case of Iran

 

Iran’s Islamic revolution spawned a mixed and contested heritage; some emphasized the "Islamic" component and others the mass or "people" side of the revolution. This duality has been present ever since. (There are other such contested dualities between the nationalist and the religious components, and the specifically Shi’i as opposed to more general Muslim aspects of the revolution. This mixed legacy is compounded by Ayatollah Khomeini’s own legacy which has been interpreted and claimed and reinvented ever since. (cf. Brumberg 2000)

For our purposes the key point is that from 1979 the ambiguous duality and tension between the rights of the people and the demands of Islam has been embedded in the constitution of the IRI and in its politics ever since. While claiming to enshrine a pure Islamic order based on the shari’a, the constitution in fact innovated controversially, nowhere more so than in the idea of a Supreme Jurisconsult or Velayate Fagih (Imam) who was given virtually unlimited powers. Contested at the time, this issue has become ever more contentious since Khomeini’s demise and the pauperisation of the Islamic republic. (It is notable that one of the authors of the idea of a Velayate Fagih, Ayatollah Montazeri has now repudiated the idea as dangerous and argues in addition that the clergy should play only an advisory role) While much of the debate between reformist and conservative in Iran today is about the respective role of the institutions (Majlis versus judiciary ,or President versus Guardianship Council or Supreme Leader) the most basic division is about the legitimacy of the popular vote as opposed to that which is appointed. This division in turn revolves around the broader issue inherent in the idea of "Islamic republic"; whether the "Islamic" should take precedence over the democratic "republic" or vice versa.

On this contest turns the future of the IRI and democracy itself. If the Islamic dimension of the IRI is dominant, it implies that religion, religious law and its application by clerics or specialists must be authoritative and that the latter should have pervasive and ultimate power. If, on the other hand, the democratic aspect of the republic is to be central tenet of the system, then the popular vote and its expression --notably the Majlis and the President-- should be the source of authority and the determinants of the course of the IRI, domestically and in foreign affairs. In such a system there is room for religious guidance and advice from clerics and others, but no executive or final authority. Many conservatives and some reformists talk of "Islamic democracy" by which they have in mind diametrically incompatible ideas. Not a few of them are also confused.

A few illustrations are instructive.

"In this republic which is the esteemed product of our Islamic revolution, the pillars of our system rest on the capable shoulders of the people and the people’s will, choice and vote. And it is the people who, either directly or via institutions that have arisen from their will, supervise all the elements and pillars of our system. And this is one of the significant meanings of republic. However it is not the only one. This popular system ...rests on divine values, measures, criteria and commands. In other words, these people must will the system which they have chosen, on the basis of Islamic measures and criteria. In a word, what we have attained is religious rule by the people…"(Pres. Khatami, 13,November 2002)

Khatami noted the divergences thus:"Some believe that republicanism will only be materialized when a secular system rules over the country. While others maintain that Islam will only be established in the country when republicanism (disappears)… We advocate a system that is based on the willpower of the people (where) the state serves, not rules the nation." (IRNA, 31 January 2003.)

Against these rather vague notions are those of the conservatives:
The Supreme Leader, Khamene’i: "The nation didn’t want western democracy…. They were not seeking profane western cultures or false western or eastern democracies….People want spiritual progress and material well-being through Islam and through the sovereignty of Islamic regulations."(Khamene’i,24 November 2002)

"The prophets of God did not believe in pluralism. They believed that only one idea was right." (Friday Prayer Leader Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, IRNA quoted in RFE/RL 18 November 2002)

"Our ruling system is religious rule by the people and in a religious democracy, the values are obtained from religion….The truth is not subject to people’s views and…… theologians and scientists never base themselves on what people think.

The people’s satisfaction can be obtained in two ways by the state: one is for us to follow wherever the people take us and listen to their earthly appetites; the other is to instruct people by serving them, guiding them and advising them." (Deputy of Tehran, Gholamali Haddad-Adel, 30 October 2002)

The differences in view expressed are fundamental as they stem from very different perceptions of the sources of authority in the political system and the corresponding role of institutions. The divergences in Iran today are thus not merely doctrinal but go to the heart of what constitutes a legitimate political system and which institutions should have governing authority and power. Hence the divergences are reflected in the acute political crisis that exists today reflected in the utterances of the regime’s leadership e.g. when Khamene’i says: "The enemies of the revolution have particularly pinned their hopes on the disenchantment of the people with the Islamic system and continue to do so. That is not correct. The Islamic system can solve problems and resolve difficulties better than any other system."(10 January 2003)

The President’s brother and Deputy Majlis Speaker Mohammad Reza Khatami: "We are apostates in relation to a religion, the message of which is not freedom and justice. And we are apostates in relation to a religion that (has) become an instrument for a group of people to contest power."(28 November 2002)

Ideological-doctrinal disputes reflect and aggravate a profound crisis on many levels in Iran. The institutional impasse is one of these. As one reformist put it in relation to the conservatives use of their (unelected) institutional bases:"The Majlis is responsible for drawing up legislation. If the Guardianship Council wants to prevent the Majlis from playing its legislative role by continuing to send various bills to he Expediency Council, then, it will have, in actual fact, eliminated the legislature as a pillar of the Islamic Republic of Iran."(Ali Akbar Mohtashemi,20 January 2003)

Two senior and influential Ayatollahs, Montazeri and Taheri-Isfahani share the view that the clerics have appropriated too much power and given the two institutions mentioned excessive and unwarranted power. This is paralleled by the conservatives’ manipulation of the judiciary and its encroachment on the freedom of the Majlis; the interference of the Revolutionary Guards in political issues (e.g. the veiled discussion of the future of the system of velayate fagih) as well as civil matters including the prison system; and numerous other instances of the exercise of crude power and intimidation. The latest example being the sentencing to death (subsequently reversed due to popular reaction) of an university lecturer (Agajari) who called for an end to clerical interference in politics and for a secular system.

The institutional and factional disputes and crises reflects the deeper legitimacy crisis of the state. Increasingly a gap yawns between state and society, a gap which the revolution after all was supposed to have eliminated. Furthermore there is the performance crisis; on every level including the political, the regime has failed to deliver benefits to the long suffering populace, no longer willing to be fobbed off with pious incantations or sordid imprecations. Economic issues are uppermost in the minds of Iranians and that implies responsive government, employment and prospects for self improvement and advancement. Given the demographic trends in the country with a population of over 6o% under 25, the revolution has lost or is losing its constituency. An increasingly restive and mobilized public demands solutions to their needs and is unresponsive to excuses and rhetoric that seeks to justify continued rule and corruption of a discredited clerical class and their hangers-on. The statistics are revealing; the government needs to create 700,000 jobs a year; it needs economic growth of at least 2.5% to prevent regression, it suffers from a brain drain of 200,000 a year.

While the differences between reformist and conservative, neither monolithic nor ideologically pure as labels, is also and even primarily a struggle for power, it is also in essence about ideas. What should be the relation between the custodians of Islam and the people’s representatives? Who is to define "Islamic?" What Khatami called the "rule of law" and popular accountability are at the root of what some wish to establish in Iran. For others, the immutability of religious law and the supremacy of the religious authorities in power (rather than as consultants or advisors) is the principal objective. The multiple crises noted, ideological, institutional, legitimacy and social-economic, make the struggle to define the future of Iran more acute and more consequential.

 

Prospects, Policy implications and Conclusions

 

What are the broader implications of this power struggle for Iran and more broadly for its behaviour internationally?

One should not exaggerate the extent to which Iran today can be called a democracy. It is only relative to the lamentable performance of the region as a whole that one could even consider this. Given the limitations on voting, the intimidation, arbitrary incarcerations and torture, restrictions of freedom of speech and assembly, dubious legal standards, discrimination against minorities (non Shi’i, non-Iranian) and persecution of others (Baha’i), Iran falls far short of even the most elementary standards. Its system is not accountable to the populace nor clearly representative. The most important institutions are under the control of officials that are only indirectly (or self)-elected and answerable to no-one. The positive aspects of Iran today however are in its potential. There are signs of a embryonic civil society, of debate, discussion, self-criticism and objective analysis. Individuals have shown courage in seeking to maintain the freedom of speech, press and assembly. They have refused to been cowed by threats and violence. They have promoted legislation seeking to ban torture and arbitrary arrest. They have disseminated ideas about the rule of law, habeas corpus and rights of individual citizens against the alleged infallibility of the clerics to determine their interests for them. This has and will further, with time, make the idea of democracy a popular notion, an idea whose time has come.

The struggle in Iran today is not between conservatives and reformists like Khatami but rather between those who believe that the system can be reformed and those who believe it is irreparable. Nor is the struggle between clerics and secularists, for both groups are themselves divided. Because of cross-cutting interests depending on the issue, reformists are a coalition rather than a unified party. Similarly the conservatives contain ideologues and pragmatists, some more and some less enamored of clerical dominance.

Given the stakes, these divisions are likely to persist without a clear outcome. Despite widespread disillusionment with the Islamic republic in its current form, there is simply no nation-wide organized opposition likely to shake the conservatives’ control of power. Iranians today are likely to register their discontent by dropping out and alienation rather than attempt a second revolution. Most Iranians simply do not have the desire to spill blood for a cause --any cause-- again. The duality noted earlier will continue. Debate, criticism and discussion will exist side-by-side with control over the effective levers of power by the conservatives. Reform will move haltingly in limited and acceptable areas, while repression and control will co-exist and always remain an option.

If the regime is not threatened by an imminent uprising, it still faces a difficult problem. Undermined by demography and ineptitude the regime is being rapidly de-legitimized. This implies that it can no longer call on the people for sacrifices, trust and the benefit of the doubt. It may mean more, for faced with apathy, distrust, if not active opposition, the regime may have to rely further on repression.

As with demography, the IRI is threatened by democracy. The appetite for democracy, for freedom of expression, accountable government and the rule of law are not limited to one culture or one faith. However it is labeled, it is the most subversive ‘ideology’ known to man and of universal and timeless appeal. Whether called democracy or the ‘rights of the people’, it has achieved a resonance in Iran and an impulse and momentum which are irrepressible. This means that while the reform movement periodically may be slowed or stopped, it cannot be reversed. The cat is out of the bag, what has conservatives are battling history (and they know it). They may find short term expedients and diversions to govern, but in the cliché, their days are numbered.

 

What does all this suggest for policy?

 

I shall look at three issues: a) the possible impact of external events on developments discussed; b)US policy with respect to intervening in the Iranian domestic politics and c) policies of engagement versus sanctions.

External emergencies like the war in Iraq could be used by conservatives to justify domestic repression on the grounds of national security. A successful, short war and minimal spillover regionally resulting in a nearby US presence might lead to the same response. On balance though the success of the war militarily and the successful transformation of Iraq are likely to reverberate in Tehran. It has emboldened the reformists and serves as a warning to their domestic opponents. This in turn could have the effect of encouraging the latter to mend their bridges with the US by changing some of their more objectionable policies. Given the opportunism of the regime in Tehran though, just as likely is the acceleration of the WMD programme, to the extent that this could be done without additional risk. In addition the hardliners in Iran appear to be seekingto increase their influence in Iraq ( through the Badr Brigade and Iranian hosted Shi’I clerics) as a source of potential leverage against a United States that might be tempted to target them in the future.

The Iraq emergency and the Korean problem have demonstrate the risks involved in developing WMD. In addition the recent declaration of the G8 has underlined the unity existing on this point .with respect to the dangers of Iran’s and Korea’s nuclear weapons’ programmes. Nevertheless, the lack of clarity about an optimum or consistent policy (containment vs disarmament; unilateral or Security Council?/ engagement or sanctions?) may send the wrong signal to Tehran. In the past Iran has taken advantage of US preoccupations elsewhere and ambiguity to win time, but now the international spotlight and attention is fixed on Tehran and it will be difficult for the regime to avoid the pressure to sign the additional protocols (enhanced safeguards).

Whether this new pressure will strengthen the reformists depends on how the US chooses to exert it

US policies in crises send messages, intended or not. Separate from that, should the US seek to influence Iran’s domestic politics and bolster democratic forces, ie. take sides? Broadly intervention in Iran’s opaque situation would be a mistake. Intensely nationalistic and proud of their independence Iranians would resist this. Those who could be labeled as foreign agents or instruments would be weakened. Some concepts like "democracy" can be damned (among some) by being called a Western import. Reformists however can depict their programmes in a local idiom that is more acceptable. More pertinent, it is not so much whether to intervene politically but rather how to do so with minimum collateral damage General support for the values espoused by reformists and for the kind of open and engaged Iran in an interdependent world, for which they stand, can be communicated by words and deeds. The US could make it clear that it would have fewer demands to make of a reformist regime and would be more inclined to provide Iran with assistance, credit etc. It is clear that the reformists in Iran have not indicated any differences with the regime with respect to the intention to develop a nuclear energy programme. Indeed the whole issue of nuclear energy is depicted in Iranas one of a "right to technology" with which the US is tampering for its own purposes. Hence the US’s policy is seen as one of technology denial and dictation, at variance with Iran’s right to develop. In these terms the necessary debate about the domestically unmentioned goal of acquiring nuclear weapons, has not taken place. The US should encourage such a debate within Iran by trying to convince the reformists of the dangers, costs and limitations of the nuclear programme, whether as source of energy or as a weapon for strategic purposes.This can be done by statistics and assessments that encourage debate and opposition within Iran itself. US threats, sanctions, and blanket prohibitions only make the reformists look at the issue in nationalist terms, requiring an independent and response opposite to that desired by the US.

The other side of the coin is pressure. Pressure to delay or make any nuclear weapons programme more costly is useful up to a point. It can be used by reformists to show the costs associated with certain programmes and to tarnish the hardliners. It can remind the regime that trickery and obfuscation is not cost-free.

However it has potential risks. Indiscriminately announced and applied it could unite the various factions. Moreover, it is likely to give the regime a string incentive to develop their own sources of leverage vis a vis the US by interference in Iraq, and if necessaryto prevent or retard the stabilistation of that country.

This raises the second question: engagement or sanctions? While sanctions can slow and make programmes and policies more costly, they have several drawbacks. They encourage self-reliance or alternative sources of supply; dual-use technology is usually widely available; foster asymmetric responses and harden positions, making the continuation of policy/programme a matter of principle and of ‘face’.

Iranian leaders have depicted US sanctions against Iran as an issue of independence and nationalism, an attempt to deprive and deny Iran of access to useful technology, (of a "right to technology") and to force it into an inferior position.

A policy of engagement doubtless has its own risks, making it easier for the target state to pursue certain policies while pocketing the concessions. It may give the appearance of being responsive to blackmail, set precedents etc. Nonetheless in the case of Iran, threats and denial have not, and are not likely, to work. They have increased the sense of embattlement of the regime and thereby played to its strengths. The argument that the US practices double standards is a powerful one and difficult to rebut in a society that has made status (equality) and dignity a part of its revolutionary myth.

Engagement has indirect benefits. Insofar as it reinforces the target country’s entanglement internationally and makes it more interdependent, and more tightly bound to a rules-based order (e.g. WTO), it makes that country more transparent, more predictable.

These considerations apply with specific reference to Iran’s WMD programmes, especially the nuclear. Instead of seeking to brand Iran, a state still officially in good standing with the IAEA, as a rogue state not honouring its commitments to the NPT, it might make sense to consider two other tracks. Positive inducements that might make the current alleged nuclear energy programme less attractive economically, and guaranteed access to certain (possibly alternative) technologies in exchange for greater transparency in the programmes.(e.g.93+2 inspections).

With specific reference to our subject, the question arises whether different factions in Iran would have different policies re. WMD and specifically whether an democratic Iran would be any different?

A preliminary answer is that most Iranians are nationalist and most would seek nuclear weapons if it was necessary for their security. (Note Director Tennant’s similar analysis, Feb, 11 2003)

However it is not clear that they do need it for their security. Iraq is no longer a threat and there are no pressing security threats on this level. In Iran the issue of nuclear technology has been raised in the context of "entitlement": i.e. "why should we deny ourselves the right to have this peaceful technology"? The fact that this technology is not particularly advanced or terribly useful for energy-rich Iran is a matter that could be easily debated in the country. The economics of the programme rather than whether Iran should be deprived of it, should be the focus of discussion. The US has contributed to making the issue one of pride rather than practicality. Encouraging informed debate within Iran should be a policy goal of the US.

Internal debate in Iran about the utility and costs of WMD (especially nuclear weapons) for deterrence and the alternatives should be encouraged. Specific security assurances should also be considered. Would reformists in Iran look at nuclear weapons differently? If seen as simply a matter of security (not technology) the answer is a qualified yes. Reformists for the most part look pragmatically to normalized relations with neighbours and to cooperative security. Their ambitions are for respect and, unlike the conservatives, seek status through the building of a free, modern and open society. The conservatives in light of their palpable failures, clearly envision nuclear weapons as a source of ersatz status (and legitimacy).

Greater debate about national security in Iran would end the monopoly of this issue by the conservatives. Framed properly in terms of Iran’s interests and resources (not denial and entitlement) there is considerable room for differences between the two broad groups in Iran.

This is not to argue that democracy is an all-purpose panacea. Today democracy is invoked to fight terror, stabilize regions and to end wars. Clearly this is an overstatement. Democracies might make ill-considered decisions (Turkey in 2003?) or find their nationalist impulses stronger than their peaceful inclinations. The process of democratization itself is generally recognized as being destabilizing. Formulated differently however, there is room for discussion: What domestic developments might stimulate a country to reconsider or reverse a decision to develop WMD?

I have argued that the democratic elements in Iran seek more accountability from government and are more prone to criticize policies that are imposed without discussion or clear rationale. They are likely to promote policies that are more transparent. Debate on controversial programmes, indeed making programmes controversial, requires a certain level of information, which reformists in Iran today could usefully use. Domestic debate and scrutiny could inhibit and make more difficult the pursual of clandestine programmes.

How democratic or transparent Iran becomes is important. If Iran’s nuclear programme is unstoppable, it may be easier to live with if Iran is a quasi-democratic, accountable state. At least it would be more predictable and probably more moderate. If the programme is stoppable, it is most likely to be arrested and reversed by a democratic regime, with a different view of security and status.

Ultimately even a limited democracy like Iran would appear less threatening suggesting that a less than perfect democracy might have security benefits.

In the final analysis, as the current arms control crisis reminds us, the most solid form of non-proliferation is where opposition to proliferation is grounded domestically (rather than imposed from outside).

Limited democracy in Iran might still blossom into something less qualified and stunted. For that Iranian democrats will need foreign friends that shed their illusions that the regime is either wholly bad or, for that matter, "good". A difficult choice for the US may soon present itself; will it trade off good behaviour from the more repressive elements in Iran (e.g. on WMD) for support? Or will it support those who espouse its values but who do not look likely to gain power in the near future?

I have argued that Iran’s is still a quasi or latent and certainly an imperfect democracy, with a long way to go before it approaches the liberal democratic model. However it is also the case that its underpinnings are strong and the trends in its favour. As democracy becomes entrenched, the role of Islam will recede, religion will become privatized and remain important as a source of culture, set of values and faith but without claims to decide or choose among competing values and policies needed for government. As this process occurs, Iran will pursue more moderate policies reflecting its own society and its view of the world.