CIAO DATE: 10/03

The "Evil Axis" One Year On

Shahram Chubin

January 22 , 2003

Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Much ink is currently being spilt over the dilemma of the United States in confronting the double crises of Iraq and North Korea simultaneously. There is considerable schadenfreude in some quarters as well at the US’ discomfiture in having to pursue two different sets of policies  in dealing with these cases. These events and the coming anniversary, at the end of the month, of the State of the Union speech that coined the term "Axis of Evil" serve as a useful point for assessing US policy after one year. 

It was remarked at the time (-January 2002) by thoughtful people that the grouping of Iran, Iraq and North Korea was unhelpful; that these were distinct entities, posing quite different challenges and requiring distinct policies and that, manifestly, they did not constitute an "axis" at all.

Less remarked at the time was that the Bush administration was reviving name calling and raising its rhetorical firepower despite (or because of?) the fact that its predecessor had tried the same ‘naming and shaming’ approach  ("rogue states") only to drop it as counterproductive. By 1999 the Clinton administration had become convinced that lumping together these very different states served to promote confusion, however catchy such labels might be for US media soundbites. The Bush administration in the aftermath of September 11 preferred plainspeaking, even simplification, to diplomatic niceties. Hence the "war on terrorism" and the "axis of evil".  But it went beyond this and personalized disputes by reference to the leaders of Iraq and North Korea as abhorrent and hateful.

No one disputes that these are, by and large, deeply unattractive states, or that terrorism is a tactic that should be eliminated in international affairs. But the word "evil" suggested a Manichean approach to international relations and the  imprecise and ambitious "war" on terrorism was not obviously preferable to "the fight against terrorism" (which Xavier Solana recently suggested was the European’s approach, Financial Times January 8, 2003).

Do words matter? The short answer is yes. States that feel threatened by the US’ claimed right to resort to preventive war and preemptive attacks, not as a last resort but now elevated to the level of doctrine, are liable to resort to extreme measures, eg. North Korea. In admitting work on nuclear weapons and threatening to withdraw from the Non Proliferation Treaty, North Korea is challenging the international community: However  US rhetoric since the advent of the Bush administration makes it appear to be a US-Korea issue in which North Korea is reacting to US threats and pressures. Similarly US rhetoric on Iraq has shifted attention away from Baghdad’s failure to fulfill its obligations to the UN Security Council to a focus on US war aims and an alleged predatory interest in that country’s oil.

Name-calling trivializes these issues and makes it appear as if the Bush administration is pursuing a personal vendetta. This has blurred the very real threats these states pose. The result is that US allies spend more time on trying to restrain Washington and emphasizing means and procedures (inspections and UN Security Council resolutions) rather than ends (such as Iraqi disarmament and Korean adherence to the NPT).

In the third case, Washington’s name calling had the effect in Iran of stifling the debate and criticism of the hardliners by the reformists, and of uniting the factions behind the state on nationalist grounds. It also made it harder to argue the case for cooperating with the US against Iraq.

The US emphasis on labeling its adversaries is surely misguided but what of threatening them with force? Does the threat or use of force in fact make sense as part of a policy of preventing (or reversing) proliferation? Clearly, force should not be discounted from the start. But there is room for doubt about its practicality. First there are generic problems.

There is no such thing as a surgical strike since intelligence can never generate enough confidence that  all weapons and installations have been  pinpointed.  Furthermore the response to such an attempted strike is likely in turn to be forceful, with serious consequences for regional states, allies of the US which will be the most vulnerable. This is the case with or without anti-missile defence systems. Both of these considerations pertain in the current cases of North Korea and Iraq.

What of the historical record of the use of force to prevent proliferation: have preventive strikes worked? The US considered, and for practical reasons parallel to the reasoning above, discarded the idea of such a strike against China in 1964.Was Israel’s attack on Iraq’s nuclear installation "Osirak"in 1981 a success? It certainly delayed Iraq’s  programme. But it also drove it underground and to a diversification of sites, making it harder to detect and eliminate. The attack also redoubled Iraq’s motivation to persist in the quest for nuclear weapons.

Will a strike on Iraq or threats against its facilities, convince Iran to stop its alleged programme of weapons of mass destruction, (WMD, including nuclear) or encourage its acceleration and camouflage?

Generally, states have rolled back such programmes when they felt more, rather than less, secure. That said, what needs to be done? On Iraq sanctions have impoverished the hapless populace while strengthening the regime’s control. Pressure needs to be maintained but "smart or targeted sanctions" are an illusion. If Iraq does not disarm  through UNMOVIC,  force will be needed to deal with it comprehensively. However even with regime change the reasons for which a successor might be attracted by WMD as a shortcut to security, will need to be addressed. This will be easier if Iraq becomes a quasi-democratic state.

It will be easier still if its neighbour Iran continues down the same road. Iran’s nuclear ambitions as they relate to energy make little economic sense. Outsiders should encourage an informed debate about the costs of these  programmes in light of alternate available  technologies and in light of a changed regional environment.  The forces pushing for more democracy in Iran though nationalist are not stupid. Enhanced engagement with the outside world will benefit the country and at the same time promote a healthy skepticism and lively debate about the wisdom of the nuclear programmes so far monopolized by a self-selected few. Engagement with Iran should promote greater transparency in that country and strengthen the forces for pluralism and this in  turn should see a less prickly and defensive Iran, able to play a genuinely stabilizing role as a regional power.

As for North Korea, a failed state with little to lose from sanctions and little to fear from conflict, neither sanctions nor threats are likely to work. Dialogue, reassurance, inducement and a comprehensive or grand  bargain that includes disincentives for Korea, however might work.  At the least diplomacy will require many instruments and rules, actors and institutions to alleviate the problems posed by these states.

It is a truism that even paranoids have enemies. Dealing with problem states that feel insecure is not a matter of choice, nor is the most effective means necessarily the one that would be the most gratifying. If dealing with these states is labeled "appeasement of nuclear blackmail", the task is not made any easier. Certainly, labeling them "evil", however it plays in the US heartland,  constricts diplomacy in advance, as the US is finding out.  Let’s hope that the "axis of evil" is laid to rest and no more efforts are made to imitate the "evil empire" as a catchword. Superpowers should resist playing domestic politics with statecraft.