CIAO DATE: 10/05

Iran: The Moment of Truth

Introduction

The definition of European policy objectives and strategies vis-à-vis Iran's nuclear ambitions must take into account the specificities of the case, setting, as it were, its problématique.

First, we have the unusual situation of a basically three-way game: the EU (and notably the EU-3, comprising the UK, France and Germany), Iran and the ‘significant other’, the United States, which is outside of the negotiation but a key player. Any student in strategy knows that a triangle is the most unstable and tricky combination to deal with, and the presence of yet another set of outsiders (notably Russia and China) adds another element of complexity.

Second, the US and Iran are acting as much, if not more, on the basis of past experience than from a cold-headed cost-benefit analysis based on current facts and future prospects. The American attitude towards Iran remains heavily influenced by the humiliation of the 444-day seizure of the American embassy and its diplomats in Tehran (1978-80), while Iran's vision of the US is coloured inter alia by the experience of the American-orchestrated regime change in 1953, with the overthrow of the Mossadegh government.

Third, the EU is approaching the Iranian nuclear question on the basis of the severe trauma incurred during the 2000-03 Iraqi crisis, which split Europe down the middle, pitting EU (and NATO) members against each other. The EU-3's decision-making on Iran will clearly put a high premium on avoiding a repetition of the split. Such a consideration can cut both ways: it can lead to emphasising cooperation with the US (as a way of limiting the trauma of another ‘old Europe/new Europe’ split) but if the US position becomes incompatible with the national interests of all the EU-3 countries, it can facilitate the establishment of a common EU front working against the US line. This has already happened, albeit in a relatively non-abrasive manner, when in early 2005 the EU put pressure (with some success) on the US to relent on its refusal to proffer carrots in the Iranian-EU-3 negotiations.

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