CIAO DATE: 7/5/2006

Considering China as a Potential Member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group

In January 2004, China formally requested to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an informal multilateral export control regime that aims to contribute to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons through the coordination and implementation of guidelines which govern transfers of nuclear material and technology.[1]  The NSG’s membership comprises the principal nuclear supplier states in Europe and the Americas, as well as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, and a number of former Eastern Bloc states, including Russia.  The group’s decisions, including those concerning the admission of new members, are made on a consensus basis, but the informal nature of the organization means that its decisions cannot be construed as legally binding upon its member countries.

As the NSG membership takes on the decision whether to accept China, there should be no illusions about China’s proliferation record.  In the recent past, Chinese entities have frequently exported the world’s most potent weapons and weapons-usable technologies to prohibited destinations, in contravention of China’s international legal obligations and promises made by Chinese authorities.

While China’s enforcement of its export control regulations may be hindered by a lack of sufficient resources to control its firms’ technology exports, the more probable explanation for China’s poor export control performance is official Chinese acquiescence in allowing profitable deals by Chinese governmental and private entities to sell nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) and missile technology abroad.  In this light, the case could be made that if China was permitted to join the NSG, it would weaken the regime by failing to exercise restraint in exporting dangerous weapons and weapons-related technology, thus undermining the efforts of an organization that has little means of enforcing compliance among its members.

Yet, in spite of China’s disappointing nonproliferation credentials, it could prove more beneficial to admit China than to deny its request for admission to the NSG.  Through institutional learning and closer expert and political contacts, other NSG participants would have more leverage over Chinese export control behavior.  With China among its ranks, the NSG would benefit from a more heterogeneous composition that would add to the organization’s legitimacy and geographic reach.  Chinese membership would promote nonproliferation objectives by enhancing China’s sense of ownership within the broader nuclear nonproliferation regime.  As an NSG participant, China would own a greater stake in upholding stricter export control standards.  Finally, China’s recent penchant for inclusion in international fora and recognition as a responsible Asian power makes it unlikely that it would forego its future status as a supporter of the NSG’s aims by failing to make progress on its export control effectiveness.

Recently, China has exhibited stricter control over its nuclear exports than it has over other types of weapons technology; this could indicate a heightened Chinese readiness to control nuclear proliferation, relative to other types of weapons-relevant technology, and may augur well for China’s intent to support NSG requirements.  China’s addition to the NSG could potentially facilitate improved Chinese export control performance and responsibility, a prospect which would contribute to international efforts to achieve the broadly desirable end of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons technology.

China’s Checkered Nonproliferation Record

If China’s NSG membership is to help promote stronger nonproliferation behavior, then it must be made clear that NSG membership does not represent a reward for China’s poor record in preventing proliferation, but instead represents a set of responsibilities that must be respected in order to curtail the spread of the world’s most dangerous weapons.  China’s potential adhesion to the NSG must not be interpreted as a “carrot” with no “stick”, which would serve to reinforce inattention to the problem without eliciting continued improvements in China’s export control performance.

It would be an understatement to say that China’s recent proliferation record has not been unblemished.  Between 2000 and 2003, Chinese entities were sanctioned by the U.S. government more frequently than entities of any other country.[2]  In 2002 alone, Chinese companies were sanctioned by the U.S. three times for helping Iran to develop chemical and biological weapons.[3]  On July 3, 2003, five Chinese companies were sanctioned for exporting materials that could contribute to nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) weapons or missile programs.[4]  China should be pressed firmly to demonstrate that it is making progress on its proliferation report card and that it is determined to identify and prevent dangerous exports by Chinese firms.

In terms of China’s possible adherence to the NSG, the organization’s members and concerned states alike should make it clear to China that it is not an option to join the group and then flout the regime’s guidelines; for example, China must not aid other states’ nuclear weapons programs or send nuclear technology to either non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) parties or non-parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which carry out unsafeguarded nuclear activities.  China has a history of cooperating with both types of states which harm the cause of nonproliferation.  The case of Russia, an NSG member which has conducted nuclear trade with both Iran and India, is illustrative of such a scenario, wherein the violation of NSG rules by an economically and militarily powerful member threatens nonproliferation goals.  Even though such a situation may not necessarily be a fatal contingency for the NSG itself, it is certainly an undesirable prospect that China be admitted to the NSG and then allowed to further damage the overall nonproliferation framework from within the NSG.

China’s nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, a country armed with nuclear weapons, but not party to the NPT, represents an especially distressing proliferation concern which the international community must address.  The NSG disallows nuclear assistance that may contribute to a nuclear weapon in the recipient state.[5]  Controls on retransfers are required, and members must not contribute to nuclear proliferation or diversion to acts of nuclear terrorism.[6]  Additionally, except where essential for safe operation, NSG members are not allowed to provide Part 1 nuclear assistance, which includes nuclear material, equipment and technology, unless the recipient country maintains safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on all of its peaceful nuclear activities.[7]

Chinese nuclear transfers to Pakistan would stand a strong chance of violating most of the above requirements.[8]  However, in terms of the safeguards requirement, NSG rules permit the fulfillment of preexisting contracts (i.e., agreed prior to NSG membership) with recipient states that lack full-scope safeguards;[9] this loophole would permit China to pursue work on Pakistan’s Chasma-2 reactor project without violating the latter NSG guideline.  The fact that China signed the contracts with Pakistan for Chasma-2 just prior to its prospective membership in the NSG only reiterates the need for vigilance regarding China’s nonproliferation intentions.

In light of recent revelations about an extensive network of illicit international nuclear trade operating out of Pakistan, NSG members should demand to know the specific details of China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation, and should require demonstrable guarantees that Chinese civilian nuclear assistance to Pakistan will neither contribute to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program nor support the illicit proliferation of nuclear technology, including materials, equipment and know-how.  China might also prove its nonproliferation good faith by using the influence of its supply relationship with Pakistan to press the government of President Pervez Musharraf to enforce more robust export controls and safeguards on military and dual-use technology.

Weighing the Benefits of Accepting China

The aforementioned shortcomings in China’s proliferation record notwithstanding, there exist a number of convincing reasons why China’s admission to the NSG might contribute to nuclear nonproliferation.

First, the leading proponents of nuclear export controls within the NSG would have more direct contact with, and potential to influence, Chinese export control behavior.  For years, China has carried on its nuclear supply activities with little international oversight or role in Chinese export policies.  Chinese membership in the NSG would allow China’s substantive participation in intergovernmental meetings on nuclear export controls as well as interaction with export control technical and policy experts from other NSG states.  Chinese participation could only encourage the development of an increasingly responsible export control “culture” within the Chinese government, as China learns through direct exposure to the prudent export control behavior which is expected of NSG states.  The NSG would provide a multilateral forum within which assistance could be provided to help China train its officials and allocate its export control resources more effectively.

China is a major political and economic power in the world, and a nuclear supplier with jurisdiction over a considerable proportion of the world’s territory, firms and individuals; it would appear beneficial to the cause of nuclear nonproliferation to harmonize Chinese licensing procedures, export law enforcement, and other aspects of Chinese nuclear export control policies and activities with the relatively higher standards required by the NSG.  China’s absence from the NSG represents a serious geographical gap in the group’s reach.  Furthermore, China is the only remaining permanent member of the UN Security Council, as well as the only nuclear weapons state (NWS) party to the NPT, that does not currently participate in the NSG.  China’s accession to the group would widen the list of NSG participants to include a country of considerable political stature whose inclusion should translate into enhanced NSG legitimacy.

In addition, Chinese membership in the NSG would give the country a heightened sense of ownership in the nuclear nonproliferation regime.  After years of carrying on its nuclear supply activities outside of the NSG framework, China would become part of the NSG’s multilateral process of coordinating nuclear supplier controls, giving China a greater stake in the success of the supplier regime, while also emphasizing the need for supplier restraint in exporting nuclear-related materials and technology as an essential component to the overall nonproliferation framework and the NPT aim of curbing nuclear proliferation.  China’s broadened role in the overall nonproliferation regime would set an example of the need for cooperative supplier restraint as an important part of nonproliferation efforts.

Further, China’s NSG admittance would fit well with its current policy emphasis on responsible involvement in international organizations and nonproliferation efforts.[10]  China has recently displayed a spirit of cooperation with the international community to control exports that might threaten international peace and stability.  Although China’s enforcement of its export controls remains problematic, it seems unlikely that China would enter the NSG and subsequently disregard completely its export control obligations under the regime, as such conduct would jeopardize China’s pursuit of recognition as a responsible nation that is engaged in international institutions.

A number of indications suggest that China would cooperate, at least to some extent, in adopting NSG nuclear export guidelines.  In particular, China has revised its export control procedures for nuclear technology transfers.[11]  According to Assistant Secretary of State John S. Wolf, in testimony on May 18, 2004, before the House International Relations Committee, “China has continued to take steps to control nuclear and dual-use exports and to demonstrate its willingness to adopt global norms.”[12]  China now maintains export guidelines, developed since the late 1990s, which utilize nuclear control lists that are virtually identical to those of the NSG.  Also, in December 2003, China’s State Council released a white paper, entitled “China’s Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures,” which emphasized the need for strong export controls, including the use of so-called “catch-all” procedures, as an integral part of China’s implementation of its international nonproliferation obligations.

China traditionally advocates nuclear disarmament and responsible nuclear policy in arms control negotiations and other international fora.  It maintains a no first-use policy for its nuclear weapons, something that the United States is at pains to claim for its own nuclear policy after the George W. Bush administration’s release in 2002 of its Nuclear Posture Review.  China has also displayed positive intentions of late by playing an integral role in facilitating the six-party talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis.  Thus, there is reason to believe that China could act as a responsible nuclear nonproliferation proponent within the NSG. 

China and the Future of Nonproliferation

The extent to which China would support NSG guidelines ultimately depends upon China’s political will to support nuclear nonproliferation.  While it would clearly not be in China’s interest to obviate the aims of the NPT and proliferate nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states or actors, China is not likely to rapidly discontinue exports for financial gain of NBC and missile technology to traditional Chinese recipients.  The country’s recent history of broken commitments should be cause for skepticism of China’s will to control the spread of this technology.  In 1992, the country pledged to abide by the missile export regulations of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); China is also a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.  But Chinese entities have not respected the prohibitions on transfers of missile, chemical and biological weapons technology contained in these regimes, even though the latter two agreements are binding commitments under international law.  On nuclear matters, reports of Chinese cooperation with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program have also been a concern with respect to China’s obligations under the NPT.

If admitted to the NSG, China could prospectively undermine regime goals by disregarding NSG requirements.  However, its tendency to shirk its nonproliferation promises would probably be to some extent mitigated upon joining the NSG, through the combined effects of China’s pursuit of a more responsible international role and the influence of NSG technical and political interaction.  In this way, Chinese involvement may help close the credibility gap which has characterized past statements about China’s intention to control its supply activities related to NBC and missile technologies.

Chinese officials have promised that, upon joining the NSG, they would mandate recipient country full-scope safeguards as a precondition for the supply of nuclear assistance.  But if China is left out of the NSG, China may only be turned away from cooperation with the world’s other major nuclear suppliers in coordinating export guidelines.  This would not be a desirable outcome.  In light of the grave danger posed to the international community by the prospect of dangerous weapons making their way into the hands of terrorists and other irresponsible actors, it would appear riskier to deny China NSG membership than it would be to encourage its cooperation with the world’s other nuclear suppliers within the NSG’s multilateral framework and engage China in a meaningful dialogue about the ways in which it could help ensure that its nuclear export controls are effective.

Chinese adherence to the NSG may prove an important step towards the much-needed objective of augmenting the effectiveness of the international nonproliferation framework.  The prospect of the undesirable spread and use of nuclear weapons technology is an urgent concern in the world today, and requires a more rapid and thoughtful international response than what has so far been undertaken.  China’s potential addition to the NSG could contribute to the legitimacy and effectiveness of an organization that, like the broader nonproliferation regime, is in need of more cooperative and innovative action.  If needed improvements are instituted in the NSG, it would be advantageous if China was included in such reforms.

Whether or not China joins the NSG, the country will not immediately become a model of compliance with nonproliferation aims.  Because of the NSG’s status as a political organization whose legal and practical influence over a powerful country like China is limited, other supplier states are institutionally constrained in their attempts to elicit Chinese conformity to the NSG rules.  Considering these circumstances, regardless of whether or not China is admitted to the NSG, it remains essential that future deliberations on China’s admission to the NSG be accompanied by parallel engagement and pressure upon the Chinese authorities to strengthen and enforce export regulations on nuclear, as well as chemical, biological and missile-related technology.

The author is a Herbert Scoville, Jr. Peace Fellow at the Center for Defense Information.