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CIAO DATE: 7/5/2006
Here There Be Dragons: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Benjamin Goldsmith
September 2005
In the aftermath of Sept. 11, 2001, the task of wiping out radical Islamist groups and their support networks gained a new urgency for the United States. U.S. attention landed squarely on Afghanistan and Central Asia, the home base of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and several other radical Islamic groups. The war in Afghanistan created the need for large number of U.S. troops in the region and a base from which to operate, while the newly proclaimed “War on Terror” created a strategic interest in maintaining this presence to suppress further Islamic radicalism.
These events have been viewed with unease by Russia, which has ruled the region from the late 19th century until the fall of the Soviet Union, and China, which is coming into its own as a great power. Their concerns over the strategic implications of a long-term U.S. presence and efforts to counteract its influence have begun to manifest themselves through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO stands to become an increasingly important tool for projecting Chinese, and to a lesser extent Russian, power.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is an outgrowth of the Shanghai Five, a mechanism for consultation between several states in Central Asia and China. Its membership, consisting of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, is firmly rooted in the former Soviet Union, but it has clear aspirations to become a larger, more influential regional body similar to ASEAN. At its most recent conference held at Astana, Kazakhstan this June, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Mongolia all attended as observers, widening the summit to include most states in or bordering the region.
Purpose
According to SCO’s website:
The main purposes of Shanghai Cooperation Organization are: strengthening mutual trust and good-neighbor relations among member states; promoting their effective cooperation in political affairs, economy and trade, scientific-technical, cultural, and educational spheres as well as in energy, transportation, tourism, and environment protection fields; joint safeguarding and presenting regional peace, security and stability; striving towards creation of democratic, just, reasonable new international political and economic order.
While it purports to cover a wide range or areas, the primary focus of SCO has always been security. All six member states face serious challenges from radical Islamic groups: Chechen nationalists have been fighting a bloody war with Russia for over a decade; the East Turkistan Islamic Movement is fighting to create an independent state in China’s Xinjiang province; and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which were aided by the Taliban, are active in the Central Asian republics. Transnational support for these militants makes international cooperation on counter-terrorism important to Russia and China, while the smaller members seek to eliminate the threat these groups pose to their regimes. Most of the activities sponsored by SCO addressed this issue - member states have conducted two major antiterrorist exercises, created a Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), and signed the “Shanghai Convention on Terrorism, Extremism, and Separatism”.
In contrast, non-military activities have mostly been confined to ministerial meetings and abstract language in SCO yearly declarations. Significantly, this has changed since 2004, demonstrating an interest in transforming SCO from a forum for addressing security concerns to a mechanism for promoting deeper regional integration and cooperation. The most recent declarations have devoted increasing space to economic and trade issues; plans are being drawn up for a SCO Business Council; and SCO has begun sponsoring more meetings on specialized trade issues such as transportation and telecommunications. These ties are particularly useful to the smaller members because they improve trade and economic aid, while avoiding the pressures for improved governance and human rights that accompanies similar aid from Western sources.
Structure and Key Documents
The SCO is nominally an international organization, with a permanent Secretariat headquartered in Beijing and a Secretary-General, currently Zhang Deguang. The structure and responsibilities of the organization are laid out by the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which was approved in June 2002. The charter provides for the following bodies:
- Council of Heads of State
- Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers)
- Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
- Meetings of Heads of Ministries and/or Agencies
- Council of National Coordinators
- Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure
- Secretariat
However, until recently, SCO has been little more than a forum for multilateral meetings between senior officials. Most of the important work occurs at an annual summit, held in the middle of the year at the capital of a member state, which is then communicated to the world by a declaration. The only bodies exclusive to SCO are the administrative organs (the Secretariat and Council of National Coordinators) and RATS. With the addition of a Business Council, SCO has begun to gain additional responsibilities, but it still remains primarily a forum to facilitate intergovernmental consultation.
The RATS is governed by a council of permanent representatives headquartered in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Its responsibilities are outlined in the Shanghai Convention on Terrorism, Extremism, and Separatism, which was signed at the same 2001 summit that declared the SCO. This document describes RATS as means for sharing intelligence on “terrorist, extremist, and separatist” groups and coordinating action against them. Under this convention, terrorism, extremism, and separatism are given broad definitions, providing its signatories with wide latitude to repress dissidents and insurgents alike.
A Brief History of SCO
The Shanghai Five
The SCO evolved from the Shanghai Five, a regional mechanism created in the late 1990s. This grouping of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan was designed to solve the border disputes lingering between the Soviet Union’s successor states and China in the wake of the end of the Cold War. The first meeting, which took place at Shanghai in 1996, focused on confidence-building measures between China and the other four states. These measures proved very successful, paving the way for an expansion of the Shanghai Five’s agreements into other areas, such as counterterrorism and smuggling, at its 1998 meeting. By 2000, the group had transformed into a general discussion forum for the region, covering areas from coordination between law enforcement agencies to economic and trade relations.
At the 2000 summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, the Shanghai Five ceased to be an organization bound by a common conflict and was transformed into an organization bound by common interests. All member states were relatively authoritarian regimes being challenged by Islamic radicals with regional support, creating an interest in cooperating to repress these movements. In the declaration released after this summit, the Shanghai Five pledged to respect the sovereignty and domestic institutions of fellow members, freeing them to deal with internal dissent, while affirming a commitment to peace and stability in the region, creating a common cause against radicals.
The Early Year
The 2001 summit in Shanghai marked the end of the Shanghai Five and the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which included the original five members plus Uzbekistan. Although this new organization professed an intention to address a full range of international issues, its focus remained firmly on security issues in general and Islamic extremism in specific. The 2001 Shanghai Declaration, as well as the 2002 Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization following from it, made abstract promises of cooperation in a number of areas, but only took concrete action on the issue of terrorism. These agreements created RATS, based on the principles outlined in the 2001 Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism.
In the time between the declaration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 and its actual founding in 2002, the situation in Central Asia changed dramatically. The Sept. 11 attacks, and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, gave the United States a new interest in the region. In order to support its operations against the Taliban, the United States negotiated with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to provide military airfields in exchange for significant increases in aid and other assistance. At the same time, the U.S.-led war on terror improved relations between Russia and the United States, pushing the problem of human rights abuses in Chechnya to the back and bringing the common struggle against Islamic terror forward. This significantly weakened the relationship between Russia and China, which had previously discussed SCO as a tool for undermining American dominance and creating a “multi-polar” world. In this new environment, the strength of SCO seemed to be waning, and with it China’s influence in Central Asia. Many experts predicted SCO’s demise, and saw evidence in Uzbekistan’s vigorous pursuit of improved relations with the United States.
This view of SCO was apparently confirmed by its slow progress towards becoming a functional organization. While there were numerous meetings between government officials, RATS Council and SCO Secretariat, the only bodies existing entirely within SCO, did not begin meeting until October 2003 and January 2004 respectively. Despite these issues, SCO claimed credit for some significant activities. In late 2002, China and Kyrgyzstan conducted counter-terrorist exercises “within the framework of SCO.” Larger, more significant exercises, involving all of SCO’s members except Uzbekistan, took place in August 2003.
The Color Revolutions
As the organization began to find its footing, it started devoting more attention to expanding economic and cultural ties. The extended U.S. presence in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan became a concern to China and Russia, who began using SCO to offer economic incentives to counter U.S. influence. For example, at the 2004 summit in Tashkent, plans were floated for a SCO Development Fund and Business Council and the emphasis on political and cultural cooperation increased significantly. These measures revealed an effort to reinvigorate SCO and its role in regional politics.
Political events in early 2004 and 2005 also helped reinvigorate SCO. The “color revolutions” of December 2003, December 2004, and April 2005 in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan respectively represented a wave of democratic movements which made the autocratic governments of Central Asia distinctly uncomfortable. With the United States and other Western states applauding these “revolutions”, China and Russia represented buttresses against unrest. The shift in attitude was particularly dramatic in Uzbekistan, which many analysts believed was disengaging itself from the organization. Following the massacre of protestors at Andijan in May 2005, relations between Uzbekistan and the West soured, while SCO offered it support for the government’s actions.
At its 2005 summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, SCO dramatically reasserted itself as an international force. In the summit declaration, SCO stated,
Considering the completion of the active military stage of antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan, the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization consider it necessary, that respective members of the antiterrorist coalition set a final timeline for their temporary use of the above mentioned objects of infrastructure and stay of their military contingents on the territories of the SCO member states.
It was the first time SCO had taken a strong stance on an issue of such great geopolitical importance. This statement was quickly followed by an Uzbek request for the United States to remove its forces from Uzbekistan, which included a major base supporting operations in Afghanistan. Additionally, the Astana summit included Iran, Pakistan, and India as observers for the first time, an expansion that included all the major regional powers. This is a clear sign that SCO has the ambition and the potential to emerge as an influential player in Central Asian politics.
The SCO and the Great Game
Russia and SCO
Russia represents one of the two preeminent members in SCO. As the governor of most of this region for over a century, it has long historical and cultural ties and a strong belief that Central Asia is its sphere of influence. However, the past 15 years have seen its military and diplomatic strength in the region wane, drained by difficulties of transitioning to capitalism, the war in Chechnya, and problems maintaining its large, Soviet-legacy military. As a result, it cannot project its power or offer the same incentives as China and the United States. Nevertheless, it maintains close cultural ties with many of the Central Asian republics, continuing to provide services such as border patrol forces.
Russia is involved in several other multilateral organizations in which it is the dominant partner, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Relative to SCO, it holds much greater influence within these groups, giving it a stronger interest in projecting its power through them. While still one of SCO’s dominant states, its imprint is much less visible than that of China.
China and SCO
At its heart, SCO is a Chinese project. The Shanghai Five was created with China on one side and the Soviet successor states on the other, making Beijing the natural nexus as the organization became a more multilateral body. The Dushanbe Declaration of 2000 reveals an organization heavily under the influence of China. It includes two references to Taiwan, which have little relevance to the region, and prominently denounces “national separatism,” a common Chinese phrase used in reference to Taiwan, while making only one other reference to a specific national conflict (Chechnya). The decision to locate SCO’s headquarters in Beijing and to appoint a Chinese Secretary-General reflects a continued, strong Chinese influence. These administrative choices have given the Chinese government much greater access to and influence over SCO leadership.
The current organization is extremely important to China’s strategic goals for Central Asia. First, several member states (Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan) have significant supplies of oil and natural gas, resources which China has been seeking to secure to fuel its economic growth. Second, SCO helps fight separatists in Xinjiang province, who draw support from other radical Islamists in the region. Finally, SCO stands as a buffer against the burgeoning U.S. presence in Central Asia. The United States has long had a significant military presence near China’s eastern coast, and the Chinese government is concerned that the United States is seeking to develop a presence along its western border, thereby encircling the country. The SCO presents the perfect tool for China to oppose the United States by cloaking its domestic interests and goals in the trappings of multilateralism.
The United States and SCO
The SCO and the Shanghai Five have never been particularly friendly toward the United States. The Dushanbe Declaration took an explicitly anti-American position on National Missile Defense and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and Russia and China sometimes mention SCO as a mechanism for creating a “multi-polar world,” a reference the overwhelming power of the United States. Tellingly, Afghanistan, a close U.S. ally, has not attended a SCO summit, despite its location in the heart of Central Asia. In contrast, Iran, which shares a border with no SCO member but is friendly towards Russia and China, observed the most recent summit. Until recently, this attitude has been primarily confined to rhetoric. However, with the Astana Declaration’s decidedly hostile reference to U.S. forces in Afghanistan, SCO may become increasingly active in opposing U.S. influence in the region.
Conclusions: The Future
The SCO stands poised to become influential in Central Asian politics. The fortunes of this organization will rise and fall with Chinese interest in the project. While Russia is a significant player, it lacks the economic clout and diplomatic interest to sustain the organization alone. In contrast, China has proved willing to invest substantial diplomatic and economic resources into the project. With the Central Asian republics badly in need of economic support, their loyalties will follow the money.
China’s interest in the region and willingness to flex its diplomatic muscle are growing rapidly. While China has eschewed international power politics in favor of securing its continued economic growth since the end of the Cold War, SCO may represent the beginning of a new trend. The Astana Declaration actively seeks to replace the United States as protector and financier of Central Asia, signifying a more assertive Chinese diplomacy and wider perception of geopolitical interests. Given the long-term U.S. presence in Afghanistan, and its likely interest in permanent bases in the region, SCO will become increasingly important to the Central Asian balance of power. As a way to present Chinese goals wrapped in a multilateral blanket, SCO will be a very powerful tool for influencing global perception of the U.S. role in Central Asia. While not yet powerful enough to overcome determined U.S. diplomacy, as illustrated by Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s continuing hosting of U.S. forces, its power is likely to grow in step with China.
The SCO seems likely to become a distinguished member of the international alphabet soup of multilateral organizations. Its significance, and ability to oppose U.S. interest in Central Asia, is likely to increase with time, making it an important group for the United States to watch.
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