CIAO DATE: 7/5/2006

Law Watch: Abu Ghraib: Military Intelligence Spc. Armin J. Cruz Convicted over Abu Ghraib Abuse

Steven C. Welsh

September 2004

Center for Defense Information

A second U.S. soldier has pled guilty and been convicted for detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, the first from military intelligence.  Specialist Armin J. Cruz of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade was convicted on Sept. 11, 2004, at a special court martial for conspiracy and maltreatment of prisoners.  Cruz has been sentenced to eight months’ confinement, reduction in rank to Private (E-1), and a bad conduct discharge.  While the ultimate site of his confinement has not been announced his sentence nevertheless begins immediately, even as it is subject to an appeal and to review by the referring commander.

Cruz is a reservist from Texas who was one of the few intelligence soldiers featured in graphic photographs of prisoner abuse.  While publicly available information about Cruz’s involvement is not yet complete, Cruz has been accused of forcing nude prisoners to crawl across the floor in such a manner that their genitals dragged on the concrete, using his foot to position prisoners’ buttocks into positions of feigned sexual activity, and standing by while prisoners were handcuffed so tightly their wrists bled.

The abuse and Cruz’s involvement arguably add to the picture of confusion and disorganization already characterizing past operations at Abu Ghraib.  Left unclear is the relevance of abuse to intelligence interrogation and Cruz’s own involvement with interrogation, intelligence or otherwise.  In this case, the abuse has been connected in part with retaliation against three prisoners suspected of raping a juvenile, and it is unclear the extent to which non-intelligence interrogation was involved.

Although Cruz was assigned to military intelligence, his role reportedly was to have been that of an analyst, pulling together information gathered by interrogators rather than directly taking part in interrogation himself.  Apparently, however, Cruz was often used to assist with questioning, perhaps blurring the lines between interrogation and analysis and exemplifying the gross understaffing of operations at Abu Ghraib.

Moreover, it is unclear the extent to which interrogation was at issue during the abuse depicted in the notorious photographs, or the extent to which Cruz may have been involved with intelligence interrogation-related abuse outside that context.  At the press conference announcing the conclusion of a U.S Army investigation into military intelligence activities at Abu Ghraib, it was indicated that none of the detainees in the photographs had intelligence value.  And it has been reported that Cruz was not to have been involved with interrogation in the context of the abuse featured in the photographs.  Even his presence in that part of the prison at that time was said to be in response to a passing invitation from a colleague. 

However, testimony in another Abu Ghraib case accused Cruz of being aggressive during what apparently were intelligence interrogations, banging on a table, yelling, screaming, and possibly assaulting detainees.

Adding to the confusion is that in the above-mentioned Army report Cruz is referred to by code number.

One might speculate that ironically, while addressing Cruz’s presence in the graphic photographs, Cruz’s special court martial may have sidestepped other delicate questions such as the extent to which abuses occurred off-camera during intelligence interrogation, whether those abuses were systematic, and why an intelligence analyst became involved with interrogation rather than relying on those trained and designated for that function. 

The latter question in turn raises questions about the readiness of operations at Abu Ghraib, pointing to the fact that military intelligence, like the military police, were under-resourced and under-staffed for their mission, in addition to relying on reservists such as Cruz who were not full-time professional military.

Cruz expressed remorse for his actions, took full responsibility, and in response to questioning by the judge speculated that his behavior may have been impacted by emotional trauma suffered as the result of a mortar attack on Abu Ghraib, an attack that reportedly resulted in the death of a colleague.  He expressed what his sentiment had been at the time of the abuse, a feeling that his victims were somehow connected with the attack, even though he knew that most likely was not the case.

The fact that Cruz was prosecuted under a special court martial, a potentially faster procedure with more lenient sentencing, meant that his imprisonment could not have exceeded one year.  His sentence still could be adjusted by either the commander or an appellate court.

Cruz was charged under Articles 81 and 93 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (hereinafter UCMJ).  Article 93 criminalizes the maltreatment of any person subject to one’s orders:

893. ART. 93. CRUELTY AND MALTREATMENT

Any person subject to this chapter who is guilty of cruelty toward, or oppression or maltreatment of, any person subject to his orders shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

10 USC §893, UCMJ Art. 93, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ucmj2.htm
#893.%20ART.%2093.%20CRUELTY%20AND%20MALTREATMENT

Article 81 makes it an added offense to conspire with others to commit a particular UCMJ offense, in the event that one of the conspirators commits an act aimed at furthering progress towards achieving the primary offense:

881. ART. 81. CONSPIRACY

Any person subject to this chapter who conspires with any other person to commit an offense under this chapter shall, if one or more of the conspirators does an act to effect the object of the conspiracy, be punished as a court-martial may direct.

10 USC §893, UCMJ Art. 81, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ucmj2.htm#881.%20ART.%2081.%20CONSPIRACY

DoD reports that thus far in connection with abuse at Abu Ghraib and other detention facilities 45 individuals have been referred for courts martial, 12 for general officer letters of reprimand, and that 23 soldiers have been administratively separated.

In connection with Abu Ghraib, two soldiers have been convicted by special court martial, both pleading guilty, five are awaiting a general court martial, and one has received a preliminary hearing that could lead to a general court martial.  While Cruz was from military intelligence, the other seven are military police.

In addition to Cruz, military policeman Jeremy Sivits in May 2004 also faced a special court martial and pled guilty, as part of a plea bargain agreement. 

Facing general courts martial, permitting more severe sentencing and providing a somewhat more extensive procedural framework, are military police Sgt. Javal Davis, Spc. Sabrina Harman, Spc. Megan Ambuhl, Cpl. Charles Graner and Staff Sgt. Ivan Frederick.  Frederick is expected to plead guilty on Oct. 20, 2004. 

Pfc. Lynndie England has been subjected to prosecution and has faced an Article 32 hearing, a preliminary hearing to determine whether she will go on to face a general court martial.

Additional prosecutions and investigations remain underway over prisoner abuse, including prisoner deaths, occurring elsewhere in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In addition to military personnel, the involvement of CIA personnel and civilian contractors remains a subject of inquiry (for example a CIA civilian contractor has been indicted in federal court over the death of a detainee in Afghanistan).  Investigators have indicated that the CIA has not been fully cooperative with efforts to investigate all activities at Abu Ghraib, including the existence of “ghost” detainees kept “off the books” in violation of law.

Clearly a number of overriding questions remain regarding Abu Ghraib and ongoing detention operations. 

One is why Abu Ghraib operations became so disorganized, undisciplined, and lacking in necessary human and material resources, exemplified by shockingly low numbers of military staff in ratio to the number of prisoners and the absence of such basic equipment as video surveillance cameras or appropriate computer and communications equipment.  Another key issue is how, in a context involving military police, military intelligence, military civilian contractors, and individuals affiliated with the CIA, the various elements of such a diverse “force” interacted with each other, as well as Iraqi police who were present, and how this impacted on the existence of a chain of command and the nature of accountability -- in short, who was in charge.  It was unclear who was prepared to take overall responsibility for operations, whether the authority of the military commander was undermined, and why she permitted that to occur.  Complicating matters further was the fact that Abu Ghraib was given a mission vastly expanded from its original purpose of detaining criminals without the capacity even to ensure its security from attack.

Added to these issues are the broader concerns of whether Abu Ghraib exemplified limitations in the overall Iraq war effort with respect to the adequacy of planning, resourcing, and adaptability, as well as the wisdom of relying on large numbers of guard and reserves to carry out combat, combat-related, and other very serious missions for significant periods of time.

Thus far, the response to Abu Ghraib has involved, among other steps, various military investigations, criminal prosecutions, a special panel investigation, and congressional hearings.  Whether these steps will be adequate to capture some of the “big-picture” lessons to be learned and prompt good policy, doctrine, and planning to effectively grapple with challenges posed by an evolving security environment remains to be seen.

Sources and further reading:

“U.S. Intelligence Soldier Jailed Over Abu Ghraib,” Luke Baker and Ed Cropley, Reuters, Sept. 11, 2004, http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=6210302&section=news

“US Intelligence Soldier Pleads Guilty to Iraq Abuse,” Luke Baker, Reuters, Sept. 11, 2004, http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=6210302&section=news

“Cruz pleads guilty, receives Bad Conduct Discharge,” Multi-National Forces Iraq, News Release #040911c, Sept. 11, 2004, http://www.mnf-iraq.com/media-information/september2004/040911c.htm

“Department of Defense Statement on Seymour Hersh Book,” Department of Defense News Release, No. 889-04, Sept. 10, 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040910-1240.html

“Intelligence operative to plead guilty to Abu Ghraib abuse,” CNN, Sept. 9, 2004, http://edition.cnn.com/2004/LAW/09/08/abu.ghraib.guilty/

“Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib,” U.S. Army AR-15 reports, Aug. 25, 2004, http://www.cdi.org/news/law/fay-report.pdf

Gen. Paul Kern, USA, Lt. Gen. Anthony Jones, USA, Maj. Gen. George Fay, USA, Special Defense Department Briefing on Results of Investigation of Military Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib Prison Facility, Aug. 25, 2004,  http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040825-1224.html

Senior Military Lawyer, “Background Briefing - Uniform Code of Military Justice and Court Martial Procedures,” Department of Defense Press Conference, May 19, 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040519-0785.html

“Spc. Harman Article 32 Hearing Concluded,” U.S. Central Command News Release Number: 04-06-45, June 25, 2004, http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/News_Release.asp?NewsRelease=20040645.txt

10 U.S.C. §893, U.C.M.J. Art. 81, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ucmj2.htm#881.%20ART.%2081.%20CONSPIRACY

10 U.S.C. §893, U.C.M.J. Art. 93, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ucmj2.htm
#893.%20ART.%2093.%20CRUELTY%20AND%20MALTREATMENT

“U.S. Soldier Sentenced to Eight Months for Abu Ghraib (Update1),” Bloomberg, Sept. 11, 2004, http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000087&sid=a0lIlljzVoa4&refer=top_world_news

Michelle Voeller-Gleason, “Soldier pleads guilty to detainee abuse, others face charges,” Army News Service, May 25, 2004, http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_id_key=5992