CIAO DATE: 7/99

The Road to Nuclear Zero: Three Approaches

Francine R. Frankel, Rakesh Sood,
Frank N. von Hippel and Morton H. Halperin

CASI Occasional Paper Number 8
December 1998

Center for Advanced Study of India
University of Pennsylvania

 

Table of Contents

Introduction
by Francine R. Frankel

The Road to Nuclear Zero: Prospects for Indo-US Cooperation
by Rakesh Sood
1. Achieving “Nuclear Zero”
2. US and Indian Approaches
3. A Shared Objective
4. Conclusion

Coupling a Moratorium to Reductions as a First Step toward the Fissile-Material Cutoff Treaty
by Frank N. von Hippel
1. A Fissile Material Production Moratorium
2. Inset: Fissile Material
3. Nuclear Stockpile Reductions at a “Sufficient” Rate
4. A Route - Not an Alternative - to the Fissile Cutoff

Defining Zero and Getting There
by Morton H. Halperin
1. Arguments Against Elimination
   US Security Interests
   Proliferation
   Verification and Instability
2. Redefining Zero

 

Introduction
by Francine R. Frankel

The dilemmas created for nonproliferation policy by the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan on May 11 and 13, 1998 and May 28 and May 30, 1998 respectively are severe. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has recognized only the United States, U.S.S.R/Russia, Great Britain, France and China as Nuclear Weapons States since 1970, and which was renewed indefinitely by 170 countries in 1995, has been shaken at its foundations. India’s decision to break a self-imposed restraint of twenty-four years since first demonstrating her capability with a nuclear explosion, at the same Pokhran test site in the Rajasthan desert, can be deplored, but its implications cannot be denied. Her leaders assert only the obvious in saying that India is a nuclear weapons state. The first three nuclear tests, described as a fission device, a low-yield device, and a thermonuclear device, and two additional low-yield tests provide a database for “design of nuclear weapons of different yields for different applications and delivery systems,” and for development of computer simulation capability supported by sub-critical tests. The wide range and sophistication of the explosions lend credibility to the declared intention of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led coalition government to induct nuclear weapons into India’s armed forces.

The nuclear tests by Pakistan, in response to those by India, reportedly of lesser strength and scientific complexity, nevertheless underline the new international political reality. Not only has the veil of strategic ambiguity been lifted by both countries, but as India’s leaders have stressed, nuclear status is not for others to grant and cannot be a “conferment” sought from the Nuclear Weapons States. Despite the most urgent pleadings of the Clinton Administration not to proceed, the leaders of Pakistan, like those of India, evaluating their own security concerns and domestic political pressures concluded they had no alternative but to demonstrate their capability. Only Israel, as the third advanced nuclear state which has not become a party to the NPT, still follows a policy of nuclear ambiguity. This, however, can also change if any country within its tense neighborhood succeeds in developing a nuclear weapons program.

Since efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons have relied so heavily on delegitimizing their use, and this evolving norm now has been frontally challenged as a rationalization designed to protect advantages of the favored five nations under the NPT, it is prudent to consider that “a chain reaction of proliferation” can result. This danger might be contained or at least slowed by diplomatic engagement with the leaders of India and Pakistan. It is particularly important to explore India’s expression of willingness to observe a voluntary moratorium on further tests, to accept obligations required of the 149 signatories to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996), and to enter negotiations on a Fissile-Material Cutoff Treaty.

Nevertheless, the nuclear future has suddenly become frighteningly uncertain. Many countries already possess the technology with which to produce nuclear weapons, and may perceive security reasons to do so. In this new situation, the shape of the nuclear future will depend much less on constraints imposed by international norms than on political will to acquire nuclear capability.

The three articles now published have an even greater urgency than when they were first presented at the May 5-8, 1997, conference, “The Future of Nuclear Weapons: A US-India Dialogue,” organized by the Center for the Advanced Study of India, with support from the W. Alton Jones Foundation and the US Department of Energy. The revised papers, by Rakesh Sood, Frank N. von Hippel, and Morton H. Halperin, arose from a self-contained discussion on “Disarmament and the Evolving Role of Nuclear Weapons.” They display a striking convergence of thinking between Indian and US nuclear experts committed to a common vision of a more secure world.

Each paper anticipated the dangerous prospect of nuclear weapons proliferation if the self-restraint exhibited by India were to break down as its security environment deteriorated, and the Nuclear Weapons States continued to retain their asymmetrical privileges under the NPT, while seeking to impose restraint on India and other nuclear capable countries. All of them argue that the United States, and India, seek to gain from a shared commitment to achieving the objective of “nuclear zero.” Together, they present fresh thinking about achieving a phased program of nuclear disarmament within “some reasonable time frame” through clearly defined processes (Sood). The papers consider a “route” which may be taken to a fissile production moratorium combined with nuclear stockpile reductions at a “sufficient” rate (von Hippel), and proposals for dealing with the difficult problems of verification by redefining “zero nuclear weapons” at a significant and verifiable number, suggested as two hundred (Halperin).

These ideas were initially developed for discussion as part of an Indo-US Dialogue. Since May 1998, there can be no more urgent agenda for policy-makers confronting the uncertain nuclear future at the global level than the momentous issues addressed by these leading practitioners and specialists in international security and arms control.