|
|
|
Email this citationCIAO DATE: 04/03
The Political Economy of War and Peace
Charles Cater
May 2002
Executive Summary
The focus of the International Peace Academy's annual New York seminar, held at West Point on May 6-10, 2002, was "The Political Economy of War and Peace." The aim of this policy development seminar was to introduce policymakers and practitioners to the emerging analytical and policy agenda of the political economy of war and peacemaking so that peace missions may be better equipped to deal with the economic legacies of conflict and the resulting challenges for building sustainable peace.
In the post Cold-War era, internal conflicts appear to be of longer duration than before. A number of economic aspects render them particularly difficult to resolve: (1) they are often self-financing and economically integrated at regional and international levels, (2) competition for resources can create problems in terms of the command, control, and cohesion of both rebel and government forces, (3) there is a proliferation of opportunities for self-enrichment over the course of a conflict, (4) diaspora networks, which some groups rely upon for financial support, are difficult for third-party mediators to influence, and (5) they involve complicated trade-offs between brokering peace and providing justice.
The presence of any one of these factors may suffice to undermine efforts aimed at establishing meaningful peace accords, and to foster the emergence of "spoilers" with vested interests in the perpetuation of conflict. While identifying and managing potential spoilers is essential to effective peace implementation, some have questioned the utility of the term "spoilers" and the disposition its application often connotes. They further caution that, due to the sanctity of state sovereignty, insurgents are, by definition, viewed as illegitimate and are thus more likely to be regarded as spoilers.
Intervention by outside actors appears to have limited effect in shortening contemporary civil wars. For this reason, conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding take on added significance. "Strategic coordination," as an indispensable element of successful peace operations, must reflect the complexities inherent in both the nature of the conflict and the relationship among the United Nations, donors, and other actors. Drawing on the collective field experience of the Special Representatives of the UN Secretary General, establishing forums for routine communication among third-party actors, and information-sharing networks among the UN Secretariat, think tanks and academic area specialists could help overcome information deficits regarding specific conflict dynamics.
Demobilization and reintegration of former combatants should be a major priority alongside disarmament. In general, the international community has responded well by rapidly establishing demobilization camps, while reintegration efforts, which may take as long as five years, have typically been neglected, as major donors shy away from openended commitments to the costly social programs that are often essential to sustainable peace. But experience has shown that reintegration programs significantly reduce incentives for ex-combatants, particularly rank-and-file forces, to act as spoilers and, hence, deserve greater support.
Economic criminality poses a potential problem for conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Protecting illicit but lucrative activities may provide a motivation for continued conflict, potentially giving rise to spoilers. Once criminal activities are firmly established in s o c i e t y, it is difficult to root them out, not only because law enforcement and judiciary capacities are weak, but also because they may serve necessary economic functions. In practice, making a functional distinction between "legal" and "illegal" commerce can be difficult as informal markets and clandestine trade may serve vital economic needs - albeit often alongside other, more clearly "criminal" activities.
The economic distortions created by outside intervention may negatively impact effective peacebuilding by crowding out the capacity of local organizations, exacerbating social and economic disparities, facilitating the growth of organized crime, and damaging certain traditional sectors of national economies. These impacts can be minimized by taking into account factors such as the configuration of international aid, the types of goods and services which can be acquired in the country, the prevailing socio-economic conditions, and the impact of interventions on these factors.
Effective post-conflict peacebuilding requires reform of both the priorities and the timing of aid as currently practiced by donors. Priorities should include the establishment of a secure environment, creating trust among the various parties, and fostering a sense of social inclusion - including through early action to create opportunities for employment. Short and medium term macroeconomic considerations should therefore be subordinate to the immediate needs of socio-political confidence building. Furthermore, most aid disbursements are made in the first three years of postconflict peacebuilding, overwhelming a country's absorptive capacity, and then decline markedly just when external assistance is needed most.
