CIAO DATE: 05/02

From Reaction to Prevention: Opportunities fo the UN System in the New Millennium

Charles K. Cater and Karin Wermester

April 2000

International Peace Academy

Executive Summary

• Contrary to conventional wisdom, most research indicates that civil wars have decreased in both number and magnitude from 1992 to 1998. A slight rise since 1998 may be an anomaly in a post-Cold War decline or it could suggest that the mid-1990's decrease is actually an aberration in an overall upward trend recorded since 1945.
  
  
• Timely action to prevent violent conflict can be difficult for the following reasons: (a) it is hard to identify situations that are appropriate for preventive action; (b) mobilizing resources for preventive action is a challenge in the absence of actual violence; (c) potential belligerents may not be receptive to external intervention.
  
  
• Understanding situations requiring preventive action can be problematic because analysis is often skewed by pre-conceived typologies and policy responses. Prevention efforts require an in-depth understanding of local context and the perspectives of potential belligerents. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) with field presence can assist with information gathering and mediation efforts.
  
  
• Inequitable access to basic resources and resource scarcity relating to high population growth have a high likelihood of contributing to violent conflict. Conversely, a plethora of natural resources can also increase the probability and duration of violent conflict as actors seek to enrich themselves through illicit means (e.g. small arms trafficking and mining of 'conflict supporting minerals').
  
  
• Anticipating and avoiding unintended consequences within an overall prevention context is a key challenge (e.g. the programs of some international institutions may have indirectly contributed to the exacerbation of horizontal inequalities, and hence to the probability of violence). This will require better strategic planning and coordination among international actors.
  
  
• Although the Security Council remains the primary actor for the maintenance of international peace and security, its record during the 1990's indicates the need for a change from a culture of reaction to prevention. The Secretary-General can help alter the parameters of debate regarding preventive action and will need to be forceful in drawing the attention of the Security Council to specific cases requiring preventive action.

About the Project

This project began in 1999 with the purpose of strengthening existing and nascent capacity for conflict prevention within the UN system and its family of agencies. It was developed in close collaboration with the Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General and the Government of Sweden.

The project began with a review of major studies on the causes of armed conflict in order to clarify areas of agreement and disagreement and identify contradictions and gaps. IPA commissioned two background papers: "Putting Prevention on Solid Ground: Recent Findings from Studies of Conflict Trends and Causes" by Ms. Anne-Marie Gardner of Princeton University; and "Preventive Diplomacy: A Review of the Scholarly and Policy Literature" by Professor Fen Osler Hampson of Carleton University.

These papers formed the basis of an Expert Workshop which convened a select group of major scholars and practitioners (31 January -1 February 2000) to apply the findings of state-of-the-art scholarship to operational efforts within the UN system to prevent violent conflict.

Following the workshop, IPA hosted several informal, working-level consultations among staff from the Secretariat, agencies, and Permanent Missions in order to discuss further the operational implications of the analytical results of the Expert Workshop.

The final phase of the project was an international Policy Conference, held in New York (13 - 14 April), which brought together close to one hundred leading policymakers to take stock of present efforts at conflict prevention within the UN system, to consider the implications of leading scholarship on persistent causes of armed conflict and to outline concrete steps that need to be taken by the UN System, Member States and other relevant actors to improve capacities for prevention.

In addition to the following analytical summary of the Policy Conference, IPA will produce a volume of essays by key researchers reflecting the themes and issues raised throughout the project, to be edited by Professor Fen Osler Hampson and David Malone.

IPA plans to continue its work on conflict prevention with a multi-year project of research and policy advocacy, to begin in Fall, 2000.

Introduction

Nearly 100 representatives of the United Nations, member states, regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, and academia gathered in New York, 13 - 14 April, for a meeting convened by the International Peace Academy on the prevention of violent conflict.

Current and emerging crises reminded participants why 'prevention' is important and to what extent international action in this area has been inadequate thus far. Exchanges among participants focused primarily on instances of recent, current, or potential intra-state violent conflict (e.g. East Timor, Angola, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, Montenegro, and Kosovo) but a few examples of inter-state war (e.g. Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia/Eritrea, and India/Pakistan) were also addressed.

The text that follows is an analytic summary of the conference. It draws upon formal presentations by panelists, comments and questions from the floor, as well as background papers circulated to those in attendance.

Violent Conflict

Since the end of the Cold War, intra-state conflicts, and especially their humanitarian consequences, have risen to the forefront of foreign policy agendas. However, contrary to conventional wisdom, most research indicates that civil wars actually decreased in both number and magnitude from 1992 to 1998. A slight rise recorded since 1998 suggests two questions: Was the mid-1990's decrease just an aberration in an overall upward trend recorded since 1945? Or is the post-1998 increase just an anomaly in an overall downward trend of the post-Cold War era? Answering these questions requires looking at four types of interrelated factors as prominent causes of violent intra-state conflict: insecurity, inequality, private incentives, and perceptions. There are also several contributing factors which explain variance among cases, such as historical legacies of conflict, the pace and depth of political and economic change (including democratizing regimes), and the role of external actors. The 'trigger' — a catalyst which spurs violent conflict under various combinations of these conditions — requires much further study.

 

Trends

• Most academic research contradicts the conventional view that intra-state armed conflicts have increased in number and intensity in the post-Cold War era. Analysis shows: a.) A dramatic decrease in the number of armed conflicts post-1992, with a slight rise since 1998. b.) A reduction in the impact and/or intensity of war within the same time frame.
  
  
• This overall declining trend could be due to improved efforts by the 'international community' to actively promote mediation of disputes, deploy force in the face of gross human rights violations, and develop post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives (e.g. 30% of conflicts ended with peace agreements in the past ten years — more than during any other decade in the past 50 years).
  
  
• However, declining intra-state conflict trends could also be primarily due to the diminishing external support for those factors that facilitate and cause conflict (e.g. authoritarian regimes and arms transfers). In this case, the reduction in conflict probably more closely correlates to the reduction in support and funding for superpower proxy wars and the increase in the number of democracies. This may explain two main patterns relating to conflict in the past decade: the break-up of states and the emergence of so-called 'failed states'.

  Causes

• Economic factors can be a significant cause of violence. Resource scarcity relating to high population growth, uneven food distribution, and a lack of access to fresh water are all potential sources of conflict. Conversely, a plethora of natural resources can also increase the probability and duration of violent conflict as actors seek to enrich themselves through illicit means (e.g. those engaged in small arms trafficking and the mining of 'conflict supporting minerals' such as diamonds).
  
  
• Research indicates that horizontal inequality (i.e. the political, social, and economic disempowerment of certain groups in a society relative to others) is an important cause of violent conflict. Examples of horizontal inequality include unequal political access, discrimination in the education sector, and inequitable treatment of certain groups within public sector employment. In each instance, conflict may occur as some groups protest the prevailing distribution of opportunities and public goods while other groups resist attempts to redress horizontal inequalities.
  
  
• The focus of prevention initiatives has tended to be primarily in the realm of crisis management, with a secondary emphasis on long-term structural prevention through development strategies. However, it is the 'gestation period' in between these two — often of long duration — which provides an important window of opportunity for preventive action. Some indicators of the precipitation of violence during this period include: an increase in state repression, a rising number of contentious political actors, and mobilization of the population.
  
  
• A major gap in our understanding of the causes of conflict is the transition from this 'gestation period' to a crisis. The nature and timing of 'trigger mechanisms' which spark violent conflict are complex, under-studied, and difficult to identify and predict without a nuanced understanding of local dynamics.

 

Prevention Strategies

Most current prevention efforts are isolated within a particular international organization or sector of international actors. However, because the causes of conflict are inter-related and interact over what can be a protracted timeframe, effective prevention requires integrated strategy across different sectors (diplomatic, military, political, economic, and social) and periods of engagement. Prevention can be greatly facilitated by incorporating resources and expertise from diverse international, regional, and local policy-makers and implementers.

A number of prevention strategies are starting to bridge traditional divisions: complex peacekeeping operations, coercive diplomacy, targeted sanctions, aid conditionality, civil society peacebuilding, and socio-economic approaches to development. However, attaining policy coherence and strategic coordination in implementation also increases in difficulty with the number of actors involved. In particular, the issue of anticipating and managing the unintended consequences of international action is very important.

  Diplomatic and Political

• Successful preventive diplomacy is difficult to recognize — due to secrecy combined with the problem of identifying 'the cause' for the absence of violence in a particular situation — thus making 'lessons learned' regarding preventive diplomacy hard to codify and institutionalize. Fully utilizing the potential of preventive diplomacy remains a challenge.
  
  
• Late preventive diplomacy — crisis management — tends to be the norm since earlier efforts by potential mediators are often perceived by states as an unacceptable breach of their sovereignty. In addition, states are reluctant to admit a potential failure in peacefully managing their own affairs. This makes early diplomatic prevention efforts more difficult.
  
  
• Membership in regional organizations and key international representative positions can be important incentives for encouraging non-violent behavior by states. Similarly, denial of access or suspension of membership in international and regional organizations can also be used as a disincentive for instigating violent conflict.
  
  
• Targeted sanctions are an important policy tool. Recent analysis indicates that targeted sanctions can be a powerful disincentive toward violence when properly focused and enforced. A potential drawback is the unintended negative humanitarian impact in sanctions regimes which are not sufficiently 'targeted' at elites and those responsible for instigating and perpetuating war.
  
  
• Coercive diplomacy is a potential tool for prevention that was not discussed at great length, although it was seen by some as desirable in the case of Montenegro. When coercive diplomacy amounts to brinkmanship, there are obvious risks to the goal of conflict prevention (i.e. that one will need to back up threats with force, thus potentially escalating rather than preventing violent conflict).

  Military

• Preventive deployment operations are an important but under-utilized tool. Evaluation of successful missions (e.g. UNPREDEP) could provide valuable insight for future operations. The extent to which this success can be replicated depends upon a number of factors such as international context and the perceptions held among key member states regarding which situations are of strategic importance.
  
  
• Humanitarian intervention can protect civilians in armed conflict. However, the 'international community' is far from agreement on a universal doctrine regarding this highly selective practice. Humanitarian intervention must remain a tool of last resort, and its occurrence in a sense represents the failure to create and implement a broad-based political culture of prevention.

  Development: Political

• Democratization is a long-term process of political and cultural transformation that can effectively build lasting peace. Generally, popular consultation and bringing actors together at the local level can help build peace and mitigate factors that might otherwise mobilize the populace for the recurrence of conflict. However, democratization can be destabilizing and the risks during transition require close attention.
  
  
• Democratic transition may be easier when entrenched elites have an exit strategy and do not have a significant personal financial stake in maintaining the status quo. Some suggested that good governance should be its own reward, while others noted that a 'democracy dividend' from donors could provide incentives for democratization.
  
  
• Elections should be part of a democratization and peacebuilding process — not just goals in themselves. The timing of elections is particularly important, and must be determined on a case-by-case basis with close attention to local political and civil society dynamics (i.e. elections may have the unintended consequence of reinforcing certain conflict-prone elites).

  Development: Economic and Social

• Development strategies offer an important window of opportunity to attack horizontal inequalities among groups. However, this can also be a delicate process since efforts addressing horizontal inequalities may face resistance from the 'haves' (i.e. those benefiting from the status quo). Generally, participants agreed that the economic motivations of actors pose significant challenges for preventing the escalation and/or recurrence of violent conflict.
  
  
• The actions of development actors in the past has occasionally had inadvertent consequences. For instance, studies suggest that the programs of international financial institutions have indirectly contributed to the exacerbation of horizontal inequalities, and hence to the probability of violence. Attempting to forestall unintended consequences within an overall prevention context is therefore a key challenge.
  
  
• Aid could be used more proactively in the service of conflict prevention. Unfortunately, it has often been co-opted by belligerent groups and has thus encouraged conflict. Systematic analysis of which actors tend to be positively influenced by aid packages could provide an important development opportunity for the future (e.g. aid for the reintegration of young men — 50% of who serve in the army — into Sri Lankan society).
  
  
• Prevention strategies could benefit from being 'mainstreamed' into the development agenda. For example, the World Bank has launched a study on violent conflict and "social capital" with case studies of Somalia, Guatemala, Rwanda and El Salvador in an effort to give further substance to this relatively under-used pillar of prevention. Two projects currently being implemented in Rwanda and East Timor deliberately aim to build such capital and foster communal bonds.

 

Preventive Action

The trajectory and life cycle of conflicts tend to be non-linear. This makes the timing of prevention initiatives particularly difficult but also crucially important. In many cases, there is a 'gestation period' during which the international community can engage in serious preventive efforts. However, in the absence of violence, it is usually difficult to mobilize resources for preventive action: political attention is highly selective and resources for prevention are relatively scarce. Furthermore, state sovereignty is jealously guarded, raising issues of legitimacy and viability.

The proliferation in the number and type of actors since the end of the Cold War has made managing potential and existing intra-state conflicts more complex. This has been compounded by a relative lack of strategic planning, differences in organizational cultures and funding systems, poor coordination, and a lack of information sharing among various headquarters and field operations. While these are serious constraints, they are not insurmountable.

  Timing

• Long-term structural efforts (i.e. economic, political, and social development) to tackle the root causes of conflict are likely to be most effective. Ironically, this should occur precisely when the risk of violent conflict may be least apparent — thus making national and international political mobilization difficult for most structural prevention initiatives.
  
  
• Certain types of early intervention may be desirable to avert violent conflict (e.g. low profile diplomatic initiatives). Focusing an international spotlight on a possible crisis could make a bad situation worse as potential belligerents seek to manipulate the dynamics of international mediation.
  
  
• Once a crisis has been acknowledged publicly, what is termed 'late prevention' is essentially crisis management rather than strict prevention. While more politically feasible than truly pre-emptive efforts, humanitarian and human rights violations may have already reached a large scale at this stage.
  
  
• The recurrence of conflict can be particularly devastating — thus crucial prevention opportunities also exist after wars. However, similar to 'early' prevention efforts, international and regional actors are rarely willing to commit the necessary resources for long-term post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives.

  Resources

• The international political attention of state actors is often based primarily on domestic circumstances (e.g. short-term perceptions of national interest, bureaucratic in-fighting and inertia, and parliamentary opportunism). Moreover, when resources are provided, the national priorities of donors lead to gross disparities in the level of assistance (e.g. contrast resources for UNMIK/KFOR vs. resources for UNOMIL or MONUC). Obviously, this can have a detrimental effect for consistent and equitable preventive action.
  
  
• Even when the political will exists to 'do something', there is often a significant gap between the amount of resources pledged by donors and the actual deployment of resources in the field. Furthermore, the time lag between the public commitment of funds and their disbursement can cost many lives as various types of action (e.g. military, relief) are delayed.
  
  
• Limited capacity constrains most regional organizations as actors for prevention. Although nearby states have a clear national interest in preventing conflicts within the region — potentially making them an important provider of necessary resources for regional organizations (e.g. financial, diplomatic, and military) — these resources are often in the hands of actors who are either interested in fueling conflict or who are ambivalent about resolving it.
  
  
• Nevertheless, several opportunities exist to enhance the resource base for prevention initiatives:
  a.) Utilizing the media and transnational advocacy networks at an early stage may help to mobilize public opinion (and politicians) in support of prevention efforts.
  b.) "Prevention trust funds", which exist in DPA and in some governments (e.g. UK), are important for short-term prevention initiatives in particular.
  c.) An analysis of funding trends and their impact could inform the donor community and enhance the efficiency and accountability of prevention investments. "A code of conduct for ethical giving", "an international system of accreditation and training", and "an international observatory of donor behavior" could be created as part of an effort to improve the donor system.

  Legitimacy

• The UN is uniquely placed for prevention efforts due to its mandate under international law and the general perception that it has more legitimacy for intervention than individual states or regional bodies. However, some participants suggested that the authority of the Security Council in particular might have been undermined by a number of failures during the past decade (e.g. Bosnia and Rwanda).
  
  
• Due to the complex nature of prevention, even well intentioned efforts on the part of regional organizations can be viewed as driven by suspect motives and intent. Participants disagreed regarding the utility of regional organizations taking preventive action prior to UN involvement: some argued for the effectiveness of regional action while others stated that this pre-empted the Security Council from carrying out its legal mandate for the maintenance of international peace and security.
  
  
• Individual states, particularly neighboring countries, may perceive a national interest in either conflict prevention or perpetuation. Even altruistic interventions may be perceived as a threat. Consequently, some states may be reluctant to take preventive action and others may not be receptive to sincere offers of mediation or assistance. States wanting to act preventively may do so more effectively when intervening under the auspices or with the approval of a regional and/or an inter-governmental organization.

  Information and Coordination

• Generalizing across case studies is difficult. Furthermore, the observation and analysis of conflict is often framed in a way that maps to pre-existing categories, strategies, and policy options — thus potentially compromising the accuracy and objectivity of information. This also makes the pinpointing of conflicts that are seen to require preventive efforts more difficult and may be a particular problem for state bureaucracies encumbered with biases of national interest.
  
  
• Although efforts have been made to encourage systematic diagnosis and establish shared warning mechanisms, they remain rudimentary and difficult to translate into an effective policy response. The policy-implementation nexus is further hampered by different informational requirements: field workers require the accumulation of comprehensive information regarding local dynamics, while headquarters need a capability for analysis to distill incoming intelligence from the field.
  
  
• The academic community generates important insights, but it can be difficult to translate such work into policy. Academics are often highly theoretical and many have little access to the inner circles of decision-making. However, the objectivity and independence of academic work also risks being compromised if it is too closely oriented toward affecting contemporary policy debates. A useful methodology for building bridges between the research community and policy-makers could be borrowed from the War-Torn Societies Project.
  
  
• One of the most significant gaps in information and coordination is the engagement of local actors with policy-makers and the research community. Developing countries, as the repositories of much under-utilized knowledge and well-informed analysis, need to be more systematically integrated into various information networks at all levels. This would provide a better understanding of general societal needs, as well as the perspectives, interests and intents of potential and active belligerents.
  
  
• 'Information networks', strategic planning units, and other coordination mechanisms can greatly facilitate horizontal (i.e. inter-sectoral plus inter-organizational) and vertical (i.e. field to headquarter) information dissemination and policy coordination.

 

Conclusion: Prevention in a United Nations Context

The UN is uniquely placed to shift international action from a culture of reaction to one of prevention — although not without some predictable difficulties. The key obstacles to the adoption of an integrated, timely approach to conflict prevention within the UN are twofold: (1) mobilizing member states to provide adequate resources for prevention and (2) improving information flow and coordination within the organization.

Nonetheless, the opportunities for preventive action by the UN are great. The UN has a broadly defined mandate, an international presence, unique staff and institutional strengths, plus unparalleled moral authority and legitimacy for preventive action. These assets and comparative advantages are explored at greater length below.

  Assets

• Timing — Due to its deliberative nature, the UN may seem ill suited for prevention efforts. On the other hand, the UN system is constantly engaged in a number of initiatives related to prevention — including diplomacy, development, and post-conflict peacebuilding. These activities give the institution a unique window of opportunity to act preventively — often with medium to long-term time horizons — which then may preclude the need for subsequent short-term crisis management.
  
  
• Resources — The UN system, including the Bretton Woods institutions, commands significant resources (financial and personnel) which could be mobilized for prevention. One useful mechanism is the creation of trust funds — particularly for unanticipated, short-term initiatives. Other underutilized tools include "Groups of Friends" for preventive purposes. Furthermore, enhanced UN partnerships with regional organizations and NGOs could augment the UN's resources.
  
  
• Legitimacy — UN intervention, while sometimes problematic, is still generally perceived as being more legitimate than action by regional actors, 'coalitions of the willing', or individual states. Also, "lead roles" sanctioned by the UN could lend legitimacy and efficacy to a wide range of complementary prevention initiatives by other actors (e.g. INTERFET in East Timor).
  
  
• Information — Although there is generally a lack of quality political intelligence transmitted from the field to UN headquarters and the early warning information that is sent to headquarters is sporadic and generally difficult to translate into policy, the UN has a nearly global field presence and unparalleled potential for collecting and analyzing information useful for prevention efforts.
  
  
• Coordination — Executive committee meetings, the inter-agency standing committee, the Prevention Team, the UN Staff College in Turin, and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) provide an existing framework for enhanced UN coordination.

  Comparative Advantages

• The General Assembly and ECOSOC were little discussed and thought to be constrained operationally. Nonetheless, these forums are important for productively crafting and promoting a prevention agenda at the United Nations — particularly one incorporating development strategies.
  
  
• UNDP and the World Bank are developing new practices to bridge the development-security divide and focus more specifically on local needs. These organizations are ideally placed to help create an integrated, long-term strategy for preventive action by managing resource scarcity and abundance, processes of political change such as democratization, and socio-economic issues such as horizontal inequality. Furthermore, the World Bank could also be an important provider of prevention resources by increasing collaboration with other organizations in the UN system.
  
  
• The International Criminal Tribunals may be important mechanisms diminishing the probability of renewed conflict in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (to a much lesser extent). The proposed International Criminal Court also has great potential as a deterrent to various forms of violence. Finally, the International Court of Justice is an important but under-utilized forum for the peaceful mediation of disputes between states.
  
  
• The Security Council has a primary but not exclusive role in conflict prevention. The Council has dramatically increased the volume of its activity since the end of the Cold War — thus providing an opportunity to advance a prevention agenda within the Council but also making the determination of exactly which preventive initiatives to undertake somewhat difficult. Furthermore, the Security Council has tools at its disposal (e.g. finding missions, observer missions, preventive disarmament, the establishment of demilitarized zones, post-conflict peacebuilding, and targeted sanctions) which could be used more frequently and more effectively.
  
  
• Complex peacekeeping operations are important (but cumbersome and expensive) mechanisms which can incorporate long-term post-conflict peacebuilding goals (e.g. democratization, economic reconstruction, human rights education, reforming judiciary systems, and civilian police training) in order to prevent the recurrence of conflict. There is also substantial scope for peacebuilding innovation in areas such as the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration of soldiers (e.g. putting former combatants to work in demining is a good way to promote their demobilization and reintegration into society).
  
  
• The Secretary-General is widely perceived to have a high degree of moral authority. This could be utilized, at forums such as the upcoming Millennium Assembly, to promote a prevention agenda acceptable to member states and other relevant actors. The Secretary-General can also play a key role in lobbying the General Assembly and the Security Council regarding the need for long-term, structural prevention initiatives. Finally, through the use of Article 99 of the UN Charter, more systematic 'fact-finding' can be undertaken and more frequent, case-specific advice given to the Security Council.

 

Agenda

Thursday 13 April

Welcome
Louise Fréchette, United Nations

SESSION I
Introduction: Making Prevention a Priority

Moving from Reaction to Prevention
David Malone, International Peace Academy

Recent Initiatives of the Swedish Government
Jan Eliasson, Department of Foreign Affairs, Sweden

Prevention in the Work of the UN and its Family of Agencies
Danilo Türk, United Nations

SESSION II
State of the Art in Conflict Prevention
Chair: Jan Eliasson

Contemporary Conflict: Trends, Causes and Options
Andrew Mack, United Nations
Peter Wallensteen, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University
Ted Gurr, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland

Security, Development and Politics: Contending with Structural and Regional Aspects of Conflict
Frances Stewart, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford
Bengt Säve-Söderbergh, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA)
Ibrahim Gambari, United Nations

Lunch
Gareth Evans, International Crisis Group (ICG)

SESSION III
Issues and Challenges
Chair: David Malone

Role of the UN Security Council in the Prevention of Armed Conflict
Sir Jeremy Greenstock, United Kingdom Permanent Mission to the United Nations
Danilo Türk, United Nations

The Policy-Implementation Nexus: From Policy to Practice, and From Headquarters to Field
Elena Martinez, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Kevin Kennedy, United Nations
Nat Colletta, The World Bank

Reception and Dinner
Jan Eliasson, Department of Foreign Affairs, Sweden

 

Friday 14 April

SESSION IV
Instruments and Implementation
Chair: Jan Eliasson

Strengthening Existing Mechanisms and Developing New Instruments
Jan Kubis, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) James Schear, Department of Defense, United States Tony Brenton, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom Michael Lund, Management Systems International, Inc.

SESSION V
Moving Ahead: Capacities and Initiatives
Chairs: Danilo Türk & David Malone

Roles of Donors
Mukesh Kapila, Department for International Development (DFID), United Kingdom
Marika Fahlén, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden

Role of Experts and Analysts
Maureen O'Neil, International Development Research Council (IDRC)
Shepard Forman, Center on International Cooperation, New York University

Opportunities and Constraints Within and Among Organizations
John Chipman, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale (IHEDN)

Concluding Remarks
David Malone