Will An Iraq Invasion Trigger An Attack By Al Qaeda?

Mark Burgess

Center for Defense Information

March 2003

With a U.S.-led war against Sadaam Hussein looking virtually inevitable, the threat of a terrorist attack by al Qaeda or like-minded groups or individuals on American interests at home or abroad has also heightened. Moreover, the missive purportedly issued by Osama bin Laden on Feb. 11 all but committed al Qaeda to such action. Should an attack fail to materialize the Qaeda leader risks looking like the "weak horse" he has accused America of resembling and losing face among his supporters worldwide.

That al Qaeda's profession of common cause was with the Iraqi people rather than Sadaam himself lent further authenticity to the latest alleged-bin Laden tape. As a secular regime in a predominantly Muslim country, Sadaam's government ranks as high on the Qaeda chief hit list as America's. That the voice on the tape did not seek to elicit support for Sadaam, who it called an infidel, also cast some doubt on U.S. insistence of links between his regime and al Qaeda. Of course, it could equally be argued that bin Laden was being intentionally misleading about any such ties as a way of discrediting the Bush administration's claims to the contrary. Regardless, adversity, like misery, acquaints a man with strange bedfellows. So, too, does opportunity.

In fact, bin Laden has made no secret of his willingness to forge temporary pacts with those he views as apostates if this serves his wider purposes, something he explicitly outlined in his 1996 fatwa entitled "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places." The al Qaeda leader's thoughts on this topic serve as a useful corrective to the mistaken assumption that he shuns such alliances and are therefore worth relating in some depth:

If it is not possible to fight except with the help of non-righteous military personnel and commanders, then there are two possibilities: either fighting will be ignored and the others, who are the great danger to this life and religion, will take control; or to fight with the help of non-righteous rulers and therefore repelling the greatest of the two dangers and implementing most, though not all, of the Islamic laws. The latter option is the right duty to be carried out in these circumstances and in many other similar situation. [Sic] In fact, many of the fights and conquests that took place after the time of Rashidoon, the guided Imams, were of this type.

As this statement shows, a marriage of convenience with a secular regime such as Sadaam's is not only permitted by bin Laden's interpretation of Islam, but viewed as an obligation when it furthers the achievement of his war aims.

Sadaam and Terrorism

For his part, Sadaam has also not been above forging alliances with a range of partners when he has considered it expedient to do so. Terrorist organization's that have received support or sanctuary in Iraq include the Palestinian group May 15 Organization, the Palestinian Liberation Front, and the Abu Nidal Organization. Saddam's relationship to with this last group (which Iraq helped found) reveals the mercenary nature with which he views such alliances. Having expelled the organization in 1983 in an attempt to foster good relations with the West during the Iran-Iraq war, Sadaam later permitted its leader Abu Nidal to reside to Baghdad until August 2002 when his house there was raided by Iraqi security forces. A month later Nidal's death was reported. Iraq claimed he shot himself, amid suspicions that the Iraqi security services were responsible, and the killing an attempt to show that Iraq was severing its links with terrorism.

Saddam has also been linked with the Kurdish Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) - formerly known as the Turkish Workers Party (PKK), an anti-Turkish group that has operated from bases in northern Iraq with the blessing and support of Baghdad. The Iranian-opposed Mujaheddin-e Khalq (MEK) has also been tied to Sadaam's regime. Indeed, the MEK has become a virtual tool of Iraqi policy against Tehran, such is the degree of control and influence exerted over the organization by Baghdad.

Despite his links with such groups, Sadaam has tended to rely on his own security services for his terrorist operations — often with quite clumsy results. For instance, during the last Gulf War their use of sequentially-numbered passports made Iraqi intelligence agents easy to detect once the first few had been detained. During the same period, the would-be-bombers of an American interest in the Philippines were dropped off at their target by an Iraqi embassy car. On that occasion, the bomb exploded prematurely, killing one of the Iraqi agents, while the other was discovered to be carrying the business card of a (subsequently expelled) Iraqi diplomat. While such ineptness should not be automatically assumed should Iraq again resort to terrorist attacks abroad in the face of any American attack, unless they have significantly enhanced their capabilities Iraq's intelligence services would be hard-pressed to successfully carry out such operations amid the heightened security of America's ongoing counter-terrorist effort.

According to a Feb. 26 report in the Christian Science Monitor, an Iraqi defector has told American intelligence officials that Baghdad recently planned to send agents to Indonesia, Amman and Jordan. The defector also spoke of Iraqi schemes to carry out suicide attacks on U.S. shipping in the Persian Gulf. Such attacks, while they cannot be ruled out, seem unlikely to be carried out by Iraq's security services. As a secular regime that rules by fear, Sadaam's would find it difficult to command either the loyalty or religious fervor to inspire such sacrifice. Admittedly, he could hold family members hostages as a means of compelling suicide bombers to carry out such missions, but this strategy would not guarantee the success of these operations.

It seems much more probable that Baghdad would seek to carry out terrorism by proxy, enlisting the help of Islamic militants with whom he shares a common American enemy. According to the Christian Science Monitor report, the Philippines government claims attempts to forge such alliances have already begun. Manila expelled an Iraqi diplomat last month, saying he was in contact with Abu Sayyaf — a Filipino Islamic terrorist organization that has been linked to al Qaeda. The diplomat was tied to Abu Sayyaf after a cell-phone activated bomb planted by the organization failed to explode. The phone that was to have detonated the device was found to have been used to call the diplomat as well as Abu Sayyaf leaders — damning, if circumstantial evidence.

Al Qaeda and Sadaam

Sadaam's apparent willingness to outsource terrorism makes sense in view of the past limitations of his own security services to execute such operations. It also suggests that an alliance with al Qaeda is something he would countenance, especially if he was fighting for his very survival. Moreover, as bin Laden's Feb. 11 tape showed, any support for Iraq by al Qaeda does not have to be reciprocated.

The crisis over Iraq offers bin Laden an ideal public relations opportunity. By so seeking to ally himself with the Iraqi people, the Qaeda leader is hoping to rejuvenate his appeal to be the champion of the Muslim world in the face of some notable, if limited successes against his network by America and others. It is highly likely that developments, such as the loss of their training camps in Afghanistan, some disruption of their finances, and the arrest and interrogation of a handful of their top players and many more of their more minor operatives have impeded al Qaeda's capability to execute another 'spectacular' terrorist attack on the scale of those of Sept. 11, 2001. However, as more recent attacks in Kenya and Indonesia by al Qaeda or their franchisees have demonstrated, any degradation of the network's ability to carry or inspire major atrocities was at best temporary.

In addition, al Qaeda's strategy is to incite terrorist acts against the United States as much as to plan and execute them itself. Bin Laden's efforts to portray himself as the defender of the Iraqi people is not only intended to serve as a further justification for his ongoing terrorist effort, but to also swell the ranks of those Muslims willing to take up arms in his cause possibly by inciting a huge overreaction on the part of his intended targets. That said, it is important to remember that, in the absence of America's current Mexican standoff with Iraq, al Qaeda's campaign would continue undiminished. Indeed, the only way to ensure that bin Laden was unable to seek to exploit such situations would be for America to give in to one of his central demands and disengage entirely from the Middle East and every other region with a sizeable Muslim population — a notion as untenable as it is unpalatable.

As said, bin Laden's pledge of support for Iraq against any U.S. military invasion all but commits him to an attack on American interests should that invasion take place. However, it is worth emphasizing that he views himself as embarked on an historic struggle against the West that is already 14 centuries old. As such, while delaying too long in launching any retaliatory strike against America may risk damaging al Qaeda in the eyes of the Muslim world, the organization has a patience not easily grasped in the West. This may mean an attack on the scale of Sept. 11 does not immediately greet American action in Iraq. However, care must be taken lest this create a false assumption that the risk of such an attack, or a strike on a lesser scale, will have somehow diminished.

Similarly, any attacks that do come may not necessarily be directed or carried out by al Qaeda. As said, bin Laden seeks to incite others to participate in his jihad, viewing this as a religious duty on their part. This is clear from his 1998 World Islamic Front Statement, 'Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders' in which he asserted: "The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies — civilians and military — is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it."

The risk that not only organizations but also individuals seeking to carry out bin Laden's jihad will carry out terrorist attacks against American interests is not a new one. However, the prospect of U.S. military action in Iraq has undoubtedly heightened it, largely through exploitation by both Sadaam and bin Laden, who each seek to portray any such action as a crusade against Islam — one for self protection, the other as a means of rallying Muslims to his cause. Statements such as the recent one from Al-Azhar University in Cairo (the world's leading center for Sunni Muslim scholarship) claiming that an attack on Iraq would constitute a "crusade" and calling upon "Arabs and Muslims throughout the world to be ready to defend themselves and their faith" will arguably assist both men in this. Any future war with Iraq, therefore, looks likely to represent not only a new chapter in the U.S. campaign against Sadaam but also the next phase in al Qaeda's war against America.

Sources

Bin Laden, Osama, 'World Islamic Front Statement: Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,' Online at: http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm

Bin Laden, Osama, 'Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places', first published in Al Quds Al Arabi, August 19965. Online at: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html

Murphy, Dan, 'Iraq to "Outsource" Counterattacks,' Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 26, 2003.

Shadid, Anthony, 'Scholars Urge jihad in Event of Iraq War,' Washington Post, March 11, 2003.