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Email this citationCIAO DATE: 05/01
Reconciliation in South Africa: Defining Success
This paper is concerned with the phenomenon of linking the term "success" and the term "reconciliation," in relation to assessing the work of the South African TRC. In the aftermath of the TRC, people are beginning to ask such questions as: "What good did the TRC do?," "What did it accomplish," or—more generally, "was the TRC successful?" Such questions are natural and to be expected. This paper addresses a smal part of a larger research agenda aimed at figuring out HOW to ask such questions in a meaningful and productive way, so that a realistic and systematic evaluation of the TRC can be conducted—one which takes into account what the TRC could feasibly deliver and what was simply unrealistic. The paper concentrates on the term Reconciliation, and relates this to how the concept has been used—and misused—in assessing the work of the TRC. It attempts to provide an analytical framework which, hopefully, provides a degree of conceptual clarification which allows scholars, and others, to move away from making large, overarching, claims such as: "The TRC was (or was not) successful, because people in South Africa are (or are not) reconciled." The underlying assumption is that it is not particularly helpful to begin the process of evaluation by asking such questions as, "Do you think the TRC has damaged or further the reconciliation process by its actions," As Brandon Hamber and Hugo van der Merwe—scholars who have published extensively on the TRC—state, this question, "simply does not have a short answer." 1 Moreover, such questions do not get us far in understanding the TRC because, as I will detail below, one's interpretation of the term "Reconciliation," (and there are several) will impact one's evaluation of the TRC's work.
Three interrelated issues have led to a concern with the pitfalls of linking "success" with "reconciliation." From the most general to the most specific, these concerns include: methodological issues surrounding the measurement of success; the presenting of hypotheses as facts; and a lack of conceptual clarity about the term reconciliation in South Africa.
On the most general level, the first concern is related to the question of how to measure "success." Scholars working in the field of Transitional Justice, as well as the TRC, have yet to carry out the rigorous work necessary for assessing success. This must include the difficult tasks of conceptual clarification (with which this paper is most concerned), followed by the operationalization of these concepts, and finally their measurement. As Timothy Garton Ash asks, by what criterion is success to be judged, in the first place? Is it "Truth, Justice? Reconciliation? Closure? Healing? National unity? Prevention of future abuses?" 2 And if it IS one of this, how would one go about determining the level of reconciliation, or the degree of healing, or how much national unity has been achieved? Other questions abound. For example, one of the goals of the TRC, is the promotion of a human rights culture. How do we know a HR culture when we see it? How would we measure this? Another goal of the TRC was to "restore the dignity of victims." Again, how do we define dignity?; how do we measure it? In the absence of serious methodological work, such questions will remain unanswered, and no meaningful assessments of the TRC can be undertaken.
A second, related, issue—one that is more specifically related to the linking of reconciliation with success—concerns the growing number of assertions, covering vastly different political contexts in different corners of the world concerning the necessary "ingredients" for reconciliation. What is troubling is that these assertions are often framed in terms of empirical fact, when, in fact, very little empirical work has been done at all. Such models, are given as starting points rather than being presented as hypotheses which need to be investigated. Everyone seems to know what is "necessary" for reconciliation. Often these models are contradictory, and this leads, to a tremendous amount of confusion. Several examples abound, both in and outside South Africa. For example, speaking at a refugee camp in Sierra Leone in October 1999, Madeleine Albright declared that "ultimately, the only way that reconciliation really can come is if people have a sense that justice has been done and those who have perpetrated the terrible crimes are punished individually." 3 The South African TRC, on the other hand, offered a different model for achieving reconciliation, perhaps best highlighted through its official slogan: "Truth. The Road to Reconciliation." Finally, a yet different model—once which appears to fuse those of Albright and South Africa while adding yet a third variable—was offered by Leo Valladares, Honduras's National Commissioner for Human Rights, after the discovery of alleged torture chambers and clandestine graves possibly dating back to the early 1980s: "With the truth you can have justice and with justice, reconciliation. But how can you forgive if you don't know what you are forgiving or whom you are forgiving?" 4 In rapid succession, then, we learn that "what is necessary for reconciliation is: prosecution, or truth, or forgiveness, or justice—undefined as Valladeras leaves this last concept. These three examples are indicative of two interrelated phenomena. The first is the rather loose flinging around of various terms associated with transitional justice with little attempt at making meaningful sense of how, and if, they fit together. The second is the tendency to, as Jonathan Allen, states "confuse aspiration with prediction." 5 When reconciliatory models are presented as fact, they appear to be tinged with some measure of "wishful" thinking. Allen finds this conflation of aspiration with empiricism to also be the case in discussions concerning the functions of truth commissions in general, and states: "Does anyone really know that truth commissions secure the benefits of healing, catharsis, disclosure of the truth, national reconciliation, etc. . . ?" In the end, Allen argues, some of the claims concerning the tasks of truth commissions are, "better understood as moral claims than as empirical statements." 6 And thus we see that in both the assertions regarding what is necessary to bring about reconciliation, as well as those concerning what truth commissions will be able to deliver, claims are presented as empirical facts when they instead belong more in the realm of hypotheses, predictions, hopes, and dreams. They are, as Michael Ignatieff writes, "not so much assumptions of epistemology as articles of faith about human nature. . . ." 7
The third, and most specific, concern about coupling the terms success and reconciliation— in this case in the South African context—relates to the lack of conceptual clarity surrounding the word reconciliation. Despite the TRC’s popularizing the term, it never provided the country with a clear definition of what it really meant. As a result, very seldom is anyone in South Africa talking about the same thing when referring to the term. 8 This is not a problem solely in the popular use of the word among South Africans. The sloppy and undefined use of the term has plagued South African scholars and even people within the TRC itself. This has at least four consequences: first, people are confused about the goals of the TRC, about what it could and could not realistically deliver. Second, a so-called "reconciled" South Africa will look differently to different people, depending on their understanding of the term. Third, through the (erroneous, in my opinion) linking of the success of the TRC with reconciliation, one's assessment of this success will likely differ depending on one's interpretation of reconciliation Finally, it is possible that conceptual confusion has lead to criticisms of the TRC which may not be appropriate. The bulk of this paper is devoted to addressing these issues surrounding the lack of conceptual clarity about the term reconciliation. The paper also attempts to enhance this clarification, in an effort to foster a more sophisticated understanding of how to think about the most appropriate way to answer the endless variations of the following question "Was the TRC successful?"
Truth—>Healing—>Reconciliation.
The TRC was designed to elicit this truth in various ways: through the qualified amnesty process (in which would be given only on an individual level and only upon full disclosure); through the statements given and taken by victims in the Human Rights Violations Committee; through the work of the research department and the TRC's Investigative Unit, and finally through additional submissions made to the TRC by various sectors of society—the innovative "sectoral and special hearings." 9 This truth, it was envisioned, would have a healing effect—not only on the individuals involved (both victims and perpetrators), but on a national level as well. Reconciliation, both individually, and nationally, was the hoped for end product. Variations of this "Truth will lead to Reconciliation" theme abound in South Africa. For example, in its discussion of the relationship between truth and reconciliation, the TRC's final report states: "There can be little doubt that gross violations of human rights and other similar abuses during the past few decades left indelible scars on the collective South African consciousness. These scars often concealed festering wounds that needed to be opened up to allow for the cleansing and eventual healing of the body politic." 10 While commenting on legality of the TRC, Constitutional Court judge I. Mahomed offered his own, lengthy, interpretation of the envisioned model:
Much of what had transpired during the past conflict was shrouded in secrecy. The truth had been concealed and was not easily accessible. The Act sought to address this massive problem by encouraging a public unburdening of grief on the part of the survivors and families of victims so that they could be helped to discover what in truth had happened, and to receive the collective recognition of a new nation that they had been wronged. The truth which was so desperately desired would be more likely to be forthcoming if the perpetrators of past violations were encouraged to disclose the whole truth with the incentive that they would not receive punishment if they did. . . . In the process, families of victims and the survivors would be better enabled to discover the truth; perpetrators would also have the opportunity of relieving themselves of a burden of guilt or anxiety with which they might have been living for many years. In the process the country would begin the process of healing the wounds of the past, transforming anger and grief into an understanding and thereby creating the climate essential for reconciliation and reconstruction. 11
Charles Villa-Vicencio, the director of the TRC's research department, offered his take on the Truth to Reconciliation model much more succinctly: "The underlying principles of the legislation are that imprisonment is not essential. Truth is." 12
While this model will be unpacked in detail below, a few preliminary remarks are appropriate here. The model is troubling on at least three accounts. First, Jonathan Allen's warning of confusing aspirations with factual reality may hold true here. Comparatively speaking, Allen claims that, "the thought that reconciliation requires truth is not very plausible as a general empirical rule," and argues that "the evidence seems to be mixed, varying both from county to country and from individual case to individual case." 13 On occasion, individuals inside South Africa voiced a certain level of discomfort with the fact that the "TRC Truth will lead to Reconciliation model" tended to be taken for granted more than investigated. One psychiatrist, for example, was concerned that, "there has been far too little genuine debate about the nature of social healing and what surely promotes it." 14 The presentation of the model as fact as opposed to proposition was facilitated by the South African media, as in the following opening sentence of a Sowetan editorial: "The principle that only a complete and truthful disclosure of past human rights abuses can guarantee lasting reconciliation is now well established." 15 Any model which is stated as a given rather than as one which needs to be deconstructed and carefully examined, does not allow any serious analysis about how reconciliation actually occurs.
A second problem with the Truth—>Reconciliation model, is that it says nothing about the concept of reconciliation (or truth, for that matter). This is a particular problem because, as noted above, the concept has been understood to mean different things to different people. Given this, does Truth necessarily lead to Reconciliation in all interpretations of the term? (or in any interpretation, given that the model may not hold at all—see the first concern stated above). Without any attempt at defining, operationalizing, or measuring the word "reconciliation," a model stating what is necessary for achieving it is not particularly useful. The major contribution of this paper is to do just this: analyze two major ways in which the term "reconciliation" is used in relation to the TRC, and investigate whether and how the TRC model holds true for each. A final and related concern with the stated model, especially in the various ways it is described, is a tendency to move rather unconsciously between discussions of individual reconciliation—between victims and perpetrators, for example—and national or societal level reconciliation. (Judge Mahomed, in his quote above, provides an example of this phenomenon). There is rarely any acknowledgment that this "leap" is made, or, more importantly, whether such a leap is even possible. The conflation of these two levels of reconciliation (individual and national) is indicative of the general lack of conceptual clarification around the idea of reconciliation.
Reconciliation: Two Interpretations
It would be almost impossible to believe that reconciliation could be understood as one single concept. Rather, it is a complex concept; one which might be best described as multi-dimensional. Any attempts at defining and measuring it should, therefore, be approached with a certain degree of caution. Still, this attempt must be made, if the accomplishments of the TRC are to be properly understood. There are two major ways the term has been used in reference to the TRC, both by those within and outside the institution (while I noted above that Hamber and van der Merwe identified five different uses of the term, I believe each can be categorized under one of the two overarching definitions). While different individuals use slightly different phrasing, the first type of reconciliation can be called "interpersonal reconciliation." Under this interpretation, reconciliation happens to individuals—usually between two people, but sometimes with oneself. The two individuals most often referred to are the victim and the perpetrator—although these two terms themselves are in need of serious conceptual clarification. This model of reconciliation varies slightly according to individual emphasis. While this interpretation has been adopted by a variety of people, from different backgrounds, it has tended to be subverted under the general rubric of what one Commissioner, Wynand Malan has called the Religious Paradigm, which emphasizes a "religious conversion model of confession, repentance and forgiveness." 16 This model thus focuses on the need to reconcile victims and perpetrators of gross violations of human rights. Jonathan Allen explains that in this model, there is a tendency towards the use of therapeutic language, the interpretation of terms such as forgiveness and reconciliation along religious lines, and the use of the language of "restoring" personal friendships or relationships. 17 Wilhelm Verwoerd posits that the "ideal" version of this model in South Africa would look as follows: a perpetrator comes forward and expresses remorse for his/her actions, and apologizes for them. The victim accepts this apology and forgives the perpetrator. In the process, both individuals experience a sense of healing. Less desirably, reconciliation can happen in the absence of one of the main actors (i.e. either the perpetrator or the victim). In this case, the individual reconciles with him/herself, which might best be called "healing." Verwoerd acknowledges that his model is only an ideal, fraught with potential problems: what happens when perpetrators refuse to apologize, or utter insincere apologies, for example?
The language associated with "individual reconciliation" can be found throughout the TRC's final report. In his foreword to the multi-volume report, TRC Chairperson Archbishop Tutu asserts that, ". . . the key concepts of confession, forgiveness and reconciliation are central to the message of this report. . . " 18 Moreover, the report highlights that the targets of healing are both victims and perpetrators, either with each other or with themselves. On the healing/therapeutic process of story telling for victims (envisioned as one of the major functions the Human Rights Violations Committee), the report says the following:
Making a statement to the Commission brought relief to some. The experience itself helped to break an emotional silence, started the process of integrating experiences that had been repressed or shut out for years, alleviated feelings of shame, and, in an atmosphere of acceptance, began to restore dignity and self-respect. 19
One victim reported that he had literally been healed by the process of story telling: "I feel that what has been making me sick all the time is the fact that I couldn't tell my story. 20 But now it feels like I got my sight back by coming here and telling you the story." Acknowledging that victims are not the sole objects of healing, the report refers to the healing of perpetrators as well. Interestingly, the report suggests a certain shortcoming in the TRC's work in this area, while simultaneously acknowledging that perpetrators were also in need of personal healing. In reference to its lack of attention to perpetrators, it states: "Essentially, the Commission did not examine the effects on the perpetrators of committing a gross human rights violation. This was understandable, as this was not part of the mandate." 21 At the same time, it acknowledges that "Nevertheless, a commitment to reconciliation and healing means that the psychological plight of individuals who were involved in the perpetration of gross human rights violations and their families should be acknowledged. Like victims, perpetrators need to be given space to examine their emotional reactions and to reintegrate what has probably been disassociated from their emotional life. . . . Perpetrators share with their victims the potential for and experiences of post traumatic stress disorder." 22 As with victims, the report provides evidence that individual healing did, at times, occur for perpetrators: "the Commission also listened to perpetrators describing in awful detail the acts of terror, assassination and torture that they inflicted on so any over so long a period. . . .Encouraging, were the expressions of remorse and a seeking for forgiveness on the part of some of those who applied for amnesty." 23
While presented here as a straightforward model of reconciliation between victims and perpetrators, the "individual reconciliation" model is, obviously, rather more complex and multi-dimensional. The different permutations of individuals in need of reconciliation is vast: victims with themselves; perpetrators with themselves; victims with perpetrators; victims with victims, and community members with other community members, to mention but some of the complicated relationships between victims and perpetrators. 24 Moreover, there are degrees of interpersonal reconciliation, such as the different forms of apology, from "I'm sorry, please forgive me," to "I accept political and moral responsibility" for my actions. Finally, while the history of apartheid tends to be discussed by the TRC in terms of victims and perpetrators, and quite often portrayed literally as a black and white conflict, as one scholar notes, "this is a misleading version of history and events and eschews the nuances and ambiguities of an often complex, difficult and problematic conflict in which there appear as many perspectives as colours in the new version of the rainbow nations." Despite these complexities, there is, I believe, a distinct model of "individual reconciliation," which can be identified in discussion surrounding the TRC; a model with which the following terms are overwhelmingly associated: healing, apology, forgiveness, confession, and remorse.
Simultaneously, a second reconciliatory model appears in the South African context; one which is distinctly different from the first. Although the term is unwieldy, the second model is best described as "national unity and reconciliation," (NUR). If the first model is associated with a religious paradigm, the second one is most closely related to a political one. The units of analysis are NOT individuals in this case, but socio-political institutions and processes. As in the first model, different scholars and activists describe NUR slightly differently, although again each description contains the same basic elements. Wynand Malan describes NUR as "a call for a commitment to share a future and for each, in his or her own way, to build towards that future. It calls for a commitment to respect law and the procedures and processes laid down by the Constitution." 25 For Jonathan Allen, NUR (although he does not explicitly use this term) 26 consists of several phenomena, including an understanding that cultural diversity is not to be regarded as a threat but as an asset, or at least as a reality to be accepted rather than engineered away; an acceptance (and even a welcoming) of an element of political discord as a healthy sign; the existence of free institutions, political competition and the rule of law which mediate political unity; an understanding of political unity in terms of an allegiance to a framework of institutions, laws, and practices that guarantee the negative liberty of individuals; and an insistence that political is compatible with—or even requires—certain kinds of political divisions and disagreements. 27 Richard Wilson offers slightly different language for the NUR model in South Africa, one in which "the state should strive to build legitimate and representative state institutions which respect fundamental human rights," and in which it is the state's responsibility to "create a culture of rights based up an inclusive and democratic notion of citizenship." 28 A somewhat different version of this model is offered by Kenneth Christie who claims that it "is a pro-active attempt to try and purge and transform the institutions of state to ensure that they protect and promote human rights," thereby "changing or rectifying the structural causes of the abuses." 29 Like the first model, the language of NUR appears throughout the multi-volume final TRC report, which, for example cites the following testimony: "A true human rights culture is a democratic culture. At the heart of a democratic culture is a tolerance of divergent views and understandings of the past, present, and future. . . . National unity and reconciliation is a society with its members relaxed, a nation democratically at peace with itself." 30
Like the "Individual Reconciliation" model, the "National Unity and Reconciliation" model is complex. Both must be thoroughly analyzed, and their nuances acknowledged. Within each category—individual versus national—further conceptual clarification is called for. For example, not all forms of national unity would serve the objectives of the TRC. Both authoritarianism and some forms of nationalism claim to place national unity as their highest priority. This is not a national unity which would be fit with the NUR model embraced by the TRC. As Allen states, authoritarian understandings of political unity tend to emphasize the importance of maintaining order in the face of subversive threats, while an increasing trend is evident under some forms of nationalisms: those who do not line up behind the nationalist project are increasingly excised from the national—either through death or forced removals. Both of these interpretations of the concept National Unity regard dissent—collective or individual—as a threat which needs to be combated. 31 This is clearly NOT the understanding of National Unity in the NUR model, which is most closely associated with the following terms: tolerance; peaceful coexistence; rule of law; democracy; human rights culture; conflict resolution; transparency, and public debate.
The existence of these two different understandings of one concept leads to several questions which must be addressed if we are to properly assess the TRC's contributions towards reconciliation in South Africa. How did the existence of two separate models for reconciliation play out in the work of the TRC? How did the TRC incorporate two fundamentally different models into its understanding of its work? What was the relationship between both models in South Africa: did they co-exist side-by-side as parallel processes, or did the two interact and cross-lines in any ways? Finally, what are the consequences of this distinction for the way in which the TRC was understood by South Africans, as well as how it will/should be evaluated by scholars?
The TRC and the Reconciliation Models
The TRC was established by an act of Parliament, the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act no. 34 of 1995. This Act grew out of the interim constitution which had been negotiated by various actors as a transitional institution which would allow for a democratic election and the creation of a constitutional assembly, which would ultimately draft a final constitution. In order to understand how the framers of both the interim constitution and the TRC Act interpreted the concept "reconciliation," one therefore needs to examine these documents. Herein lies a problem: neither the interim constitution or the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act provide clear definitions of the concept reconciliation, and evidence of both the "individual reconciliation" and NUR interpretations can be found in each. Indeed, one encounters this problem right from the beginning: with the Act's title. Should the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation be read as: "National Unity and Reconciliation," which implies the NUR model, or should it more properly be read as "National Unity" and "Reconciliation," which more easily leaves room for both an NUR and an "individual reconciliation" interpretation of the concept? Perhaps the conceptual vagueness in the title is clarified in the Act's language? Unfortunately, this is not the case. No section of the act provides an explicit definition of reconciliation; however, the framer's understanding of this term can be gleaned in the section dealing with the objectives and functions envisioned for the TRC (Chapter 2, Section 3, subsection 1 of the Act). The Act states that the objective of the Commission was to "promote national unity and reconciliation" through four specific tasks. The first was the establishment of as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of Gross Violations of Human Rights which were committed between March 1 1960 and May 10, 1994, with a specific mandate of understanding the perspectives of the victims as well as the motives and perspectives of perpetrators. The second objective was facilitating the granting of amnesty on the basis of full disclosure of acts associated with a political objective during the mandate period of TRC investigation. The third was the restoration of the human and civil dignity of victims, by establishing and making known their fate and whereabouts, through giving them the opportunity to relate their own accounts, and by recommending reparation measures. The final objective was the compilation of a report containing recommendations of measures to prevent the future violations of human rights.
Two observations are immediately obvious: first, reconciliation is never clearly defined in this mandate. There appears to be an underlying assumption that these four tasks, once completed, will have in some ways contributed towards, or effected, reconciliation in South Africa. How and why this is true is never discussed. Again, one gets a sense of a model stated as a given, rather than as a proposition to be investigated. The second observation is that strands of both the individual reconciliation model and the NUR model can be found in the four stated objectives. Specifically, the third objective (restoring the dignity of the victim) hints at the individual level of reconciliation with its emphasis on individual (especially victim) healing. Still, it is crucial to note that NO discussion of apology or forgiveness by perpetrators and victims appears anywhere in this mandate. In contrast, the fourth objective (the prevention of future human rights violations) falls closer in line with the NUR model of reconciliation, with its emphasis on the creation of a human rights culture, and democratic institutions. The consequences of this "mixed" approach to the concept of reconciliation in the very mandate of the TRC are profound, and discussed below.
Despite the TRC's genesis in the interim constitution, the concept of reconciliation is even more vaguely defined there. Specifically, the Commission was the institutionalization of the guarantee of amnesty provided for in the interim constitution's post-amble. Justifying this extremely controversial provision, the postamble states the following:
The pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South African citizens and peace require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction of society. The adoption of this constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past which generated gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and the legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding but not vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not victimization. In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts of the past. 32
Nothing else is said concerning reconciliation, what it means, and how it is to be achieved. The only objective for achieving this provided here is amnesty, and it is not until the TRC Act that other potential methods are fleshed out. This passage epitomize the promulgation of a model for achieving reconciliation in which the core concept is not defined, nor the mechanism tested.
And thus the "Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act" was promulgated with no definition of reconciliation ever provided, and the TRC, once constituted, was left to its own devices to wrestle with both the definition of the term and how to structure its work to best facilitate it. And the TRC did, in fact, spend considerable energy attempting to define and operationalize the concept. The fruits of this labor are most evident in its five volume final report. While a discussion of reconciliation can be found throughout the report, the Commission's own understanding is made most explicit in three sections. The most detailed analysis is provided in the thirty page chapter entitled "Concepts and Principles" (Volume One, Chapter Five). The section on reconciliation opens with the statement that "the interpretation of this concept was highly contested." 33 Despite this acknowledgment, or perhaps because of it, the report sidesteps any serious grappling with these contestations, referring instead to two "essential elements" of the concept: that reconciliation is both a goal and a process; and that there are different levels of reconciliation. Four "levels" are presented: with one's-self; between victims and perpetrators; within a community; and at a national level. One can infer aspects of both models in the discussion of these various levels. For example, the first level of reconciliation is "coming to terms with the painful truth," in which the disclosure of truth helps people to reach closure and to make peace with their past. Victims become reconciled with their own pain and perpetrators come to terms with their guilt and shame. 34 On the national level, the report states: ". . . the most the Commission could and should hope for, at least in the short term, was peaceful co-existence. Thus, a healthy democracy does not require everyone to agree or become friends. However, a culture of human rights and democracy does require respect for our common human dignity and shared citizenship as well as the peaceful handling of unavoidable conflicts." 35
While the delineation of "levels of reconciliation" is a step towards acknowledging that the concept is indeed complex and multi-dimensional, I will argue below that the understanding of reconciliation offered by the TRC did little to clarify the distinction between the two models of reconciliation. Moreover, rather than helping to clarify the concept, this delineation may well have hurt it, because the two models of reconciliation are presented as a matter of scope, as opposed to a difference in type. In other words, the TRC's discussion of reconciliation implies simply an increase in the number of people—from an individual (oneself) to two individuals (victim and perpetrator) to a group of individuals (the community) to the nation. However, as will be argued below, the two models of reconciliation (the individual and the NUR) cannot be seen in such an additive way; and that they may, in fact, be fundamentally opposed to each other.
Thus, while an explicit discussion of reconciliation occurs in the "Concepts" chapter, the discussion provided there does little to settle the muddy waters in which the concept is floating around in South Africa. The second place where the TRC provides insight into its understanding of reconciliation is the 45 page chapter on "Recommendations," (Volume Five, Chapter Eight). These recommendations were issued as part of its mandate and were aimed at various sectors of society, including primarily the government, but also the faith and business communities. As these recommendations are specifically aimed at the achievement of reconciliation in South Africa, these sections serves as a guidepost for the TRC's understanding of how this might occur. And here, an important development must be noted: while a few recommendations are offered for the achieving of individual reconciliation, the overwhelming emphasis of the recommendations is the promotion of national unity and reconciliation. This emphasis was made clear in the chapter's introduction which indicates that what would follow would be a "series of recommendations related to specific areas of the public and private sectors that the Commission believes could assist in the consolidation of democracy and the building of a culture of human rights." 36 And, indeed, the recommendations which follow are primarily targeted at "the creation of a human rights culture," and the transformation of many institutions, including legal and judicial, prisons, the health system, and the security forces. This is not to say that no attention is paid to the individual level of reconciliation. The chapter does contain a smattering of references to such language as apology and forgiveness, healing and rehabilitation, and the dignity of victims. Still, in this particular chapter, these references are few and far between in relation to the language associated with the NUR model, as evidenced in the chapter's conclusion, in which the TRC states: "For [reconciliation] to develop, it is imperative that democracy and a human rights culture be consolidated." 37
It is a striking, then, to note that the final section in which the TRC reveals its understanding of reconciliation—the 85 page chapter entitled "Reconciliation" (Volume Five, Chapter Nine)—is marked by a singular emphasis on the individual model of reconciliation. The contrast is made more striking by the fact that this chapter follows immediately after the one on Recommendations. The focus of the chapter, the introduction states, is to "underline the vital importance of the multi-layered healing of human relationships in post-apartheid South Africa: relationships of individuals with themselves; relationships between victims; relationships between survivors and perpetrators; relationships within families; between neighbors; . . . ." 38 The chapter then proceeds to discuss the TRC's reconciliation work almost exclusively in language associated with individual reconciliation, such as in the following passage:
Extracts from testimonies before the Commission illustrate the varying ways and degrees in which people have bee helped by the Commission to restore their human dignity and to make peace with their troubled past. They include cases where an astonishing willingness to forgive was displayed, where those responsible for violations apologized and committed themselves to a process of restitution, and where the building or rebuilding of relationships was initiated. 39
To underscore this individual interpretation, the chapter draws heavily on the transcripts of testimonies, in which individuals discuss the impact the TRC has had on their personal lives, such as the following quote from a former conscript: "The Commission has deeply affected m life in a short space of time. . . . It has begun a healing process in all sorts of relationships in my family and has enabled me to begin on my own road to inner healing." 40 With sections on "the restoration of human dignity," "Forgiveness," and "Apologies and Acknowledgments" the attention paid to an understanding of reconciliation which incorporates the NUR model is negligible; indeed, one finds scant acknowledgment in this chapter of the existence of this alternative understanding.
Thus, the TRC was given little guidance from either the interim constitution or its founding act on how to interpret the core concept at the foundation of its mandate: promoting reconciliation in South Africa. The Commission therefore had to develop its own understanding of reconciliation. However, throughout its writings, the TRC never provided a clear definition of the concept. Moreover, it tended to take a "mix and match" approach to the different interpretations of reconciliation. While the Commission was aware that two distinct interpretations of reconciliation co-existed in its work, it had a tendency to move back and forth between them rather carelessly, at times almost conflating their difference by referring to aspects of both in one discussion(as in the chapter on "Concepts"), and at other times seeming to ignore the existence of one by an over-emphasis on the other (as in the chapter on "Recommendations" as opposed to the chapter on "Reconciliation," and vice-versa). The TRC, in sum, rarely provided a clear and consistent approach to the concept of reconciliation.
One major implication of this inconsistent, sometimes sloppy, use of this term, is that it has affected the way in which the TRC has been judged. As detailed above, the TRC gave mixed messages to the public regarding its own understanding of the institution's work. Archbishop Tutu, the Commission's chairperson, and international symbol of the TRC more often than not referred to the individual reconciliation model, with its emphasis on apology and forgiveness. Time and again, when talking about the work of the TRC and his visions for a future South Africa, Tutu used such language as: ""Having looked the beast of the past in the eye, having asked and received forgiveness and having made amends, let us shut the door on the past. . . not in order to forget it but in order not to allow it to imprison us, " 41 or "On the whole we have been exhilarated by the magnanimity of those who should be rights be consumed by bitterness and a lust for revenge; who instead have time after time shown an astonishing magnanimity and willingness to forgive. It is not easy to forgive, but we have seen it happen. . . Dear fellow South African, please try to bring yourselves to respond with a like generosity and magnanimity." 42 Others affiliated with the TRC, however, spoke from an NUR understanding of the TRC. Then Minister of Justice Dullah Omar, when introducing the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act to Parliament portrayed the TRC thus: as a pathway which would "commence the journey towards a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence, and development opportunities for all South Africans irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex." 43 And, despite the fact that the TRC acknowledged that a "potentially dangerous confusion" existed between "a religious, indeed Christian, understanding of reconciliation, more typically applied to interpersonal relationships, and the more limited, political notion of reconciliation applicable to a democratic society," the TRC itself contributed to this confusion. The two models of reconciliation were used interchangeably by those associated with the TRC. . . sometimes in a single speech.
As the TRC noted, this confusion was "potentially dangerous." Why? Because, I believe, it set up a disjuncture in how the work of the TRC was viewed, a discrepancy which is currently being played out in discussions of how one is to judge the "success" of the TRC. The disjuncture is this: Archbishop Tutu became perhaps THE overwhelming symbol of the TRC. Images of him in his flowing purple robe, exhorting Winnie Mandela to apologize were beamed around the world, for example. As a result, the popular equation of the TRC with Archbishop Tutu emerged, not just in South Africa, but internationally. With his language of reconciliation which included a notion of confession and forgiveness, many people came to expect that this level of reconciliation would be delivered by the TRC. This dynamic was explained by Anglican Reverend Rowan Smith, Dean of St. George's Cathedral in Cape Town: ". . .when the Chairperson appears in his cassock and wearing a crucifix . . . it seems almost to indicate that this is the way in which one must understand truth and reconciliation. I don't think it is his purpose to do that, it's simply who the person is." 44 However, there is ample evidence, as detailed above, that the framers of both the interim constitution, and the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act had in mind a notion of reconciliation which more closely resembled the NUR model. Nowhere does the act lay out an expectation of individual apologies or acts of forgiveness, and while the Act (as noted above) could have been more clear, the language used in establishing the TRC's mandate draws heavily on the NUR model. For example, in describing the types of recommendations to be forwarded to the State President, the Act specifies that they should relate to "the creation of institutions conducive to a stable and fair society and the institutional, administrative and legislative measures which should be taken or introduced in order to prevent the commission of violations of human rights." 45 Indeed, as already noted) the bulk of recommendations did, in fact, pertain to a NUR reading of reconciliation. The influence and symbolism of Archbishop Tutu, then, unintentionally fostered an expectation of the TRC in which an individual sense of reconciliation could result, with its accompanying notions of apology and forgiveness. In contrast, however, the framers of the Act which created the TRC most likely had in mind a different vision of the TRC's potential contributions, one which relied NOT an individual sense of reconciliation, but on a national, more political, one, which included understanding of reconciliation.
There is an ironic consequence to this disjuncture: The TRC is most likely to be judged in a way in which it is least likely to succeed. In other words, whereas many people tend to view the TRC through a lens of interpersonal reconciliation (for two reasons: the symbolism of Tutu, and the TRC's failure to fully clarify the concept), the TRC's contribution is far more likely to occur in the realm of National Unity and Reconciliation (also for two reasons: its mandate covered this area, and individual reconciliation cannot be legislated). While individual reconciliation may be an ideal, judging the TRC by its ability to deliver this potential may not be fair. As Charles Villa-Vicencio has argued, contrition cannot be imposed and forgiveness, even when it is possible, is rarely a first step. Rather, "peaceful co-existence, governed by a culture of human rights and the dismantling of the structures that made human rights violations not only possible but often inevitable, is perhaps more important, at least for the present, than forgiveness and reconciliation." 46 It is regarding this level of reconciliation about which questions of the TRC's success are most appropriately asked.
EndNotes:
Note 1: Brandon Hamber and Hugo van der Merwe, "What is this thing called Reconciliation?" Back.
Note 2: Timothy Garton Ash, "True Confessions," The New York Review of Books: July 17, 1997, Vol XLIV, #12, p.36. Back.
Note 3: New York Times, October 19, 1999. Back.
Note 4: David Gonzalez, "Rebel War Comes Back to Haunt Honduran Base." New York Times, October 8, 1999, Section A, p. 3. Back.
Note 5: Jonathan Allen, "Balancing Justice and Social Unity: Political Theory and the Idea of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission." Unpublished paper Back.
Note 7: Michael Ignatieff, "Articles of Faith," Index on Censorship, 5 (1996). Back.
Note 8: Hamber and van der Merwe have identified at least five different understandings of the concept in South Africa: non-racial; intercommunal; religious; human rights; and community building. Back.
Note 9: Truth was not only revealed through the amnesty process; it was revealed through a variety of other methods: including the work of the Human Rights Violations Committee, and the Investigative Unit. Back.
Note 10: Vol. 1, p. 115. Back.
Note 11: Constitutional Law Reports, XXVI, 1996, "Azanian Peoples Organisaton (AZAPO) and Others V President of the Republic of South Africa and Others," p. 1017. Back.
Note 12: Charles Villa-Vicencio, "A Different Kind of Justice: The South African Truth and REconciliation Commission," Contemporary Justice Review 1/1998: 411 Back.
Note 16: Vol 5., p. 442. Back.
Note 21: vol. 1, p. 368 (italics in original). At the same time, however, Chapter Nine of Volume Five of the final report is entitled "Reconciliation." Within this chapter, a five page subsection appears, entitled "Towards the Restroation of Human Dignity: Perpetrators." Thus, the TRC admits to a certain level of neglect towards perpetrators early on in its report (Volume One), and attempts to rectify this by Volume Five. Back.
Note 24: In relation to community members, the report notes, "the difficult challenge of reconciliation within black communities: between those who fought against the apartheid system and those who were seen as 'collaborators' because they participated in state structures (black councillors ) or helped to enforce the apartheid system (black police, 'kitskonstabels.'"). Vol. 5, p. 362. Back.
Note 25: Vol. 5, p. 443. Back.
Note 26: Allen refers to three separate types of political unity which correspond to the concept of NUR used here: civic republicanism, pluralist constitutionalism, and liberal constitutionalism. For a detailed discussion of each, see Allen, p. 20. Back.
Note 28: Richard Wilson, "The Sizwe Will Not Go Away: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Human Rights and Nation-Building in South Africa." African Studies: 55 (2) 1996: 5-6 Back.
Note 30: Vol. 5, p. 412. Back.
Note 31: Allen, pp. 18-19. Back.
Note 32: Vol. 1, p. 103. Back.
Note 35: Vol. 1, p. 108. Back.
Note 36: Vol. 5, p. 305. Back.
Note 38: Ibid., pp. 350-351. Back.
Note 44: Transcript of "Transforming Society Through Reconciliation: Myth or Reality?" Public Discussion held by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Cape Town, March 12, 1998. Available on TRC website. Back.
Note 46: Charles Villa-Vicencio, "Truth and Reconciliation: In Tension and Reconciliation," unpublished paper. 1998, p. 2. Back.
