At What Volume Does Scotland's Voice Compel Attention?

A relatively small island like Britain might reasonably have been expected to become a single nation-state. And for centuries, it seemed as if that was precisely what -- if it had not happened already -- was slowly but inexorably on the way to happening. Although tensions among the various British nationalities remained, there seemed little reason to believe that Wales or Scotland would ever completely sever its relationship with the United Kingdom, assimilation and voluntary integration appeared certain to triumph over the memory of conquest and military occupation. Great Britain was forged not through forced "Anglicization" but through the slower but more natural and less violent pressures of a large central nationality upon smaller peripheral regions. The resulting alliance became one of the great unitary states of history, a state in which absorption rather than federation was the primary principle of its development. The center remained strong but not too threatening, which prevented demands for self-government from the "fringe areas" from becoming too great. Until extremely recently, these demands were relatively quiescent, and seemed extremely unlikely to endanger British constitutional and political unity. As Tom Nairn has written, "Only a few years ago, the break-up of Britain was almost inconceivable." ₁

In the last decade, however, the situation has altered dramatically, as resurgent nationalism in Scotland and Wales has generated a fierce debate on the future of Britain, and has awakened new hopes and fears that the increasingly precarious union of the three nations which occupy the main isle will be shattered by the new economic, social and political forces of the late-twentieth-century world order. Instead of becoming a truly unified and homogeneous state, Britain is now comprised of three semi-autonomous collectives, each claiming separate nationality with steadily growing virulence. Thus far in Wales, this new aggressiveness has by and large confined itself to expressions of cultural and linguistic distinctiveness with relatively little emphasis upon proposals for political independence. In Scotland, however, the prospects for a complete or at least partial separation from the United Kingdom have advanced to a much further stage of development. Recent polls show support for some form of devolution at 44% and that for outright independence at 38%, while a mere 17% of the Scottish electorate favors a continuation of the current relationship with England. ₂ "If there was a devolution referendum now, it would pass easily," predicted Dr. Lindsay Paterson of Edinburgh University's Institute for the Study of Government in Scotland in May 1994. ₃

This paper will assess the prospects of Scottish nationalism by examining the numerous significant developments which have occurred in recent years, concentrating in particular on the second half of 1994, a crucial time for those who hope to see an independent, or at least more independent, Scotland in the near future, as well as for those who hope to see the Union preserved in essentially the same form as it exists today. During this period, the pace of the independence movement has accelerated dramatically, and now it appears as if devolution -- if not outright independence -- could be only a few years away.

This change in the intensity and tempo of Scottish nationalism has largely been brought about by broader political developments involving the three main parties involved in the debate over Scotland's future and whether that future will take place within or without the Union. The decrease in the popularity of the Conservative party, whose support, according to recent opinion polls, has plummeted to well below 20% in Scotland, has cast considerable doubt on the ability of its leaders to fulfill their commitment to keep the Union together in its current form. Meanwhile, Tony Blair, who replaced the late John Smith as Labour leader in the summer of 1994, has pledged in unequivocal terms to introduce within a year of his party's taking office legislation for a Scottish parliament which would have jurisdiction over Scottish domestic concerns. And ever lurking in the background is the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP), which, under the increasingly assertive leadership of Alex Salmond, has in recent months renewed its commitment to an "all-or-nothing" form of independence. A recent poll taken by the Scotsman placed the SNP's support at 23%, second only to Labour and 10% ahead of the slumping Tories and fading Liberal Democrats. ₄ Polls taken by the Glasgow Herald have yielded similar results, showing the SNP as the main challenger to Labour in Scotland: ₅

Britain's next general election will occur no later than 1997 and perhaps even sooner if the Tories continue to sustain heavy losses in local elections. In the interim, it is the interaction among these three parties -- the Conservatives, Labour and the SNP -- that will do much to determine Scotland's future, and the future of the British constitution as a whole. Never before has the Scottish electorate been presented with the choice of determining the course of their nation's future in such clear-cut terms. They will soon be compelled to pick one of three distinct options: they may vote Conservative and maintain Scotland's current place in the Union virtually intact, they may vote Labour and opt for devolution -- which would entail the establishment of a Scottish parliament with powers over certain aspects of government policy -- or they may vote SNP and choose outright independence. What their final decision will be remains to be seen, but before speculating as to what the ultimate outcome of this newly vigorous Scottish nationalism will be, it is worthwhile first to examine briefly the centuries of Scottish dissatisfaction with their relationship with their larger, more populous and more powerful southern neighbor which have brought matters to their current state, and second to explore the nature of the current political situation, and the role each of the three main parties concerned has had in engendering it.

THE HISTORY OF SCOTTISH NATIONALISM, 1286-1707

Much of Scotland's history has been determined by its geography, and in particular by the fact that it has been forced to share an island with one of the most dynamic and assertive nations the world has ever known. Indeed, the present state of Anglo-Scottish relations can be -- and must be if it is to be fully understood -- traced to an historical root: from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century, Scotland has been a potential liability to England's national security -- a foreign and potentially hostile and dangerous state on her very border, offering a stepping-stone to her enemies and not infrequently allying with them, particularly at those vulnerable moments when England's armed forces were occupied on the European continent. For the safety of the English realm a neutral if not amiable Scotland became not only a fervent hope but a necessity, and the surest way to obtain it was to bring Scotland firmly under English control. It was a simple task, but a formidable one, and it took almost five hundred years to achieve.

In spite of being physically attached to a state as dynamic and often domineering as England, however, the Scots have survived as a people, with a unique culture and distinctive laws and institutions. But the protection and preservation of this difference has not been easy, and the scars of the centuries-long struggle show. The "Other" against which Scotland forged its sense of national identity has always been, and seemingly always will be, England. Scottish nationalism has asserted itself primarily in response to its denial. Like its Welsh, Irish, Breton, Basque or Corsican counterparts, it exists in its most strident form as a reaction to the assimilative tendencies of a larger nation. ₆ As a result, deeply embedded in the Scottish national consciousness is the memory of a long and desperate struggle for independence, a struggle which in the minds of many Scots continues to this day.

When King Alexander III stumbled and plunged off a cliff to his death in 1286, little did it seem that this unfortunate misstep would give rise to a series of political machinations and military clashes between England and Scotland that would continue for centuries to come. Previously, the two countries had managed to coexist in an uneasy harmony which allowed both to prosper, but Alexander's demise left a power vacuum at the apex of Scottish politics. Edward I, one of the most aggressive and rapacious kings ever to occupy the English throne, was not one to let such a golden opportunity slip by. He saw the possibility of bringing the Scots under his control, much as he had already subdued the equally troublesome Welsh, and he set out with his customary ruthless efficiency to bring his plan of a united Britain to fruition. Edward managed to conquer Scotland with relative ease, but he swiftly discovered a lesson which would later be taught to several of his successors: it was far easier to gain control of Scotland than it was to maintain it. After Edward and his army departed, leaving behind only a token force to govern the country, a revolt broke out almost immediately, led by two of Scotland's greatest patriot heroes, William Wallace and Robert the Bruce, names which still resonate in Scottish hearts today. The victory won by Bruce at Bannockbrun in 1314 still stands as the high point in the fight for Scottish independence, as the finest army England had ever put in the field was annihilated in less than two days.

For the next two and a half centuries, the Scots fiercely defended the border between England and Scotland, and the animosity between the two nations grew, as each came to see the other as the author of all its ills. Despite this atmosphere of mutual distrust, however, the two countries united under a single king in 1603, when James VI of Scotland succeeded to the English throne, the culmination of a scheme launched by Henry VIII almost a century before to marry his sister to the Scottish monarch. After the royal court moved from Edinburgh to London, Scotland came to be treated as a peripheral region, and it lost much of its ability to determine defense and foreign policy. For a time, the material prosperity of the country prevented any substantial opposition from developing, but in the 1680s the Scottish economy began to decline, and a succession of harvest failures produced popular discontent with the settlement with England. The accession of William of Orange to the English and Scottish throne in 1688 further weakened the Union of Crowns by breaking the emotional bonds that had tied the Scots to the monarchy during the Stuart dynasty.

Why, then, was an incorporating Treaty of Union was signed in 1707, at a time when dislike and distrust of the English had never been greater? Scottish nationalists have traditionally sought to explain this apparent paradox in one way, British assimilationists in another. Nationalists emphasize the purportedly corrupt and non-democratic methods by which the treaty was achieved; no true Scot, it is implied, can be a Unionist. An ex-chairman of the Scottish National Party recently wrote, "In 1707 how many ordinary people wanted the Union of the parliaments? None. Nobody asked them. The thing was wangled through by a small group with no mandate from the country at all." ₇ Assimilationists, on the other hand, attempt to explain the Union as the product of good sense and wise statesmanship on the part of Scotland's political elite, who after 1707 got on with the apolitical business of improving the country, happy to join in an alliance which promised greater economic prosperity and military power.

Neither of these explanations is satisfactory, however. They both fail to understand the true nature of the forces which produced the Union. The ideology which triumphed in 1707 was not, as the nationalists would have us believe, anti-Scottish; nor was it, as the assimilationists claim, purely mercenary. The Treaty of Union was the only way that many Scots could see of guaranteeing their nation's future, for the alternative seemed to be for Scotland to become a poverty-stricken backwater on the margins of Europe. The Scots thus saw it as perfectly logical to be simultaneously nationalists and advocates of the Union, and it is wrong to see the end of a separate Scottish state as an indication of the end of Scottish nationalism. On the contrary, a strong sense of "Scottishness" persisted, which preserved and nurtured the rudiments of the political nationalist movement which emerged in the twentieth century. To be sure, the Union functioned with the consent and co-operation of the Scottish people, but it is necessary to understand that this consent and co-operation was given only grudgingly and with certain terms and conditions attached. The Union was thus as much nationalist as assimilationist, and many Scots who strongly supported it also took great pride in the land of their birth.

It is crucial to understand the peculiar nature of the Union in order to comprehend the forces making for its current renegotiation. The agreement signed in 1707 did not result in the absorption of one nation by another, but rather created a unique balance of assimilation and autonomy. It was a bargain which "resigned statehood but preserved an extraordinary amount of the institutional and psychological baggage normally associated with independence -- a decapitated national state, as it were, rather than an ordinary 'assimilated' nationality." ₈ Under the terms of the treaty, many Scottish institutions -- in particular the legal, educational and religious systems --remained for the most part independent and free from English interference. ₉ This unusual situation helps to explain the paradox of Scotland in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when spectacular intellectual and social vitality co-existed alongside apparent political servility. And it is the precise nature of the Act of Union which is at the crux of the modern debate over Scotland's position within the United Kingdom. For the Scots, the central problem remains essentially the same: how to acquire greater control of Scottish affairs while at the same time retaining all the existing benefits of being a partner nation in the United Kingdom?

THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION

For almost three centuries after the Act of Union was put into effect, however, it seemed to pose no particular difficulty, as Scotland's economic and institutional assimilation with England steadily increased. During these years, the threat of English domination by force was replaced by English supremacy by default, as nationalists failed to raise any substantive challenge to the dramatic growth of the centralization of the British government. The First and Second World Wars accelerated this trend as more and more government functions came to reside at Westminster. But as postwar British governments failed to combine sophisticated economic planning for Scotland with the adequate finance or consultation necessary to bring it into being, frustration mounted north of the border, and nationalism provided an attractive recourse for the more disenchanted elements of the Scottish electorate. Throughout the 1960s, the Scottish Nationalist Party gained steadily in support, and by the end of the decade it boasted the largest membership of any party in Scotland.

It would be another decade, however, before these dramatic gains bore any tangible fruit, and even then it was a fruit which quickly turned bitter in the mouths of its tasters. The failure of the 1979 referendum calling for the establishment of a Scottish legislative assembly continues to be the subject of heated recriminations to this day. As Scottish voters streamed into the polls on that icy January day, nationalists were confident that the result would serve as the culmination to a decade of hard work and steady increases in the prospects for an independent Scotland. Instead, what emerged when all the votes were counted was the greatest disaster the movement had ever experienced. Due to an amendment tacked onto the Scottish Bill before it passed its third reading in the House of Commons, 40% of the electorate had to support devolution or else the bill would be repealed. Thus, when less than a third of those who cast their votes favored the establishment of an assembly, devolution collapsed, leaving in its wake a bewildered and thoroughly dejected nationalist movement.

With the benefit of hindsight, however, the failure of the 1979 referendum is far less surprising than it appeared at the time. Although nationalists came to embrace the government's plan, it had never been a product of their own initiative. Rather, devolution had been concocted in London, the result of political machinations having far more to do with partisan jockeying for position at Westminster than demands emanating directly from the Scottish electorate. From London, the revival of Scottish nationalism in the early 1970s looked far more threatening than it did from Edinburgh or Glasgow, and some measure of conciliation seemed to be the best way of quelling agitation and preventing the Union from exploding. Politicians deemed Scotland's continued link with England especially crucial at a time when North Sea oil offered an apparent respite from the steadily downward spiral of economic decline that had plagued Britain since the end of the Second World War. It was thus the latest in a long series of attempts to solve the Scottish "problem" without any effort to consider seriously the British constitution and how best to make it a more efficacious instrument of government. Given the fact that the referendum was introduced by the Labour government in a climate of confusion and internal dissent, in truth it was fairly miraculous that it managed to attract as much support as it did. It was from the beginning a doomed compromise between irreconcilable principles -- parliamentary absolutism on the one hand, self-determination for Scotland on the other -- and in the end nearly everyone involved was divided on its true message: was it the culmination of a decade of nationalist agitation or the harbinger of a more stable form of Union? Whatever the reasons underlying the referendum's failure, however, what remains undeniable is that it did indeed fail, leaving behind a disillusioned electorate and an extremely frustrated nationalist movement. Although they had always seen devolution as at best a temporary expedient and first step on a path which would ultimately lead to outright independence, nationalists were stunned by its defeat, and it would take over a decade for them to regain their momentum.

It was not until the early 1990s that the debate over Scotland's place in the Union regained its central position in British political affairs, and it appears that at long last that debate may be reaching its final stages. The next general election will almost certainly represent a de facto referendum on Scotland's future. This time, however, Scottish voters appear likely to be given a far more clear-cut choice than they were in 1979. Instead of a confusingly worded, vague and ambivalent proposal for a Scottish assembly with nebulous powers, in the next general election they will be able to select one of three distinct options being offered to them by Scotland's three main political parties: maintaining the status quo, as the Conservatives advocate; limited but still substantial devolution, as proposed by Labour; or outright independence, as the SNP favors. Never before has the issue been presented to the electorate in such sharply defined fashion. It appears that the crucial moment for Scotland has finally come.

THE CONSERVATIVES

With each passing month it appears less and less probable that the status quo will be maintained, and all but certain that significant alterations in Britain's constitutional structure will have to be made sooner rather than later. Nevertheless, John Major has continued to make increasingly vehement statements avowing Conservative intentions to defend the Union at all costs. Although Major's personal commitment to the Union is undoubtedly strong, the primary reason for his recalcitrance has less to do with ideology than with political practicalities. Desperate to find a flagpole around which to rally his disunited and demoralized party, Major has turned to patriotic rhetoric invoking the sanctity of the Union.

Ironically, less than thirty years ago, the Conservatives led the campaign for devolution. In the late 1960s, Edward Heath seized upon it as a potential means of arresting the precipitous decline in the number of Scottish Tory MPs which had been occurring ever since the 1959 general election. Although they had no intention of introducing any substantive policy initiatives, the Tories continued to issue vague statements about returning government to the Scottish people throughout the 1970s. But when Margaret Thatcher assumed the leadership of the party in 1979, she quickly returned it to its more traditional role as stalwart defender of the Union. The issue of Scotland's constitutional status became virtually a taboo subject in party circles, and by the early 1980s it had all but disappeared off the political map. When John Major assumed the leadership mantle in 1990, he, too, attempted to keep the Scottish issue on the back burner, or even off the stove entirely, but by then it was becoming clear to the Scottish electorate that they were voting for left-wing candidates and getting a right-wing government, and disenchantment was growing rapidly. Whether the Conservatives wanted it or not, Scottish nationalism was once again a major issue in British politics.

Major has attempted to turn this to his party's advantage. Speaking in Glasgow in February 1992, Major issued an unequivocal defense of the Union. He sharply criticized those who would "break the links through which we have worked together for nearly 300 years":

They want an independent Scotland. By that they mean a separate Scotland -- a very different Scotland. A Scotland apart, adrift from England, Wales and Northern Ireland. I can understand the pride in being a Scot that may lead to that ambition. But everyone should pause to consider what such an historic rupture would mean -- not just for Scotland, but for every part of the United Kingdom. Does anyone seriously believe that, if Scotland plunged down the road to separation, the influence for good in the world that we have exerted together would remain the same? It could not be. And, sadly, it would not be. It would be a loss for us all -- a loss for Europe and the shaping of the century to come....I believe with passion and conviction that this Party should stand for unity -- not division. We are a Unionist Party. We should fight for the Union. ₁₀

Major argued that the British constitution was a "delicate balance" which would be irredeemably destroyed by the creation of a Scottish parliament. He concluded with an unabashed declaration of pride in the achievements of the Union, and a warning about what dissolution might mean for the future of the nations which had once comprised it:

I believe profoundly that the Union has served the people of the United Kingdom well. And served Scotland particularly well. The case for Union rests not only on historic experience, but on the common interests we still have in joining our affairs together. Not only on what we have achieved together in the past, but on the lead we must give each other in the world of today....Our vision for Scotland will be realised best if Scotland, by her own free choice, remains a full partner in the Union. Working together to increase prosperity and to improve care for all our citizens....It is not fanciful to say that together the peoples of these islands have moulded the history of the world. Separating or separated we would be tossed to and fro on its tides. ₁₁

Since then, Major's attacks on any form of devolution for Scotland -- no matter how limited -- have intensified; he is clearly attempting to use the Union to inspire a burst of flag-waving patriotism from his dispirited and disunited followers as the political fortunes of his party have deteriorated. At the party conference in October 1994, he revealed a newly articulate and defiantly English nationalism which was as hostile to rival expressions of sovereignty within the United Kingdom as it was to attempts to dilute British sovereignty in Europe. The English nation, Major emphasized, was not about to permit its last provinces to break away, any more than it was about to allow a German-dominated Europe to extinguish the power of its Parliament. ₁₂ In a radio interview in December, he issued his most vitriolic attack thus far on the Scottish nationalist movement, denouncing plans for a Scottish legislative assembly as "teenage madness" and "one of the most dangerous propositions that has ever been put before the British nation." He claimed that the establishment of such a body would spell the beginning of the end of Great Britain and cause constitutional chaos. "You can't shake the constitution around as if it were a cocktail at an Islington dinner party," he declared. ₁₃

Not surprisingly, Major's newly emphatic opposition to even the most circumscribed form of devolution has met with considerable hostility in the Scottish press. In an editorial from October 1994, the Scotsman complained of the "gratuitous attack on majority opinion" north of the border made by Major at the Conservative party conference. ₁₄ Two months later in the same newspaper, another editorial angrily proclaimed that Major had spoken "in plain defiance of the wishes of the majority of the Scottish nation." Denouncing his words as "insulting nonsense," the Scotsman asked, "At what volume does Scotland's voice compel attention?" ₁₅ Others, however, predicted that his recalcitrance would backfire on his party:

To try to construct, for the voters of one part of the country, a scarecrow image of the politics of another region which the voters there know to be nonsensical is simply to offer a direct incitement to the politics of separation and secession. John Major is wrong in his understanding of the British constitution, wrong to ignore its tradition of pragmatic evolution, and dang wrong, at least in the Scottish context, about the depth and character of the movement for change he opposes. ₁₆

Indeed, McMillan's assertions seemed to be proven largely correct by the fact that, while virtually no metropolitan newspaper printed a full report of his "teenage madness" remarks, their Scottish counterparts contained complete coverage, often on the front page. Major appears to have erred by gratuitously insulting the Scots with his implication that the widely-felt wish for more control over their own affairs was a kind of political subversion bent on the destruction of the British nation. ₁₇

Major's primary concern, however, was not the reception of his words north of the border, for they were directed first and foremost at his own party, which he is clearly hoping to reunite through a spirited defense of the Union as he did in the 1992 general election. But here, too, his tactics seem to be backfiring, for instead of promoting unity, the Scottish issue appears to be fomenting further dissent. Shortly after the party conference in October, a prominent group of senior Scottish Tories called for a major reconsideration of the party's staunch opposition to devolution, some sort of which they claim is essential to secure the Conservative future in Scotland and to prevent the break-up of the United Kingdom. Arthur Bell, the leader of the Scottish Tory Reform Group, argued that the party must face up to its current electoral predicament and take bold measures to rescue its fortunes. "Saying that at no time -- never -- shall we have any change is the politics that could lead to the break-up of the Union," he declared. ₁₈

Other Scottish Tories concur with this assessment. They have begun to feel that a fundamental change in party policy is necessary if long-term Conservative prospects in Scotland are to be secured. Although they are currently a relatively small and disorganized group, they are confident that they have wider but still, as yet less vocal support, particularly among the younger, more ambitious activists who have analyzed the political realities of the situation and come to the conclusion that their future may be as Tory members of a devolved Scottish parliament. As one young Tory recently declared, "I want the Conservative party to have a future in Scotland. I've got a vested interest in that. So I'm bound to be positive about a Scottish parliament." These Conservatives resent the way in which their views have become heresy as the government has wrapped itself tighter in the Unionist flag, and they fear that the party has missed an historic opportunity. "Imagine if we had brought forward our own devolution proposals," commented one senior Tory consultant recently. "We could have shaped the Scottish parliament the way we wanted it, and insisted the number of Scottish Labour MPs was reduced. We could have made sure Labour never ruled again, north or south of the Border. Now it looks as if we are going to get a parliament anyway -- but the Labour version." ₁₉ In the wake of Major's December remarks, Chief Secretary to the Treasury Jonathan Aitken called upon him to re-examine the inflexible stance to which he had committed the party. He proposed that the Tories include in their next manifesto a pledge to hold a referendum on any future constitutional changes:.

Labour are throwing down a gauntlet of certain constitutional changes," he asserted. "They are proposing parliaments for Scotland and Wales...I say if there are going to be constitutional changes of any serious magnitude, the Conservative government of the future...should be prepared to consider doing what it did during the last time we had constitutional change from a Labour government. The last time we had Scottish devolution and Welsh devolution, we Conservatives supported a referendum, a very successful referendum, because it stopped that Labour nonsense of trying to break up the United Kingdom. ₂₀

Scotland has thus not proven the rallying point which Major so desperately needs. The rank and file of the Conservative party have not jumped on Major's Unionist bandwagon because they recognize what their leader does not, that continued staunch opposition to devolution, at least if the political situation in Scotland continues to evolve along its current lines, appears to be a policy doomed to failure. At present, the course of Scotland's future appears to be far more likely to be determined by one of the two main opposition parties, and not the party which has ruled Britain for the last sixteen years.

THE SCOTTISH NATIONALIST PARTY (SNP)

1994 was an extremely good year for the SNP, but the next twelve months will have to be even better if the party is to achieve its long-awaited objective of outright independence for Scotland. On the plus side, support for both the SNP and its platform have never been higher. In the regional elections in the spring of 1994, the SNP seized 26% of the vote, taking a strong second place behind Labour. Its annual conference, held in Inverness in September, found the party riding high in voter esteem and conducting itself with cool decorum as its leaders reiterated their commitment to an "all-or-nothing" independence strategy. Alex Salmond was extremely pleased with the outcome, declaring that "it is certainly the best SNP conference I can remember. It has shown the SNP as a mature and developed political party at ease with itself and confident about its future." ₂₁

But the SNP has not managed to free itself entirely from all its past problems. At the local government level, its ability to handle real power has been called into question due to delays in fulfilling campaign pledges, such as the promise to give every old-age pensioner in Tayside and Grampian a £10 cold weather payment to help with heating costs during the winter months. ₂₂ The party has also experienced difficulties abroad. In December 1994, American legal authorities launched an investigation into the activities of W. Mark McKnight, the flamboyant attorney who was spearheading the SNP's fundraising drive in the United States. ₂₃ And in Europe, the stability of the party's main partner in the European Parliament was called into question later that same month following the bankruptcy of the French millionaire Bernard Tapie, the leading figure in the populist left-wing Radical Energy Party, the SNP's biggest ally in the group of small political parties known collectively as the European Radical Alliance (ERA). Many observers believe that, without Tapie, both the Radical Energy Party and the ERA will collapse, although it has not happened yet. ₂₄ Thus, although its goal -- an independent Scotland -- appears to be closer to becoming a reality than ever, the SNP must maneuver carefully in the immediate future or else it will slip away once again.

Indeed, before becoming too sanguine about its current prospects, the SNP would do well to review its history as an organized political party, a history far more abundant in despair and frustration than triumph. Dissatisfied with the failure of the Labour party to move forward towards the restoration of Scotland's independence, a group of ardent left-wing nationalists formed the National Party of Scotland (NPS) in 1928 with the express intention of restoring Home Rule as a main issue on the British political agenda. Paralleling the establishment of the Welsh nationalist party Plaid Cymru three years earlier, the NPS marked the emergence of Scottish nationalism as an independent political movement. In 1934, it merged with the Scottish Party, a Conservative group, to form the Scottish National Party (SNP).

For the first decade of its existence, the party's achievements were extremely limited, and internal dissension threatened to split the movement. From a peak of over 10,000 in 1934 its membership fell to below 2000 by 1939. The Second World War nearly turned decline into total destruction. In 1940, Douglas Young, the chairman of the SNP's Aberdeen branch, was arrested for failing to register for military service or as a conscientious objector. The case acted as a catalyst driving the various factions into two main camps, and a substantial number of moderates seceded from the party and set up the Scottish Union, which soon became the Scottish Convention and later the Scottish Covenant Association. This group had a powerful initial impact, and for a time it threatened to supplant the SNP as the main political voice of Scottish nationalism. The all-party approach it favored proved flawed, however, for without votes in a parliamentary election, the British government would never recognize nationalism as a potent political force. The Covenant Association withered away in the mid-1950s, while the SNP proved far more resilient than many observers expected.

Between 1962 and 1966, membership doubled annually, increasing from 2000 to 42,000. This boom would become even more dramatic in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the SNP at long last became a well-organized mass political party which regularly polled between one-quarter and one-third of the popular vote in Scotland. But this boom period was quickly followed by a bust, as the SNP suffered from a serious and continuing lack of support during the Thatcher years, and the constitutional issue receded in importance almost to a vanishing point. By 1982 the party's parliamentary representation was less than it had been in 1965, and in the 1983 general election the SNP polled under 12% of the vote.

In recent years, however, the SNP's fortunes have begun to revive yet again. The Conservative government's staunch opposition to any form of compromise has contributed to a pervasive sense on the part of many Scots that they are being ruled from afar in an increasingly high-handed fashion. In late 1993, a tremendous furor erupted over the Tories' ill-considered move to privatize the supply of water, and the government was forced to beat a hasty retreat before the massive tide of public and political opposition. ₂₅ Less successful, however, was the campaign to convince the government to reconsider its decision to eliminate all overnight sleeper rail services between Scotland and England, a move which will almost certainly do considerable damage to the Scottish tourist industry. ₂₆ And in late December 1994, Scottish fisherman were furious after the government opted to comply with an EC directive to grant the Spanish fleet access to the ecologically sensitive grounds surrounding the west coast of Scotland. ₂₇ Other government initiatives which have proven unpopular in Scotland include the readjustment of local authority boundaries, the planned privatization of Rosyth dockyards and the imposition of VAT on home fuel. "The Major Government, for all its confusion and ineptitude," the Scotsman recently concluded, "has generated plenty of policies that jar against the best instincts and sensitivities of the majority in Scotland." ₂₈

It is not only poorly considered and often misguided Conservative policies which have occasioned the revitalization of the SNP, however. The single biggest factor behind its revival is undoubtedly the emergence of a new constitutional option, independence within the European Community. The progressive subordination of the power of the constituent states to the central authority of the EC has given new opportunities to regions such as Catalonia and Brittany, and many Scottish nationalists see no reason why they, too, should not benefit. In the campaign for regional council elections in 1986, Jim Sillars claimed that the party had "redefined its policy to take account of the reality of the European Community" and asserted that "the basic thrust is now towards independence within that Community." According to Sillars:

If...the SNP makes its target independence within the European Community and does so without ambiguity, then it is we who are backed by the solid advantages of political and economic logic, and the unionists who are left flat-footed. With an independent Scotland within the Community, the charge of separatism disappears....Continuity and lack of disruption becomes the key factor in this policy. There will be no change in trading relations with England or any other Community country as a consequence of Scottish independence: no change in social relations, continued freedom of travel and living in different parts of the Community and continued market access for industrial products. Scottish companies and those firms which have settled here in order to gain access to Europe can maintain their strategy without fear. Anxiety about job security among workers with markets in England and Europe would be fully met. Whether at the commercial or personal level, the British connection which is both practically and psychologically important to the Scots is maintained. The separatist gibe is silenced. What does change is Scotland's political position and influence, not only over those domestic affairs that are outwith Community control, but within the policy-making bodies of the Community itself. Scotland loses nothing in its trading access, but gains considerably in its elevation as a distinctive European political entity. ₂₉

Even in the wake of continuing setbacks to European unity, the party's commitment to "Independence in Europe" remains strong. In a recent speech, Salmond declared:

The justification for a closer European union from a Scottish perspective is that, firstly, it provides a peaceful and stable environment among our neighbours, secondly, that it secures a massive "domestic" market of some 350 million people and, thirdly, it is in keeping with the Scots internationalist traditions to see this new European stage as one in which we can express our individual talents and hopefully our national and collective talents. ₃₀

As a political strategy, "Independence in Europe" has proven quite popular with the Scottish electorate. 61% of Scots queried in a recent poll supported the unification of Europe, and the percentages rise even higher among Scotland's youth. In a poll conducted of Scots aged ten to sixteen, 77% reported that they would like to see a unified Europe, as opposed to an average for the United Kingdom as a whole of only 56%. ₃₁ During the run-up to the European elections in May 1994, the Manchester Guardian quoted many Scots as favoring closer ties to the EC due to the social and economic benefits, such as improved child care facilities, cheaper consumer goods and improved employment prospects, that they feel European unity will bring. A recent article in the Scotsman proclaimed, "With the decline of the importance of the nation state, and a shift toward regionalism...Scotland is well placed to overcome its problems as a peripheral country." ₃₂

The extent to which Scotland has already moved into the EC's orbit is striking. After a recent increase in the amount of regional aid allotted to Scotland, Euro-funding now affects the lives of about 85% of the Scottish population. ₃₃ Strathclyde recently was granted £400,000 in aid for flood victims, and in December the Borders region won a £50 million investment package intended to help improve its fragile rural economy. Over the next five years, more than £300 million in Euro funds will be pumped into areas hit hard by the decline of traditional industries. ₃₄ The influence of Europe is not only felt in terms of money coming into Scotland, however, but also in terms of products going out. Between 60 and 70% of Scotland's manufactured exports currently end up on European shelves, and Germany and France are now bigger customers than the United States or the old Commonwealth trading partners. ₃₅ In addition, Euro-institutions have opened up welcome career opportunities for many Scots. ₃₆ Over the past several years, Scottish representation in Brussels, from Government ministers to businesses, local government and unions, has expanded dramatically. ₃₇ Even the die-hard unionist Tories at Westminster have been forced to make concessions to Scotland's desire for a higher profile in the EC. Last year in Brussels, Scottish Secretary Ian Lang emphasized the Scots' readiness to trade and cooperate with their European neighbours, and set out a distinctive role for Scotland in the new free market of the EC. ₃₈ The power to allot over £124 million from the European social fund was recently moved from Whitehall to the Scottish Office in Edinburgh; the importance of such moves to the Scottish community was demonstrated by the fact that the story appeared on the front page of the Scotsman . ₃₉ And the Scottish Office now has its own European minister, Lord Fraser.

But the SNP cannot single-handedly make "Independence in Europe" a reality. Despite recent dramatic electoral gains at the local and regional government levels, its representation at Westminster remains a paltry three MPs. If it is to achieve its objective of an independent Scotland in the near future, an alliance with another opposition party seems to be a necessary step. Labour would seem to be the logical candidate for such an alliance, but Salmond has thus far proven extremely reluctant to contemplate any sort of cooperation. Instead, he has doggedly maintained his commitment to an "all-or-nothing" strategy for achieving Scottish independence, with no room for compromise or a more gradualist approach. In recent months, he has reiterated his plans for a separate currency, and also proposed that an independent Scotland should have its own army. ₄₀

And in the process, his attacks upon Labour's plans for a more limited form of devolution have increased in intensity. At the party conference in November 1994, he argued that there is no difference between Toryism and the "Tonyism" of new Labour leader Blair; Salmond clearly wishes to position the SNP not just to the left of Labour as he did in the 1992 general election, but as a resolutely Scottish party in staunch opposition to its two non-Scottish competitors. Accordingly, he and some of his SNP associates have taken to launching fierce attacks on Labour's Scottish policies. In November 1994, Salmond challenged Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland George Robertson to declare whether he would stand for the devolved Scottish parliament Labour envisions or continue to serve at Westminster. When Robertson refused to answer, Salmond claimed that "it tends to indicate that Labour has in mind the continuation of B-league politics in Scotland." ₄₁ In a recent letter to the Scotsman , SNP Vice-President Paul H. Scott asserted that "what...the Labour party devolutionists have to explain is, why should Scotland settle for an inferior status, no independent voice in Europe and less influence where it matters than Denmark, Ireland or even Luxembourg?" ₄₂

For its part, Labour has responded to these attacks with some vitriol of its own. At his own party conference, Blair declared that "the Nationalists' narrow chauvinism is never the democratic socialism I stand for" and argued that any plan to separate Scotland from the rest of Britain is the "counsel of despair." ₄₃ Robertson called the SNP's plans for a separate currency "daft" and claimed that such a scheme is "based on the economics of the tooth fairy." ₄₄ From the perspective of the SNP, however, far more worrying than Labour's angry response to its attacks are the internal dissensions created by Salmond's stubborn refusal to compromise. ₄₅ Some members have criticized his commitment to an "all-or-nothing" strategy on the question of independence. ₄₆ They feel that the party would be better served by campaigning for a multi-option referendum which would give voters a choice among outright independence, some form of devolution and the existing Union. Further, they fear that a continuing adherence to hard-line tactics will lend support to Labour's more limited devolution policy and reduce the SNP's ability to win votes for independence. According to a recent editorial in the Scottish press, "leader and led seem curiously out of kilter over the nature of the faith." ₄₇

Those members who would like the SNP to adopt a less uncompromising stance would seem to have a point. Currently, the only advantage the Conservatives have north of the border is the chasm-like gulf separating their two main opponents, who seem doomed to spend the next electoral campaign attacking each other more often and more fiercely than they do they Tories. There is almost no doubt that if the SNP maintains its inflexible commitment to outright independence -- and there seems little reason to suppose that it will not -- it will inflict serious damage on the Labour vote, not only in Scotland but in the South, where its anti-devolutionist rhetoric will be seized upon with glee by the Tories. ₄₈ But if the SNP really wishes to see a Labour government and the establishment of a Scottish parliament, at the very least as a preferable option to the continuation of Tory rule, then it will have to take a different tack, making it clear that it favors even limited devolution to no constitutional change at all.

LABOUR

But what will the SNP be getting if it opts to ally with Labour in an attempt to oust the Conservatives from their long stranglehold over Westminster? And more importantly, what will the Scottish electorate be getting if Labour wins the next election? First and foremost, they will be getting a firm and seemingly unrescindable pledge to introduce legislation to establish a separate Scottish parliament within a year of a Labour government taking office. In a recent interview, Tony Blair described his commitment to such legislation as "absolute and total." ₄₉ He has been unequivocal in asserting that Labour will not hesitate to fulfill its promise once it is in power. "We will [legislate for a Scottish parliament] because it is important not just to honour our commitment," he declared at the party conference in Blackpool last October, "but to show how we can govern the whole of Britain differently; to show how we can end government...by central control, by decisions always taken in Westminster or Whitehall, and to show how we trust people with power." ₅₀

Despite its apparent unequivocality, however, Blair's stance on devolution raises many unanswered questions. His rhetoric about ending government by "central control" sorts oddly with the interests of an ostensibly socialist party. How, then, does Labour plan to interweave its plans for greater Scottish independence with its broader governmental aims? And what will be the precise nature of the legislative body Blair intends to create for Scotland? What sort of powers will it have, and how extensive will they be? Once it is in existence, will Scottish MPs continue to sit at Westminster as well? All of these, and plenty more, questions will face Blair if his party wins the next general election. But they are hardly new to Labour circles. On the contrary, they have been facing the party since its inception over a century ago.

On the surface, nationalism and socialism would seem to have little in common. A nationalist movement inherently posits itself as transcending all class interests, which change as society develops, in sharp contrast to the timeless immutability of national identity. ₅₁ Nevertheless, the Labour party has long enjoyed a flirtation with the Scottish nationalist movement, a flirtation that is nearly as old as the party itself. In fact, it may be even older, for it was an inheritance bequeathed to the labour movement by its radical forebears. In the 1880s, Scottish radicals, noting Parnell's success in Ireland, began to see Home Rule as a means of advancing causes such as religious disestablishment, temperance and land reform. When the Scottish Labour Party (SLP) was founded in 1888, Home Rule featured prominently on its political agenda as part of its shared heritage with radicalism.

After the SLP merged with the Independent Labour Party (ILP) in 1894, however, the nature of the Scottish labour movement's commitment to Home Rule underwent a subtle but very significant change, a change whose ramifications are still being felt today. The movement's new leaders were men who came from a background in trade unions rather than radical politics, and they saw social legislation as far more important than political reform. Home Rule did not appear to provide solutions to the problems of poverty and the exploitation of the working classes plaguing Britain, and in fact was seen by many on the left as a distraction from these more vital issues. Thus, although it remained part of the ILP's program in Scotland, it steadily dwindled in importance. The interwar years saw a steady widening of the gap between the forces of nationalism and the forces of socialism in Scotland. Labour's advocacy of a central, planned economy and an interventionist state as the cure for the nation's economic ills was not easily compatible with radical measures of devolution. In addition, nationalism had been tainted by its association with right-wing regimes in Europe, and was no longer regarded as an ally of progressive socialism. ₅₂ In the decades following the Second World War, Labour attempted to extricate itself completely from any commitment to the Scottish cause.

In the 1960s, however, the SNP's electoral breakthrough turned the constitutional settlement into the dominant theme of British politics, and Harold Wilson's government had little choice but to confront the devolution issue. But Labour's profound hatred of the SNP made any concession to nationalism extremely painful, and many dissenters within the party continued to argue against a more active policy. Wilson thus had to proceed with caution, and, as a result, the White Paper Our Changing Democracy, which was published in November 1975, offered a legislative assembly to Scotland which had only extremely circumscribed powers. Angry Scottish Labour MPs, led by Jim Sillars, announced their intention to form a "parallel" Scottish Labour Party. Stung by this threatened defection, Labour abandoned its restrictive stance, and at the party conference in March of 1976 all but two of its MPs supported a plan for a Scottish assembly with a much greater range of powers. The government had little desire but equally little choice than to introduce some sort of legislation, and what emerged was the Scotland Act, a hastily cobbled together measure which sought simultaneously to assuage Scottish demands while not destroying Labour unity. Its failure in the 1979 referendum came as a shock to the party leadership, but it was scarcely a disappointment.

Throughout the 1980s, Labour showed little inclination to move Scottish nationalism off the back burner to which it had been relegated after the referendum's defeat. The party's embrace of the nationalist cause in the 1970s had never been the product of ideological conviction, but rather a purely tactical move, forced upon it by political circumstances. Once those circumstances altered, Labour could return to its more familiar stance of judicious avoidance of the constitutional issue. Party leader Neil Kinnock had always had little patience with Scottish nationalism, which he viewed as a distraction from the more pressing social concerns which should be the party's primary responsibility, and he was happy to ignore the issue for much of his tenure.

But the nationalists did not remain quiescent for long. Within a decade, they had recovered from the blow dealt them by the failure of the referendum, and Scotland's future was back on the political agenda for all major parties, including Labour. In the early 1990s the Labour party has once again been forced to confront Scottish demands for greater control over their affairs, and once again, the party has opted to offer a form of limited devolution, just as it has done on several occasions in the past. So what is to make this instance any different from its predecessors? In other words, why will Labour not retreat from its commitment to Scotland yet again once its broader electoral ambitions are satisfied? Most obviously, there is the firmness with which Blair has pledged his party to legislate for a Scottish parliament almost immediately upon taking office. He will accomplish this, he says, without a referendum, thereby refusing to risk turning over Scotland's future to the electorate as Labour did in 1979. Blair clearly believes that something simply must be done about Scotland, and he wants to ensure that any changes made in Britain's constitutional framework are structured so as to provide maximum electoral benefit to his party. North of the border, Blair wants to be known as the man who finally gave Scotland its own parliament, a luxury the Scots have not enjoyed since 1707. In so doing, he will succeed where the SNP and all previous attempts at constitutional reform have failed. And in the process, he will earn for his party the gratitude of the overwhelming majority of the Scottish electorate, a gratitude which he hopes will be expressed in general and local elections for years to come.

But on the other hand, Blair must tread carefully in granting the Scots even a limited degree of autonomy. Many party strategists believe that a perception on the part of the British electorate that Labour's policies would lead to Scottish independence cost them votes in 1992. Moreover, the departure of Scotland from the Union would severely damage Labour's future electoral prospects, for the party has traditionally derived much of its strength from north of the border. This is undoubtedly one reason why Blair has been taken such great pains to emphasize the fact that he sees devolution as a means of bolstering the Union, not destroying it. "I think we need to take on the argument of the Tories that this is breaking up the constitution of the country," he recently asserted, "and instead argue that it in fact is saving it, it is deepening our political process, making it more democratic and making it much fairer." ₅₃ But will this really prove true, or will devolution instead turn out to be the first step down the slippery slope leading towards the eventual break-up of Britain, as the Conservatives and some nationalists claim?

Whatever the case may be, Blair will have little choice but to fulfill his promise to establish a Scottish parliament if his party takes office following the next general election. The doubts regarding Labour's policy towards Scotland arise not over the party's will, but its way. Creating a new, sovereign parliament will not be an easy task. If Labour opts to tackle it immediately, it will doubtless occupy much of the government's "honeymoon" period with a project that is bound to be controversial and to cause considerable parliamentary trouble. Some thorny questions must be answered prior to the creation of a Scottish parliament. Most significantly, there is the so-called "West Lothian" question: will Scottish MPs in an Edinburgh assembly continue to sit at Westminster as well? To allow them to do so would seem to give the Scots an unfair political advantage. Scottish MPs would be able to vote on English affairs, but their English counterparts would be banned from interfering in Scottish domestic business.

To solve this problem, Labour recently drew up a blueprint for the future in which a separate Scottish parliament would serve as only one component of an elaborate plan to create approximately twelve regional governments in England as well as a legislative body for Wales, all of which would have some independent powers. "It is extremely important that what we do for Scotland and Wales is seen as part of a comprehensive package to deal with the constitution of Britain," Shadow Scottish Secretary George Robertson recently declared. ₅₄ Labour thus clearly wishes to put its plans for a Scottish parliament in the context of a broader, United-Kingdom-wide program of reform, in order to assuage English fears that Scottish devolution as an isolated experiment would lead to political instability and to deal with the constitutional anomaly that Scottish MPs at Westminster could continue to vote on English issues, but English MPs could not vote on many Scottish issues. "I think there is no reason why you can't have a more pluralist form of democracy," Blair has asserted, "where the powers of a Scottish parliament and a central Government are perfectly clearly delineated and people know where the boundaries are. I have never really seen this as a problem of great difficulty." ₅₅

The Scottish press clearly agrees. They point to the recent settlement reached in Northern Ireland as proof that the West Lothian problem is not insurmountable, although the Major government has summarily rejected arguments that the plan to create an assembly there would open the way for a similar legislative body in Scotland. ₅₆ According to the Scotsman , "the creation of an elected assembly in Northern Ireland would deepen the resentment of the majority of Scots who want a parliament in Edinburgh....It would also raise a question to which the Government's answer might be instructive: if an elected legislature in Belfast can strengthen the Union, why should one in Edinburgh be thought to endanger it?" ₅₇ Support for Labour's proposals is currently very strong in Scotland, and recent polls give Blair and his compatriots a seemingly insurmountable lead.

If the predictions prove true, and Labour sweeps into office following the next general election, then it is virtually certain that Scotland will have a parliament as soon as the requisite legislation can be passed and the relevant practicalities of establishing a new legislative body can be dealt with. At the moment, Scotland's future still hinges upon the outcome of a three-horse race. But it is a race in which two of the contestants are in dire danger of becoming also-rans due to the inflexibility of their policies. By refusing to make any concessions to Scottish demands, the Conservatives have fallen so far behind that it is all but impossible for them to catch up. The SNP is still in the race, for it remains to be seen if its stubborn commitment to an "all-or-nothing" strategy for Scottish independence will prove the winner in the long run. For now, however, the smart money is on Labour. Blair's carefully constructed program of responding to the desire of many Scots for a greater degree of autonomy while ensuring that the electoral prospects of his party are not damaged in the process seems the most likely to cross the finish line first.

Whichever party prevails in the next general election, it is all but certain that the next several years will see significant changes in Scotland's position in the United Kingdom, the European Community and the world. What will a more independent Scotland look like, and will it be able to survive on its own economically? The answer to this question hinges largely upon developments in Brussels. A more integrated Europe will permit Scotland to exist as a viable economic entity without the support of Britain. If the EC continues to be more of an ideal than a reality, however, the Scots will most likely find survival as an independent nation extremely difficult. With its heavy dependence upon the production of capital goods, the Scottish economy will require open access to European markets in order to flourish. Without that access, the country's economic woes will deepen, especially if in the wake of independence the British impose upon the Scots the same trade restrictions and tariffs that they currently apply to their other trading partners. Currently, the economic integration of the EC does not appear to be sufficiently advanced to permit Scotland to achieve a viable form of full independence. Instead, a degree of limited autonomy would seem to be better suited to the present European climate. For now, Scotland must position itself so that it may take advantage of developments regarding the EC, but not plunge too impetuously ahead with rash schemes for outright independence if it cannot survive on its own. In other words, the Scots must not let their political aspirations overreach their economic capabilities.

Notes

Note 1: Tom Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism (2nd ed., London: Verso, 1981) 11-12. Back.

Note 2: Gary Duncan, "Major's Devolution Attack Leads to Furious Backlash," Scotsman, 31 Dec 1994, 1. Back.

Note 3: Erlend Clouston, "Scots Warm to the Continental Drift with One Eye on Autonomy," Manchester Guardian, 30 May 1994, 6. Back.

Note 4: Peter Jones, "Tories and Major Hit Record Low," Scotsman, 20 Sept 1993, 1. Back.

Note 5: William Clark, "Tories Hit Rock Bottom as Major Heads for Scotland," Glasgow Herald , 7 Sept 1993, 2; Duncan Black, "Labour's Support Slips among Scottish Voters," Glasgow Herald, 1 Oct 1993, 2. Back.

Note 6: Keith Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977) 25. Back.

Note 7: Cited in Webb 42. Back.

Note 8: Nairn, Break-up of Britain 129. Back.

Note 9: According to Christopher Harvie, "Because of the lack of parliament the nation was not omnicompetent, yet the distinctive institutions which survived claimed to exercise authority beyond their specific functions. The Union theoretically created a common citizenship, yet the Scots continued to enjoy privileges in Scotland denied to the English....It created a society in which nationalist and universalist elements were uniquely combined." Christopher Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics, 1707-1977 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977) 63. Back.

Note 10: John Major, Scotland in the United Kingdom (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1992) 7. Back.

Note 11: Major, 13-14. Back.

Note 12: See Iain Macwhirter, "English Nationalism Fills the Conservative Vacuum," Scotsman, 11 Nov 1994, 13. Back.

Note 13: Joy Copley, "Devolution Plans Mad, Says Major," Scotsman, 12 Dec 1994, 1. Back.

Note 14: "A Thorn in Major's Rosy Message," Scotsman, 16 Oct 1994, 17. Back.

Note 15: "Whistling into a Cold Wind," Scotsman, 31 Dec 1994, 12. Back.

Note 16: Joyce McMillan, "Scarecrow Politics Will Backfire on John Major," Scotsman, 4 Dec 1994, 18. Back.

Note 17: See Iain Macwhirter, "Tories Hit the Button for a Bumpy Ride," Scotsman, 7 Dec 1994,15 Back.

Note 18: Kenny Farquharson, "Scottish Tories Flirt with Devolution,"Scotsman, 16 Oct 1994,1. Back.

Note 19: Kenny Farquharson, "Whispering Campaign Cries for Devolution," Scotsman, 16 Oct 1994, 10. Back.

Note 20: Ewen MacAskill, "Aitken Seeks Pledge on Referendum," Scotsman, 23 Dec 1994, 7. Back.

Note 21: Kenny Farquharson, "Still Room at the Top for Party Rebels," Scotsman, 25 Sept 1994, 6. Back.

Note 22: Jackie Kemp, "Nationalists Feel the Heat over Cold Weather Payments," Scotsman, 6 Nov 1994, 9. Back.

Note 23 In twenty-one separate complaints, McKnight was accused of financial irregularities stemming from allegations that he held onto cash that should have been returned to his clients when their cases were dropped or dismissed. Kenny Farquharson, "Investigation into SNP's Man in US," Scotsman, 4 Dec 1994, 1. Back.

Note 24: Kenny Farquharson, "SNP Alliance Threatened by Bankruptcy," Scotsman, 18 Dec 1994, 2. Back.

Note 25: Scottish Secretary Ian Lang announced that, although responsibility would be removed from regional and islands councils, the assets would effectively remain in public hands through the setting up of three water subsidies. "Public Concern over Water," Scotsman, 23 Nov 1993, 12. Back.

Note 26: See "Fresh Fears for Scots Sleeper Services," Scotsman, 2 Nov 1994, 1; Allan MacLean and Ewen MacAskill, "Threat to Sleeper Service Confirmed," Scotsman, 3 Nov 1994, 2; "Spending Axe Falls on Night Trains," Scotsman, 14 Dec 1994, 1; "Campaign to Fight Cuts in Scots Train Services," Scotsman, 15 Dec 1994, 1; "Scots Night Train Cuts Confirmed," Scotsman, 15 Dec 1994, 3; Douglas Fraser, "Major Accused of Breaking Highland Rail Line Pledge," Scotsman, 16 Dec 1994, 3; Allan MacLean, "Threat to Overnight Motorail," Scotsman, 17 Dec 1994, 4; Allan MacLean, "Cash Shake-up Added £7m to Losses, Leak Shows," Scotsman, 19 Dec 1994, 3; and Douglas Fraser, "Second Blow to Highlands Rail Link," Scotsman, 19 Dec 1994, 6. Back.

Note 27: See Chris McLaughlin, "Brussels Deal Unleashes Fury of Fisherman," Scotsman, 23 Dec 1994, 1; "Skippers Set to Fight Spanish Armada," Scotsman, 24 Dec 1994, 3; and "SNP Demands Help for Fishing Fleet," Scotsman, 28 Dec 1994, 6. Back.

Note 28: "Through the devolving doors," Scotsman, 26 Nov 1993, 14. Back.

Note 29: Jim Sillars, Scotland: The Case for Optimism (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1986) 186. Back.

Note 30: Keith Bruce, "Salmond Reiterates Eurp Vision," Glasgow Herald, 13 Sept 1993, 7. Back.

Note 31: Graeme Wilson, "The Young Scot Is Not Going to Pot," Scotsman, 8 Sept 1993, 1. Back.

Note 32: Chris McLaughlin, "State of Evolution: View from the Barricares," Scotsman, a Oct 1993, 12. Back.

Note 33: Frances Horsbrugh, "EC Aid Bid for 85% of Scots,: Glasgow Herald, 12 Oct 1993, 1. Back.

Note 34: Tom Crainey, "Strathclyde Set for £400,000 Euro Flood Aid," Scotsman, 20 Dec 1994, 7; and William Chisholm and Marcello Mega, "Borders Wins £50m Investment Package," Scotsman, 8 Dec 1994, 7. Back.

Note 35: Clouston, "Scots Warm to the Continental Drift" 6; McLaughlin, "State of Evolution" 12. Back.

Note 36: See Chris McLaughlin, "Regions' Rural Areas Line up for EC Boost," Scotsman, 15 Sept 1993, 4; and "New Areas Put Forward to Qualify for EC Aid," Scotsman, 12 Oct 1993, 5. Back.

Note 37: McLaughlin, "State of Evolution" 12. Back.

Note 38: McLaughlin, "State of Evolution" 12. See also Murray Ritchie, "Lang Bangs the Drum on Scotland's Role in Europe," Glasgow Herald , 21 Sept 1993, 2. Back.

Note 39: Chris McLaughlin, "Scottish Office to Take Charge of EC Aid," Scotsman, 16 Dec 1993, 1. Back.

Note 40: Peter Jones, "Salmond Clarifies Vision of Scotland," Scotsman, 10 Nov 1994, 4. Back.

Note 41: David Scott, "Devolution Posers Put to Robertson," Scotsman, 25 Nov 1994, 8. Back.

Note 42: Paul H. Scott, "'Scare' Stories about Independence," Scotsman, 21 Dec 1994, 10. Back.

Note 43: Peter Jones, "Blair Widens Gulf with SNP over Home Rule," Scotsman, 12 Nov 1994, 1. Back.

Note 44: Peter Jones, "War of Words over Separate Scottish Currency," Scotsman, 2 Dec 1994, 9. Back.

Note 45: See Peter Jones, "Danger in the Shifting Sands of Factionalism," Scotsman, 21 Sept 1993, 12; and William Clark, "SNP Attacked as 'Another British Party'," Glasgow Herald , 20 Sept 1993, 3. Back.

Note 46: Peter Jones, "SNP Fears over Salmond Tactics Signalled in Conference Agenda," Scotsman , 1 September 1993, 5. Back.

Note 47: Charles Kennedy, "A Party Created in its Leader's Image," Scotsman, 13 Sept 1993, 8. Back.

Note 48: Joyce McMillan, "Little Comfort in Absurd Spectacles Down South," Scotsman , 16 Oct 1994, 16. Back.

Note 49: Ewen MacAskill, "Blair Laid Bare," Scotsman, 9 Sept 1994, 13. Back.

Note 50: Peter Jones, "Scottish Parliament to be Labour Symbol," Scotsman , 4 Oct 1994, 1. Back.

Note 51: Michael Keating and David Bleiman, Labour and Scottish Nationalism (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1979) 1-2. Back.

Note 52: Keating and Bleiman 111-14. Back.

Note 53: MacAskill, "Blair Laid Bare" 13. Back.

Note 54: Peter Jones, "Labour Plan to Soothe English Fears on Scots Parliament," Scotsman, 6 Oct 1994, 1. Back.

Note 55: MacAskill, "Blair Laid Bare" 13. Back.

Note 56: See "Special Factors," Scotsman , 13 Dec 1993, 10. Back.

Note 57: "Delicate questions," Scotsman, 5 Nov 1993, 14. Back.