Widening Participation in EU Crisis Management

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CIAO DATE: 03/03

Widening Participation in EU Crisis Management

Kelly Baumgartner

Briefing Paper No. 26
May 2002

The International Security Information Service

Executive Summary

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has developed rapidly since its inception at St Malo in 1998. At Helsinki and Feira guiding principles for third-country participation in a 'single inclusive structure' were established. These guidelines were fleshed out at Nice in December 2000, but require further clarification. Hence modalities for participation reflect the embryonic character of ESDP.

Third-country participation in crisis management actions centres routinely on meetings and consultation at ministerial level in a 'single inclusive structure', known as the '15+15' format. ₁ Within the single inclusive structure there is a sub-group forum in which the EU can engage with the six non-EU European NATO states independently of the other nine accession countries (the 15+6 format). This body deals primarily with questions concerning the nature and functioning of EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities. During crisis periods consultation is stepped up in both formats. Meetings at military experts level also take place and third countries have appointed interlocators to the Political Security Committee as well as points of contact to the EU Military Staff. However, the Nice Treaty explicitly states that these structures are primarily consultation mechanisms and stresses they will not compromise the EU's decision-making autonomy.

As with other international security organisations, such as NATO, the UN and the WEU, the level of participation open to third countries is largely dependent on the phase the mission is in and whether they are intending to contribute substantially. The WEU was a particularly inclusive organisation offering its associate members de facto participation rights and obligations in WEU Council meetings, working groups, subsidiary bodies and operational structures. The UN is inclusive and requires full consensus among participating states. However the EU is striving for a more robust and rapidly deployable capability than that offered by the WEU or the UN. A highly consensual approach to operations would compromise the need for efficient and swift decision-making among the EU members. The procedures in NATO are perhaps the most similar to those envisioned for the EU force.

Comparison with these institutions highlights that the EU's structures remain relatively ill-defined. Criticism has focused on the lack of a substantive process of routine information exchange and the failure to define an overt decision-shaping role for third-countries. Most of the 15 non-EU Allies and accession countries have identified some areas of concern, but, on the whole have responded positively to the arrangements agreed at Nice. In view of imminent NATO and EU enlargement these countries have preferred a 'wait and see' strategy. Strong objections have, however, been raised by Turkey and Greece. Their objections continue to block an agreement between the EU and NATO on the use of NATO planning assets for EU-led operations.

The ESDP test cases are likely to be in the Balkans where missions have traditionally been led by NATO, UN or OSCE and have involved many non-EU actors. The success of EU-led missions will depend on efficient decision-making and the continued support and expertise of third-countries. A failure to maintain third-country participation would result in the loss of valuable expertise and political will currently backing the development of EU crisis management capabilities.

To maximise participation, the EU can draw on the positive experiences of other security organisations in the implementation of its participation structure. The EU should make the single inclusive structure more transparent and substantive by enhancing and deepening routine dialogue. It should also maximise the involvement of third countries in the decision-shaping process. More generally there is a need to clarify how the 'single inclusive structure' will be implemented and how it fits into the Union's broader institutional and operational structures.

1. Introduction

The European Union (EU) is in the process of developing institutional and operational structures for military crisis management operations. The 1998 Anglo-French Declaration at St. Malo set the stage for the creation of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) with institutional and operational capacities that would allow it to act autonomously should NATO decide not to do so. ₂ Subsequent European Councils have established a political-military institutional framework that should be operational by 2003. For the more demanding Petersberg Tasks, ₃ the EU will need to rely on the use of NATO assets. The EU and NATO are in the process of developing modalities for the release and transfer of such assets. At the lower end of the spectrum of Petersberg tasks, the EU is calculated to have the capacity to conduct autonomous operations.

At the same time as it develops its internal military crisis management mechanisms, the EU is also defining a single framework for the participation of non-EU countries. At the Nice European Council in December 2000, the EU agreed a framework for the participation of 'third countries' (non-EU NATO Allies and EU accession candidate countries) that at the same time maintains the decision-making autonomy of the EU.

2. Models of Participation in International Organisations

Both the WEU, the former military arm of the EU, and NATO have developed participation mechanisms governing the involvement of states that are not full members, while the UN, by definition inherently inclusive, has established rather different modalities for participation. These models have set precedents reflected in the expectations of non-EU member states and in the EU's proposed framework for their involvement in EU crisis management actions. It is therefore useful, for comparative purposes, to describe the participation mechanisms within these organisations, and draw attention to any shortcomings that have been identified in the operation of these structures.

2.1 Participation mechanisms in NATO

There are two main forums through which third party states can participate in NATO activities:

1. NATO's Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) provides a multilateral forum for regular consultations on political and security issues in all regions of the Euro-Atlantic area with its 27 Partner states (the 19+27 format). This forum, established in 1997 to move beyond the limited focus of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, includes traditionally neutral countries such as Austria, Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Switzerland as well as those countries that were formerly NATO adversaries. ₄

2. The EAPC also functions as the political framework for the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. The PfP establishes a forum in which the 27 Partners cooperate with NATO on a bilateral basis (the 19+1 format). This is a consultation mechanism for joint defence and security-related activities between NATO Allies and individual Partners. The PfP includes a Political-Military Framework (PMF), which defines the role of PfP Partners in the planning and execution of future NATO-led PfP operations.

It is the PMF that structures the way in which third party states are involved in the planning and execution of NATO-led operations. The PMF sets out to develop a more operational role for PfP, to provide for greater involvement of Partners in PfP decision-making and planning and to strengthen the political consultation element in PfP. It also reinforces the goal of the EAPC 'to afford Partner countries, to the maximum extent possible, increased decision-making opportunities relating to activities in which they participate'. ₅ Partner involvement occurs in two principal forms:

1. Through national representatives representing their nations' views directly to the Allies. In political consultations and decision-making the focus will almost exclusively be on this first form of involvement with the inclusion of national Partner representatives on committees and working groups.

2. Through Partner officers in international positions focusing on creating and maintaining a cooperative and consensual understanding between the Allies and Partner countries. In command arrangements the emphasis is predominantly on the inclusion of Partner officers in international functions. In operational planning both national representatives and officers in international positions are involved. The development of plans is mainly in the hands of officers in international positions, and the guidance for and approval of plans rests with national representatives at Military Committee and North Atlantic Council (NAC) level.

Regarding specific missions the level of Partner involvement also depends on the phase of the operation and whether or not the Partner potentially intends to contribute to the mission or not. The Political-Military Framework consists of four phases:

1. The non-crisis phase focuses consultation and cooperation between NATO and third parties on establishing the ability of Partner forces to interact with NATO forces. Joint training and exercise activities between NATO and its Partners strengthen practical military cooperation. Partner officers serving in international functions in the NATO/PfP framework may be involved in contingency planning for NATO-led PfP operations. Partners can participate in planning through national liaison officers or through Partner representatives at Military Committee (MC) level. The MC may also distribute relevant documents to better inform Partners.

2. The consultation phase allows for the exchange of information and sharing of situation assessments, during which all Partners are involved on an equal basis. At this stage, potential contributing Partners are identified. Preliminary pledges occur through the EAPC framework and through bilateral contacts. Ideally, the identification of Partners willing to participate in an operation occurs at the same time, or very shortly after a decision by the NAC to begin the strategic military planning, so as to incorporate potential contributions into the military planning process as quickly as possible. The consultation phase concludes with the decision by the NAC to begin the strategic military planning.

3. During the planning and consultation phase potential contributing Partners are increasingly involved in decision-shaping. To this end consultations on the planned operation, including at MC level, take the format of the Allies plus those Partners intending to contribute (the 19+n format). The importance attached to their early involvement in consultations is explicit and clear. The Political Military Framework states that:

"Potentially contributing Partners should be fully involved in the decision-shaping process by contributing to preparations of decisions to be taken by the NAC. This means that before the relevant planning documents (Concept of Operations, OPLAN) are approved, while respecting the ultimate decision making authority of the NAC, potentially contributing Partners should be offered opportunities to exchange views with the Allies and associate themselves with the decision." ₆

The process of accepting and certifying Partner contributions begins during this phase and is ideally finalised before the operation begins. ₇ Once the contributing Partners have been formally recognised further preparations will be based on a three-step process of 1) NAC initiation - 2) Partner involvement in decision in Allies+n format - 3) NAC decision. This process is complemented by Partner involvement in aspects of planning and in the force generation process at the military level through the International Coordination Centre (ICC) at SHAPE.

4. During the execution phase, contributing Partners will continue to participate in providing political guidance and oversight of the operation when changes are required to the Operational Plan (OPLAN) or the Rules of Engagement (ROEs). Their most direct involvement in an operation is through their actual commitments and their participation in command arrangements. Contributing Partners have representatives in the chain of command at the operational level and liaison officers at the strategic level.

While NATO's Political-Military Framework includes an explicit and substantive decision-shaping role for Partners, it has been poorly implemented during crises when framework modalities have not always been respected. The speed at which conflicts have developed has generally left little time for consultations with Partners. This experience should lead the EU to examine whether there is any way around the practical difficulties in maintaining participatory structures during a real crisis.

2.2 Participation mechanisms in the WEU

Though now largely subsumed into the EU, the WEU was the first European security organisation to offer membership to countries of Central and Eastern Europe allowing for their participation in both its institutional and operational structures. The WEU's three-tiered partnership structure included:

1. Observers ₈ who attended WEU Council meetings and working group meetings unless Full Members unanimously requested that the meetings be restricted. In WEU-led operations, Observers had the same rights and responsibilities as Full Members when an organisation that they belonged to transferred assets and capabilities to the WEU.

2. Associate Partners ₉ participated in WEU Council meetings, but had no veto rights. They were regularly informed of the activities of WEU working groups and could be invited to participate in these groups. They had a liaison arrangement in the WEU planning cell and could contribute forces to specific operations. Upon agreement of force contributions, they had the same rights and responsibilities as full members, including the right of involvement in WEU command structures and in the Council's decision-making process. The modalities for this participation took place on a case-by-case basis.

3. Associate Members ₁₀ enjoyed full de facto participation rights and obligations in WEU Council meetings, working groups, subsidiary bodies and operational structures. Five votes from Full Members were needed to block an Associate Member's participation in meetings. The majority of decisions were taken on a consensus basis. Associate Members participated as full members in an operation and in relevant exercises and planning on a case-by-case basis. In the planning and conduct of an operation, the WEU Council would take into full consideration the security interests of Associate Members. Associate Members were also able to send three liaison officers to the WEU planning cell.

The inclusive nature of the WEU created a new spirit of cooperation in the post-Cold War era. However, operations carried out under the aegis of the WEU were limited in scope. They were concerned with soft security missions involving, for example, civilian policing. Moreover, the limited scope of WEU operations meant that WEU meetings often involved pro forma briefing sessions rather than substantive and qualitative discussions. The level of participation in the WEU, especially in it's decision-making structures, is not mirrored in NATO structures and is unlikely to be directly transferable to the EU. This aside, the precedent of the WEU has raised expectations that the EU operate inclusively.

2.3 Participation structures in the UN

The UN is a very different animal to NATO, the WEU or the EU. Unlike these organisations the UN is a global entity counting the vast majority of nations among its membership. By definition there are in practice very few 'third-parties' or non-members. Hence there is a uniform mode of participation in UN-led missions characterised by a very strong consensus-based approach.

Since it has no standing army to draw on, each time the Security Council calls for the creation of a new operation its components must be assembled from 'scratch'. Though there is a substantial decision-making onus on the role of the Secretary-General and the Security Council in the deployment and mandate of a peacekeeping operation, member state contributions remain voluntary, and hence lead-times to assemble and deploy a peace-keeping force vary greatly.

In all UN missions the primary emphasis is on reaching consensus among Member States and other affected parties in the Security Council prior to the launch of an operation. Swift reaction to crises, though important, does not take precedence over the commitment to consensus-based decision-making. This has meant that in practice the UN response to some crises has been inadequately slow.

The heavy emphasis on consensus makes the UN system too slow for 'rapid reaction' operations where inclusiveness needs to be compromised for efficiency of decision-making and action. For this reason the UN looks favourably on the development of ESDP as it might, in the future, request that the EU Rapid Reaction Force implement an action with a UN mandate.

2.4 The EU's participation structures

Building on previous Council decisions, the Nice European Council in December 2000 further clarified the structure for the participation of third countries in the ESDP. Member States affirmed that the EU is open to receiving contributions from third countries for the development of EU military crisis management capabilities in order to enhance the effectiveness of EU-led military operations. This must, however, respect the EU's decision-making autonomy.

The EU Member States established two permanent formats for direct third party participation and/or consultation during routine non-crisis periods:

1. The 15+15 format: a 'single inclusive structure' in which all non-EU European NATO members and the candidates for accession to the EU can meet with the EU members for dialogue and consultation and to ensure cooperation.

2. The 15+6 format which is established within the broader 15+15 inclusive structure. It allows the EU to engage the non-EU European NATO members in consultation and dialogue independently of the accession countries where the subject matter requires it, such as on questions concerning the nature and functioning of EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities.

Within this context, the Nice Treaty sets out loose guidelines for formal dialogue stating that, 'the frequency of and procedures for consultation will depend on requirements and be guided by considerations of pragmatism and efficiency'. The document stipulates minimum requirements in terms of meetings in the above formats, those at ministerial level and those at Military Committee and military experts levels, with more frequent consultation focused on the 15+6 format. Although expert meetings can be called on a variety of different matters, specific reference is made in the Treaty to those that are concerned with the establishment of capability objectives, a focus which reflects the embryonic character of the ESDP. Additional to these meetings, third countries have appointed interlocators to the PSC as well as points of contact to the EU Military Staff. Also important will be specific liaison arrangements, for example during NATO/EU exercises, and for the involvement of the 15 and the 6 in the development of military capabilities.

During a crisis situation two separate phases are identified:

During the pre-operational phase leading up to a Council decision, there is an intensification of dialogue and consultation at all levels, including ministerial level. The Council envisages that this phase will allow the EU and third countries to assess the situation and discuss any concerns, especially with those who feel that their security interests are affected. It is also an opportunity for third parties to be informed of the EU's intentions. When military options are under consideration the Council has suggested these consultations could be held at the politico-military experts level to ensure that potential contributor countries are kept informed, particularly regarding the military options being envisaged. For options requiring the use of NATO assets and capabilities particular attention will be paid to consultation with the six non-EU European NATO members.

The mission enters the operational phase once the Council has chosen the strategic military option(s). The operational planning work will be presented to the non-EU European NATO members and those states among the accession candidates who have expressed their intention, in principle, to take part in the operation, to allow them to determine their potential contributions. Once the Council has approved the operational concept after due consideration of the outcome of the consultations with third countries, these countries will be formally invited to participate in the impending EU-led operation. However invitation is subject to the arrangements agreed at the Helsinki European Council which specify that the six non-EU European NATO members may participate if they wish in the event of an operation having recourse to NATO assets, but when NATO assets are not being used they must be invited to take part by the EU. The accession candidate countries can only take part if they are formally invited to do so by the Council. Moreover when NATO resources and capabilities are being utilised then operational planning is carried out by Alliance planning bodies and third countries will be involved in planning according to NATO procedures. For autonomous EU operations planning will be carried out within one of the European strategic level headquarters and participation, both for non-EU European NATO countries and for the accession candidates, will be by way of liaison officers sent to the European Military Staff. This allows for exchanges of information on operational planning and on the sort of contributions being envisaged. These consultations are the principal method by which the EU and third countries seek to establish the specific third country contributions and their compatibility with the EU's operational requirements.

Once an operation is officially launched a Committee of Contributors (CoC) is established. The Council states that this body will play a key role in the day-to-day management of the operation. The CoC acts as the main forum for discussing all day-to-day issues during the operation regarding the measures taken by the Political and Security Committee. The Council has emphasised that a close working relationship between this body and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) should evolve.

The main roles of the CoC are as follows: to deal with various problems of implementation of the military operation, including the use of forces and all day-to-day management matters not exclusively the responsibility of the Operation Commander; to provide opinions and recommendations on possible adjustments to operational planning; and to adopt a position on planning the end of operations and the withdrawal of forces. To perform these functions, the CoC will be provided with detailed information regarding the operation on the ground and will receive regular briefings from the Operation Commander.

Again it is notable that the PSC, where the political control and strategic direction of an operation ultimately lies, is not obliged to act on the views expressed by the CoC but only to take them into account during its deliberations. Moreover, the composition of the CoC varies with the nature of the tasks that it is to undertake. The Nice Treaty explains this as follows:

'For Member States, it may be comprised of representatives on the PSC and on the Military Committee. It will usually be chaired by a representative of the Secretary General/High Representative or the Presidency, assisted by the Chairman of the Military Committee or his Deputy. The Director of the Military Staff and the Operation Commander may also attend or be represented in the Committee.'

Hence there is the potential for a considerable degree of 'cross-fertilisation' between, on one hand representatives from contributing third countries, and on the other Member State actors who input directly into the EU's planning and decision-making structures. Though, once again, the formal guidelines remain only loosely defined, many of the fifteen non-EU NATO members and accession countries have identified the evolution of the role of the CoC as potentially the most important focus point for their participation in EU-led operations.

3. Assessing the EU's Participation Mechanisms

It is still too early to fully evaluate the implementation of the new participation mechanisms. However a preliminary assessment by way of comparison with structures established in other security organisations points to some potential shortcomings.

Firstly the EU proposal lacks a substantive and qualitative process of information exchange in the routine phase, evident in both the WEU and NATO. In practice, to date, slow internal decision-making procedures have diluted the practical effectiveness of these structures. Consequently third parties have not been informed well enough in advance to provide input into the agenda or to adequately prepare for the meetings.

Secondly the Nice conclusions do not define an overt decision-shaping role for third-countries. Once the EU has decided on the strategic military options for an operation, they are presented as a fait accompli on the basis of which partners must determine whether or not they want to contribute. Third country contributions are only debated substantially during the operational phase once the decision has been taken to launch an operation. By contrast, NATO Partners have an explicit and well defined role in decision-shaping running up to the launch of an operation, allowing mission planners to take account of their potential contributions, and allowing themselves more time to identify capabilities useful to the mission goals of the operation. Many third-countries have felt that the EU structures could in practice exclude them from future missions, as they will not be able to identify or integrate their contributions quickly enough.

Despite its relatively inclusive procedures, NATO efforts to maintain consultation and participation with Partners have been compromised because of the need for a rapid and united response. Given that the EU's decision-shaping and decision-making structures are more complex than NATO's with a greater separation of responsibilities between different bodies, many third parties are sceptical that the EU will be able to conduct meaningful consultations with third parties before launching an operation. The Nice Conclusions offer little to clarify how the single inclusive structure will fit into the myriad of institutions that form the broader EU crisis management structures. If the EU can not manage to ensure transparency and internal co-ordination between the Commission, Council and its member states, there will be little chance of third parties being involved in a coherent way.

4. National Reactions (See Annex A for a more detailed account)

For the most part national reactions to the Nice structures have been supportive and non-provocative. For most non-EU members of NATO and the accession countries the recognition that there is a need to take an evolutionary approach to ESDP and the fact that the impending enlargements of both the Union and NATO will largely synchronize their (European) memberships, have meant that they prefer to subsume specific concerns to broader political interests. The hope is that problems will be ironed out on a case-by-case basis through consensus-based decision-shaping during each ongoing operation.

The non-EU Allies, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland (all expected to be included in the first wave of EU enlargement), Norway and Iceland have stressed the importance of the enhanced consultation mechanisms and specifically the need to be better informed of developments prior to 15 + 6 meetings. They also emphasize their desire to have as large a role in the decision-shaping process as possible. EU candidate countries all stress that the EU should deepen dialogue and enhance transparency, openness and information-sharing. They argue that the routine functioning of the 15 + 15 format has been poorly implemented so far. These states have not been given sufficient time to prepare, nor have they been formally and regularly briefed on EU meetings and fear that this de facto exclusion will be extended into other areas of crisis management.

Among the transatlantic NATO allies, the US views the Nice conclusions as a good start, but one which has not resolved the participation issue. Canada has expressed interest in contributing to EU-led operations under 'appropriate modalities' and therefore feels that it would be more appropriately included in the '15+6' format than grouped together with Russia and Ukraine.

4.1 The EU, NATO, and Turkey

The main objections to the structures established at Nice centre on Turkish and Greek security concerns in the context of negotiations to establish a permanent and effective EU-NATO relationship. ₁₁ For NATO Allies, these negotiations proceed on the principle that 'nothing will be agreed until everything is agreed', ₁₂ meaning that the EU-NATO partnership will not be finalized until the issue of participation in EU-led crisis management mechanisms is resolved to the satisfaction of all Allies. ₁₃

The worry for Turkey primarily concerns the prospect of operations undertaken by an autonomous EU force over which it would have no right of veto and no role in the decision-making process. The country's geographical situation in a volatile and unstable region gives credence to these concerns. ₁₄ In particular, Turkey fears the potential for a European intervention in Cyprus and the Aegean Sea area. Moreover, Turkey has pledged a substantial number of troops to the EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) and is one of the biggest contributors to NATO and feels it deserves a greater role in the ESDP's decision-making procedures. Turkey has demanded either explicit security guarantees or an increased role in decision-shaping and decision-making both in the pre-operational, and in the operational phases.

Most of the Turkish objections and demands were addressed in an agreement forged by the UK, the US, and Turkey in December 2001. Reassurances were given to Turkey that, in practice, there would be the presumption that Turkey (and the other non-EU allies) would be involved EU operations undertaken in areas of security concern to them. This allows the EU to maintain its decision-making autonomy, but allows for early consultation, during the decision-shaping phase, of potential operations to be undertaken in areas of direct security concern to Turkey.

However, this deal is currently being blocked by Greece. Though senior Greek officials agree that the 'Ankara compromise' should be used as a "working document", Greece wants any agreement to be brought within Union structures. ₁₅ Greek objections focus on the modalities for consultation of NATO members when the EU takes a decision on an operation which does not involve the use of NATO assets. They are concerned that the long consultation process outlined in the document would effectively set a precedent for including third-country participation in the decision-making process, hence compromising the decision-making autonomy of the Union. Despite these problems all sides have recognised the need to break the current impasse by the end of the Spanish Presidency.

5. Participation Put to the Test

The negotiations with Turkey highlight the difficulty in trying to square the circle between EU decision-making autonomy and inclusiveness. The EU Military Staff tried to reconcile these two competing requirements in agreeing a set of loose guidelines for third-country participation. The overall participation framework will apparently develop in an evolutionary fashion on a case-by-case basis. The first EU-led operation will be the benchmark by which third-countries judge the adequacy of the participation arrangements as they now stand. This may well be as early as September 2002 with the proposal that the EU take-over from the NATO operation 'Amber Fox' in Macedonia once its mandate expires. ₁₆ An EU Police mission to Bosnia has already been agreed and will start work there on 1 January 2003. Hence, the ESDP test cases will be in the Balkans where missions have been either NATO, UN or OSCE and have involved many non-EU actors.

The success of EU operations will depend on efficient decision-making and the ability to keep the expertise and the support of third-countries. Should it fail to do so support in the ESDP project may be undermined and member states may prefer to see the NATO, the UN or the OSCE continue to take lead roles in the Balkan region.

6. Recommendations

In implementing the participation mechanism, the EU needs to strike the right chord between effectiveness and inclusiveness. The EU can draw on the positive experiences of other security organisations in the implementation of its participation structure.

6.1 Enhancing and deepening routine dialogue

The EU could make the single structure more substantive, transparent and open through the following measures:

Once NATO and the EU have signed a permanent agreement regarding security issues, the EU could conclude similar agreements with third-countries. Ideally this would involve a system such as the WEU security network, which disseminates different levels of classification of information to different levels of users, for the routine exchange of information. In the meantime, the EU should use the Associate Countries Network (ACN), the security network that disseminates information between the EU and accession partners at the lowest level of security classification, more often to provide PSC briefings and agendas. Until security agreements are concluded, meetings will remain declaratory and pro forma in nature.
The EU should distribute meeting agendas and relevant documents for both the 15+15 and 15+6 formats well enough in advance so that partners have time to prepare and then provide substantive input.
The EU should establish joint committees at working group level so that meetings at the ambassadorial (the 15+ formats) level do not revert to pro forma tour de table declarations. ₁₇ Preliminary meetings at the working group level would allow for more substantive discussion and dialogue to occur at higher levels.

6.2 Defining and extending participation in Decision-shaping

The EU could clarify and extend the involvement of Partners in the relevant decision-shaping processes during the 'pre-operational' and 'operational' phases. The NATO PMF document in describing its planning and consultation phase outlines that, 'Potentially contributing Partners should be fully involved in the decision-shaping process by contributing to preparations of decisions to be taken by the NAC [and] should be offered opportunities to exchange views with the Allies and associate themselves with the decision'. This would serve as a good guideline for the EU.
The EU should create an Informal Consultative Mechanism at the end of the 'pre-operational' phase that would give Accession Candidate Allies a larger decision-shaping role prior to an EU decision on strategic military options. When the EU has recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, it should allow non-EU NATO Allies an intensified decision-shaping role within this mechanism.
How the role of the Committee of Contributors develops will be vital in maintaining faith in the participation structures. Its role should be clarified prior to the launch of any EU-led operation in Macedonia, and before the EU Police Mission starts its work in Bosnia. For a 'close working relationship' to be established with the PSC, substantial discussions should take place in the CoC allowing, as far as is possible in a limited time-frame, for consensus to be reached prior to formal decision-making by the Council.

6.3 Clarifying future implementation

The EU needs to clarify further how the 'single inclusive structure' will be implemented and how it fits into the larger institutional and operational structures. To this end the following issues still require resolution:

The Annex to the Nice Treaty contains a clause stating that third countries, 'deploying significant military forces under an EU-led operation will have the same rights and responsibilities in terms of day-to-day management of the operation', as participating member states. Clarification of what exactly this entails and how partner countries will be involved will be necessary prior to the launching of an operation.
The coordination role of military experts and military liaison officers from Candidate states with respective EU bodies will need to be expanded and better defined. At the moment these arrangements work primarily as information channels and active participation by third country experts is not easy.
The way that the single inclusive structure (15 + 15 and 15 + 6 formats) interacts with the other EU structures and institutions remains poorly defined. At present it remains outside the EU's institutional set-up and there is no elaboration of its relationship with the Council, Commission and Parliament.
The relationship between the Committee of Contributors and the PSC and other institutions needs to be established. Is it merely a sub-committee of the PSC, its input being channelled through this body to the Council? What degree of independence will the CoC have to communicate with other institutions and actors such as the Commission or the Military Committee and Military Staff? Clarification on these issues will go a long way towards reassuring third-countries of the participatory character and essential inclusiveness of the structures outlined in Nice.

Annex A : Individual National Reactions to the EU's Participation Structures ₁₈

Non EU Nato Allies (except Turkey).

The Czech Republic is taking a non-proactive approach on this issue, balancing its needs and concerns in relation to both the EU and NATO. It does not have an overt position on this policy, but places importance on the enhanced consultative dialogue mechanism. Regarding the WEU-model, it places real value on participation in substantive and qualitative meetings.

Hungary is taking a non-provocative, proactive stance on the participation issue. Although the Nice conclusions are not the maximum Hungary could have imagined, they do represent a good basis. Hungary called for an additional 15 + 6 meeting regarding events in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, but the EU declined. Hungary does not view the WEU as constructive for EU-third country arrangements and would prefer to have less participation rights in a more balanced, substantive organization if compared to its rights in the WEU.

Iceland welcomes the Nice conclusions as a step forward, but it is not entirely satisfied with the offer. Iceland does not have a military and has a small relative population. It would like the EU to clarify the 'significant forces' clause because it fears this clause would eliminate the participation of smaller states. Furthermore, it supports the WEU-model, which serves as the basis for the participatory mechanisms. Lastly, all non-EU NATO Allies should have a large role in the decision-shaping process with or without the recourse to NATO hardware.

Norway stresses that if the EU-NATO permanent arrangements are worked out correctly, then the participation mechanism will be less important. Nonetheless, Norway would like to have working groups at the preparatory level and to receive documents and agendas further in advance to be better prepared for meetings. The EU should also define role of the 15 + 6 format in the overall EU framework for crisis management procedures. Norway had more rights and obligations in the WEU, but it is not attaching particular importance to this model.

Poland sees the Nice conclusions as an evolutionary process. The 15 + 6 format is not the preferred outcome, but does recognize the special security interests of the 6. Poland would like to have the opportunity to prepare better for joint meetings by receiving documents and agendas further in advance. In addition, the role of liaison officers and all aspects of planning need to be further defined. Poland initially stressed the WEU model, but has subsequently softened its tone. However, the WEU model's spirit of cooperation should be maintained.

EU Accession Countries

Cyprus and Malta have not publicly expressed their views on the Nice conclusions.

Bulgaria stresses that the participation mechanism needs to be further enhanced. It welcomes that meetings have become more substantive, especially concerning regional issues. There needs to be greater inclusiveness and transparency in the 15 + 15 format on the daily working basis. Third countries suffer from a delay in information.

Estonia stresses that the EU should make dialogue in the 15 + 15 format more substantive. The EU is slow to distribute agenda items, which does not allow third countries to enough time to prepare for 15 + 15 meetings in advance.

Latvia emphasizes that the Nice conclusions could be enhanced by outlining the coordination role of military experts and financial arrangements. It would also like to reinforce political dialogue through increased formal information exchanges and more systematic briefings. Furthermore, more information could be provided regarding EU-NATO negotiations.

Lithuania is looking for more inclusiveness and transparency to ensure the fullest participation with decision-shaping capabilities. Lithuania is calling for increased formal exchanges of information at all levels of contact and more substantive, frequent meetings at both the political and military expert levels.

Romania would like the participation mechanism to be further developed in order to see the impacts of its implementation. Romania seeks closer dialogue at the political level with the PSC because military crisis management is a special issue that needs to be treated differently. It has called for enhanced dialogue at the political and military expert levels and for more participation in the decision-shaping process.

Slovakia is calling for enhancing the participatory framework in a effective and flexible manner. Officials have called for a more flexible approach on the part of the EU to develop better informal mechanisms to exchange views and information.

Slovenia welcomes the Nice conclusions as a step in the right direction, which is a process that will take time. However, it has called on the EU to deepen dialogue by making meetings more substantive and to make the 15 + 15 format more transparent by allowing a better exchange of information.

Transatlantic View

Canada is in a 'unique (transatlantic) position'. Unlike the United States, it has expressed interest in participating in a EU-led operation under 'appropriate modalities' because it has 'an abiding interest in European security'. ₁₉ Canada encourages the EU to be 'inclusive as possible on this issue, in order to avoid divisions between EU and non-EU members of the Alliance'. ₂₀ Furthermore, the EU non-EU NATO Allies should be offered the possibility to shape EU decisions and their implementation to the fullest possible degree.

The United States wants to ensure 'the regular involvement of non-EU Allies in shaping the strategy and in doing the military planning for EU-led operations and exercises affecting their security'. ₂₁ Non-EU NATO Allies deserve participation rights in EU military crisis management mechanisms due to their NATO Article V security obligations and their proven commitments towards European security and defence. Participation rights however do not mean decision-making (veto) rights.

Kelly Baumgartner wrote this briefing paper while a researcher at ISIS Europe in Spring 2001. Jamie Woodbridge, a current researcher at ISIS Europe, has since updated and edited the paper. The author is grateful for these contributions.

Mr. Baumgartner now works in the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) in Washington, DC. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not reflect the views and policies of the GAO. He can be contacted at:

Email: baumgartnerK@gao.gov

End Notes

Note 1: The 15 EU member states and 15 non-EU European members of NATO and other accession candidate states. Back.

Note 2: Joint declaration on European defence issued at the British-French Summit, St-Malo, France, 4 December 1998. Back.

Note 3: The Petersberg Tasks were set out in the Western European Union Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration on 19 June 1992. They include: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Back.

Note 4: These are: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Croatia, FYROM (Macedonia), Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. Back.

Note 5: 'Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP Operations', in, 'Towards a partnership for the 21st century the enhanced and more operational partnership', (http://www.nato.int/pfp/docu/d990615b.htm) Back.

Note 6: Idem. Back.

Note 7: Potential contributing Partners that do not make formal commitments are kept informed and have the possibility of becoming contributing Partners at later stages. Back.

Note 8: Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Ireland Back.

Note 9: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania Back.

Note 10: Poland, Turkey, Czech Republic, Hungry, Norway, Iceland Back.

Note 11: Four Ad hoc Working Groups have been established to negotiate the inter-institutional cooperative framework: Security issues, capability goals, modalities enabling EU access to NATO assets (commonly referred to as Berlin Plus), and definition of permanent arrangements. Back.

Note 12: Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session, Brussels, 5 December 2000. Back.

Note 13: Foreign Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 14-15 December 2000. Back.

Note 14: 13 of 16 potential areas for deployment of the RRF identified in NATO's work on potential scenarios are situated around Turkey. Back.

Note 15: Bulletin Quotidien Europe, No 8179, 25/26 March 2002 Back.

Note 16: This is currently a hot political issue with many observers questioning the EU's readiness to take on a mission of such magnitude and complexity, not the least because the RRF is not due to become operational until January 2003. Back.

Note 17: Currently, there are no working group level meetings to prepare for meetings at the ambassadorial level. Back.

Note 18: The author conducted interviews and/or relied on information that was current as of June 2001. Back.

Note 19: Speech by David Wright, Ambassador of Canada to NATO. Paris Transatlantic Forum. 18 May 2000. Back.

Note 20: Idem. Back.

Note 21: Speech by US Ambassador Alexander Vershbow. 'The Transatlantic Relationship at the Crossroads? Meeting NATO's Five Challenges'. Netherlands Institute of International Relations - Clingendael, March 23, 2001. Back.