Columbia International Affairs Online
CIAO DATE: 6/5/2007
AsiaSource Interview with Dr Abdullah Abdullah, former Afghan Foreign Minister
May 2007
Dr Abdullah Abdullah was appointed foreign minister of Afghanistan following the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, a position he retained til March 2006. He spoke to Nermeen Shaikh in Almaty, Kazakhstan, at the Eurasian Media Forum, about what the greatest failures of the war on terrorism have been, what the prospects for Afghanistan are now, and the role of Pakistan in contributing to the deteriorating security situation in the region. In particular, Dr Abdullah alleges that the government of Pakistan has consistently drawn a distinction between Al Qaeda militants - whom the Pakistani authorities have handed over to the US - and Taliban leaders, whom Pakistan continues to protect.
Dr Abdullah, thank you very much for your time. Could you briefly characterize what you think the status of the war on terrorism in Afghanistan is today?
Today it is of course not as challenging as it used to be a few years ago. But still we are faced with this problem as the top priority, as the top challenge in the country. And in various areas of Afghanistan, the Taliban are in control of some districts. Not only that, but they are threatening the rest of the areas in those districts.
The Taliban still receive support outside Afghanistan and their leaders continue to enjoy support outside the country. Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar, nobody knows where they are but it is believed or perceived to be outside Afghanistan. So after a situation where the Taliban had lost all their bases inside the country, we see an escalation in the situation within Afghanistan. Though, in strategic terms, they have not gained the support of the people. But they have managed to create a state of fear and constant threat in some parts of the country that they are active in. So it is a big cause of concern for the people of Afghanistan.
You say the Taliban still receives support from outside. Where do you think they receive support from?
Their leaders-almost all of them-are based in Pakistan. And they get recruits there. There are some camps there. This has been the case for quite some time now.
And you believe that Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar are also in Pakistan?
[laughs] That's what we think.
Why do you think the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated to such a point that the Taliban has regained control in some areas?
There are domestic factors-which I will get to-but there is a regional factor as well. As far as the regional factor is concerned, the fact that Taliban leaders as well as their commanders receive support from outside the country has been a very critical point. There are recruiting bases outside Afghanistan as well. All this has been dismissed from time to time -- but then, admitted from time to time. So we know what is going on. This has been the most critical issue with respect to the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan.
Within Afghanistan I think there are some factors: weak government institutions in the regions where the Taliban are operating, the absence of reconstruction programs, employment, job opportunities and all that, or very little in those areas in any case. The issue of narcotics is another problem. Sometimes, of course, collateral damage is to blame, because of the bombardment and operations of the coalition forces, and when innocent people are arrested - those who have nothing to do with the Taliban. These are the domestic factors. In addition, of course, there is the problem in some cases of lack of coordination between the international forces and the government, both at the local and central levels.
You don't mention, though, what many commentators have pointed out - namely, that when the United States began this war in October of 2001 they neither committed enough troops, nor did they stay focused long enough, because less than two years later they had invaded another country. Do you think that if their focus had been exclusively on Afghanistan things might have turned out differently?
Of course that was a distraction, what happened in Iraq and the shift of focus which happened as a result of that. The center of the global effort against terrorism used to be Afghanistan. So the main focus should have stayed in Afghanistan; that would have made a big difference, I have no doubt in my mind. But at the same time, all these factors which I counted should have been addressed throughout.
And what happened at the beginning? The Taliban lost control of Afghanistan so quickly. That was because of their lack of popularity. At the beginning there were a few hundred or a few dozen American Special Forces when the Taliban were kicked out of the country. Then they went to Pakistan and they found sanctuary there-the Taliban and Al Qaeda. It took them time to establish themselves back there and that coincided with political developments within Pakistan where the MMA [the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal] was in an alliance with the establishment in Pakistan. So they helped their friends back home. So that was also a factor in this.
Another major factor was that Afghanistan was considered a post-conflict country, whereas in fact it was an in-conflict country, and still is today. This in itself was also not helpful.
But in your view the most important thing that was overlooked right from the beginning was the complicity of Pakistan in the maintenance and, one could even say, the resurrection of the Taliban from the outset.
Yes, yes, yes. That is true. Right from the beginning, while Pakistan was helping the coalition forces and the Americans to track and find Al Qaeda, or the Arab and foreign Al Qaeda, when it came to Taliban, they used to make a very clear distinction. We were trying to convince them then that these are of the same brand, and had it not been for the Taliban in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda wouldn't have been able to establish itself there. But they always would present the "internal demographic" argument. Afghanistan is a country of diverse ethnic groups including Pashtun (the largest), Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek and Turkmen. The Taliban has a political and ideological opposition to the idea of democracy and a moderate Islamic identity for Afghanistan. They are opposed to the political process as well as to engagement with the international community. Thousands of people from other areas of the world consider themselves as Taliban and are working with them. The problem is that Pakistan equates the Taliban opposition with the Pashtuns' opposition to the government which is not the case. The Taliban want the establishment of an Islamic Emirate where Taliban from all around the world could take part, and would extend far beyond Afghanistan boundaries. This is not what Pashtuns in Afghanistan would like to see. Yes, the Taliban are dissatisfied. Pashtuns are dissatisfied, which was not the case. When Pashtuns were given the chance, they voted for President Karzai. President Karzai was Pashtun. No question about that.
At the same time Pakistan has been making a distinction between the Afghan Taliban movement and their Al Qaeda collaborators; when it came to the foreign friends of the Taliban, including Arabs, Pakistan has made some arrests but no arrest has been made of any senior Taliban leaders. In addition, the state of Pakistan continued to deny the presence of terrorist camps for quite some time. In 2003, for example, I mentioned in one of my interviews in the United States that there were terrorist camps within Pakistan and it was flatly denied
By the Pakistanis or the Americans?
By the Pakistanis. I received a good share of bombardment from all sides. You know how the Pakistani establishment acts in these sorts of situations when it decides to! I took it. But I believe that I was stating the truth. Later on, at the beginning of 2004, Pakistani officials themselves stated that they had started military operations against those camps. So, yes, this is one example of the kind of misinformation and denial that I have been talking about.
But all this time Musharraf was also one of the key allies of the US in the war on terrorism. So do you think that the US was also in denial about Pakistan's complicity or that they were simply unaware?
I don't know the exact situation. First of all, President Musharraf has been misinformed about the situation in Afghanistan. Pakistan has never given up on the idea that the Taliban are a useful asset. There is also a perception that the United Front (referred to as the Northern Alliance) has anti-Pakistan sentiments.
When it comes to the Americans, Pakistan has been assisting in the bigger picture by handing over people like Khalid Sheikh, etc., and this has been considered a very important kind of cooperation. Then, for instance, the whereabouts of Mullah Obaidullah [the former defense minister of the Taliban] seems less important. Since the Pakistani authorities did well on that score, their relative inaction against the Taliban was ignored. Also I think that Pakistan's arguments against the prominent role of the former United Front in the Afghan government received some sympathy in the US.
Do you think that Pakistan's role has changed at all since 2001? Over the course of the last, well, almost six years now, has the government of Pakistan, to the extent that it is a unitary government, played a more or less continuous role, that is, pursued a systematic policy with respect to Afghanistan?
During this time, there have been a lot of events which we have seen, like the attempts against the lives of President Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. The operations which Pakistan has started in those areas, the losses which they suffered - all this happened as well. They also made various treaties and so on and so forth, although there was no clause on stopping the cross-border operations. As a whole the policy has been the same but the tactics and PR have changed from time to time.
But I think that there is a situation today that is a big challenge for Pakistan as well. I'm not saying that dealing with it is a piece of cake. That's not the case. But my point is that there has to be a sort of black and white, straightforward decision on this, and based on that, there should be cooperation with the coalition, and cooperation with Afghanistan. We must forget about the illusion of "good Taliban" and "bad Taliban" - a group which might serve anybody's interest in Pakistan. Prior to September 11th, Pakistan's official policy was to support the Taliban. President Musharraf, for example, said in July 2001 that supporting the Taliban is in Pakistan's national security interest. When dramatic pressure built up on Pakistan to give up that policy after September 11th, Pakistan's position shifted to the idea of bringing so-called "moderate" Taliban into the government. When President Musharraf was in a joint press conference with President Bush in Washington, he mentioned that the entry of the Northern Alliance into Kabul would lead to a bloodbath in Afghanistan. In fact, the people of Afghanistan welcomed the liberation of Kabul from the Taliban and helped expel the Taliban in a matter of weeks. One can read his intention very clearly. This idea has to be forgotten.
Afghanistan is prepared to go, has been prepared to go, any inch. Of course we do not want to compromise our integrity and sovereignty. That's not a question. But beyond that, Afghanistan has been ready to go to any inch in our friendship with Pakistan in order to overcome this common challenge. It is a question of approach. If the ideas are ideas of control over events, this simply cannot happen in Afghanistan. If the idea is friendship and common interest, of course, it is possible. Which other country has more in common with us in terms of long-term interest than Pakistan?
Now people are talking about Afghanistan's location, which will be like a crossroad between Central Asia and South Asia, absolutely essential to energy transport and all that. We understand that. I don't think that the establishment or a group of people in the establishment are pursuing any other interest but the interest of Afghanistan. But all the time we hear that voice of suspicion from Pakistan - Northern Alliance, panjsheris, and the Indian issues within Afghanistan and so on and so forth. Now I think both countries should move to different levels of interaction, increase people to people dialogues, have more cultural exchanges. All diplomatic efforts should also be pursued of course. For quite some time I didn't see any diplomatic effort taking place between both countries. That should not be allowed. Our friends should also work with both countries. There are some mechanisms like trilateral, tripartite meetings - the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan are meeting on a monthly basis, for example. But more than that, on some practical issues, both countries should move forward.
But as we were discussing earlier today, you know now what the perception is in Pakistan: Vice-President Dick Cheney was there recently and gave a warning about "not doing enough" in Afghanistan, and so on. There seems to be a general feeling that Pakistan has done all that it can and indeed more than it can-it has lost a great many military lives in this conflict. So the perception in some quarters is that the situation in Afghanistan is falling out of everybody's control. In a sense, it could almost be compared to the war in Iraq at the moment, which is to say that no amount of military reinforcements by any side, by any party involved, is likely to bring the situation under control.
On that, my opinion will be slightly different. I would say that still there are good opportunities for Afghanistan and Pakistan. I have no doubt in my mind. Now, things could be done within Afghanistan. All our efforts focus on Afghanistan. Of course, more focus would have helped. But without something parallel back there at the bases where these people are coming from it wouldn't have resulted in what we all would have expected. I know what a big challenge this is, but I also know that a half-hearted attitude will not work. We are caught in a bind. Whenever we say that they are not doing enough, that is, I think, adding a certain fire to it.
Even in using our words we have to be careful. But at the same time when the destiny of all of us is at stake, what choices do we have? The good intentions of Afghanistan in establishing friendly relations with Pakistan was not understood there, and the idea of the Taliban as Pakistan's only friends persisted. If there was opposition to what Pakistan was doing before September 11th it was against the policy of supporting the Taliban, not against Pakistan as a country or against its people who have helped us during the jihad [against the Soviet Union].
When President Musharraf announced in 2001, in July, that supporting the Taliban is in the national security interest of Pakistan and a top priority, why would people within Afghanistan accept that? Of course such a policy would be challenged and would be opposed. This is what happened at that time. But later on, when Pakistan announced that now they are not supporting the Taliban anymore and they are part of the coalition, everybody welcomed that. So there isn't a lobby as a whole of any kind in Afghanistan which would oppose Pakistan under any conditions. But Pakistan's policy in supporting, in thinking that one way or another a group like the Taliban or a group like Hekmetyar should be in charge-that thinking will bring negative results and has brought negative results for Pakistan as well as for Afghanistan. And I have been unfortunate enough for so many years to work on this and to talk about it without succeeding. Of course in some areas we have made progress - trade, commerce and of opening people to people relations. I have been there also when other problems occurred. What else could we have talked about? Yes, there was the Taliban, there was support for the Taliban and there was the situation in Afghanistan.
Between 1997 and 2001 I led the Afghan delegation every year to the UN General Assembly and attacked Pakistan's policy of supporting the Taliban which, as we now know in retrospect, led to the establishment and strengthening of Al Qaeda within Afghanistan, and the expansion of its global network. I spoke about all this at the UN. For us it was the survival of our country and our nation that was at stake.
Similarly today I think what is at stake is the survival of both nations. It's nothing less than that. So given this, nobody should hesitate from making efforts. But when will we start with a new beginning on this? I don't know. How it will develop, how it will affect us, I don't know.
Let's assume a situation - that there isn't September 11th 2001, and what happened. There is the 9th of September, the night when Commander Ahmed Shah Massoud, the leader of the resistance, was assassinated. There is this one event, and not the event of September 11th. And there isn't the intervention by the international community. What would have happened? What would have been the result? Afghanistan would have been lost to Taliban and Al Qaeda - all Central Asia and probably as far as Kazakhstan here would have been destabilized as a result of what was happening and as a result of that old policy. So in a sense we all suffered a lot and continue to suffer. But we are also fortunate to have this window of opportunity. It's for us to seize it or not.
I think the Taliban would have become the first threat against the statehood of Pakistan had they succeeded fully in Afghanistan. They would have been out of control, absolutely out of control and Pakistan wouldn't have been able to stop them. I would repeat the same thing we talked about this morning: an Islamic revolution in Afghanistan would be followed by an Islamic revolution in Pakistan, the disintegration of India, and the Islamization of the Central Asian republics which was the idea held by the army establishment in Pakistan in the late 1980s (though they believed that they could live with a stabilized India). It would have happened perhaps not in the same order, but this would have been the destiny of that part of the world. So now that is behind us. But what we are looking towards is still bleak because we are not on the same note on this. We believe that a stable and democratic Afghanistan, a democratic and stable subcontinent, a stable Central Asia is in the best interest of all parties concerned. Hopefully we will get there.
What do you think of the constitution of the present Afghan government? Can you rate the performance of the Karzai government since it came to power and also comment briefly on why it is that you are no longer in the cabinet?
[laughs] The second one is easier to answer. But the first one, since I was in the government whatever I say about the performance I consider myself a part of it. Now, I think the government is losing touch with the people gradually, with the people of Afghanistan, which is the main source of strength, with the realities of the country.
Why did that happen?
A lot of factors, including-
Green zone syndrome, like Baghdad?
[laughs] The people who used to come to see us in the cities, in Kabul - a city - they used to be more or less the same people all the time. And when we used to travel to the provinces that demanded strict security teams that wouldn't have allowed any interactions with the people. That is one. Secondly, team work. Leadership, which leads a team, which agrees on a vision for the country and works coherently with one another to take it forward -- there also we had a lot of shortcomings. Then between the international community in Afghanistan, apart from the technical sort of coordination, in its essence, there was little coordination. All these things have affected the views of the people. Apart from that, there might have been very high expectations on the part of the people- sometimes unrealistic. But I don't think that we have been able to deliver even on the realistic, objective expectations of the people.
When we talk about unrest it is in some limited parts of the country. Despite the fact that I mentioned that there is escalation, still this is only in four districts which are under Taliban control out of two hundred and who knows how many districts in the country as a whole. In the areas which are not under Taliban control, the people are not engaged in all the developments - economic, political, having to do with governance and so on and so forth. So I would say that our government today is not popular. I would say that. It will be judged, of course, in different ways. But my perception is that it's not - from what I hear, from people talking on radios and TV, and from contacts which I have with the people.
Other problems include sometimes lack of consistency in the program, sometimes lack of transparency. For example, there is a process of reconciliation. But the people don't know how it works. Yes, Professor Mojadidi is in charge of that group. Yes, of course, the people in broad terms have accepted reconciliation because at the end of it people should live together. But then how does it happen? Sometimes this process, from what I hear, contributes to the security problems. For example, without checking or verification, people are giving away cards which make them immune from being arrested by the police. So then they sometimes carry those cards and they carry out their programs. So lack of transparency, as well as incompetence in the process of reconciliation, has created a lot of doubts among the people. There is also corruption. These are things that affect the views of the people.
Are you very pessimistic now about Afghanistan's prospects? What do you think could improve the situation now?
I have a lot of concerns today that were not there five years ago. But still I think we have good opportunities when it comes to fighting terrorism: sincere and serious cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan is the key answer. About the situation as a whole it will be wise to have a review and draw lessons for the future.
