Task Force on the Future of Transatlantic Relations: How Much Does the Transatlantic Relationship Matter After the End of the Cold War?

Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill and Kristin Archick

Council on Foreign Relations

January 1997

Is the Importance of the Transatlantic Relationship Diminishing?

With the collapse of communism, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and enhanced Western European political and economic cooperation, some policy analysts argue that the importance of the transatlantic relationship has significantly eroded. The majority of these experts do not assert that the changing international environment means that the North American-European relationship has become irrelevant, nor, of course, do they advocate severing political, economic, and cultural ties across the Atlantic. But they do question the extent to which the transatlantic partnership continues to matter in the context of the international security and domestic challenges of the present era.1 Those who contend that the transatlantic relationship has lost much of its salience organize their arguments around four major themes:

• Diverging geographic priorities, national interests, and policy preferences;

• Increasing domestic preoccupations and demographic changes;

• Growing transatlantic trade competition;

• Diminishing benefits of the transatlantic partnership.

Diverging Geographic Priorities, National Interests, and Policy Preferences

During the Cold War, the need to deter Soviet aggression, defend Western Europe, and protect both European and American vital national interests united the transatlantic alliance behind common purposes and against a common enemy. Differences among the allies were often suppressed or at least kept to a minimum for the good of the alliance; it was rightly believed that the USSR would quickly exploit any cracks in the Atlantic system. With the disappearance of the threat posed by the Soviet Union, however, a number of commentators believe that the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance has been severely weakened.2 This, they say, has been reflected in diverging geographic priorities, interests, and policies.

These experts argue, in particular, that the nations of the European Union remain fixated on the problems of the Continent, while the United States, perceiving no serious threats to its vital interests in Europe (except for Russian loose nukes), turns greater attention to growing strategic and economic challenges outside Europe.3 Such challenges, inter alia, focus the United States on ensuring access to energy resources in the Persian Gulf and eventually the Caspian basin; preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; dealing with China's growing economic, political, and military power; managing instability on the Korean Peninsula; and strengthening U.S. economic competitiveness, especially relative to the Asia Pacific region. Thus, these U.S. pundits are frustrated with what they regard as Europe's strategic myopia--i.e., its apparent inability to recognize the emergence of new global challenges amid a shifting security landscape, especially in the Middle East and East Asia. At the same time, some Europeans criticize what they perceive as a lack of sufficient and sustained U.S. concern for and economic assistance associated with the EU's core potential external problems: the political and economic prospects of East Central Europe's (ECE) fledgling democracies; the eruption of further nationalist and ethnic conflicts in the Balkans; and increased instability in North Africa, which could lead to mass migration pressures into Europe.

Moreover, observers on both sides of the Atlantic identify transatlantic policy differences emerging on a wide range of issues, both within and outside of Europe 4:

• The next phase of NATO enlargement may well trigger serious disputes within the alliance, both with respect to potential new members and regarding the Russian reaction to enlargement.

• The United States continues to maintain that it will withdraw all its military forces from Bosnia by July 1998, regardless of the situation on the ground. To prevent a reignition of the conflict, the European allies are convinced that U.S. troops must remain in Bosnia for the foreseeable future.

• There is a sharp disagreement across the Atlantic regarding the value of Turkey as a strategic partner and how best to ensure that Turkey maintains its Western orientation.5

• If the Middle East peace process goes into a steep dive, there is likely to be strong divisions within the Atlantic Community regarding Israel's culpability.6

• Washington's policy of "dual containment" of Iraq and Iran is not supported by many allies, while the United States worries that European engagement with these two troublesome states will undermine Western interests.7 These differences have been exacerbated by the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1996, which imposes mandatory penalties on foreign companies investing in Iran and Libya.8

• The European Union has also been irritated by the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, designed to stop or at least limit foreign companies and individuals from doing business with Cuba. Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress maintains that this legislation is necessary to protect the interests of American citizens whose private property in Cuba was confiscated during the revolution.

• Some Americans charge that while the United States struggles to manage the strategic consequences of rising Chinese power, Western Europe pursues a purely commercial approach vis-a-vis the PRC, sometimes at the expense of the United States and long-term transatlantic interests.

Question 1: How serious are these and other policy differences between the United States and Western Europe, both at present and in the next several years?

Increasing Domestic Preoccupations and Demographic Changes

Critics assert that the importance of the U.S.-European relationship is also diminishing in light of domestic economic and societal preoccupations on both sides of the Atlantic. U.S. leaders and the American public are concerned with the state of the economy, the federal budget deficit, structural income disparities, welfare reform, health-care reform, crime, drug use, and so forth.9 Indeed, in a December 1996 Gallup Poll, only 1 percent of those polled responded that foreign policy issues should be a top concern for the second Clinton administration.10 Nor was one traditional foreign policy issue listed among the ten greatest problems facing the United States in a 1995 poll of the general public conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.11 The Council's study also polled U.S. leaders, who ranked foreign policy in general as tenth on their list of top concerns (cited by 7 percent).12 Similarly, European countries are facing a discouraging array of domestic problems. In particular, EU governments are focused on high structural unemployment, downsizing the welfare state, the feasibility of a single European currency, and deepening and widening the European Union. It is noteworthy and reflective of the wider West European scene as a whole that with the exception of European integration, no foreign policy issue is among the top 15 concerns of German leaders and elites.13

Furthermore, current generational and demographic trends indicate that U.S. ties to Europe may be weakening. Only a few years ago, all major U.S. and European leaders had played a role in or lived through World War II and were "products of a period during which the West held firm against Soviet pressure."14 Notice that Bill Clinton and Tony Blair were both born after 1945. The past two U.S. congressional elections have brought to power more than 200 new members. Most are preoccupied with domestic issues and do not seem to share the same intensity of transatlantic experience or orientation as their predecessors on the Hill.15 In addition, the demographic composition of the American public is changing. In 1990, the number of Americans of primarily European origin fell below 80 percent and by 2020 is predicted to be below 65 percent.16 Philip Gordon notes that although "There may not be a direct link between the ethnic origins of voters and the policies pursued by their governments,...it is hard to believe that a more Asian/Hispanic United States will feel the same ties to Europe as one whose roots were firmly planted there."17 Given these demographic changes and the priority placed on domestic matters on both sides of the Atlantic, some claim that it is unlikely that either the United States or Europe will be willing to commit the political and financial resources necessary to invigorate a strategically oriented transatlantic relationship over the long term.

Question 2: Can a vital transatlantic partnership be sustained in the period ahead, given these domestic preoccupations in Europe and the United States and American demographic trends?

Growing Transatlantic Trade Competition

Both the United States and the countries of the European Union are prosperous.18 Increasingly, however, concerns are being raised in the United States about the effects on the U.S. economy of Europe's deepening economic integration. As the European Union moves toward establishing a single European currency, the EU's influence in the global economy is likely to increase. It is expected that the Euro, slated to become legal tender in January 1999, will eventually challenge the dollar as the currency of international commerce.19 Depending on the number of initial participants in the Economic and Monetary Union, the EMU could represent an economy about two-thirds that of the United States, with a greater share of global trade.20

Moreover, during the last several years, persistent trade disputes have arisen between the United States and the European Union over aircraft, broadcasting, telecommunications, and agricultural issues, among others.21 The United States and the nations of the EU frequently find themselves vying for emerging markets in Asia. Thus, some Americans increasingly view the European allies as serious economic competitors, and question the wisdom of sustaining intimate transatlantic relations in this climate of increasing trade rivalry.22 Alan Tonelson notes that perceptions of growing economic competition across the Atlantic are aggravated by U.S. defense expenditures to maintain the security of the very countries with which the United States is competing. Not only does such military spending decrease U.S. competitiveness, he says; it also boosts the funds available for market research and development to promote European competitiveness because EU countries can devote fewer resources to their defense needs.23

Question 3: What will be the likely impact of EMU and these trade disputes in the next five to ten years on the broad transatlantic relationship?

Diminishing Benefits of the Transatlantic Partnership

Even before the end of the Cold War, a number of scholars were arguing that the U.S.-European relationship, in its current, unbalanced form, does not serve the interests of either side of the Atlantic. These observers insist that rather than enhancing Western security and prosperity, the partnership increasingly endangers it. For them, the dissolution of the Soviet threat merely offers further proof of their contention that the transatlantic partnership pulls America into the quarrels of others, unduly constrains unilateral action on the part of the United States, and at the same time imposes enervating limitations on Europe.

This line of reasoning rests on the notion that the present transatlantic partnership is a thinly disguised vehicle for U.S. domination of Europe, which in turn weakens both the United States and Europe. These experts affirm that American preeminence in the transatlantic relationship damages the United States in three ways. First, it breeds anger, resentment, competition, and even fear among U.S. allies.24 As Christopher Layne says, even though "Washington may believe its aspirations for world order reflect universal values, they reflect American preferences that may not comport with others' interests."25 Thus, other nations tend over time to seek to improve their military, economic, and technological capabilities to resist coercion by the dominant power.26 This, in the long run, will generate anti-American instincts on the part of Washington's closest allies.

Second, Layne and Benjamin Schwarz declare that the United States involves itself unnecessarily in the affairs of the European allies: "A world order policy based on pacification, reassurance, stability, and economic interdependence expands the frontiers of insecurity for the United States....U.S. forces must deter and defend not only against direct threats to American interests but, even more important, against threats to the security of others."27 They assert, for example, that despite the absence of a direct threat to its vital interests, the United States intervened on the ground in Bosnia on the mistaken assumption that political and economic instability in the Balkans could spread to other areas of geostrategic and geoeconomic importance to the United States.28

Third is the issue of burden sharing. During the Cold War, it is estimated that the United States spent between $125 billion and $160 billion per year (approximately 60 percent of its annual defense budget) to defend Europe.29 As the 1980s drew to a close, the United States was devoting approximately 7 percent of its GNP to defense (a third of which was used for Europe's benefit), while European allies were spending roughly 3 to 4 percent of their GNPs.30 Critics argue that for over four decades, the United States subsidized NATO defense, thereby allowing the allies to minimize their share in Western conventional defense and force projection capabilities.31 These assayers claim that the funds saved by European countries on defense were redirected to building and supporting vast welfare states and increasing their economic competitiveness at the expense of the United States.32 In their view, European governments irresponsibly continue to resist assuming a greater share of the transatlantic defense burden, maintaining that they face daunting economic difficulties and dislocating domestic social pressures.33 Ted Galen Carpenter sums it up like this, "The members of the European Community have a collective population of more than 342 million and a collective gross domestic product of nearly $6 trillion. It is ludicrous to suggest that a community with those characteristics cannot manage problems that arise from disorder in Eastern Europe or defend itself from threats that might emanate from sources outside the European region."34 In short, the burden of Western defense is unfairly apportioned, with the Europeans hopping on as free riders on the U.S. defense effort, which Washington brings on itself by insisting on dominating the Western alliance.

Others hold that U.S. dominance in the transatlantic relationship is equally detrimental to Western Europe. These analysts note that in the absence of the Soviet threat, allied interests are no longer served (if they ever were) by a U.S. security commitment that inhibits the development of European confidence and capability.35 Analysts attribute the inability of Europe to develop more flexible and effective military forces to a "dependent mentality," a direct result of America's military dominance of Europe.36 Again they point to Bosnia, where European efforts to keep the peace between 1992 and 1995 were ineffectual because without American participation on the ground, European forces did not have the adequate military capabilities, the necessary credibility, or the political determination required to end the hostilities.37

In addition, pundits worry that Western Europe's dependence on the United States for the maintenance of its security leaves it vulnerable to American coercion. Layne terms such U.S. coercion "leverage strategy" and defines it as the use of U.S. military power "to compel other states to give in on issue areas where America has less power. It is a coercive strategy that attempts to take advantage of the asymmetries in great power capabilities that favor the United States."38

Question 4: What are vital and important U.S. national interests related to Europe?

Question 5: Can the European Union develop a strong regional and strategic identity in the face of pervasive American influence on the Continent?

Question 6: How serious a problem is burden sharing in the transatlantic relationship?

Question 7: Should the Europeans be doing more?

Question 8: If so, how likely is it that the allies will take on a greater share of the transatlantic security burden?

The Atlanticists Answer

Proponents of the view that the transatlantic partnership remains crucial and relevant remind us that a relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic has existed for two centuries. Werner Weidenfeld remarks that the Euro-American connection "goes right back to the early years of the United States. Ever since settlers first arrived in North America and the USA came into being, there have been links between Europe and America unlike those between any other regions of the world."39 The United States has extensive cultural ties and a long history of economic interaction with Europe. In the first half of the twentieth century, America twice came to the rescue of the Continent. Thus, supporters suggest that the transatlantic relationship is much older than NATO and based on something much broader than deterring Soviet aggression. Rather, its rests on the commitment of like-minded countries together to maintain peace, promote security, and protect their common freedom and values in an unstable and often dangerous world. Consequently, and despite the disappearance of the USSR, these folks believe that the North American-European partnership today serves an important function in managing the political, military, and economic dimensions of this turbulent era. Two major assertions buttress this view:

• The United States and Western Europe continue to share enduring interests and face common threats, both within and outside the Continent;

• The United States and the allies both need help in facing the global challenges of the decade ahead, and they are the only realistic and desirable partners for one another.

Sharing Common Interests and Facing Common Threats

Many observers on both sides of the Atlantic contend that the United States and its European allies continue to share a large number of common interests and face an increasingly diverse set of regional and global challenges and threats. Within Europe, the alliance must guard against the emergence of a renewed hegemonic threat (i.e., a resurgent Russia); prevent the renationalization of defense and the return of European rivalry; and thwart (or at least contain) the outbreak of nationalist and ethnic violence on the Continent. It is obvious why these threats are of consummate concern to Europeans--they are on their doorstep. However, these experts believe that insuring the continued security and prosperity of Europe remains a vital interest of the United States as well. In his address to the American people in late 1995 explaining why U.S. forces were being deployed to Bosnia as part of a NATO-led peacekeeping mission, President Clinton made the argument: "Generations of Americans have understood that Europe's freedom and Europe's stability is vital to our own national security....A conflict that already has claimed so many victims, could spread like poison throughout the region, eat away at Europe's stability and erode our partnership with our European allies."40 Furthermore, the spread of instability on the Continent could disrupt transatlantic trade and endanger U.S. foreign investments, thereby negatively affecting the American economy.41

Outside of Europe, these strategists argue, the Atlantic Community should be struggling together with a variety of threats and challenges, including preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; developing and maintaining access to energy resources in the Middle East and the Caspian basin; enlarging the international free-trade system; opposing the spread of Islamic extremism; managing rogue states; dealing with the rise of China as a regional power; addressing environmental degradation; reducing terrorism and the spread of organized crime; and stemming mass refugee flows.42 But even Atlanticist Robert Zoellick acknowledges, "A statement that Europeans and Americans face common problems is not the same...as an assertion that the two always have shared interests. Sometimes they perceive the challenges differently. Frequently they are drawn to varying approaches for dealing with the problems."43 He goes on to note, however, that "a democratic Europe and America should both recognize that their shared strategic interests far outweigh their differences in assessment and approach."44 Furthermore, advocates of the Atlantic Community assert that throughout its history, tensions have always existed among its constituent members because of diverging priorities and policy preferences (from Suez to Bosnia), but despite the doomsayers, these episodic arguments have not resulted in any serious undermining of the transatlantic relationship over time.

Question 9: Is the transatlantic partnership today as resilient as ever or has something important changed?

The Need for Partners

Many analysts opine that the United States and Europe both need partners for a variety of reasons, beginning with burden sharing. The challenges likely to confront the international system in the years ahead are so many and diverse that the United States cannot adequately protect its interests alone. The American public is at times unenthusiastic about either the "duties or the prerogatives" that superpower status implies.45 David Gompertand Richard Kugler observe that, "faced repeatedly with a choice between unilateral military action and inaction, the American people will be tempted by the latter," which in the long run will benefit neither European nor American interests.46

Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee stress that Europeans should also accept the burden-sharing requirement, noting that, "The U.S. role in Europe itself cannot be assured if Europeans fail to take more responsibility for common interests there and elsewhere."47 Gompert counsels, "Instead of fretting over American isolationism, Europeans should recognize that their introversion undermines the American engagement they seek....The relevance of Europe to America now depends on the actions of Europeans, not their anxieties."48

In addition, experts emphasize that increasingly important transnational problems likely to surface in the coming decades also necessitate transatlantic partnership. These issues cross territorial borders, and no one state or power can be expected to manage all of them effectively. Jessica Tuchman Mathews has written, "Environmental strains that transcend national borders are already beginning to break down the sacred boundaries of national sovereignty, previously rendered porous by the information and communication revolutions and the instantaneous global movement of financial capital. The once sharp dividing line between foreign and domestic policy is blurred....No one nation or even group of nations can meet these challenges."49 Thus, to address such transnational issues, many scholars argue that cooperation between states will be not just an option but a requirement.50 Atlanticists would say that America's European allies are the obvious place for the United States to start.

Indeed, enthusiasts of the transatlantic relationship affirm that the United States and the countries of Western Europe are the only viable and desirable primary partners for one another. This contention is rooted in the shared values of the Atlantic Community, which are perhaps best enumerated in the Preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty: "The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law." Thus, say the Atlanticists, the American and European commitment to these values, facilitated by the similarities of their political systems and ideals, establishes a uniquely common baseline for cooperative international action. Gompert stresses, "The U.S. government has never been good at maintaining lasting ties with states whose values (or lack of them) leave the American people uneasy."51 Conversely, he notes that the closer values are between states, the greater the likelihood that U.S. public opinion will support cooperation.52

Transatlantic supporters believe that the long history of cooperation between the United States and Europe also makes each the best partner for the other. They observe that both sides of the Atlantic would be hard-pressed to duplicate elsewhere the institutional structures, the habits of political and military cooperation, and the trust and confidence that exist within the Western community.53 Americans and Europeans alike recognize that despite occasional policy differences, they can depend on each other, especially when vital interests are threatened.54 Even those analysts who question the true value-added of European contributions in the 1991 Gulf War acknowledge that European leaders were motivated to aid the U.S. effort by the need to present a united front and support their ally.55 Similarly, they emphasize, "during the debate over whether to insert American troops into Bosnia, the need to stand by NATO allies was the most persuasive argument with the American public."56 Such loyalty, confidence, and trust in international relations is not easy to come by; given that it already exists in substantial measure between the United States and Western Europe, this group believes it should be maintained and strengthened.

Advocates of the Atlantic system are critical of those who seek to "downgrade" the U.S.-European relationship in favor of other regions of the world. Henry Kissinger has commented that without transatlantic ties, "America would find itself in a world of nations with which--except in the Western Hemisphere--it has few moral bonds or common traditions."57 He is skeptical of U.S. efforts to forge a "Pacific Community," an initiative tabled by President Clinton in 1993, noting that "Clinton's proposal for a more institutionalized Pacific Community...was received with polite aloofness, largely because the nations of Asia do not view themselves as a community. They do not want an institutional framework that might give potential Asian superpowers--or even the United States--a major voice in their affairs."58 Others suggest that East Asia "has produced no candidate for global partnership with the United States."59 Despite the region's growing prosperity, political stability in many countries is tenuous, territorial and national enmities continue to fester, and Asian political and economic structures and institutions for resolving conflicts and maintaining peace are virtually nonexistent. They claim that even Japan, which is wealthy and democratic, "is neither global in its outlook nor willing to accept the duties of a genuine partner," and as long as it continues to seek to maximize its national economic power, Japan will remain foremost a commercial rival.60 In sum, Atlanticists assert that only the North American and European allies possess the attributes necessary to address cooperatively the myriad challenges that face the West in the next ten years and beyond.

Question 10: How important are transatlantic values and history with respect to the likelihood of future partnership?

Question 11: Do the "new" international challenges (the environment, drugs, crime, terrorism, etc.) make transatlantic partnership more necessary? More likely?

Conclusion

Question 12: On balance, what will be the relevance of the transatlantic partnership as the United States and Europe seek to deal with external threats and opportunities in the decade ahead? Should there be a robust global partnership? If so, how likely is it to occur?