Task Force on the Future of Transatlantic Relations Council on Foreign Relations: The domestic contexts of the transatlantic relationship

Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill and Kristin Archick

Council on Foreign Relations

January, 1997

Introduction

For citizens on both sides of the Atlantic, the end of the Cold War has produced a much greater focus on domestic issues. Economic problems, welfare reform, education, crime, drug use, and health care are among the most salient concerns in Europe and the United States. European publics and leaders are also increasingly occupied with issues relating to the European Union--especially the feasibility of an early Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and EU deepening and widening. Many American strategists are critical of what they view as Europe's fixation on its own internal problems, to the neglect and detriment of European and transatlantic interests outside the Continent. European critics reproach Washington for increasingly basing the conduct of U.S. foreign policy on domestic politics, and for American unilateralism. Thus, U.S. and European commentators now often worry about the effects of growing domestic preoccupations on the continuation (creation?) of a robust transatlantic relationship.

EUROPE

European and American analysts note the following four factors, related to the European domestic context, that are likely to influence the shape and strength of the U.S.-European relationship in the years ahead:

• European domestic economic and social concerns;
• Transition to EMU and EU internal and enlargement processes;
• Increasing EU pursuit of economic interests at the expense of Western security concerns;
• Decreasing Allied defense budgets and a growing gap in military capabilities vis-a-vis the United States.

European Domestic Economic and Social Concerns

Issues currently topping the European domestic dialogue are joblessness, overgrown welfare systems, crime, drug use, and health care.1 Structural unemployment remains high in most countries in the union. It is estimated that 18 million people within the 15 countries of the European Union are unemployed. On average, the EU's jobless figure is 10.7 percent of its workforce.2 Unemployment rates in France and Germany are at their highest levels since World War II--approximately 12.6 percent and 11.6 percent, respectively.3 In Spain, 22 percent of the labor force is unemployed.4 Particularly troublesome are the numbers of jobless among Europe's youth. It is believed that about 5 million of Europe's unemployed are under 25 years of age.5 Recent political developments clearly reflect European frustration with the apparent inability of their respective governments to curb and reduce unemployment. In France, President Jacques Chirac's Conservative party in Parliament suffered a stunning upset this past June when French voters returned a Socialist government to power on a platform of job creation.6 Germany's troubled economy has led to a decrease in Chancellor Helmut Kohl's popularity, causing some to question his chances for reelection next year.7

Europe's vast welfare states, which levy heavy taxes on European publics and impose numerous regulations on companies and businesses, represent another major domestic preoccupation. In 1996, the average EU tax and social contribution (TSC) was 42.4 percent of national GDP. Sweden topped the list with 55.2 percent of GDP taken for taxes and social contributions; Ireland ranked lowest, with 34.5 percent of its GDP for TSC.8 To decrease European unemployment levels and increase competitiveness, some advocate that European countries must, among other things, reduce welfare payments and loosen protective policies that legally guarantee job security but fail to restrain wage growth.9 The majority of European governments, however, are loathe to implement these suggested measures in any fundamental way, fearing both the public's reaction to and the social costs of such initiatives. In Germany, powerful unions and a growing elderly population refuse to accept cuts in social programs viewed as a critical part of the German social contract.10 The French public, as demonstrated by the recent parliamentary election, continue to demand a significant role for the state in social and economic matters to regulate the effects of the market and avoid the widening income disparities seen in the United States and Great Britain. The new French government, led by Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, has asserted that it is possible simultaneously to improve France's economic competitiveness and maintain its wide social safety net, further fueling the debate on whether and how European countries should revise their respective social contracts.11

In addition, European publics are significantly preoccupied with curbing drug abuse and its attendant societal ills and maintaining law and order.12 Illegal drug use tops the list of European parents' worries about their children.13 Health care is also increasingly cited as an issue of growing importance in Europe in light of government attempts to curb health spending as another means of getting budget deficits under control.14 Education is cause for more concern in Great Britain than in its other EU partners, with 30 percent of British respondents in a recent poll naming it as their main worry, compared with just 6 percent elsewhere in the EU.15 The United Kingdom also appears to be more focused on crime than are other European countries; in the same poll, 32 percent of Britons cited it as a primary concern, as opposed to 20 percent across Europe as a whole (citizens in 13 European countries participated in the survey).16 The Continental countries, however, place far more significance on drug abuse, race relations, and AIDS than does the United Kingdom.17

Question 1: Given these compelling domestic preoccupations within EU publics and governments, how likely is it that America's European Allies will join the United States in a robust global partnership to manage the opportunities/threats of the present era?

Transition to EMU and EU Internal and Enlargement Processes

The EU processes also, at present, occupy a good deal of European time and attention, especially for the leaders in the union. By most accounts, EMU remains more or less on schedule, with the Euro slated to become legal tender on January 1, 1999.18 However, in light of Europe's economic straits, questions are increasingly surfacing about whether the Euro will be a hard or soft currency and who will/should be eligible for EMU membership at the outset.19 The Maastricht Treaty outlines criteria for joining the single currency, the most important of which are that a nation's annual budget deficit must not exceed 3 percent of GDP, its debt-to-GDP ratio must be 60 percent or less, and inflation must be held at under 3 percent.20 Although the treaty does provide some leeway in these requirements, Chancellor Kohl and the Bundesbank have insisted that these standards be strictly adhered to to ensure that the Euro is a strong currency and to guard against inflation. But even Germany itself is now struggling to meet these rigid qualifications. In 1997, the year that is supposed to determine whether a country is allowed to enter EMU in 1999, Germany is expected to record a deficit slightly above 3 percent, as are France and Italy.21 Germany opposes Italy's inclusion at the outset of EMU because despite Rome's belt tightening (credited with drastically reducing Italy's 1996 deficit of 6.8 percent), many Germans remain wary of Italy's recent history of lira devaluations and political instability.22 Furthermore, Italy's public debt, although declining, is still more than 120 percent of GDP.23 Germany's economic problems, however, are leading some commentators to conclude that Germany will be unable to maintain its inflexible approach regarding who will be allowed to join EMU in the first round. Martin Wolf of the Financial Times notes that, "Germany can no longer simply sit in judgment on lesser countries....The outcome will either be an Emu that includes every country wanting to be in--or, less likely, no EMU at all."24

Germany's stance on Italy and the EMU also places it at odds with France, whose new Socialist government insists that Italy as well as Spain be brought into the EMU in January 1999.25 This is only one of a number of German-French disagreements regarding the single currency that have surfaced since the French election. Jospin's government has pressed repeatedly for greater flexibility in interpreting the Maastricht criteria and has asserted on numerous occasions that job creation must not be sacrificed for EMU.26 Prior to the Amsterdam Summit this past June, which capped the 18-month Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), Jospin threatened to refuse to sign the budget stability pact, designed to impose penalties on EMU members who fail to keep their budget deficits under the allotted percentage. Jospin eventually relented when European leaders reached a compromise at the summit, adopting a resolution calling for the promotion of growth and employment to accompany the stability pact. Jospin's stance on the single currency, which has partly been motivated by concerns in the French electorate, is illustrative of a more widespread aversion in European publics to the tough measures required to join EMU. It is widely believed that Jospin and his Socialist coalition owe their election success to the French public's disenchantment with Chirac's financial austerity measures aimed at qualifying France for the single currency. Alan Friedman in the International Herald Tribune writes, "Mr. Jospin's victory itself makes it clear that the French electorate, like its counterparts in Germany, Italy, Belgium and Spain, is bitterly opposed to any more sacrifice in the name of Maastricht."27 The German public is considerably less enthusiastic about the monetary union than are Germany's leaders. German opinion polls "indicate a steady erosion of German support for the uncertain euro and in favor of keeping the strong mark."28

Simultaneous to EMU implementation, the European Union is in the process of deepening and widening itself. But many divisions exist among current EU members regarding the pace at which to expand the union. Proponents of ambitious EU enlargement stress the need to bind further the countries in Eastern Europe to those of the union, thereby solidifying their democratic political structures and strengthening their free-market economies. Critics counter that further EU enlargement will yield an even more unwieldy union than that which already exists, compound decision-making problems, and increase the economic burdens of Western Europe. As a result of these differences, the outcome of the Amsterdam Summit, tasked with revamping the EU's outdated operating procedures and deepening European political cooperation, was inconclusive. Following the Summit, the Economist observed, "the emerging shape of Europe is looking rather different from the edifice imagined by the leaders of France and Germany five years ago. A future EU now promises to be a lot less grand."29 It went on to point to the lack of development of a common foreign and security policy, the stalled joint defense identity, and the IGC's failure to resolve key institutional issues that often stymie EU decision-making.30

In light of Europe's present economic difficulties, some argue that the importance of foreign policy and defense matters to European leaders and publics has decreased significantly. An article in the German Deutsche Presse-Agentur quoted a European diplomat, following the disappointing outcome of the Amsterdam Summit, as saying that "Europe will have to turn inwards to deal with these issues. ...For the next few years our main priorities will be domestic."31 A British survey assessing public views on the most important matters facing the country today found a negligible degree of interest in foreign affairs and defense policy.32 In addition, Germany has grown more introverted as it continues to struggle with the economic and social consequences of reunification.33 In a 1996 poll of German leaders and elites, no foreign policy issue, with the exception of European integration, was among their top 15 concerns.34 Indeed, many Americans criticize European leaders for being fixated almost exclusively on the problems associated with establishing EMU and deepening and widening the union--to the neglect of security and economic concerns beyond Europe. David Gompert comments, "Since the revolution of 1989, West Europeans have been so preoccupied with the pace and particulars of their own integration that they have accomplished little else, relative to their means."35 However, many Europeans assert that until the EU achieves further political integration, they have no choice but to focus on issues internal to Europe because in the long run, only a more integrated Europe will be able to effectively address international matters and constitute a suitable global partner for the United States. Thus, they claim, it is in the U.S. interest for Europe to concentrate on getting its own house in order. John Roper comments, "Greater European coherence can only make a working partnership easier to achieve."36

Question 2: Should the United States accept that in the next several years, EU widening and deepening will legitimately keep the Union fully occupied and therefore largely unavailable for sustained partnership with the United States outside of Europe?

Increasing EU Pursuit of Economic Interests at the Expense of Western Security Concerns

Many experts argue that economic factors, in the absence of the threat posed by the Soviet Union, are increasingly bringing Europe into conflict with American national security policy. Perhaps the most glaring examples are the transatlantic differences in dealing with Iran. Philip Gordon writes, "With persistent double-digit unemployment and their own domestic priorities, Europeans are now less likely to follow Washington's lead on global political problems if it means denying themselves commercial relationships."37 China poses a similar divisive problem. Some Americans charge that European governments are so intent on exploiting the vast economic opportunities in an emerging China that they ignore the potential strategic consequences of such an approach.38

Question 3: To what degree do transatlantic security interests and European economic interests conflict? Do such problems seriously threaten the cohesion of the Western Alliance?

Decreasing Allied Defense Budgets and a Growing Gap in Military Capabilities

European governments have been significantly lowering their defense budgets. Between 1985 and 1995, NATO Europe defense expenditures fell from 3.1 to 2.3 percent of GDP; during this same period, that of France declined from 4.0 to 3.1 percent, Germany's from 3.2 to 2.0 percent, and Britain's from 5.2 to 3.1 percent.39 From 1995 to 1996: French defense spending fell from $41.4 billion to $38.5 billion; German military expenditures dropped from $33.9 billion to $31.9 billion; and that of the United Kingdom declined from $35 billion to $32.5 billion.40 Most recently, Prime Minister Jospin of France has announced further defense cuts, mostly in procurement, transferring some of the savings to job creation programs and education.41

Such defense reductions have led to the emergence of a growing gap in military and technological capabilities between the United States and Europe. The Washington Post reported, "This disparity can be seen in the size of the forces; the money devoted to defense research and procurement; the key capabilities of movement, intelligence and logistics; and particularly, in technological acumen."42 European forces are mostly configured for territorial defense, rather than power projection. Throughout the Cold War, most West European armies were organized to fight only 125 to 250 miles from their own countries.43 As such, they lack lift capabilities and are largely dependent on U.S. intelligence and communication resources. In an interview last year, General Klaus Naumann, who chairs NATO's military committee, noted for example that 46 of the 48 high-tech communication satellite channels used in IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia belong to the United States.44

Defense planners on both sides of the Atlantic are especially worried about Europe's failure to keep up with America's force modernization programs and advances in weapons systems and battlefield and strategic communications. Total spending on military procurement and research and development in Western Europe is only 53 percent of that spent in the United States; European R&D in particular lags behind that of the United States (NATO Europe spends roughly 32 percent of that spent by the United States on R&D).45 Some argue that European procurement dollars are no less scarce in relative terms than they are in the United States, but they are used less efficiently in Europe, which lacks a consolidated defense industry.46 To compound these problems, weapons R&D in the United States is focusing more and more on the application of information technology to warfare.47 Thus, some observers caution that Western militaries will find it increasingly difficult to work together in the future, aggravating already serious interoperability problems, as "low-tech" European forces become incapable of "plugging into American information networks."48

Question 4: How important for transatlantic partnership over the long term is this growing gap between U.S. and Allied military capabilities?

THE UNITED STATES

Experts emphasize the following six U.S. domestic factors likely to affect the future direction of the transatlantic relationship:

• U.S. domestic preoccupations;
• Shifting demographics;
• Degree of American public support for an active U.S. role in world affairs and a strong U.S.-European relationship;
• Level of congressional interest in foreign policy and the maintenance of the transatlantic relationship;
• Role of special interest groups in U.S. foreign policy;
• Extent of Clinton administration focus on foreign policy.

U.S. Domestic Preoccupations

In the United States, issues of gravest concern to American leaders and the U.S. public are the state of the economy, education, crime, drug abuse, health care, and welfare reform.49 Overall, the present mood in the United States regarding the state of the economy is markedly different from that in the countries of the EU. With a booming stock market, low unemployment (4.9 percent), and a decreased budget deficit (from $290 billion in 1992 to about $109 billion in 1996), Americans are, in general, more positive and upbeat about their economic prospects than they have been for the past five years.50 In a May 1997 Gallup poll, 46 percent of Americans reported that they were "satisfied with the way things are going in the United States at this time."51 However, the same poll cautioned that this current level of economic satisfaction is significant mainly because it stands in sharp contrast to the dismal mood of a few years ago--not because it marks an unprecedented level of satisfaction; economic issues continue to rank as priorities in the United States. In an April 1997 public opinion poll, 73 percent of Americans cited job security, 71 percent named the federal budget deficit, and 64 percent noted unemployment as top worries.52

Anxieties about the long-term economic future of the United States, especially as it relates to widening income disparities, high taxes, corporate downsizing, inflation, and the costs of the social security system, are especially prevalent. Journalists John Berry and Richard Morin observe that though the economy is growing and statistics indicate that this growth is benefiting the average American, "many people don't see these gains reflected in their lives. Instead they're looking anxiously at friends and neighbors who aren't sharing in the gains."53 Some analysts, in fact, assert that much of America's current economic boom has come with high costs: a growing gap between rich and poor and many low-paying jobs. Robert Reich states, "The very poor in America--including more than one in five of the nation's children--are poorer than the poor in any advanced nation. And a significant number of poor U.S. families contain someone working full-time. An entire category of U.S. worker is unknown in Europe, the "working poor."54 He attributes the development of this class of worker to the fact that globalization and vast technological changes have decreased the value of the bottom third of advanced workforces (because the jobs they once performed can now be done more cheaply elsewhere in the world or by computers and robots). As a result, these workers in the United States, where employers face fewer restrictions on dismissing employees and safety nets are weak, have been forced to take lower-paying jobs, often in the service industries. Thomas Friedman sums up much of the public's view succinctly: "I'd feel better about America's economy if I knew we were prospering as one country, not as two."55 Other experts also paint a gloomy economic picture of America, noting that the United States has been transformed from the world's biggest creditor country to its biggest debtor nation and that the U.S. deficit, despite its reduced size, continues to be financed from foreign sources to a much greater degree than in Europe.

U.S. leaders and the public are also increasingly concerned about education. In his 1997 State-of-the-Union address, President Clinton cited improving the American educational system as his "No. 1 priority for the next four years."56 He outlined a ten-point proposal for advancing education and expanding its reach, by instituting national standards and national tests, plugging classrooms into the Internet, allotting money for school reconstruction and teacher training, and increasing federal assistance to college students. This issue's place at the top of his agenda seems to reflect American public opinion. In a poll taken this past April, 75 percent of Americans interviewed indicated that elementary education was a primary preoccupation and 57 percent ranked higher education as a major concern.57 The quality of primary education and the availability of secondary education are also receiving renewed attention as it becomes even clearer that in a globalizing marketplace, the level of one's education is key to enhancing wage-earning potential.58 Since 1974, the income of employees without a college degree has decreased by 10 percent.59 Werner Weidenfeld observes, "The increasingly evident shortcomings in the [U.S.] educational system pose a particularly severe problem, in that they contribute to the growing marginalization of large sections of the population. At its best, the U.S. education system leads the world. But a concentration of excellence at the top end has led to an increasing neglect of education and training for the masses."60

Opinion polls also indicate that Americans remain concerned with crime and drug abuse, even though crime in the United States has been decreasing for the past five years and drug use among adults has also declined.61 Americans continue to view crime rates as unacceptably high. Some commentators posit that intense media coverage of violent crime has increased public worries, while others maintain that the increased coverage of crime, especially on television news programs, merely reflects legitimate public concerns.62 As overall crime and drug-use figures have fallen, U.S. leaders have increasingly turned their attention to combating these rates among adolescents. This past year, President Clinton declared that the battle against juvenile crime must become the nation's top law enforcement priority, and General Barry McCaffrey, who directs the administration's drug-control effort, identified the use of illegal and addictive substances by teenagers as the country's most important drug-related problem.63

Health-care issues rank high on Americans' lists of primary concerns as well. In a Gallup poll conducted in February 1997, 88 percent of respondents believed that the costs of medical care should be accorded "top" or "high" priority by U.S. leaders.64 Currently, over 40 million Americans have no health insurance; 10 million of the uninsured are children.65 Medicare, cited by 87 percent of those interviewed, followed close behind as an issue deserving increased government attention.66 These public concerns are undoubtedly driven by the rising costs of health care and the Medicare system, which will increase as the American population ages and baby boomers become senior citizens. Experts note that in 1970, the United States spent 7 percent of its GDP on medical care; in the 1990s, that figure has doubled.67 The Congressional Budget Office predicts that by 2030, Medicare and Medicaid expenses will increase from the present 4 percent of GDP to 10 percent.68 In the wake of President Clinton's failed health-care reform plan, the administration has trod lightly on this issue, and it is unlikely that it will undertake another effort to comprehensively restructure the U.S. health-care system.

Welfare reform is another top domestic priority, as noted by 72 percent of Americans polled recently by the Gallup organization.69 In August 1996, under pressure from the Republican Congress, President Clinton signed legislation revamping the nation's welfare system. New regulations require most aid recipients to work after two years; limit lifetime benefits to five years; and eliminate the federal entitlement of aid to poor women and dependent children, replacing it with bloc grants to individual states. It also shifts to the states authority to determine how to craft their individual welfare and work programs. These sweeping reforms were initiated in response to the demands of an American public that had come to view welfare recipients--especially those who appeared to rely on welfare benefits as a permanent source of income--as a drain on the nation's economy. Supporters of the reforms point out that a year later, welfare rolls are plummeting across the country.70 Skeptics assert, however, that the 1996 law cannot claim credit for this decrease in welfare recipients because there has not yet been enough time for it to take effect (they credit a strong economy and experimental welfare-to-work programs devised by states before 1994 with driving caseloads down). Furthermore, they maintain that the new law does not sufficiently ensure that those who have been on welfare find employment and that it poses significant risks to poor children.71 Other domestic issues that typically rate high on the American public's list of concerns include poverty, AIDS, the homeless, the environment, housing costs, and race relations.72

Question 5: Given these powerful U.S. domestic concerns, how strong and stable is U.S. public support for a proactive American role in the world and as a leader of the transatlantic community?

Shifting Demographics

For a number of pundits, the fact that the demographic composition of the American public is changing suggests that U.S. ties to Europe will weaken over time. Recent immigration is largely from Latin America and Asia.73 In 1990, the number of Americans of primarily European origin fell below 80 percent and by 2020 is predicted to be below 65 percent.74 Philip Gordon notes that although, "There may not be a direct link between the ethnic origins of voters and the policies pursued by their governments,...it is hard to believe that a more Asian/Hispanic US will feel the same ties to Europe as one whose roots were firmly planted there."75 Thus, some surmise that as the American population diversifies, it is likely that ethnic groups of a non-European origin will grow in membership and influence, thereby moving U.S. attention away from Europe.

Question 6: Will these demographic changes have any tangible effect on U.S. foreign policy and the transatlantic relationship in the next several years? If so, how in concrete terms?

Degree of American Public Support for an Active U.S. Role in World Affairs and a Strong U.S.-European Relationship

With the end of the Cold War, some assert that the American public is less supportive of maintaining an active American role in international affairs, especially as domestic preoccupations multiply. Richard Haass observes that for many Americans, "Events abroad are increasingly viewed as remote and relatively unconnected to day-to-day concerns or, even worse, a distraction that we as a society can ill afford, given all that is wrong and cries out for attention within our own borders."76 In a December 1996 Gallup poll, only 1 percent of those questioned responded that foreign policy issues should be a top priority for the second Clinton administration.77 Nor were any traditional foreign policy issues listed among the ten greatest problems facing the United States in a poll of the general public conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in October 1994.78 This latter study also surveyed U.S. leaders, who ranked foreign policy in general as tenth on their list of primary concerns (it was cited by 7 percent).79

However, others stress that although foreign policy issues rank low on the priority lists of the U.S. public and its leaders relative to domestic concerns, the majority of Americans favor a leadership role for the United States in world affairs. The 1995 Chicago Council survey on American public opinion and U.S. foreign policy found that 65 percent of the public and 98 percent of the policymakers interviewed believe that the United States should continue to play an active part in the international community.80 Moreover, a recent review of polling data revealed little evidence that the American public favors a U.S. withdrawal from the world in the wake of the Cold War. Moreover, in a September 1996 poll, 68 percent of respondents rejected the argument that the United States should pursue a unilateralist foreign policy.81 Thus, many analysts conclude that the American public supports a "pragmatic internationalist" role for the United States--i.e., they wish to see the country remain an engaged participant in international relations but reject the notion of the United States as the "world's policeman."82 In a June 1996 poll, conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland's Center for International Security Studies, 74 percent of those interviewed endorsed the view that "the US should do its fair share in efforts to solve international problems together with other countries."83

In short, while recognizing the global responsibilities of the United States, Americans seem not to wish to shoulder these burdens alone. Ronald Asmus posits that the American public would like to strike a "politically sustainable balance between domestic concerns and international commitments."84 As such, it would appear that the public recognizes the present tension between rising domestic preoccupations and international responsibilities and views burden-sharing as the only way to adequately protect its diverse interests and fulfill its global duties.

In general, the approval rating for President Clinton's handling of both domestic and foreign affairs remains high. In the latest Gallup poll surveying how the public views the President, 61 percent of respondents indicated a favorable opinion, while 28 percent held an unfavorable opinion and 11 percent were uncertain.85 However, despite these lofty ratings, opinion polls have also demonstrated that there is no single major policy or political achievement that Americans identify with Clinton.86 And many Americans remain troubled by questions regarding the President's character, particularly owing to the charges of sexual harassment leveled against him by Paula Jones and to uncertainties regarding his involvement in the Whitewater and campaign financing affairs. In 1993, about one-third of Americans believed that the President was honest and trustworthy; by early 1997, this figure had fallen to under one-quarter.87 A recent editorial in the New York Times remarked, "The American economic boom is helping to keep Mr. Clinton's approval ratings at an all-time high, yet a sense of personal scandal makes this a Presidency constantly on the edge."88

Question 7: What events could puncture U.S. public support for a proactive American internationalist role, including with its European partners?

Level of Congressional Interest in Foreign Policy and the Maintenance of the Transatlantic Relationship

A number of pundits claim that nowhere is the declining importance of foreign affairs in the United States more evident than in the attitudes and actions of members of the U.S. Congress. Taking their cues from the American public, which they view as anxious for concentration on domestic issues after supporting high military expenditures to protect U.S. national security for more than 40 years, current representatives and senators devote little time to and have the most modest interest in foreign policy issues.89 The last two congressional elections have brought to office more than 200 new members, the majority of whom have much less knowledge about foreign policy in general and Europe in particular than their predecessors. Werner Weidenfeld notes that in 1996, 14 U.S. senators--including Sam Nunn, Bill Bradley, and Clairborne Pell--with "proven experience" in issues related to the Atlantic Alliance, did not stand for reelection and were replaced by "younger" and "less-experienced" colleagues. Weidenfeld notes that they seem "reluctant to follow European affairs closely" and that transatlantic parliamentary contacts in the past two years have decreased significantly.90 He states, "Faced with the ambitious domestic policy agenda of the new, Republican-dominated Congress, any foreign contacts that congressmen are seen to cultivate are regarded as highly suspect by the electorate, because they distract attention from what are perceived as the real tasks at hand."91

Furthermore, some observe that when members of Congress do take an interest in foreign policy issues, they are driven largely by domestic politics and special interest groups, much to the irritation of many Europeans. Weidenfeld states that especially since 1994, influential congressional leaders "have devoted themselves to a far-reaching reinterpretation of American foreign policy, using the domestic challenges as a guideline for foreign policy initiatives."92 Among congressional actions most infuriating to Europeans was the passage in 1996 of the Helms-Burton Act, designed to stop or at least limit foreign companies and individuals from doing business with Cuba. The U.S. Congress maintains that this legislation is necessary to protect the interests of American citizens whose private property in Cuba was confiscated during the revolution. Most Europeans perceive it to be the result of the strong Cuban-American community in the United States and their well-organized and well-funded lobbying effort.93 EU leaders are also troubled by the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, through which Congress imposed mandatory penalties on foreign companies investing in Iran and Libya.

Many also argue that the reductions in America's international affairs and defense budgets since 1990 are indicative of the declining importance accorded to foreign policy by the Congress. They note that the foreign affairs budget has fallen nearly 20 percent in real terms, relative to the average in the 1980s, and stands today at roughly $19 billion, or about 1 percent of the federal budget.94 In the past three years, this reduced budget has resulted in shutting down over 30 diplomatic posts overseas, the closure of U.S. cultural institutes in Europe, heavy reductions in the number of Fulbright scholarships awarded, and a sharp decrease in foreign economic and development assistance.95 The U.S. defense budget has also been reduced since the mid-1980s. For the Department of Defense alone, annual appropriations have declined from a high of $400 billion in 1985 (in constant, FY97 dollars) to roughly $250 billion today.96

Other commentators question whether, even in light of greater preoccupations with domestic issues, the record proves that Congress has been less supportive of American foreign policy efforts. Despite considerable wrangling and some congressional opposition over the ratification this past April of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Senate did grant its approval to this multilateral treaty expanding the prohibitions against chemical weapons. Many analysts also stress that as international trade expands and its impact on local communities increases, congressional representatives are being drawn into foreign economic and trade issues. The current debate on fast-track trade negotiations will be an important milestone in this respect.

Moreover, some point out that most of the top Republican leadership in Congress shuns isolationism. Michael Elliott of Newsweek observes that in the struggle to ratify the CWC, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott was a strong administration ally, as was Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, who has always had, according to the Clinton administration, "an expansive view of the responsibilities of the United States."97 In addition, many members were disturbed by the administration's FY98 defense budget request, believing it to be too low to enable the U.S. military to adequately prepare itself to meet future threats and challenges. Reuters quoted one congressional member as stating that the level of defense funding in Clinton's budget proposal would lead the nation down a road "fraught with peril."98 Consequently, Congress proposed a $7 billion increase to the $265 billion requested by the administration for defense spending.99 And although some congressional members question the wisdom of enlarging NATO and how much it will cost the American taxpayer, it appears to most observers that in the end, the Senate will vote for the addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the alliance.

Question 8: How important a role will the U.S. Congress play in the period ahead regarding the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy related to the transatlantic relationship?

Question 9: Is this congressional involvement likely to be primarily positive or mostly negative?

Role of Special-Interest Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy

Although foreign policy-oriented organized interest groups are neither as numerous nor as wide-ranging in scope as those in the domestic arena, a number of scholars and analysts believe they represent an important factor in keeping U.S. policymakers active and interested in foreign affairs. John Tierney states, "Members of Congress are increasingly drawn to foreign policy matters by the growing number and increased efforts of organized interests intent on influencing the direction of congressional decisions over foreign and defense policy matters."100 He goes on to note that in addition to the traditional interest groups--such as corporations, trade associations, labor unions, and ethnic lobbies--there has been an increase in groups concerned with "nonmaterial interests and values," such as protecting the global environment and international human rights.101

Perhaps the ethnic lobbies, however, are of greatest importance to the future of U.S.-European relations. Samuel Huntington writes, "Now, ethnic diaspora groups proliferate, are more active, and have greater self-consciousness, legitimacy, and political clout," and notes that in recent years, ethnic groups have had a major impact on U.S. policy toward Greece, Turkey, Croatia, and the conflict in Northern Ireland, among others.102 For practically every European country there is at least one corresponding ethnic group in the United States lobbying for issues important to that country's immigrants or descendants. Many commentators have remarked that the Clinton administration was heavily influenced in its decision to support NATO enlargement by the ethnic lobbies representing the 21 million Americans of Eastern and Central European heritage.103 Prior to the 1994 and 1996 elections, the Polish American Congress (PAC) flooded Washington with more than 100,000 messages in support of expansion.104 And in fact, the administration is now counting on their lobbying efforts to help convince Congress to ratify the alliance's enlargement.105

Question 10: To what extent do special interest groups affect U.S. policymaking processes related to the transatlantic relationship? For better or worse?

Extent of Clinton Administration Focus on Foreign Policy

Many argue that despite the pressures of domestic economic and societal concerns, President Clinton has come to enjoy the mantle of leadership that foreign policy provides. Although elected in 1992 with a mandate to focus "like a laser-beam" on the economy and in spite of a rocky first two years in handling international affairs, by 1996 foreign policy had become "a surprisingly useful forum for refuting, in deed, GOP charges that Clinton was feckless and lacked backbone."106 Now, Clinton appears firmly committed to U.S. leadership in the international arena, not least because in his second term, he has his eye on establishing his place in history around his diplomatic achievements.107 Elliott remarks, "At home, there's not a lot he can do to keep monument sculptors busy. Constrained by tight budgets, he is limited to preaching sermons from the bully pulpit to which Americans may--or may not pay attention. Overseas, however, the congregation is always attentive....It would be quite a thing to be remembered as the president who put in place structures that made it all but impossible for Europeans to suck the rest of the world into their own vicious quarrels."108

Therefore, a number of commentators believe that, at least in the short term, the United States will remain invested in maintaining, if not enhancing, a strong U.S.-European relationship. As further proof of the administration's commitment to foreign relations, they point to President Clinton's FY98 budget proposal to Congress, in which he requested a $1.2 billion increase in FY97's spending levels on international affairs ($18.1 billion). Thomas Lippman reported that this increase "reflects the President's view that international affairs spending has been cut too far already, and further reductions would undermine the ability of the United States to carry out effective diplomacy."109

Moreover, experts stress the growing inseparability of foreign and domestic issues, particularly economic ones such as trade.110 With the globalization of markets, international trade is directly affecting more individuals and sectors of the U.S. economy than ever before. This factor has not been lost on the Clinton administration. In fact, in the 1996 presidential campaign, Clinton and his aides emphasized expanding foreign trade and investment as a signature feature of his administration's foreign policy, noting its enhanced use of commercial diplomacy to "grow" the domestic economy.111 The European Union is the biggest and most important market for the United States. More than 20 percent of all U.S. exports are to Western Europe. Three million Americans work in the United States for affiliates of European corporations. European direct investment in the United States is more than $250 billion; U.S. direct investment in Western Europe equals more than $200 billion. European affiliates of U.S. corporations earn an estimated $850 billion per year from sales.112 Therefore, many emphasize that as the reliance of both the United States and Europe on foreign trade and investment increases, the line between foreign and domestic policy will continue to blur, thereby leading U.S. administrations to focus on international issues, including those related to the transatlantic relationship.

Question 11: How likely is it that the Clinton administration will sustain an encompassing interest in transatlantic relations? Its successor?

Conclusion

Question 12: Given the vast array of economic and societal problems on both sides of the Atlantic, do European and American leaders possess the political will to forge a dynamic global partnership capable of addressing new challenges and threats both within and outside of Europe?

Question 13: If so, how do leaders over time convince their domestic publics of that global partnership's value and necessity?