CIAO DATE: 07/03

U.S. Interests and Options in Colombia: An Alternative Framework

Introduction

Over the last several months, and beginning most decisively in the spring of 2002, U.S. policy toward Colombia has gone through a significant shift. Traditionally defined in terms of counter-narcotics, and then expanded under Plan Colombia to include areas of democratic and economic strengthening and peace, U.S. policy is now focused squarely on security issues: improving the capacity of the Colombian government to combat left-wing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries; establishing an effective military presence throughout the national territory on which other state programs depend; and fighting the drug trade that finances all illegal armed groups. To illustrate the shift, consider the statements of two highranking U.S. officials. In August 2001, Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman told a Bogotá press conference that "we support Plan Colombia because . . . Plan Colombia recognizes that a negotiated settlement is the only way to achieve peace." By March 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell told a House subcommittee that "we have to help Colombia save its democracy from narcotraffickers and from terrorists." The following discussion aims to understand how and why this shift came about, as well as its implications for U.S. interests and policy.

The shift is rooted in four inter-related factors. The first and most obvious involves the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and the way U.S. foreign policy coalesced around fighting terrorist threats abroad. All of Colombia's three major armed groups—the FARC, ELN, and AUC—have earned a place on the official U.S. list of terrorist organizations for acts including kidnapping, targeted assassinations, and massacres, aimed at Colombia's civilian population as well as a small number of U.S. citizens. Following September 11th, both U.S. and Colombian officials have cast Colombia policy within the rubric of the war on terrorism, to capitalize on heightened sensitivities and garner congressional and public support for expanded U.S. assistance to Colombia.

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