Military Reform in Russia: Dilemmas, Obstacles, and Prospects

Alexei G. Arbatov

International Security Program
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA)
September, 1997

Debates and infighting over Russia's military reform are at the very center of its domestic politics. This should not be a surprise in view of the great role that the military establishment has played in Russian history and in its seven decades of communist rule, building the greatest military empire in the world. At the same time, struggles over military issues in Russia have broad economic, social, state-building, foreign policy, and ideological implications. ₁

The failures of military reform during the last four years have tremendously exacerbated the misery of the Russian military and disrupted the defense industry, which have remained static in a society that has otherwise changed profoundly. At the same time, various reform plans and their implementation, presently discussed, may just as easily bring about the final collapse of the military as save it as a functioning state organization compatible with the democratic transformation of Russia.

The focal points of this article are the recent experience, future prospects, dilemmas, and political struggles that surround military reform in Russia. Against this background, some crucial points, which are not always fully recognized in the West, are substantiated and emphasized.

Military reform in a country like Russia, with its particular history and traditional features, must be one of the primary elements of overall democratic, economic, and political reforms. General reforms have made military reform necessary and unavoidable, but without it, the other reforms are also doomed.

Certain economic reforms and political developments in Russia between 1992--97 have not been conducive to military reform and in many respects have severely hampered it. There is a very small chance for radical military reform if Russia's current economic and political model of development is not substantially revised and corrected. Simultaneously, as the Russian budget crisis of 1997 has clearly proved, this is also a necessary requirement for saving the economy from further disintegration and avoiding a major social crisis with the most dire political implications.

In view of the unprecedented crisis of Russia's armed forces and defense industry, military reform is not so much a matter of adjusting Russian defense to the post-Cold War security environment (as it is in the United States), but rather the only way of saving it from final and irreversible ruin.

Moreover, fast and radical military reform is not just the means to provide for Russia's future national defense and external security. Most importantly it is also the route to avoid domestic political destabilization and conflict.

Genuine military reform is the only way to establish meaningful civilian control over the armed forces and defense policy in general, providing an ultimate guarantee of Russia's further democratic development and bringing its defense in line with its security requirements and economic resources. Former communist mechanisms of political control over the military were destroyed, while new ones have not been built. Military reform is infeasible without strong civilian political control over the defense establishment, which is resistant to radical change like every big bureaucratic organization.

The post-Cold War degradation of Russian armed forces has been detrimental to the development of its military interaction with the U.S. military, as well as to implementation of the Partnership for Peace program with NATO. The worse the conditions of the Russian armed forces-its equipment and combat readiness-the greater the appeal of nationalistic, anti-democratic, anti-Western propaganda to the military and the stronger the desire of top defense brass to isolate it from foreign contacts.

Sharp decline of Russia's armed forces and defense industry and curtailment of arms modernization programs in recent years have negatively affected Moscow's ability to negotiate, ratify, and implement bilateral arms reduction treaties with the United States, as well as multilateral disarmament agreements. The Western policy of open-ended NATO expansion, if carried out, would have detrimental implications for radical military reform in Russia, as well as create new tensions in Russian-Western security relations.

Further and final decomposition of Russian armed forces and the defense industry is one of the greatest dangers to both its close and faraway neighbors, including the United States. This is not only because Russia still possesses huge stocks of nuclear and chemical weapons, but also because such collapse cannot but deeply undercut the government, economy, and society as a whole with the worst imaginable consequences for Russian democracy and foreign relations.

What is the Russian understanding of military reform?

The commonly accepted meaning of the term "military reform" in Russia (in particular, provided by the draft law "On The Military Reform," elaborated by the Russian parliament in the spring of 1997) is a combination of political, economic, legal, military, technical, and social measures, designed to qualitatively transform the armed forces of the Russian Federation, other troops and military formations, ₂ military executive agencies, and defense production organizations so they can provide a sufficient level of national defense within the limits of available resources.

It should be emphasized that "military reform" implies a more comprehensive framework than "reform of armed forces." The latter term is mostly confined to the doctrine and strategic missions, structure, composition, force levels, combat equipment, and training of the armed services and armed forces of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD). "Military reform" includes comprehensive reorganization of troops and formations, defense industries and war mobilization assets, the recruitment system and social security for the military, the division of power and authority among the branches of the government on military matters, the financial system for funding defense and security, the organization of the executive branch and the MOD itself for implementing defense policy, military build-up (or build-down) and force employment.

The general definition of the term "military reform" provides no clues of its principal guidelines. Nonetheless, in recent years some consensus has appeared in Russia on such guidelines. Although opinions differ on many details, a broad consensus is shared in principle by a vast majority of politicians (including many pro-reformist members of parliament and President Boris Yeltsin himself), experts, academics, as well as the mass media and public opinion. The exception consists only of marginal groups on both the liberal extreme (Valeria Novodvorskaya, Gleb Yakunin, Konstantin Borovoi) and reactionary flank (Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Albert Makashov, Stanislav Terekhov, Valentin Varennikov, who have recently been joined by the chair of the State Duma Defense Committee Lev Rokhlin and former Minister of Defense Igor Rodionov).

The primary point of consensus, supported by the predominant part of the new Russian political elite and strategic community is the imperative for Russia to maintain a sufficiently strong defense for the foreseeable future, which would address real threats and conceivable contingencies, but would not overburden the national economy. ₃

Another accepted point is to sacrifice quantity in personnel, military units, weapons, defense sites, and military production facilities for better quality in arms and equipment, housing, financial standard of living, training and combat readiness, efficiency of maintenance and supply, and command and control and information gathering systems. ₄ Part of this and much more controversial is the need to eventually shift from a massive system of conscription to a smaller all volunteer, professional armed force, better suited to operate modern weapons and fight wars of new types. ₅ Another aspect of military reorganization is the need to redirect armed forces from preparing for global or large-scale protracted nuclear and conventional wars to local and regional conflicts of much shorter duration.

The next point, which is supported by a majority though not the predominant part of the political-military elite, is the requirement to rechannel main efforts in strategic contingency planning from traditional global or Western European theaters to the Southern (meaning the Transcaucasus and Central Asia) and the Far Eastern theaters. No one in Russia seriously thinks about fighting in the theaters of former operations in Central or Western Europe, the Middle East, Mongolia or Manchuria, nor of implementing support combat missions on the high seas in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, Subtropical Africa or in the Caribbean Sea. ₆ Even participation in collective peacekeeping operations out of post-Soviet space is a matter of controversy in Russia.

Many in the security community consider future contingencies to be confined only to Russian border areas or, at a maximum, to some post-Soviet conflict zones. However, this general reorientation of threat perceptions of the last few years from the west to the south and east might be arrested by the practical initiation of NATO enlargement.

Finally, a point of almost universal agreement is giving highest priority to nuclear forces in the Russian defense posture. This is seen as compensation for both the absolute and relative weakening of Russian conventional capabilities, and the new vulnerability of its geopolitical situation. It is also seen as an umbrella for implementing profound military reform as well as the only remaining legacy of Soviet superpower status and its former role in world affairs. Although almost no one (except Makashov and a few others) seriously envisions a threat of large-scale external aggression against Russia in the foreseeable future, most politicians, military officials, and researchers prefer to retain a reliable material guarantee in the form of viable nuclear forces to make sure that this forecast is not proved wrong by future developments.

However, prioritizing nuclear deterrence does not imply a crash missile build-up or hair-trigger employment strategy. Rather, it is mostly conceived in terms of "inherent enhanced deterrence." Russia's planned nuclear force levels are lower than U.S. levels and its sufficiency criteria are close to the concept of a "finite deterrent."

Despite bitter controversies around START II, arms control retains broad support as a viable element of the national security strategy in Russia. This is a far cry from the former Soviet war-fighting/damage-limitation strategic posture, with a strong flavor of first-strike operational planning and the avowed goal of maintaining "strategic parity," commonly interpreted as superiority in nuclear weapons over all combined opponents.

Discussions of military reform in Russia, particularly the new defense requirements, are invariably conducted with reference to the changes in the external security environment after the end of the Cold War (against NATO as well as against China), the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Indeed such profound changes in less than a decade warranted a serious adjustment of the whole Russian defense posture-certainly one much deeper than what the United States implemented during the same time-since the demise of the Soviet Union has put Russia in a starkly different security situation in terms of its frontiers, neighbors, and foreign policy problems.

However, it is the unprecedented scale and speed of domestic changes that account for the need for radical military reform, rather than a simple adjustment of the Russian armed forces and defense industry. It is certainly not enough to state that Russia has inherited 76 percent of the territory and 60 percent of the economic power and population of the former Soviet Union. True, most of the Russian population live in the same place, have spent most of their adult lives under the Soviet system, and have inherited their national traditions and character from hundreds of years of Russian history. But the Russian Federation of 1997 differs profoundly from the Soviet Union of 1991 in its territory and borders; size, ethnic composition, and structure of population; natural resources and communications network; economic foundation, financial and taxation systems; political regime, ideology and moral values; constitution, federal arrangement, legal system, and criminal code; as well as in such symbols as the name of the state, state banner, national anthem, and emblem. Whether these changes are good or bad is not the issue of this article. But they illustrate that of all aspects of contemporary Russia, its defense establishment has changed the least since the Soviet era. That is the core of this unprecedented and dangerous crisis in the Russian military, and explains the imperative for its radical reform. Two principal factors will directly affect the Russian defense posture: new military requirements and the availability of economic resources.

The imperatives of military reform: new defense requirements

Russian military requirements continue to be the subject of domestic debate, except for the points of consensus mentioned above. Current official Russian military doctrine largely derives from the "Principal Guidance on the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" (PGMD), approved by the Security Council on November 2, 1993, and officially legalized by Presidential Decree No. 1833. ₇ This document is too general, amorphous, and controversial to resolve its points of discord or to serve as clear guidance to those who command the armed forces and provide them with weapons and equipment. Hopefully, the outcome of its ongoing revision will be more to the point.

Nonetheless, some of the new realities of the Russian security environment are obvious. In the past, the geopolitical space controlled by Moscow directly bordered on the territories controlled or protected by the United States and China. Hence, Soviet armed forces were built, deployed, and assigned missions to fight and limit damage to the Soviet Union in a global nuclear war with any combination of the four other nuclear powers; win large-scale, multi-theater wars in Europe and the Far East; and conduct sub-regional operations in support of its Third World clients (i.e., Afghanistan). In the mid-1980s at the apogee of the Cold War, out of almost four million members of the Soviet armed forces, approximately 70 percent were allocated to the European theater, 20 percent to the Far East, and 10 percent to the Southern zone. These forces were armed with 10,000 strategic and 22,000 tactical nuclear weapons. ₈

Presently, to the west and south of Russia there are former Soviet republics marked by high degrees of internal instability, vulnerable to outside influences, and in either tense relations or open armed conflict with their secessionist groups, with each other, or with the Russian Federation. Russia's borders with these republics are mostly symbolic and largely open to illegal migration and massive smuggling activities.

Still, whatever the problems Russia faces in the former Soviet space around its borders, it should be clear that the Russian armed forces are unlikely to be called upon to fight in a large-scale, theater-wide war in the foreseeable future. The need for a stable nuclear deterrent and the complications of NATO enlargement notwithstanding, the principal contingency for the Russian armed forces in the next five to ten years is local conflicts which could happen in several places simultaneously. Actually, President Yeltsin clearly formulated this doctrinal point when he appointed the new minister of defense, Igor Sergeev, in May 1997.

Although reactionary communists and nationalists would disagree on this, the firm belief of the author is that Russian armed forces should never be used against any of the other former Soviet republics, however sharp contradictions with them might become in future. The only exception to this principle would be if some of these states became members of alliances hostile to Russia, allowed deployment of foreign troops on their territories, and supported unprovoked military aggression against Russian territory, property, or military assets. Apparently, the Russian political leadership and Minister of Defense Igor Sergeev share this view.

At the same time, Russian armed forces may be employed in local relief and peacekeeping operations in the post-Soviet space (and outside of it, under the UN or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] mandates), as well as provide protection to other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in accordance with the 1992 Tashkent Collective Security agreement. ₉ However, in such cases Russian forces should primarily provide air and naval support, training and command assistance, military supplies, and transportation to indigenous forces. Only in extreme circumstances should Russian troops be engaged in ground warfare, and then only to counter direct external aggression-not to support unpopular regimes against domestic opposition.

Beyond the post-Soviet space, Russia will be facing a number of states or alliances with considerable armed forces. In the West, NATO will most likely enlarge its military potential and come much closer to the borders of Russia in the process of accepting new member-states. ₁₀ During the next ten years, in addition to a range of 2:1 to 3:1 conventional superiority in Europe, NATO will also possess a substantial nuclear superiority over Russia both in tactical and strategic nuclear forces. (Whether the West's strategic nuclear superiority is 30 percent, doubled, or tripled depends on the future of arms control treaties and the level of funding for Russian strategic forces.) This is certainly a major shift in the military balance in Europe. Less than ten years ago the Warsaw Pact was enjoying three-fold superiority over NATO in conventional forces, two-fold superiority in theater and tactical nuclear weapons, and parity in strategic forces. The Soviet Union alone was twice as strong in conventional forces as all European NATO states.

Numerical balance of armed forces is not sufficient to estimate real war-fighting capabilities of the sides in offensive or defensive operations. However, beyond numerical ratios, in Russia it is generally assumed that qualitative factors (training, combat readiness, command and control, troop morale, and technical sophistication of weapons and equipment) presently favor NATO. Such a fundamental shift is not conducive to Russian interests, regardless of all other circumstances. ₁₁

Nevertheless, conventional or nuclear war with NATO remains unthinkable, whatever political tensions between Russia and the West result from NATO expansion. Besides, it would be hopeless for Russia to try to match NATO in nuclear or conventional forces because of economic, demographic, and geopolitical limitations. If Russian relations with an expanded NATO are not settled politically, Moscow will have to rely on the doctrine of "enhanced nuclear deterrence," much like NATO had in the 1950s and 1960s. It could be based on limited "trip-wire" conventional forces in key areas of its western borders, as well as on a nuclear deterrent force, consisting of some combination of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. However, whereas formerly it was considered acceptable to unilaterally reduce force levels to lower than those of the United States, with the initiation of NATO expansion an overall parity would be considered essential for enhanced nuclear deterrence.

At its southern rim, Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (and less likely Iran), may present a security problem for Russia individually or in some alignment during the next five to ten years. Most likely, these would not be direct threats, but would rather materialize through the support of regimes, movements, or policies in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, which are directed against Russia or its allies. Another possibility is that these states would support secessionist activities against the federal government of Russia like in Chechnya. In a military sense, Russia will retain a clear-cut qualitative, if not quantitative, conventional superiority over any of these opponents-even if its forces are cut by 50 percent or more-provided that their quality (training, firepower, mobility) does not further decline. But as the wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Chechnya showed, such superiority is no guarantee of victory. However, if applicable at all, the reformed armed forces of Russia should be sufficient for such contingencies.

In the Far East two powers, Japan and China, may hypothetically present a threat to Russia during the next ten to fifteen years. Japan's offensive conventional capabilities against Russia will be quite limited for at least the next ten years. Its attempt to take the Kurile Islands or Sakhalin by force is hardly conceivable in general, and much less so without the support of the United States, which would be highly unlikely to encourage such a policy. ₁₂ Remilitarization of Japan and revival of its expansionist strategies would represent a major change in the security environment of the Far East, which would require a profound revision of Russia's military requirements in the region, in particular its naval and air power. But this would not happen overnight and there would be sufficient time to take adequate measures. As of now, this scenario may be safely disregarded in Moscow's defense planning, provided that the minimal air and naval forces, as well as basing infrastructure, are retained in the Russian Pacific Fleet.

China is a special matter. Its current military buildup, geostrategic situation, and long history of territorial disputes with both Russia and the Soviet Union might encourage Beijing's expansionist policies towards Russian Siberia and the Far East, or against Kazakhstan and other Central Asian allies of Moscow. In ten to fifteen years, China may achieve conventional offensive superiority along the Transbaikal and Maritime Province borders, and thus would have serious reinforcement advantages and capabilities for interdiction of Russian reinforcements from its European territory. On the other hand, China will remain inferior to Russia in tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear capabilities, allowing Moscow to retain a credible enhanced nuclear deterrent strategy and escalation dominance.

China's projected nuclear forces would provide it with a finite nuclear deterrent against Russia (and eventually against the United States as well). It would probably be sufficient for China to deter a first strike by Russia against strategic sites and urban-industrial centers, but not deter the employment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons against military targets to stop hypothetical Chinese offensive operations on the ground. In that case, China would be unlikely to respond on a strategic nuclear level, since such an act would be deterred by overwhelming strategic retaliatory power by the other side.

Besides, China's conventional build-up will depend at least for some time on massive imports of weapons and technology from Russia. Thus, Moscow has effective means of restraining or at least seriously slowing down the emergence of this hypothetical threat. Nonetheless, preparing for such a long-term contingency, which might acquire the status of a regional conflict, is the greatest challenge to Russian defense policy. NATO expansion would seriously hinder the concentration of Russia's resources for an eastern contingency. The higher the tensions in the west, the stronger the arguments will be in Russia by advocates of an "appeasement" policy towards China and the heavier the reliance will be on Iran to contain the threat from the "Muslim south." These are among the key considerations for planning military reform and resource allocation among potential theaters and between conventional and nuclear forces.

Clearly, military projections describe threats that are conceivable in principle, but not necessarily likely under current actions or plans of other nations. Political and economic cooperation with Japan, China, and hopefully the United States in the Pacific will be no less important than a robust defense capability for preventing those contingencies from ever turning into reality.

Hence, apart from the need to maintain stable nuclear deterrence at whatever level is implied by arms control treaties, during the next three to five years Russia may be required to participate in a few simultaneous local conflicts in the south at a brigade or division level of involvement. During the next five to ten years it may also be necessary for Russian armed forces to engage at the same time in one sub-regional operation in the south at a corps or army forces-size level. Finally, in ten to fifteen years, Russia may be obliged to simultaneously involve itself in one sub-regional and one regional-scale conflict (all in all by forces of two or three armies) in the south and/or east.

Depending on the evolution of Russia's relations with an expanded NATO and on NATO's plans for the Baltics and Ukraine, it could be possible either to consider western districts of Russia (Moscow, Leningrad, and Ural-Volga) purely as a basing, supply, and training infrastructure for forces assigned to missions in the south and east, or as a countervalue deployment area for NATO expansion towards Russian borders. In the latter case, as much as 40-50 percent of Russian conventional forces would be tied to its western districts, besides strategic and tactical nuclear forces. This would also be a serious factor in defining whether Russian armed forces would be reduced to a 1.2 million, one million, or 800,000 personnel level by the years 2003-2005.

Obviously, the opinions of politicians and experts differ widely on many details of Russia's present and foreseeable defense requirements. Still, their basic parameters are shared by the majority of those who support the need for radical military reform. Partisans of opposing opinions in most cases are opponents of military reform as well. For instance, former Minister of Defense Igor Rodionov advocated preparations for theater-wide conventional war with NATO, ₁₃ which implied open-ended defense requirements and a major increase in defense appropriations and force levels. (This eventually led to his conflict with both the Secretary of the Defense Council Yuri Baturin and President Yeltsin and ended in Rodionov's demotion.) After the ouster of Rodionov, another general, Lev Rokhlin, the chair of the Duma Defense Committee, joined the former minister of defense in opposing military reform and openly challenged his own party, "Russia-Our Home," and President Yeltsin. ₁₄ It goes without saying that reactionary communists and nationalists, who are keen on reestablishing the Soviet Empire by force and who interpret military requirements accordingly, would also be opposed to any reasonable version of military reform.

However, even those who share the general guidelines of Russia's military requirements discussed above might differ on their practical assessments of force levels, structure, equipment, and deployment. Nonetheless, the availability of resources at present and in the future is the principal determinant, narrowing the range of alternatives and placing stringent bounds on what is feasible, in contrast to what may be desirable.

The imperatives of military reform: available material resources

Undoubtedly, the most important imperative for radical military reform in Russia is a stringent limit of resources available for national defense and the way these can be expected to change over time. This limit has two aspects. The first factor is the comprehensive transformation of the economic and political systems of Russia since 1991.

Pro-government parties and analysts would claim that for all its problems, Russia is making progress towards democratic economic and political reforms, an advanced market economy, and national prosperity. The Communist and nationalist opposition would attack these developments as an implementation of the "grand plot" of the Russian pro-Western bourgeoisie and corrupt state structures, together with the "U.S./Zionist elite" and Western financial institutions (the IMF and World Bank), designed to destroy Russia as an advanced industrial-military power and to turn it into "a source of raw materials and radioactive-chemical garbage pile" of the West.

Democratic opposition insists that due to huge blunders by the Yeltsin administration in choosing a particular version of reforms since 1992, Russia is moving towards an East Asian model of monopolized corporate capitalism with strong authoritarian propensities in its political system, a handicapped democracy, gaping social stratification, huge corruption, and reliance on "rule of force, rather than force of rules." ₁₅

Whichever view is correct, which is not the subject of this article, it is clear that the new Russian economic and political systems are not able to rule by the same "command administrative" methods the Soviet leadership ruled with for seven decades, resulting in a military-industrial super empire. It was not just that too large a portion of the economy was tied to military needs-it was also that the entire Soviet industrial economy's highest priority was to provide for the defense, ever since the first five-year plans of the 1920s and agricultural collectivization of the 1930s. This momentum was sustained by the whole planned economy, which permitted arbitrary allocation of resources, control over wages and prices, keeping or relocating labor, distribution of wealth, rewards, and punishments.

To ensure that momentum, a repressive totalitarian political and ideological system was required, permeating all levels of the economy and society, which reached its climax of terror in the second half of the 1930s and late 1940s. To provide for social stability and the demands of industrial development, modest but comprehensive and equalized systems of health care, education, housing, and welfare were created by the 1960s. The Soviet economy was highly monopolized: 99 percent state-owned and state-planned, with 70 percent oriented on industrial output ("to produce weapons and produce machines that produce weapons"), while only 30 percent was directed towards consumer goods and services. Taxes were collected automatically, money was always in sufficient supply, and inflation was never a problem, since resources and goods were allocated directly by the state instead of being bought and sold by subjects of economic activity (except in the impoverished consumer sector). In the predominant part of the economy, money was simply an accounting tool for resource allocation.

The economy was constantly plagued by shortages of consumer goods and services, the "black market" was ever present, agriculture was always backward and heavily dependent on state subsidies (and, since the 1970s, on grain exports). Arbitrary rule created huge distortions in the national economic development and pricing system. Goods and services were mostly allocated by state authorities, particularly in the provinces, rather than made available on the free market. Absence of private property, competition, or incentives for innovation insured both low productivity and poor quality. Still, the concentration of resources on high priority spheres, foremost defense, guaranteed high rates of industrial growth as long as the state was able to increasingly mobilize natural and human resources.

By the mid-1980s, by various estimates the Soviet economy constituted about 50-60 percent of the U.S. GNP and was thus second largest in the world. Moreover, due to its command economic system, the Soviet Union was allocating around 12-13 percent of its GNP directly on defense while the United States spent about 6.5 percent. The share of the defense budget in the Soviet state budget was at a level of 45-50 percent compared to 25-27 percent for the United States. The Soviet defense budget was estimated at $250-300 billion per year, which was close to the United States for the same period. ₁₆

Of course, these estimates are extremely conjectural, since the price-forming systems of the two states were very different, as were the levels of wages and salaries, and the domestic costs of energy and raw materials. Still, the above figures give the overall scale of the Soviet defense effort, which provided for 3.9 million military personnel in the armed forces at the time, compared to 2.2-2.3 million in the United States. There was also significant advantage in the numbers, if not in quality, of deployed weapons of most major classes over the United States (and in some cases over the rest of the world, with 60,000 Soviet tanks, or in an aggregate number of intercontinental, medium-range, and tactical nuclear missiles). Soviet armed forces were inferior only in the numbers of a few classes of weapons like aircraft carriers, large combat ships, and combat helicopters.

There is no question that under the new Russian economic and political system, whatever its deficiencies and merits, it is impossible even to think of mounting such a defense effort in peacetime. Since 1992, with the economy largely privatized or out of centralized control, and with both wages and prices largely liberalized, the main preoccupation of the government has been to collect taxes, contain the budget deficit, and fight inflation. The government no longer directly allocates resources but rather rules through budget, subsidies, subventions, transfers, and interest rates of state bank credits and state bonds. Moreover, the budget process is now public and involves negotiations with the parliament, various lobbying groups, and vested interests. Funds allocations, taxes, and subsidies have become the main issues of public policy and the mass media, directly related to regular elections at all levels of government.

Under the new economic and political system, the share of the national defense items in the Russian GNP have decreased to 5.6 percent in 1994, 3.7 percent in 1995, 3.5 percent in 1996, and 3.8 percent in 1997, as planned by the initial budget law. The percentage of the national defense in the federal budget expenditures correspondingly constituted 20.8 percent in 1994, 20.9 percent in 1995, 18.4 percent in 1996, and was planned at 17.8 percent for 1997. This is in addition to other troops and force structures assigned domestic functions and protection of the borders, which have been at a level of 1.5-2 percent of GNP and 6-9 percent of the federal budget expenditures during 1994--97. ₁₇

It is possible to predict that, regardless of the state of the national economy or finances, it would be highly unlikely for the government to increase defense appropriations to more than 3.5 percent of GNP and 20 percent of the expenditures of the federal budget. Only major changes in the external security environment or in Russia's political regime might lead to much higher military spending. Still, the relative terms do not reveal the whole picture of a severe limitation of resources available for defense.

Thus, the second aspect of the shortage of these resources is due to the fact that for the last five years, the Russian Federation has experienced a deep and protracted economic and social crisis, the end of which is still far from over. As a result of the so-called programs of "shock therapy" in 1992--93 and "macroeconomic stabilization" in 1994--97, Russia has suffered an unprecedented decline in production and investment, which hit not only heavy and defense industries, but-even harder-agriculture, consumer goods production, and housing.

In 1992 Russia inherited about 60 percent of the Soviet GNP, which constituted close to 50-60 percent of the U.S. GNP. Since that time, Russia's GNP has declined by 50 percent and presently is at a level of 15-18 percent of the U.S. GNP. ₁₈ Russia's overall GNP is about $500 billion (by commercial exchange rate), its federal budget expenditures are about $93 billion and its national defense allocations for 1997 were planned at $18 billion or 104 trillion rubles.

Hence, in just five years Russia has fallen as an economic power from second place in the world after the United States, to eighth place, behind Japan, China, Germany, France, Britain, and Italy. Due to a larger than expected economic decline in 1997, Russia is at risk to fall further behind Brazil and Canada. True, the domestic purchasing power of the ruble in the defense sector is higher than the commercial exchange rate would indicate. Still, the majority of experts agree that even with such corrections Russia's defense budget is no higher than $25-30 billion. Hence, since mid-1980s Soviet/Russian defense expenditures have declined by about 90 percent, or by ten times in constant prices, and presently constitute around 10-13 percent of the U.S. defense budget.

Moreover, due to constant miscalculations by the government in planning revenues, federal budgets have usually been implemented by less than 100 percent. ₁₉ The deepest crisis came in May 1997 when the government had to introduce a formal draft law into parliament to cut 1997 budget expenditures (sequestering) to avoid expanding the deficit due to much lower revenues than officially expected. Thus it was proposed to cut the overall federal expenditures by 27 percent, including a reduction of the defense budget by 21 percent. ₂₀

It goes without saying that all state-subsidized areas have been severely undercut by the "shock therapy:" education, health care, arts and culture, state-sponsored scientific research, welfare, crime control, and the environment, where the results of governmental policy have been no less devastating than in defense.

Against the background of this drastic decline of budgetary resources, the size of the Russian Armed Forces looks completely out of proportion. Russia inherited 2.7 million armed forces personnel from the Soviet Union of which 600,000 were deployed beyond Russian borders. Through force withdrawal and spontaneous personnel reduction, the armed forces were reduced to 2.1 million by 1994. ₂₁ In early 1997, the authorized strength of Russia's armed forces was 1.7 million military and 600,000 civilian employees, ₂₂ which was about equal to the U.S. armed forces (1.5 million military and 800,000 civilians). However, due to constant shortages of manpower in the private and junior officer classes, the actual strength of the Russian armed forces was 1.6 million military personnel. At the same time, the actual number of civilian employees was at least 50 percent higher and there were thousands of military personnel, paid by the defense budget, who were not included in counts of actual strength (like quality control employees at military production facilities and Baykonur space range personnel).

All in all, it is safe to assume that by 1997, the actual personnel level of the Russian armed forces was slightly higher (by 10 percent) than that of the United States. This does not include "other troops and military formations," which are funded by their own budgets (about $8 billion according to the 1997 budget plan) and employ close to 1.2 million people. By major classes of weapons, with few exceptions, Russia still has 10-30 percent more than the United States. ₂₃ The Russian Armed Forces are still comprised of five branches (Strategic Rocket Forces, Ground Forces, Air Force, Air Defense, and Navy), some independent armed forces (i.e., Military-Space Forces, Missile-Space Defense, Paratroop Forces), eight military districts, over thirty regular heavy divisions, and four fleets.

The fact that the Russian Armed Forces, comparable to the United States in numbers, is financially supported at a level of 10 percent of the U.S. defense budget goes far in explaining the unprecedented crisis in the Russian military. Further, domestic prices and standard of living criteria are now much closer to Western levels, in particular with regard to the new affluent class of Russians, openly enjoying the benefits of the new life in contrast to the constraints of the former privileged classes: the military, defense managers, technocrats, and skilled labor.

Moreover, even by Russian standards, to say nothing of American or West European criteria, there is a wide gap between the financial resources available for the Russian Armed Forces and the minimal requirements of their support and modernization. Thus in September 1996 the "minimal" budgetary request of the Ministry of Defense for fiscal year 1997 was 270 trillion rubles ($47 billion), which was reduced a month later by the military to 160 trillion rubles ($29 billion). Eventually the appropriations for national defense (including the military program of Minatom, military pensions, and maintenance of mobilization assets) were approved by the parliament in a law on the federal budget of 1997 at a level of 104 trillion rubles ($18 billion at the direct commercial exchange rate). ₂₄

However the cuts in the budget, proposed by the government in May 1997 due to the shortage of revenues, would further reduce defense appropriations to 82 trillion rubles ($14 billion). Hence, even the gap between Russian defense requirements-as defined in the MOD's budget requests-and actual funding has been at a maximum 70 percent and a minimum 35 percent.

Human resources as a political factor

Apart from material and financial limitations, the often unappreciated shortage of manpower is one of the key imperatives to military reform and one of most divisive issues in Russian domestic politics.

Traditionally, manpower was an almost unlimited resource in both the Soviet and, before it, the Russian Empire's armies. That defined the historic tradition of building and maintaining large armies, relying on high manpower levels much more than on technology or mobility, and the practice of fighting wars by overwhelming opponents with manpower and the ability to take much greater losses (which was most vividly demonstrated during World War II).

For the first time in its history, Russia is deprived of this crucial advantage. In the west, in the east, and probably even in the south, Russia faces potential opponents with greater military manpower. At the same time, NATO will undoubtedly retain a significant overall technological advantage, while China may achieve conventional forces superiority in ten to fifteen years. Moreover, even in peacetime Russia's pool of human resources is severely limited. The overall number of young men eligible for compulsory draft (18-27 year olds) in Russia is presently 1.7 million. ₂₅ Most of them have been using draft exemptions of all kinds, provided by the law titled "On military duty and military service," adapted in the spring of 1996 and amended during the summer and fall of 1997. Each year about 800,000 young men in Russia turn eighteen and become eligible for the much dreaded draft. However, according to the existing law, only half of them are actually called to duty while others use exemptions of health, education, or family reasons, are ineligible due to criminal records, or simply evade the draft, risking imprisonment.

Of the young men actually drafted only half (about 200,000) join the Armed Forces, while others are sent to other troop and military formations run by fifteen federal agencies. With a two-year term of service, at any given time there are about 400,000 to half a million private soldiers. Under the accepted ratio of 1:3 officers (and non-commissioned officers) to privates, that would be enough for a normal, full-complement armed force of 600,000-700,000 men. In contrast, the actual strength of the Russian armed forces is about 1.6 million, of which 500,000 are drafted privates, 100,000 contract soldiers, and the remaining one million are officers (a large part of which serve in the defense bureaucracy, research institutes, and industry), non-commissioned officers, and cadets of military colleges.

Hence, the constant shortage of manpower relative to the size of the armed forces, which undercuts combat readiness of the Armed Forces, is one of Russia's largest military problems. The average shortage in regular units is around 30 percent, but in some services, like the Ground Forces, it is as high as 50 percent. The war in Chechnya, apart from other facts, has clearly illustrated the detrimental effects of such shortages of manpower and the inefficiency of hastily assembled units. ₂₆ Further, at this insufficient manpower level, quality steadily declines. In 1996, 28 percent of draftees had below average intelligence, 40 percent were not fully physically fit, 25 percent had weakened health and chronic illnesses, only 70 percent had a high school and college education, 20 percent had alcohol and drug habits, and 8 percent had criminal records. ₂₇

Apart from a shortage of funding for living conditions, training, and food supplies, the decreasing quality and quantity of those serving in the armed forces have exacerbated horrible, wide-scale abuse of young privates by older soldiers, which has become a grave problem for the Russian armed forces. Several thousand soldiers die each year from accidents, murder, beatings, or suicide (about 500 per year), and several thousand defect from the service annually, sometimes with their weapons.

Moreover, this abuse has become a systemic element of the Russian armed forces. Due to shortages of funding and of manpower, inadequate training, additional non-military duties to perform, and lack of morale or incentive for good service, the officers control troops through a tacit deal of allowing older soldiers to shirk their responsibilities in exchange for their disciplining young privates and making them an obedient "slave labor" force.

Traditionally the peasantry constituted the bulk of the Russian/Soviet armed forces and willingly served in order to acquire an elementary technical education and a chance to move to a city after service. In the closing Soviet decades and present Russian times, these incentives have disappeared with increased urban populations and the rise of compulsory education. Being drafted has become equal to punishment in the perceptions of Russian youth. This trend, the war in Chechnya and fighting in other combat zones, miserable living conditions and inadequate food supply, and the abuse of young privates have all become reasons for the unprecedented scale of draft evasion. In 1985, only 443 men evaded or tried to evade draft in the Soviet Union. In 1995--96, draft evasion in Russia reached 30,000 per year. ₂₈

The only way of addressing this problem is through a deep reduction of the armed forces' personnel level, a dramatic improvement in quality of life for soldiers and officers, a limit on draft to troops other than the Armed Forces, the introduction of an alternative civil service, an expansion of contract recruitment and a curtailment of the draft until the final transfer to all-volunteer armed forces. Enhancing legal and social protection of the military is also important, but may be fully effective only after the elimination of the draft.

However, instead of dealing with the roots of the problem by reducing force levels and improving the quality of life and conditions for service, in recent years the Ministry of Defense has fought for a tougher draft law, elimination of exemptions, and harsher punishment for draft evasion. It has also sought to limit the number of volunteer contract soldiers (presently slightly more than 100,000) and expand the draft using the argument that a draftee private costs five times less than a contract soldier (and ten times less when posted to combat zones). The Ministry of Defense and its allies in the Duma have also blocked the law "On alternative civil service" ₂₉ during the last three years.

Nonetheless, these means proved inefficient and in Russia's newly democratic environment, have also encountered the growing resistance of civil society, public movements (i.e., "Soldiers' mothers") and opposition in the State Duma. The law on draft service has become one of the hottest political issues, as well as the law "On alternative civil service." It was not by chance that at the peak of the presidential election campaign in May 1996, Boris Yeltsin signed Presidential decree No. 723 promising to transform the military to an all-volunteer force by the year 2000.

This was clearly a populist gesture which the Ministry of Defense did not take seriously and in fact, was doing just the opposite. Still, the shortage of manpower is a serious matter, which may be resolved only by way of radical military reform. What is principally needed is a deep reduction of force level. Even if those eligible for the draft were presently recruited only by the Armed Forces and Border Guards, the Ministry of Defense would have about 300,000 draftees per year. With two-year service terms, this would provide 600,000 privates at any one time, plus the present number of contract soldiers (100,000). To have a normal structure and no shortage of manpower, combined with officers and non-commissioned officers, this would make an armed force of about 900,000 (plus an adequate number of cadets in colleges). Such an armed force would be about 50 percent less expensive in maintenance than the present one.

Another option might be to transfer to all-volunteer armed forces, in which case 800,000 members of the Armed Forces would cost in maintenance about the same as the present 1.6 million. ₃₀ Although by direct salary a contract soldier gets five times as much as a draftee, in the course of a few years contract armed forces would bring considerable savings due to longer service terms and the removal of the need for massive yearly transportation and initial training of drafted conscripts.

This would effectively solve the problems of the manpower shortage, prestige of military service, abuse of soldiers, and quality of personnel, but would not provide savings to enhance the technical quality of the armed forces, to support defense industry and science, and to improve the military infrastructure. Actually, the cost of maintenance would be greater if the salaries of contract soldiers were increased to attract a better contingent, to raise salaries for officers accordingly, and to allocate more for training, housing, social benefits, repairs, and technical maintenance, all of which are badly needed now. Some compromise or combination of the two basic options might be the best course for military reform.

As described above, both financial and human resources are severely limited in Russia, and the government's economic policy over the last five years has aggravated these limitations. But the simple fact is that regardless of past mistakes in economic reforms and regardless of their possible and desirable correction in the future, Russia simply cannot afford the present armed forces.

It is this enormous gap between the present size of the armed forces and available resources that creates the main imperative for radical military reform. New external security conditions and defense requirements are not an imperative for such radical reform. They might imply some corrections, like those in U.S. defense reviews of recent years. Even if the external situation had not changed, radical military reform in Russia would have been needed in any case, due to domestic transformation. Fortunately, Russia's new and forecasted security environment is also conducive to the reform, although some developments-foremost NATO expansion-could complicate the picture in the coming decade.

The features of the defense crisis

It is the disparity discussed above that is primarily responsible for the diseases that plague the Russian national defense. First, within the defense budget there is a constantly growing proportion of appropriations for maintenance (salaries, wages, food, and supplies) in relation to investment funding (weapons and equipment procurement, research and development, testing, and construction). ₃₁

In the 1970s and 1980s this proportion was 30:70 percent in the Soviet Union due to the cheapness of manpower and labor and large-scale defense production. In contrast, in Russia the ratio of maintenance to investment portions of the appropriations for "building and maintaining national defense" (which relates to defense appropriations minus military pensions, the Minatom military program, and support of mobilization assets) was 58:42 percent in 1994, 60:40 percent in 1995, and 61:39 percent in 1996. However, since the federal budget implementation usually fell short of the plan, national defense funding was at 70 percent of what was planned in 1994, 83 percent in 1995, and around 73 percent in 1996. Since it was impossible to cut salaries and wages, the sequestering mostly cut into the investment funds, shifting the ratio further to around 70 percent or 75 percent for maintenance, which was just the opposite of Soviet defense budgeting. ₃₂

In fiscal year 1997 the defense and budget committees of the State Duma managed to overcome pressure from the Ministry of Defense (personally expedited by Igor Rodionov and supported by Lev Rokhlin) and reversed this trend, fixing the ratio at 53:47 percent. Nonetheless, the sequestering of the budget, proposed by the government in May 1997, envisioned cuts in national defense appropriations of 22 trillion rubles ($4 billion) which, for the same reason as in the preceding years, would enhance the past trend and raise the proportion of maintenance to over 60 percent.

This propensity to spend more and more to support the Armed Forces leads to its creeping "disarmament:" degradation in the levels of technical equipment and competitiveness, which defeats the purpose of maintaining modern armed forces, designed not only "to somehow exist," but to defend the nation and support its interests. ₃₃

Also, since investment funds include construction, their shrinkage in relative and absolute terms has exacerbated the housing shortage. After retiring, those who have "service apartments" try to stay at the base or military town for lack of any other home, while new officers, after arriving to serve in the unit, have no place to live. They must rent flats from private owners, who charge much more than officers' housing subsidies permit, even if paid on time. Shortage of housing is presently one of the highest priority problems and affects as many as 98,000 officers and their families who face retirement, have no permanent homes of their own, or who serve without the "service apartments" due to them.

Second, within the maintenance part of the defense budget the crisis has manifested itself in the growing proportion of the appropriations (and even larger, in actual budget implementation) for the so called "defended items," which cannot be cut- military salaries, wages for civilian employees, and food supply-to the detriment of other items, related to the quality of life, training, technical level, safety, combat readiness, and morale of the Armed Forces and those employed in their support infrastructure. These items include: operational and material expenses for the functioning of the Armed Forces; maintenance, repair and spare parts for weapons and combat equipment; petroleum, oil, lubricants, and special fuel; transportation; renting of communications channels; medical and recreation facilities; and clothing and personnel equipment. Thus, in 1995 the proportion of the "defended items" was 56 percent, in 1996 it was 65 percent, and according to the plan, 70 percent in 1997, but with the proposed sequestering 80 percent, since cuts may be implemented only in categories other than "defended items." ₃₄

The detrimental effects of this trend include miserable quality of housing for soldiers, officers and their families, and the inability to leave their assigned areas-many of which are located in harsh climates far from officers' native areas-for vacations or recreation. In general, housing maintenance and social infrastructure (hospitals, schools, busing, garbage pick-up, etc.) at military bases and townships are quickly disintegrating for lack of funding from the defense budget, while regional municipal authorities are reluctant to take over as proposed by the Ministry of Defense because of subsidy shortages from the federal budget. ₃₅

Another effect of the trend is a low level of training: For instance, the average flight time of combat pilots per month is a small fraction of their U.S. counterparts; there were no division-scale exercises in the ground forces for many years; and ship and submarine crews receive inadequate training at sea, which increases the accident rate during patrol or sea duty. The lack of funding for overhaul, repair, and spare parts renders a large portion of relatively new weapons and equipment unusable. This is one of the reasons for the early decommissioning of a huge number of nuclear submarines, creating mind-boggling problems and environmental hazards in dismantling the vessels and disposing of their radioactive materials.

Third, even though guaranteed as "defended articles," military salaries and civilian wages are paid only after long delays. By mid-1997, the average delay of military salaries was three months. What this actually means is that there is about 25 percent less money really delivered for salaries and wages than is required by the present level of personnel. Along with housing shortages, this has become the most painful problem for the Russian officers corps.

Apparently, the fundamental reason for these hardships is the discrepancy of the actual personnel strength of the Armed Forces and the numbers used as criteria for budget outlays. As mentioned above, the Russian armed forces have three figures for military and civilian personnel level-the authorized, the actual, and the actual that includes "beyond the staff" personnel (i.e., personnel not included in Ministry of Defense staff statistics but who are paid from the defense budget)-while funding is programmed for each year's budget in accordance only with the actual figure. Another reason is that in 1995, then Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev exceeded his authority and raised military salaries by about 25 percent. He did this across the board to boost his personal popularity in the armed forces, while having been authorized by a presidential decree to do it only "within the bounds of financial reserves." Since that time the 25 percent increase has never been preprogrammed in the defense budgets.

Another reason for these conditions is the arbitrary decisions of district, fleet, army, and all local military commanders down to the division and regiment to use the money allocated for salaries for many other purposes-usually quite benign ones and sometimes at the consent of the officers of the unit such as to pay for heating and electricity (which in some cold areas are no less vital than salaries), to send families on summer vacations, to remove garbage, or to repair houses-since each of these functions have been severely underfunded for several years.

Finally, along with these obstacles, additional delays are most likely superimposed by the sheer diversion of money by corrupt officials and commanders at various levels of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces. After they receive the money from the Ministry of Finance, they both distribute and control its transfers. In an atmosphere of universal corruption and with virtually no independent, outside auditory control over the budget's implementation, some financial officials in the Ministry of Defense must find themselves tempted. ₃₆ Many MOD "field banks" apparently cooperate with commercial banks to divert funds for high interest short-term credits, split the profit between them and transfer the money to the addressees, resulting in additional delays.

Most of these factors simultaneously affect the other "defended item," the food supply, resulting in a yearly food crisis in the Armed Forces, that requires urgent additional appropriations by the Duma each fall. Ironically, the food costs, preprogrammed by the MOD, are usually much higher than even market retail prices, but the quality of food declines annually as do the rations for personnel assigned to hardship duties (fighter pilots, submariners, those serving in severe climate conditions, etc.). The scale of corruption in this area is one of the highest in the military establishment, second only to construction and transportation. ₃₇ All told, the MOD's debt to suppliers in maintenance, including salaries and food supply, was 22 trillion rubles ($3.8 billion) by 1997.

The resulting miserable quality of life for officers and soldiers (not to mention constant uncertainty of officers about their futures) has provided fertile soil for the spread of anti-democratic, nationalistic moods in the armed forces. At that, many officers do not differentiate between the principle of democratic reforms in general and their implementation during 1992--97 by government institutions and officials. Comparing the past to the present, a growing number of mid-level officers have become nostalgic for Soviet times, and have grown skeptical of possibilities for alternative, constructive reforms. This mood is being used by nationalist and communist political parties, Rokhlin's Summer Initiative being the most recent and prominent example. In some sense, the second half of 1997 seems to be the last chance to change this mood and keep the bulk of the armed forces within the democratic guidelines of Russia's development.

Moreover, in 1995--96 the high command under Pavel Grachev and the Chairman of the General Staff Mikhail Kolesnikov started to curtail all military cooperation with the United States and other NATO countries and to once again impose isolationism on the Russian armed forces. This policy was further expanded by their successors, Igor Rodionov and Viktor Samsonov. Apart from traditional anti-Western conservatism of the above commanders, the reason was to prevent officers and soldiers from comparing their standard of living and quality of service to their Western colleagues. Tacit encouragement from the top of MOD of the spreading nationalist and anti-Western moods was intended to detract attention from the hardships of the Russian military by recreating the "image of the enemy" and "besieged fortress mentality." Other scapegoats were the democrats, liberals, and pro-Western intellectuals who allegedly destroyed Russia's defenses "to please their masters abroad." This line received strong support from militarists in parliament. This political evolution and the lack of military funding were the main reasons for the low profile of Partnership for Peace programs between Russia and NATO in 1995--97.

In the investment arena, the crisis started in 1992 when in the course of one year, defense procurement contracts were cut by 65 percent. Even in a developed market economy this would have been an unprecedented crisis. But it was much worse in Russia, where neither defense nor civilian industries had ever operated under free market conditions, where all prices were artificial, there was no free flow of capital or labor, and there were no clear property rights. Having been deprived of defense contracts, the military industry was not provided with funding or guidance for conversion either. Appropriations for conversion during the last five years have not exceeded 10 percent of the planned funding by the federal conversion program.

By 1997, defense contracts were down on average 95 percent compared to 1990. Defense production in the main classes of weapons and equipment was two orders of magnitude less than ten years ago. Whereas in the mid-1980s the Soviet Union was producing 2,000-2,500 tanks per year, in 1997 Russia's output was only a few dozen. Procurement of combat aircraft has fallen from 300-400 airplanes to less than ten, and in both 1996 and 1997, new aircraft procurement for MOD was zero. Commissioning of combat ships and submarines went down from 15-20 to 1-2. There is no doubt that in the Soviet Union arms production was excessive by all standards, but in Russia like many other things, it went to the other extreme, leaving the armed forces with increasingly obsolete weapons (by the year 2005 only 10 percent of equipment will be relatively modern) and if the present trend continues in the next fifteen to twenty years there will be virtually no sophisticated equipment or heavy weapons at all. ₃₈

The principal plagues of the defense industry are shrinkage of funding in relative and absolute terms; accumulating debts; disintegrating scientific-technological base; gross size inherited from the Soviet Union; and the absence of a serious conversion program or a strong set of priorities by the government.

The shrinkage in funding had a "double-wave" effect on industry. One wave was the sharp absolute reduction of the defense budget (or more precisely, its purchasing power) from $250-300 billion to $25-30 billion during the course of only ten years. The second blow was the relative decline in the share of procurement and R&D appropriations within the defense budget from around 70 percent in the mid-1980s to about 25-26 percent ten years later. Since Russia inherited around 60 percent of the Soviet defense industrial assets, the net reduction in the funding of the Russian defense and scientific research industries has been from about $150 billion to $6 billion (or to $8-9 billion in actual purchasing power). ₃₉

In the Soviet Union the defense industry was relatively autonomous from the Ministry of Defense, since most of its funding was channeled through defense-industrial ministries, while major decisions on development and procurement were made in the Military-Industrial Commission of the Council of Ministers and defense department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. On many occasions, weapons programs were imposed on the military by the defense industries.

In Russia, procurement is implemented by MOD departments, which is more logical since the military is entitled to much larger influence (although by no means final or exclusive) on decisions of what to fight with. However, with the severe shortage of overall defense appropriations, the MOD has tended-shortsightedly- to fund its force levels and structure on a priority basis, while giving industry the leftovers. In this way the military, acting out of parochial bureaucratic interests, have quickly destroyed the very basis of their existence as an organized modern fighting force: the weapons, combat equipment, and the momentum of technological progress and competitiveness.

In the1997 defense budget, the State Duma tried to stop this suicidal process by raising both relative and absolute funding for procurement and R&D compared to 1996 (from 22 to 33 trillion rubles and from 27 percent to 31 percent of the overall defense budget). Nonetheless, the sequestering proposed by the government in May 1997 would deal industries a hard, maybe even fatal blow. Procurement would be cut from 20.9 to 14.7 trillion rubles. However, of the planned 20.9 trillion rubles, 11 trillion were to pay the 1995--96 debt, which would leave only 4 trillion rubles ($700 million) for new procurement. As for R&D, the planned appropriations would be cut from 11.6 to 8.1 trillion rubles, of which 5 trillion were also to pay past debts, leaving only 3 trillion rubles ($530 million) for new projects and programs ₄₀ .

Moreover, since industrial labor strikes are usually considered more politically damaging to the government, there certainly would be an attempt to shift the burden of budget cuts from the industries to construction bureaus and research centers. This led to the disintegration of scientific and engineering schools and collectives, which took many decades to build up.

The first half of 1997 was not encouraging. The funding only began to pay the 1996 wage debts, while only as much as 54 percent of the requirement, and as little as 25 percent of the planned contracts, were transferred for procurement and R&D. ₄₁ Each year, late release of contracts obliges the enterprises to borrow from commercial banks at 70-80 percent interest, which by the end of the year raises their debt accordingly. Moreover, the failure of the government to transfer defense contracts in time and in full does not liberate the enterprises from paying oppressively high federal and regional taxes, or paying their dues to transportation companies, and suppliers of energy, materials, and components. Thus accumulated debts, stemming mostly from the failure of the government to implement past defense budgets at higher than 70-80 percent, as well as the MOD's questionable priorities when making cuts, has greatly exacerbated the consequences of the shrinkage of procurement and R&D appropriations during recent years.

Finally, the very size of the defense industry inherited by Russia has created enormous problems. For instance, there were and still remain two huge tank production plants, two large heavy self-propelled artillery plants, four nuclear submarine-building shipyards, sixteen military aircraft and helicopter production enterprises, three principal space-missile companies, etc. Due to cuts in contracts, the number of defense enterprises under the control of the Ministry for Defense Industries (Minoboronprom) went down spontaneously from 1,800 in 1991 to 500 in 1997 and their aggregate military and civilian output fell by 82 percent. ₄₂ (Incidentally, in May 1997 the government decided to eliminate this ministry thus depriving the military industry of its only advocate in Moscow.)

Very few of the 1,300 lost enterprises were converted efficiently for civilian production. Most were just mothballed, disintegrated, or prolonged their agony by selling out stocks and equipment, leasing space, surviving on small contracts, and shifting their labor to a partial working week. Besides, huge industrial mobilization assets still have to be preserved by enterprises according to the law on "Mobilization capacity," being mostly a "dead capital" and consuming large resources (for heating, lighting, and guarding).

Instead of addressing defense requirements, military contracts have been granted and thinly extended on the basis of minimum profitability of the remaining enterprises for paying wages to their labor forces. Still, initial defense contracts for 1997 (before sequestering) were only 28 percent of this dubious minimal criteria.

On the average, wages of the defense industrial labor force are 60 percent of the overall Russian industrial level and delays in payment of wages reach as much as six months. Moreover, in many cities the whole social infrastructure (housing, hospitals, recreation centers, schools, etc.) was traditionally built and supported from the profits of key (sometimes only one or two) defense enterprises. Their collapse means total social degradation and criminalization of whole urban areas, while relocation of labor to zones of higher employment (as few as they are) are hampered by lack of housing and the staggering costs of transportation and living space. It is particularly prohibitive for workers, who have not been paid wages for many months. ₄₃

No doubt, the Soviet defense industry was overbuilt out of all proportion and is neither affordable to, nor needed by Russia. Still, the most efficient elements of these assets and advanced technologies are vitally in need, not only for Russia's future defense and security but for developing a modern market economy and maintaining social stability as well.

The inability of the government and MOD to make painful but necessary decisions about procurement and R&D, closing and converting surplus enterprises, full funding of the conversion program, and on sustaining sufficient and timely defense contracts for enterprises retained in military production, is leading to the general eclipse of one of the world's most advanced industrial and scientific assets, built in the Soviet Union during six decades at enormous sacrifice to the people.

Finally, the cuts in appropriations for construction (from 7.1 to 3.2 trillion rubles, or $560 million, by the 1997 sequester), ₄₄ apart from hampering housing for officers, are leading to further deterioration of the basing, communications, and storage infrastructure of the Armed Forces. For instance, in the Air Force the hardened shelters and earthen walls on the airfields provide protection for only 50 percent of the frontal and 70 percent of the long-range aviation. The existing system of storage sites is overloaded and provides storage space for less than 50 percent of the accumulated stocks. The storehouses are not reliably protected, while many are obsolete and do not provide the required safety conditions. About 45 percent of all airfields, having runways 1,800 meters and more in length, are in urgent need of repair and reconstruction. Another example of this policy's results is the shortage of storage for spent highly-radioactive liquid and solid fuel from nuclear submarines, which has created a great environmental hazard in the Murmansk and Vladivostok regions and is the bottleneck for the dismantlement and safe utilization of decommissioned nuclear submarines. ₄₅

For all the detrimental effects of the funding shortage, in relation to the size of the Russian military establishment and the misapplication of the available appropriations, the greatest deficiency in Russia's defense policy from 1992 to 1997 has been the shortage of political control and leadership in addressing all these problems.

Discussion of military reform started as soon as the Russian armed forces were created by Boris Yeltsin's decree in the spring of 1992. As early as that summer, the principal guidelines of the reform were elaborated: personnel reductions from 2.7 million to 1.5 million; professionalization through all-volunteer service; elimination of strategic commands and the creation of the Mobile Force; and the reduction of the number of armed services by merging some of them. ₄₆

However, these plans were never implemented, although every year until mid-1997, high military officials and President Yeltsin himself made numerous references to a "process" of implementation and future plans for military reform. ₄₇ There were several important reasons for the deadlock.

The first and foremost deficiency was a deep relaxation of political control in Moscow over the military, which left it virtually on its own during the times of profound changes within the armed forces and in its political, ideological, strategic, economic, and demographic environments. General disorganization of Russia's administrative structures and the growing autonomy of its bureaucratic institutions had affected the armed forces most of all. This was a particularly dangerous development for a society in a state of transition to a market economy and democratic political system. ₄₈

In the Soviet Union, stringent political control over the military was exercised through pervasive Communist Party structures and secret police (KGB) supervision. In contrast, President Yeltsin decided to rely on the personal loyalty of the Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev, appointed by Yeltsin as a reward for his support during the August 1991 coup. Another instrument was an unprecedented accumulation of constitutional and administrative controls (including promotion to general ranks) in the president's hands, as well as his favorite tactic of divide-and-rule. These were applied to the MOD and other power structures (i.e., the Ministry for Internal Affairs and the Federal Border Service).

Another reason was that President Yeltsin had come to rely on the military in his domestic politics, which was demonstrated by his appeal to the armed forces to suppress militant opposition in Moscow in October 1993 and a year later, in December 1994, by his use of regular Armed Forces to crush Chechen secessionists in the North Caucasus. Political reliance on the military is not the best posture with which to implement radical and potentially painful reform, especially as the communist and nationalist opposition were applying great pressure to win over the military.

And finally, economic downfall, and the steady shrinkage of the federal budget and its "national defense" portion were not conducive to the implementation of reform either financially or politically. As in many other areas, President Yeltsin simply did not know what to do, relying on loyal subordinates to keep the military at bay and postponing difficult decisions as long as possible.

In the absence of a consistent security policy or budgetary guidance from above, military reform had been implemented during 1992--97 largely by ad hoc adaptation of traditional military institutions, concepts, and functions to the severe budget limitations and new demographic, social, and ideological environment. The armed services and the General Staff departments had tried to preserve their strategic doctrines, personnel levels, deployment patterns, weapon holdings, and missions as much as possible at the expense of readiness, training, maintenance, and the capability to perform the new tasks warranted by the new security environment.

This policy, against the background of unprecedented economic decline and financial crisis, has led to all the consequences, described in detail above, and brought the military to a state of comprehensive crises. Moreover, defense policy and military reform have turned into the central issues, among a few others, in the domestic political struggle in Russia. The miserable state of the military and defense industry has been a principal target for communist and nationalist opponents of Yeltsin's regime. The democratic opposition, centered mostly around the "Yabloko" party led by Grigory Yavlinsky, has also been sharply critical of the defense policy of the president and the executive branch of the government.

One principal political group (which includes figures like Lev Rokhlin, Igor Rodionov, Valentin Varennikov, and Albert Makashov) and many others with radical communist or nationalist views, postulates that it is the state organization, economy and budget, society, and foreign policy that should be adjusted to the needs of the military establishment, not the other way around. They cannot think of Russia's mission or role in the world, except as a rival and enemy of the West. They do not recognize the possibility of any other pillar of Russia's international influence except huge military power and intimidation of close and far neighbors.

Basically, their concept of military reform boils down to providing the present military establishment with all necessary financial resources to maintain, man, train, and equip it at the level of the Soviet armed forces during the Cold War. They are for expansion of the draft and severe punishment for evasion, and against alternative civil service. If doubling or tripling of defense appropriations requires returning to a command economy, fixed prices and wages, imposition of an authoritarian political regime, and a militant ideology-they would all be in favor of that.

Another group consists mostly of the representatives of the ruling elite: the "Russia-Our Home" party in parliament (Alexander Shokhin, Vladimir Ryzhkov, Alexander Zhukov), Premier Victor Chernomyrdin and many officials in the presidential administration and the Cabinet of Ministers (Anatoli Chubais, Alexander Lyvshits, Ivan Rybkin, Yuri Baturin) as well as extreme liberals (Yegor Gaidar, Konstantin Borovoi, Galina Starovoitova). With few exceptions they perceive military reform primarily as adjusting the armed forces and defense industry to the minimal budget outlays, which are allocated to the national defense under the government's plan for "macroeconomic stabilization." They might subscribe to the points of consensus on military reform in general, but often do not recognize that any sensible military reform requires substantial initial investment for the reduction and reorganization of the military establishment. This group has largely underestimated the devastating social, economic, and technological consequences of such neglect, as well as its detrimental effects for Russia's security in the years to come. With regard to these issues, this group usually blames the resistance of the MOD to implement the necessary reforms and to widespread corruption within the top levels of the military (which, no doubt, has been a sizable but not exclusive problem).

In some respects, the dialogue between the two groups has proceeded according to the "chicken and the egg" model. While the first group says, "first the money, then the reform," the second group responds, "first the reform, then the money." It is no surprise that reform has remained in a stalemate for five years.

Finally, the third political group consists of representatives of the democratic opposition to the incumbent president and the government (Grigory Yavlinsky, Vladimir Lukin, Alexei Arbatov), as well as realistic moderate and centrist politicians and experts (Sergei Karaganov, Sergei Rogov, Eduard Vorobiev, Vitali Shlykov). It also includes many intelligent and open-minded senior military officers, some state officials, and people from the defense-industrial and scientific community. This group would advocate a different economic and budgetary course to provide for a rational and consistent defense policy, including additional funding for the practical implementation of military reform. This is by no way limited to the defense sphere only, but also relates to their position on some other security and social functions of the state.

During the past five years, the second ruling group primarily shaped the general framework of Russia's military policy, which has led to stagnation of military reform and disintegration of the defense establishment. This, in its turn, has fortified the first group's position and influence in the armed forces, defense industry, and political elite in general as a counter to the governmental policy. Most recently (summer 1997), a shift has begun at the highest level towards the position of the third group, which was reflected by the activism of President Yeltsin on the military reform issue and the appointment of the new Minister of Defense Igor Sergeev.

It is quite normal that there should be differences of opinion on such a crucial subject as military reform. However, in Russia in 1992--97 the infighting on this issue acquired broad political and ideological implications which have been detrimental to the search for consensus and the optimal course within the political elite. On top of the blunders of the ruling regime and mismanagement in the MOD, this has tangibly exacerbated the crisis of the Russian national defense.

To recapitulate, the three fundamental factors of the crisis in the Russian military and defense industry are: their excessive size, accumulated debts (altogether 49 trillion rubles, or $8.6 billion), and lack of political control, all of which have undercut a consistent course in defense policy and military reform to address these acute problems.

For lack of strong political leadership and out of bureaucratic inertia, the Russian armed forces have been maintained at a much higher level and with a flawed organizational structure than possible contingencies may warrant. But even if a major military mutiny, regionalization, or appraisal is somehow avoided in the next few years, its spontaneous dwindling in numbers and technical quality would eventually expend all the capital inherited from the Soviet Union and in ten to fifteen years it would find itself and its industrial base completely unprepared to deal with new, predictable security problems. It would be unable to defend the nation from external threats and rather would present a permanent threat to its internal stability.

Arms control implications of the defense crisis

Simple logic suggests that the miserable state of the Russian economy and the overwhelming crisis in its defense establishment should make Moscow all the more forthcoming in cooperating with the United States and NATO on security and arms control issues. But this is not so in the political reality of contemporary democratic Russia.

The profound economic crisis, industrial decline, and financial crunch have provoked strong opposition not only among the communist and nationalist political parties, but also within moderate groups in Russia. Disintegration of the Armed Forces and defense industry is perceived as one of the most drastic consequences of the "reforms," which are closely associated with Gorbachev's "new political thinking" and Yeltsin's "strategic partnership" with the West in international relations.

Russian military weakness during 1992--97 is perceived as one of the main reasons for Moscow's subservience to the West, manifested in its humiliation in the Bosnian peace enforcement; setbacks in nuclear deals with Iran; the missile contract with India and the reactor project in North Korea; and the crushing defeat on NATO expansion and unilateral concessions on START II and other arms control agreements. Hence, the opposition to Yeltsin's economic, military, and foreign policies includes resistance to arms control treaties on general political grounds, which unites the majority of communists, nationalists, and moderate conservatives in the parliament.

Further, the deep financial crisis and shortage of funding for national defense directly undercuts support for arms control in Russia. The aggregate cost of implementation of major arms control treaties and agreements over the next ten years (1996-2006) is estimated at 92 trillion rubles ($16 billion). Of this, 44.7 trillion rubles would be spent on START I and 18.3 trillion on START II. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) would cost Russia 25.3 trillion rubles, the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty (CFE) would cost 860 billion rubles, "Open Skies" would cost 1.3 trillion rubles, and the indirect collateral elimination of weapons and equipment would cost 1.3 trillion rubles. ₄₉

The pattern of the last three years has shown a regular shortage of appropriations in the government's budget with actual funding at 61 percent of the plan in 1994, 77 percent in 1995, and 55 percent in 1996. In 1997, actual funding for the first half of the year was at the level of 21 percent of the plan, but taking into account the debt of 1996, real funding has constituted only 11 percent of the 1997 plan. ₅₀ This has been a real handicap for the implementation of arms control agreements.

The financial crisis of 1997 and cuts in the federal budget have for the time being spared the funding for implementation of arms control treaties, as inadequate as it was in the initial budget plan. However, facing severe cuts in other budget items, including the defense appropriations, the State Duma would certainly be tempted to search for additional areas of savings. Since there is such a great shortage of funding for the national defense, there is a growing reluctance to spend so much on disarmament agreements (the overall sum is almost equal to the yearly budget deficit), which are perceived as unfair and adjusted to Western strategic posture. NATO expansion, which is perceived as being against Russian interests, makes arms control appropriations a tempting and vulnerable target of budget cuts.

Finally, the military crisis that results from inadequate funding has hampered arms control, both strategically and technically. By 1996 the Russian strategic forces consisted of 1,497 launchers and 6,949 warheads, including 351 SS-25 single warhead mobile ICBMs. By the year 2003 (the initial deadline of START II reductions) implementation of START II would bring the Russian strategic force down to around 2,000-2,300 warheads (1,400 warheads would have to be removed through dismantling and downloading MIRVed ICBMs several years ahead of the end of their service lifetime). Hence, Russia would be 1,200-1,500 warheads short of the START II ceiling.

The main reason for this is the constant shortage of funding for both maintenance and adequate modernization of land- and sea-based strategic forces. Foremost, this relates to timely overhaul, service life extension, and the maintenance of existing forces, as well as testing and procurement of the follow up to the SS-25 ICBM system: SS-26 ICBMs, or Topol-Ms; the construction of new Delta-V ballistic missile submarines known as the "Yuri Dolgorukiy" 955-class; and testing and procurement of new SLBM systems for these submarines.

To reach at least the lower bracket of the START II warhead ceiling (3,000-3,500) by the year 2003, Russia would need to deploy 700-1,000 additional warheads. Under the circumstances, the only way to do this would be to deploy more SS-25/26 ICBMs at a rate of 100-200 missiles per year. This is about a ten to fifteen times higher rate than the current one and totally infeasible in the present financial crisis.

During this time the United States would easily maintain about 3,500 warheads, thereby acquiring more than double superiority just through implementation of the START II treaty. Clearly, for Russia to maintain parity with the United States within the START I framework would require still higher expenditures than under START II. U.S. financial and technological help through the Nunn-Lugar program has also helped to alleviate the costs of START II dismantling.

However, if the principle of parity was revised, as many opposed to the treaty argue, Russia might save on both the dismantling of MIRVed ICBMs and deploying single-warhead missiles, thus retaining its traditional force structure. The opponents of the treaty want to retain MIRVed ICBMs as long as possible and develop a new land-based MIRVed missile system as a successor to those which allegedly would be cheaper and more consistent with Soviet strategic tradition-although incompatible with START II. As for the Nunn-Lugar program, arms control opponents proclaim it as "selling out national security" and claim that it does very little to cover the extra expenditures of implementing the treaty.

Political factors aside (like NATO extension), this goes far in explaining the reasons for strong opposition to START II in Russia. In 1995--96, even the treaty supporters predicated their position on extending its implementation schedule by five to seven years. This extension would make it less expensive and technically complicated for Russia and further, would bring dismantling more in line with the weapons' natural service lifetime expiration.

In March 1997 at the U.S.-Russian summit in Helsinki, the START II treaty implementation time was extended until the end of 2007, which largely alleviated Russian strategic, technical, and economic concerns. With the new schedule, the extra costs of START II might be only 500-700 billion rubles over ten years (not including the cost of force modernization). Adjustments to START II agreed upon in Helsinki in principle opened the door to its ratification in late 1997. The appointment of the new Minister of Defense Igor Sergeev, who replaced Igor Rodionov-an opponent of the treaty-might have made the prospects of ratification quite assured.

Nonetheless, the Madrid declaration on NATO expansion may negate the positive achievement of Helsinki to a large extent. In addition, inadequate funding of strategic force modernization in the future, as a part of an overall financial crunch and defense crisis, would remain the major obstacle-and by no means an incentive-to START II and START III on strategic grounds. Shortage of funding for the armed forces within the arms control treaties plays to the hands of arms control opponents since they would rather spend additional resources on enhancing military power than on reducing and restructuring to comply with agreements. To a varying degree, the same negative effect of the funding crisis for defense is true for other arms control agreements.

Addressing the paradoxes of military reform

After five years of stagnation and passivity, in summer 1997 President Yeltsin finally began practical steps toward military reform. It remains to be seen whether beyond the appointment of Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces Igor Sergeev to minister of defense (one of only a few good personnel decisions by Yeltsin), and the issue of several new decrees on military reform, the Russian political leadership will at least start to address this problem. Too much time has been lost, the crisis has become too deep, and the dilemmas involved are too controversial and tied to much broader political and economic implications. ₅₁

Reducing force levels. The first and one of the toughest issues is the gross size of the Russian defense establishment. Without a radical reduction of the force levels and a conscious decision to salvage the necessary minimum of the defense industry, neither will be saved from final collapse within a year or two maximum.

However, reducing the armed forces is not free of charge. The paradox is that for the first few years substantially reducing the Armed Forces is more expensive than maintaining them at the present austere level. By the laws "On the status of the military servicemen" and "On the military duty and military service," a retiring officer is entitled to twenty monthly salaries, an apartment or house (if he or she does not have one), and relocation expenses. On the average this would imply spending on the order of 80--120 million rubles ($14,000--21,000) for a single, retired middle-rank officer, while his continued service in the armed forces during the first year would cost two to three times less, depending on numerous other factors.

Hence, the rule of thumb is that to retire 100,000 officers would cost 10 billion rubles ($1.8 billion). In fact, in the initial 1997 budget, 6.3 trillion rubles were allocated: 1.6 trillion rubles for paying the twenty monthly salaries to all retiring officers, 2.1 trillion rubles for housing within the defense budget and 2.5 trillion rubles in the section of the federal budget on capital investment for housing in general, of which a portion was allocated for military housing. All of this provided to 50,000 officers at a figure of 120 million rubles per person ₅₂ . In the same year the budget for personnel wages would be reduced by about 1.2 trillion rubles after the personnel cuts. Hence, at a considerable cost (almost equal to all MOD civilian employee wages-6.8 trillion in 1997) only 3 percent of the armed forces' actual force strength would have been reduced while achieving a meager economy on maintenance costs for the Armed Forces.

Reducing the officer corps at a much larger scale would redress the distorted ratio between officers and privates; permit organizing fewer, but fully-manned and combat-ready units; and render sufficient savings on maintenance in several years that could be used for procurement, R&D and construction, training, and improving the quality of life for servicemen. However, in the meantime that would cost much more. For instance, laying off 300,000 officers in three years would cost 10--12 trillion rubles ($2 trillion) in additional appropriations annually, including the cost of merging partly-manned units and storing surplus weapons and equipment. This is about equal to all 1997 R&D appropriations before the sequester.

and relocation expenses. On the averag

An alternative might be to go for more radical reductions by laying off officers and privates proportionally, for instance 150,000 privates for each 50,000 officers. This would not cost much more since sending soldiers home is cheap, but force levels would be drastically reduced by 600,000 in three years. However, this would not provide substantial personnel savings either, since maintenance of privates is relatively inexpensive at two million rubles per private per year, or $500. Of course, eventually this would provide savings by reducing the scale of the draft, the cost of transportation and training of draftees, the cost of maintaining barracks and all the overhead maintenance of large numbers of fully- and partly-manned units. However, in the first few years, once again, savings would be smaller than expenditures which would include the costs of closing units, bases, and defense sites, storing of weapons and equipment, and providing for their safety and security. Also, since the present personnel structure of the Russian armed forces is distorted (too many officers compared to the number of privates), proportional cuts would exacerbate this problem and eventually leave the armed forces with very few privates and few combat-ready, fully-manned units.

Hence, from a purely financial point of view, it would be cheaper to leave everything as it is, which has been the main argument of opponents of reduction for years, and which is a thesis not easy to discard in the present financial crunch. On the other hand, the fact is that at the present level of funding, the armed forces and industry are dying anyway and will not last more than a few years, with the most dire political and social implications.

The simple truth is that if, by official estimates, the minimal maintenance of the present armed forces is funded only at an annual level of 52 percent (and the defense industry at 28 percent) ₅₃ -and there is no reason to hope that this will improve in the next few years-the armed forces must be reduced accordingly to bring it in line with the available resources, the defense industry must be partly converted, and the savings on maintenance should be used to support procurement and R&D. Fortunately, the external security environment remains conducive to that, in spite of the complications and tensions that may stem from NATO enlargement. No doubt, this will require substantial up-front investments during the first several years, but supreme national interests demand it and there are possibilities to implement reductions economically.

Although the MOD's present reform program, approved by President Yeltsin, does not go further than a personnel reduction in 1999 (down to 1.2 million), there is a general consensus among the partisans of the reform that it should evolve in three stages. The first, until the year 2000, envisions a reduction of force levels by 600,000 (down to about one million) through some optimal combination of the above two alternatives, so that reduction is deep but not excessively expensive, renders substantial savings on personnel pay (by retiring a sufficient number of officers), and leaves at least a small number of combat-ready units in conventional forces, while assigning the rest to guard storages of surplus equipment and weapons. At this stage, the program of conversion should be revived and R&D centers and programs must be supported, while procurement should be kept at a minimal level to save industries needed in the military production sector.

Housing may be provided to officers not through an expensive and inefficient MOD construction program, but by opening personal bank accounts for officers to buy homes at places of their own choice, which may be both cheaper and more convenient. Likewise, retirement pay may be provided by opening bank accounts at high interest rates, so that officers have an incentive not to withdraw money immediately. Paying for relocation could be arranged through vouchers, and in order to make transport companies accept them, their mutually outstanding debts could cancel each other out.

During the second stage of three to five years, until the year 2003 or 2005 depending on economic and other factors, the armed forces should be further reduced down to 800,000--900,000 mostly through retirement, curtailment of the draft and the expansion of contracts. This should bring the Armed Forces to a more sensible proportion of officers to privates, provide a larger number of fully-manned combat ready units, and allow improvement of the quality of life and training of the military at a reduced overall level of about 800,000.

If by that time the Russian economy takes off and budget revenues go up, the armed forces might shift to an all-volunteer basis. Its cost would be the same as the present Armed Forces, but additional appropriations would pay for better training and infrastructure, and larger procurement and R&D. If, on the other hand, the economic situation does not tangibly improve, such an armed force would rely on a mixed draft/contract system (recruiting about 100,000--150,000 draftees per year and maintaining about 300,000 contracted privates). It might have a larger proportion of partly-manned units and cost 20-30 percent less than the present force. The savings could be used for improving quality, reorganizing the defense industry, and research in science and engineering.

At the third stage, until the year 2010, the armed forces should fully transfer to a contract/professional basis. By this time the reorganization and redeployment of the forces should be finalized and their equipment by new weapons and technology should be completed by the revived defense industry. It is important to emphasize that under any scenario or option for radical military reform, it would be necessary to initially provide additional appropriations for reductions and reorganization on the order of at least 10 trillion rubles per year (up to $1.8 billion). However, this money should not be allocated within the limited and annually sequestered appropriations for "National Defense," but by a separate, defended article of the federal budget. In this way an additional burden would be removed from the defense budget, leaving within it more room to fund reorganization and support the defense industry. Further, it would reduce the MOD's opposition to deep reductions and prevent active sabotage of reforms at all levels of the military bureaucracy, which happened between 1992--97. At least partially, these costs might be covered by a reduction in military expenditures. Beyond reducing waste, corruption, and inefficiency, lowering the START III ceilings to 1,300--1,500 warheads by the year 2007 or 2010 would save Russia trillions of rubles in the implementation of a broad strategic force modernization program. This money could be used for military reform.

Reorganization. A deep reduction of the armed forces, as suggested above, would require a serious reorganization of the structure, deployment, and command systems of the Armed Forces, which are needed anyway due to new military requirements and a shortage of resources. Since this would largely depend on the mode and pace of reductions, it will suffice to mention only very general guidelines for it.

Clearly, Russia cannot afford and does not need five armed services, eight military districts and four fleets. One view is that four armed services would be enough (eliminating Air Defense and merging its air arms with the Air Force, and its early warning systems with the Strategic Rocket Forces). A more radical proposal is to eliminate the Ground Forces as an armed service and subordinate them directly to the General Staff. The military districts' command structure may be canceled altogether. Instead, three groups of forces (principally ground forces, air forces and naval elements) could be organized to react quickly to contingencies in the south (deployment in the North Caucasus) in the east (Transbaikal and the Maritime province areas), and in the west-depending on the rate and form of NATO expansion.

Incidentally, before the decision to expand NATO, force deployment in Russia's western part was mostly perceived as a basing area for reinforcements, which would be assigned missions in southern and eastern directions. After Madrid, probably the western deployment is to be seen as a strategic direction in its own right-to deter NATO's further expansion and defend Russia's interests in potential conflicts. In light of planned deep reductions in conventional forces, heavier reliance would be placed on a nuclear deterrent and smaller force allocation might be dedicated to the eastern direction.

Although the MOD's present official position is not sufficiently detailed, a large group of politicians, military officials, and experts who are close to the defense leadership supports the following plans. ₅₄ Of the 800,000 members of the armed forces, 200,000 could be allocated to strategic forces and their C3I; 150,000 to the Air Force; 150,000 to the Navy and 300,000 to the ground and Rapid Deployment Forces; plus about 100,000 to central and local staffs, administrative organizations, and colleges.

In the new Russian forces the Air Force would acquire a much more prominent role, for which 1,000-1,500 well-maintained combat and transport aircraft with well-trained crews would be sufficient. The role of the ground forces should be confined to preserving some forward positions with a screening force, rapid deployment, and reinforcement for large-scale short intensive warfare, or longer, small-scale operations, for which fifteen to seventeen heavy and two to three light division equivalents would eventually be sufficient. The Navy should be assigned to protect SSBNs (Northern Fleet) and guard economic exclusive zones and sea communications (Pacific Fleet), while the Black Sea Fleet and the Baltic Fleet may be transformed into flotillas or even squadrons. Altogether, 70-80 large combat ships, 40-50 attack submarines, and 200-300 shore-based naval aircraft might be adequate for these missions.

The Russian Strategic Forces (after the merging of land, sea, and air components, early warning, and space systems under the Strategic Rocket Forces' operational command) should remain an uncontested priority of the defense posture. In the wake of NATO expansion and an unclear future for the START II and START III treaties, nuclear deterrence would become Russia's principal tool to provide for its security both in the west and in the east. It is also an "umbrella," under which it is possible to implement radical reduction and a reform of Russia's conventional forces without fear.

Actually the Strategic Rocket Forces (and nuclear-technical troops) are the only armed service that has retained high combat readiness, reliability of its command-control system, and almost fully-manned units (with a high proportion of officers and contract soldiers). Allegations of former Minister of Defense Rodionov to the contrary, which created a great concern in the West, were unjustified and caused by his misunderstanding of the problem. In particular, he mistook the classified information on the effectiveness and reliability of the command-control system under various scenarios of nuclear exchange for an estimate of their day-to-day functioning in peacetime.

Presently, the strategic forces consume no more than 10 percent of the defense budget. With all the financial limitations, it will be twice as necessary to increase their funding by 100-150 percent in order to maintain viable land- and sea-based missile forces well into the next century, at a level of 3,000-4,000 warheads without the START II treaty, and between 2,000-2,500 or 1,500-2,000 within the START II/III framework. It goes without saying that from both an economic and political point of view, it would be far preferable to take the START II/III route and save money for a more rapid and radical military reform. Command and control systems should be improved and made more survivable and reliable, as a matter of first priority, to provide for consistent and selective retaliatory capability. In combination with a limited but mobile, flexible, and survivable tactical nuclear force this would form the basis for "extended nuclear deterrence" vis-à-vis superior conventional forces, that may be deployed at Russian borders in the east, as well as in the west.

Whatever the model and scale of the future reorganization, it is obvious that in the first few years, along with deep force reductions, it will require additional funding before

savings on maintenance can be used to pay for reorganization. Precise costs are impossible to forecast, but it is safe to assume that at a minimum, an additional 2-3 trillion rubles ($500 million) per year would be necessary within the defense budget. This money would be spent on mothballing defense sites, securely storing extra weapons and equipment, relocating troops and their material assets, merging command structures at all

levels as well as combat units, providing for interoperability and compatibility of command-control-communications systems (as in the case of Air Defense and Air Force), maintenance and spare parts, and retraining military and support personnel.

Saving the core of the defense industry. The present government's attitude toward the defense industry should be revised. Clear priorities of arms programs within the minimally available funding should indicate which branches of industry or single enterprises should be saved and supported, and which must go. Among the former are, first of all, the missile and space industry, aircraft-building industry, nuclear technology laboratories and production facilities, radio-electronic and high-technology information and communication industries, and ammunition production facilities. ₅₅ Ground forces weapons production and shipbuilding industries should be reduced to an absolutely minimal level. The former should primarily deal with repair and partial modernization of what already exists in the forces and in storage, while the latter must concentrate on better maintenance and repair of relatively new vessels, as well as dismantling old, decommissioned submarines and ships.

Within the retained branches, unnecessary redundancy should be eliminated. For instance, Russia does not need two tank-producing plants or two heavy-caliber self-propelled Howitzer factories, nor can it afford four nuclear submarine shipyards. In each case, one production complex and construction bureau should be enough. As important as it is to support the aircraft industry, sixteen production facilities are too many. Instead, two plants (related to companies like MiG and Sukhoi) for combat aircraft, one for military helicopters and one for transport airplanes would be quite sufficient. When selecting which plants to stay open, many factors should be taken into account: technological level, advantages of location and communications, dependence on post-Soviet suppliers, existence of design bureau and testing grounds, the role of the enterprise for the social infrastructure of the city and availability of alternative jobs.

If such a hard choice is made by the political leadership, if it is capable of resisting pressures by vested interests and regional politics, even the appropriation allocated in the 1997 defense budget before the sequester (33 trillion rubles per year on procurement and R&D, or $6 billion) would be enough for a few years, provided that the debts of previous years are excluded from this money and it is defended from sequestering. This would be sufficient to support reliably what is essential until the time when savings on maintenance from armed forces reductions, economic growth, or both provide an opportunity to start a reasonable technical rearmament of the reformed, modern Russian armed forces, presumably sometime after the year 2003.

Some support could also be gained from the state and guarantees of arms sales abroad by licensed enterprises. The law "On military-technical cooperation," approved by the Duma in June 1997, could be conducive to this, although it should not be seen as a substitute for a consistent state policy on defense contracts and conversion.

As for other enterprises, they should be treated not as discarded liabilities, but as great assets for the civilian economy since they possess high technology, a skilled and disciplined labor force, and large stocks of precious materials (traditionally preserved for mobilization). However, there must be a practical, (as opposed to declaratory) state program of privatization and conversion of these plants and factories. Until now, the former state program on conversion was funded at only 10 percent of the plan. Apart from raising appropriations for conversion, a lot can be achieved by providing those enterprises with tax exemptions and long-term credits and subsidies. Those plants that cannot be converted would have to be sold and closed, which would entail additional costs to take care of housing, provide social infrastructure, retrain labor, and create new jobs (or relocate labor to new areas).

All conversion and related costs should be covered by special items in the federal budget and subsidies to the regions. In general, relieving the MOD from its accumulated debt (49 trillion rubles, or $8.6 billion) is one of the key requirements to start actual military reform and should be dealt with on a case by case basis. When the debt occurs at the fault of the government, which did not provide the appropriations in time or at all (in the case of sequester), it should be transferred to the overall state debt and become the responsibility of the government instead of the Ministry of Defense or the defense industry.

Finally, the huge industrial mobilization assets, which are currently being preserved by enterprises, should be radically cut and largely turned over to the market economy. The new military doctrine and strategy should basically envision fighting with weapons and equipment already in service or in storage during peacetime. These weapons should be sufficient for a local or regional war, while in a large-scale war, industries would be subjected to long-range conventional precision-guided weapons strikes, which would preclude any serious wartime build-up. The only mobilization assets worth retaining are those for production of ammunition, fuel and spare parts, as well as for repair and infrastructure maintenance.

The state-political mechanism for the military reform. It is obvious that the above measures for radical military reform require quite a different mechanism for their implementation. Actually, apart from the lack of political will, understanding, and interest of President Yeltsin, the main reason for the deadlock on military reform in 1992--97 was the lack of a mechanism for its elaboration and implementation.

The most important first step should be to eliminate numerous redundant committees created in recent years for military reform, and assign one administrative organ to implement reform with the input of ministries, parliament, and various independent panels. At present, the Defense Council looks like the prime candidate for the role of such an institution. To make it powerful enough it should be routinely subordinated to a deputy prime minister directly assigned to supervise military reform. Higher level officials (i.e., the president or prime minister) would not work since they have too many other obligations. A lower level assignment would make this official weak in competition with the heads of ministries and power structures. In addition, the past practice under which ministers of defense, internal affairs, and heads of other so-called "armed structures" reported directly to the president and were not subordinated to the prime minister should end. A cabinet-level subordination would make coordination of military reform easier and the programs of "armed structures" more realistic and integrated into the overall economic and budgetary policy. It is all the more important that military reform should involve not only the MOD, but all other structures, which use military formations.

Although this goes beyond the scope of this article, suffice it to say that reductions and restructuring of other "armed agencies" is one of the ways to save additional money for the reform of the Armed Forces and defense industry. As noted above, presently their budget is at the level of 50 percent of the defense budget, their personnel is more than 70 percent of the size of the armed forces, and they consume about 40 percent of the draft contingent yearly. This is certainly an abnormal situation, which should also be addressed by military reform.

Other important directions should be further expansion of the defense budget for public scrutiny, as well as the program of military reform. In 1992--96, the State Duma approved the defense budget by only seven principal articles. In 1997 their number was expanded through the law "On the budget classification" to more than thirty lines. Future amendments to this law, which are now in the works, would further broaden it to several hundred lines.

Increasing the role of the parliament in defense policy and military reform is a crucial direction. In the past, the Duma made decisions on the defense budget without the slightest idea of how they would affect particular issues of security and reform (strategic deterrence, regional warfighting capability, and support of key industries and technologies). Besides, the Duma does not have the instruments to control the implementation of the budget, discover violations in due time, or punish those responsible for violations. This should be changed by laws and amendments to the Constitution when necessary. If the president wants efficient military reform he should support, not oppose, such initiatives.

The present political composition of the State Duma should not be an argument against its deeper involvement in defense policymaking. After all, the parliament reflects the moods of society as a whole, including its military and defense-industrial sectors. Military reform is doomed without broad public support, which to a large extent is rendered through parliament. Deeper involvement, broader information, greater responsibility, constructive engagement plus tough bargaining are all ways to change the negative positions on military reform of a substantial number of Duma deputies.

Another imperative is an independent audit control over the financial activity of the Ministry of Defense and its implementation of the budget according to the law on the budget. Each change, amendment, additional allocation of funds or sequestering must be discussed and approved by the Duma with full information about their consequences for defense and security.

One way of dealing with the problem of delays in military salaries and wages, as well as to enhance control over the finances of the MOD in general, would be to deliver the money for salaries, wages, and maintenance directly through the Federal Treasury, which is part of the Ministry of Finances and has branches in all regions. This would break the present monopoly of the Ministry of Defense and make the MOD and its force units the natural controllers of timely delivery of the paychecks by the Federal Treasury. The State Duma Budget committee proposed exactly this in 1996 during elaboration of the 1997 budget, but the MOD resisted it and the proposal did not gain the necessary majority of votes.

Apart from parochial interests, there are some substantial concerns about this. One is that it might make the Armed Forces dependent on the regional authorities, who have strong levers of influence on the regional branches of the Federal Treasury and who always have plenty of their own needs on which to spend the money released by the federal government. However, this should be resolved by special laws and practical policies on financial relations between federal and regional authorities. An important and controversial issue for Russia is the introduction of the post of civilian minister of defense. Being in principle a necessary element of civilian political control over the military, this measure should be postponed until a later stage of military reform. The crisis is so deep and the reform would be so painful under all circumstances that it would be unwise to aggravate it more by putting a civilian in charge of the Ministry of Defense now. The choice of General of the Army Igor Sergeev seems like an optimal step under the circumstances.

Later it would be easier to change the law "On defense" and to approve the law "On civilian control and management over the armed forces," which is presently being discussed in the Duma. To make a civilian minister effective, he (or she) must be provided with an apparatus for military analysis independent from the armed services, cost-effectiveness studies, and adequate preparation of sensible policy options and programs. No less important, the functions of the minister and the General Staff should be separated. The former has to run general defense policy, doctrine, and budget; deal with the rest of the government and parliament; and manage procurement and R&D programs, personnel and social security issues, while the latter must handle operational planning, tactics, and training of forces; run military operations and activities in peacetime; and command combat forces in case of war.

It is evident that only a profound restructuring of the state mechanism would permit radical military reform and justify large additional expenditures for it. This is basically a mechanism for more efficient civilian and political control over the military, without which military reform is unfeasible, whatever the personal virtues of top military commanders. And at the same time, creating this mechanism of civilian control, which is aggressively opposed by fundamentalist communists and nationalists, is one of the key elements of military reform per se, without which Russia's democratic development would remain fragile and uncertain.

On macroeconomics (instead of a conclusion)

The financial crunch of the spring of 1997 implied deep cuts in the defense budget and threatened to provoke outright military opposition. This opposition could now rely on the leadership of the Minister of Defense Igor Rodionov and other prominent generals, like Alexander Lebed and Lev Rokhlin. A consensus has formed in the political elite, that one or two more years of such disintegration would lead to most dire social and political events.

These could take the form of mutiny of some military units or whole military districts; blocking of communications or energy lines; active support by the bulk of the officer corps of communist or nationalist opposition parties, which might challenge the results of the next federal or regional elections; or the regionalization of the military and alignment with regional authorities to defy Moscow. The opposite scenario could be a direct armed collision of the military in the regions with local authorities over electricity, water, and heating for the military sites which may be cut by local authorities if the MOD fails to pay its debts. All of these and other imaginable scenarios imply the collapse of the organized state, ensuing social and political chaos, armed clashes between the armed forces and other troops, or between the units within armed forces with unpredictable results and the possibility of escalation to civil war on a regional or even national scale.

Indeed, all the above are the "worst case scenarios" and their probability is still quite low. However, the fact that they started to be soberly discussed in the political elite and strategic community (in contrast to the "horror stories" of extremists in the past) is indicative of the seriousness of the matter. The catastrophic state of affairs in the military establishment has finally become so central in both public opinion and the activities of the main political groups, that at last Boris Yeltsin has started to move seriously on the issue.

With the appointment of Igor Sergeev and the new determination of the president to finally initiate actual military reform, things have apparently started changing. A package of presidential decrees issued in mid-July 1997 initiated some radical steps. ₅₆ In particular, it was resolved to cut active duty Armed Forces by 300,000 by 1999, down to a level of 1.2 million in actual manpower. In the course of these reductions, the restructuring started with the integration of the Missile-Space Defense and Military-Space Forces into the Strategic Rocket Forces. A decision of historic dimensions was the elimination of the Ground Forces as an independent (and traditionally the largest and most influential) armed service. It is to be directly subordinated to the General Staff. In 1998, the Air Defense will also cease to exist as an independent armed service, and its systems and infrastructure will be split between the Air Force and the Strategic Rocket Forces. All these measures are encouraging and have been advocated by proponents of radical military reform in Russia for a long time.

However, it is just the beginning of a long and tough journey, and the main tests and obstacles are still ahead. One is political. Besides stubborn resistance by the military bureaucracy and vested interests at the federal and regional levels, a powerful opposition of fundamentalist communists, nationalists, and militarists in the parliament and political elite at large will certainly rise. Actually, this preceded the first reform steps and was initiated by the new party of General Lev Rokhlin in June-July 1997 in anticipation of the moves by the new minister of defense. There will be strong and continuous efforts by reactionaries to thwart radical reforms and capitalize on the natural fears and uncertainties of the millions of people who will be affected by reforms.

The policy of open-ended NATO extension, legalized in Madrid, is a real blessing for this opposition, which will be constantly referring to a growing foreign threat, emanating from enlarging NATO and its proximity to Russian borders. This has become the chief argument against cuts in the armed forces, restructuring, and clear, but painful defense priorities. ₅₇ This would be an even more effective argument if the provisions for future cooperation between NATO and Russia, agreed upon in Paris in May 1997, remain on paper or are perceived in Russia as Moscow's latest unilateral concessions to the West. Another major test will be economic and financial. Even with the most rational and economical implementation of reforms, it will require extra expenditures. In addition to funding an armed forces personnel reduction by a separate article of the federal budget (besides "National Defense"), and clearing the military budget of accumulated debts, military reform will incur additional expenses in conversion and infrastructure. Depending on the reform program chosen, additional costs could amount to 10-13 trillion rubles ($2.3 billion) annually for the first few years, and 2-3 trillion ($500 million) at least until the end of the second phase (by the year 2005).

The natural question is, where will the money come from? After all, the principal motive for military reform is the tremendous shortage of resources to support and equip the Russian armed forces under present unstable economic conditions. Of course, the strong political leadership and the choice of the most efficient and economical reform program may cut the costs to an absolute minimum and activate large resources within the defense establishment presently frozen, mismanaged, or stolen by bureaucrats at all levels. Nonetheless, under all circumstances the reform will not be free and at least during the initial phase, considerable up-front investments will be needed until the reform starts to generate its own capital through savings and efficient management. That is why the question of where to get the money is still impossible to evade. It is the firm belief of the author (which is disputed by some in Russia and many abroad), that the answer to this question is as follows: under the current economic policy and budget strategy, nowhere. With the main goal to keep inflation low, limit the budget deficit, and introduce various surrogates of money ("macroeconomic stabilization"), ₅₈ the only source of additional appropriations would be from other areas of the federal budget.

However, these areas are already at the very minimum or even below the minimum of public demands. Thus, even before the sequestering of the 1997 budget, appropriations for health care were planned at 11.4 trillion rubles ($2 billion), 18.5 trillion ($3.2 billion) for education, 18 trillion ($3.2 billion) for social services, 3.3 trillion ($580 million) for arts and culture, fundamental science-15.3 trillion ($2.7 billion) for scientific research, and 2.7 trillion ($470 million) for spending on the environment. ₅₉ The proposed sequestering of the budget would cut all of this by 30 percent or even 50 percent, leaving virtually nothing for these purposes, for a country with 150 million people and the most advanced science, culture, and technology by world standards. To cut these appropriations further for the sake of military reform, however important it is, would be both wrong and politically unacceptable.

If additional revenues are not found, which is highly unlikely, the cost of military reform may increase the present budget deficit from 95 to 105-110 trillion rubles ($19-20 billion). Nonetheless, there is no doubt in the opinion of the author that Russia will survive with a 10-13 trillion rubles larger budget deficit or 2-3 percent higher monthly inflation, but it will not survive socially, politically, or as an organized democratic state if there is a final collapse of its armed forces and defense industry, stemming from the inability to fund military reform. ₆₀

Nor would it be morally or politically acceptable to implement reform without proper financial support; by just throwing officers out without money or homes, leaving weapons and equipment in the open field, abandoning military sites and infrastructures, and leaving defense plants to disintegrate together with their cities. This would play right into the hands of the recalcitrant opposition and eventually bring about a backlash that may thwart the reform and topple the government itself. Going for a larger budget deficit and higher inflation would imply revising the present economic strategy of the government and renegotiating its agreements with the IMF and World Bank.

It goes far beyond the scope of this article to elaborate on how the macroeconomic policy should change to find a way out of the present crisis. However, it is obvious (and the financial crunch of 1997 was clear evidence of it), that the policy of the so-called "macroeconomic stabilization" has finally failed. It cannot activate economic growth, and the "invisible hand of the market" is not working. Continuous economic decline-resulting from high taxes, lack of state subsidies and high interest rates on state bonds-reduces budget revenues even further each year, provokes sequestering, higher taxes, and further decline, while continuing to degrade both social and security functions of the state.

Moreover, this economic policy is one of the main reasons for the drastic crisis in the Russian defense establishment and past failures of military reform. Implementing military reform would require a revision of this policy. However, in this case, irresistible pressure would have the same effect on many other areas of state responsibility, including health care, education, science, culture, social security, and environmental protection.

The answer to this is that increased federal funding also should be undertaken with respect for all other spheres-of course in a balanced, consistent, and well-conceived way. What is required in general is much higher state spending; active investment into economic growth, creating jobs, and important national programs, as well as the reduction of taxation while eliminating tax exemptions for many business and financial groups-even at the expense of a larger budget deficit and higher inflation.

After all, the crisis of the Russian military is only the most obvious, potentially most dangerous domestically, and most frightening internationally area of the comprehensive national crisis in Russia. The revival of social and security functions of the state are not in contradiction to each other, although they compete for the limited budget resources. But they are complementary in their demand for a very different type of reform to avoid further national degradation and eventually, the inevitable counter-reformist reactionary backlash.

Hopefully, the Russian political leadership is beginning to understand this, and the fresh start on military reform in mid-1997 will initiate a consistent, comprehensive, and efficient long-term program of reform. Moreover, such a program should be integrated into a much broader revision of the nation's overall course of economic and political reforms, which is needed to encourage economic growth, insure social stability, and strengthen the young and fragile roots of democracy in Russia.

Footnotes

Note 1: L. Rokhlin, "The Address to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and to the Russian Military, of June 23, 1997," Nezavisimoye Voennoe Obozrenie (Independent Military Review), No. 24 (June 5-11, 1997), pp.2-3. Back.

Note 2: According to the law "On Defense," "other troops and military formations" consist primarily of the Border Guards, Internal Troops, Railway Troops, and troops of the presidential Federal Agency on Governmental Communications and Information. Back.

Note 3: A. Arbatov, "Army Reform in the Midst of Disaster," Moscow News, No. 3 (January 20-26, 1995). Back.

Note 4: A. Lebed, "Russia Has the Army, But Is It Indeed an Army?" Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 16, 1994. Back.

Note 5: V. Lopatin, "A Professional Army Instead of an Armed Nation," Novaya Ezhednevnaya Gazeta, May 26, 1994. Back.

Note 6: V. Lukin, "The Medicine for Geopolitical Psychosis," Obozrenie, No. 6 (June 1995), pp. 10-14. Back.

Note 7: "Principle Guidance on the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," Izvestiya, November 18, 1993, pp. 1-4. Back.

Note 8: R. Woff, The Armed Forces of the Former Soviet Union, Vol. I, Update 1 (Portsmouth: Carmichael & Sweet). Back.

Note 9: D. Trenin, "Collective Security and Collective Defense," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 4, 1994. Back.

Note 10: A. Konovalov, "Towards a New Division of Europe? Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 7, 1994. Back.

Note 11: S. Oznobistchev, "Cooperation Between Russia and NATO: Doubts and Prospects," PRISM, Jameston Foundation, Vol. III, No. 10 (June, 1997), pp. 5-11. Back.

Note 12: A. Arbatov and B. Makeev, "The Kurile Barrier," Novoye Vriemya, No. 42 (November 1992) pp. 24-26. Back.

Note 13: S. Karaganov, A. Arbatov, and V. Tret'yakov, "Russia's Military Reform," The Report of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy in Nezavisimoye Voennoe Obozrenie (Independent Military Review), No. 25 (July 12-19, 1997), pp.1-7. Back.

Note 14: L. Rokhlin, "The Address to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation," Op. cit. Back.

Note 15: G.Yavlinsky, "There is an alternative to a robber-capitalism," Vabloko of Moscow Region, No. 24-25 (July 11, 1997) pp. 10-14. Back.

Note 16: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1995 (Washington, D.C., 1996), pp. 80-83, 86-87. Back.

Note 17: Reference information on the 1997 Federal Budget Law and 1997 Federal Budget Sequestering Draft Law, Committee on Defense, State Duma, the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, (December 1996 and June 1997, Moscow). Back.

Note 18: S. Rogov, "Will Russia's Armed Forces Survive?" Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 3, 1994. Back.

Note 19: V. Borodin, "The Government Has Promised to Foot 70 Percent of the Military Bill," Kommersant Daily, November 24, 1994. Back.

Note 20: Reference information on the 1997 Federal Budget Law and 1997 Federal Budget Sequestering Draft Law, Op. cit. Back.

Note 21: P. Baev, "Russia's Armed Forces: Spontaneous Demobilization," Bulletin of Arms Control, No.13 (February), pp. 8-13. Back.

Note 22: Reference information on the 1997 Federal Budget Law and 1997 Federal Budget Sequestering Draft Law, Op. cit. Back.

Note 23: The balance between Russia and the United States in 1997 was 10,000:7000 in tanks, 20,000:12,000 in armored combat vehicles, 4,700:3,200 in combat airplanes, 3,200:4,500 in combat helicopters, 270:235 in large combat ships, 101:96 in large submarines and 10,000:9,000 in strategic and tactical nuclear warheads. Back.

Note 24: Reference information on the 1997 Federal Budget Law and 1997 Federal Budget Sequestering Draft Law, Op. cit. Back.

Note 25: A. Arbatov and G. Batanov, "What Kind of Army Can We Afford?" Moscow News, No. 67 (October 1-8, 1995). Back.

Note 26: A. Golovnev, "Fighting in Chechnya: Lessons and Conclusions," Interview with Krasnaya Zvezda, February 16, 1995. Back.

Note 27: Reference information on the 1997 Federal Budget Law and 1997 Federal Budget Sequestering Draft Law, Op. cit. Back.

Note 28: Ibid. Back.

Note 29: A. Arbatov, "Duma Steps Back from Military Reform," Moscow News, No. 14 (April 14-20, 1995). Back.

Note 30: S. Karaganov, A. Arbatov, and V. Tret'yakov, "Russia's Military Reform," The Report of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Op. cit. Back.

Note 31: S. Karaganov, "European Security System Is Undergoing the Deepest Crisis," Segodnia, August 1994. Back.

Note 32: Reference information on the 1997 Federal Budget Law and 1997 Federal Budget Sequestering Draft Law, Op. cit. Back.

Note 33: A. Zhilin, "If the War Comes Tomorrow," Moscow News, No. 2, January 9-16, 1994. Back.

Note 34: Reference information on the 1997 Federal Budget Law and 1997 Federal Budget Sequestering Draft Law, Op. cit. Back.

Note 35: V. Litovkin, "Decay: The Crime Trial of Three Officers of the Northern Fleet," Izvestia, May 12, 1995. Back.

Note 36: A.Kondrashov and V.Tsepliaev, "The Army Will Have to Be Disbanded. There Is No Money," Argumenty I Fakty, No. 32 (877), (August 6, 1997). Back.

Note 37: A. Zhilin, "Generals in Business," Moscow News, No. 24 (June 17-23, 1994). Back.

Note 38: V. Shlykov, "Economic Readjustment within the Russian Defense-Industrial Complex," Security Dialogue, Vol. 26, No. 1 (March 1995), pp. 19-34. Back.

Note 39: S. Rogov, "Will Russia's Armed Forces Survive?" Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Op. cit. Back.

Note 40: Reference information on the 1997 Federal Budget Law and 1997 Federal Budget Sequestering Draft Law, Op. cit. Back.

Note 41: Ibid. Back.

Note 42: P. Mann, "Economic Morass Foils Military Progress," AW&ST, May 26, 1997, pp. 72-73. (Carlisle, PA) Back.

Note 43: V. Shlykov, "Economic Readjustment within the Russian Defense-Industrial Complex", Op. cit. Back.

Note 44: Reference information on the 1997 Federal Budget Law and 1997 Federal Budget Sequestering Draft Law...Op. cit. Back.

Note 45: G. Kostev, Problems Of Safety Of Operating and Dismantling Nuclear Submarines, Committee on Critical Technologies and Non-Proliferation, Moscow, 1997. Back.

Note 46: K. Kobets, "Priorities of Russia's Military Policy," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 5, 1992, pp.1-2. Back.

Note 47: P. Grachev, "Russian Army: A New Time," Interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 8, 1993. Back.

Note 48: L. Shevtsova, "Russia Facing New Choices: Contradictions of Post-Communist Development," Security Dialogue, Vol. 26, No. 3, (September 1994) pp. 321-334. Back.

Note 49: Reference information on the 1997 Federal Budget Law and 1997 Federal Budget Sequestering Draft Law,Op. cit. Back.

Note 50: Ibid. Back.

Note 51: S. Karaganov, A. Arbatov, and V. Tret'yakov, "Russia's Military Reform," The Report of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Op. cit. Back.

Note 52: Reference information on the 1997 Federal Budget Law and 1997 Federal Budget Sequestering Draft Law, Op. cit. Back.

Note 53: Ibid. Back.

Note 54: S. Karaganov, A. Arbatov, and V. Tret'yakov, "Russia's Military Reform," The Report of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Op. cit. Back.

Note 55: A. Kokoshin, "Defense Industry Conversion in the Russian Federation," in T.P. Johnson and S. Miller, eds., Russian Security After the Cold War, (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1995), pp. 43-74. Back.

Note 56: M. Specter, "Yeltsin's Plan to Cut Military Touches a Nerve," New York Times, July 28, 1997, pp. A1-A2. Back.

Note 57: L. Rokhlin, "The Address to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and to the Russian Military," Op. cit. Back.

Note 58: E. Gaidar, "The New Course", Izvestia, February 10, 1994. Back.

Note 59: Reference information on the 1997 Federal Budget Law and 1997 Federal Budget Sequestering Draft Law, Op. cit. Back.

Note 60: S. Karaganov, A. Arbatov, and V. Tret'yakov, "Russia's Military Reform," The Report of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Op. cit. Back.