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Email this citationCIAO DATE: 03/04
International Crisis Diplomacy: A Collective Approach for the Future of Conflict Management
Bethany A. Aquilina and E. Graves Tompkins
November 2000
Abstract
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Table 2: The Impact of the Diplomatic Revolution on the Classical European
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International System (from Craig and George, Force and Statecraft?Diplomatic
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Problems of Our Time, 287)
Contributors to the Report
Bethany Aquilina
E. Graves Tompkins
Jennifer Nam
Daniel Ostrow
This paper represents the work of students of a seminar at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. That Seminar, WWS 471 of Fall 2000 intended to exploit the intricacies, challenges, and capabilities of international diplomacy during crises between states or within states in a theoretical and applied manner. The seminar tried to prepare the students by offering an overview of major international diplomatic issues from the conference of Versailles 1919 until the Paris Summit of 1990 and the Millenium Summit 2000. The seminar also dealt in the first part with the theory of (international) negotiations and with relevant aspects of the theory of international relations (alliance, power, state, etc.); for every three-hour session held each week students were asked to lead off the discussion by in-class presentations.
Part Two of the seminar focused on a selection of five case studies of major international crises - Cuba, Kuwait, Bosnia/Kosovo, Chechnya, and Kashmir. For several of the relevant sessions, outside practitioner experts were invited in order to inform the class about the real life developments as they happened during these crises, permitting a more thorough examination of the causes of the respective crisis, their development, the role of leadership and negotiators, and to put them into the historical international context. It became thus also possible to discuss variants of actors' involvement, or the choice of instruments in crisis management, as well as the beginning debate on the search for appropriate crisis diplomacy and anticipatory strategies.
The final part of the seminar was dominated by the evaluation of potential new crises - such as intrastate and self-determination conflicts, fundamentalism, space systems race, AIDS, hunger, environmental disasters - and the implementation of possible anticipatory strategies. The emerging international system experiences crises that emanate from the disintegration of the bipolar blocs, the falling apart of the (last) Soviet Empire, and from ethnic rivalries, ruthless leadership interests, power politics, global interdependence, the increasing role of organized crime networks, and the progress of (civil and military) technology, including easier access to weapons of mass-destruction. Nevertheless, it became clear that the role of the state, the role of sovereignty and hard external boundaries will remain critical in the emerging international system. National governments, especially those of great powers, will continue to play a dominant role, evan as new actors take on greater responsibility on the world stage.
The analysis of the most recent developments in crisis diplomacy suggest the heightened relevance of powerful individual actors - i.e. persons who can dispose of sufficient personal wealth to be able to influence events any time or any place on the globe - and non-governmental organizations or NGOs. The latter have taken on many tasks which traditionally have been the primary obligation of governmental agencies and public institutions. It seems that the role of NGOs will still increase in the future, both in terms of direct involvement in the execution of policies or decisions by the governments or international organizations, as well as regarding the development of new forms of activities and policies in a post-industrial globally interdependent society.
Furthermore "private" or "informal" diplomacy, i.e. negotiations in informal settings including governmental representative, other parties' representations, and experts have become increasingly relevant in assisting the official governments to achieve their objectives through negotiation. This may include efforts to prevent or manage international crisis or contribute to the reduction of tensions. "Second" and "Third Track" diplomacy is an additional possibility though does generally not include official representatives. All such diplomatic efforts are typically funded by private individuals, corporations, and non-profit foundations. In spite of global electronic real-time communication and interactive media it has become clear that the classical aspects of person-to-person diplomacy and negotiations are still critical to successful negotiations and that result in viable solutions. This seminar concluded that the role of these dimensions and supporters ought to rather be enhanced, and their agenda enlarged, while carefully weighing the effects on governmental affairs, ongoing negotiations, and resources.
During the course of this class it has become obvious that issues such as direct personal communication (also between the leaders), availability of information, personal education and involvement, the role (and contribution) of women in politics and decision making, public opinion pressure exerted by media (in democracies) or on an international scale (via allies), etc., can have significant influence on the decision-making process. Inversely, it has become clear that there are at least two schools of how to deal with current or future crisis or threats: either by the development of ever more sophisticated defense system and hence a periodically accelerated arms race (which in turn may incite some to look for new means of threat or availability of counter strategies) or by a greater focus on "softer" security and socio-cultural dimensions such as unemployment, personal threat perception, ideology, and national/communal specific issues. In intense debates the weight and value of developing new defensive strategic capabilities (N/MD) were held against the argument that an entirely new area of space based defense systems will incite another epoch of developments in yet more sophisticated offensive systems, plus the intensified search for other non-conventional means to develop potential counter strategies (including "hand delivered" weapon systems). Such developments will certainly also influence power and administrative arrangements in institutions whose tasks include crisis management - like the UN Security Council.
For someone who is devoted to teaching international relations and who finds himself frequently in situations reflecting the practical application of what he teaches to young citizens, this seminar was remarkable in at least four dimensions: 1) the tremendous interest of the participating students; 2) their great personal involvement (lots of out-of-class contacts and nearly never an absence from class); 3) the deep commitment with which they prepared their in-class presentations and offered their learned intellectual as well as individual interpretations; and 4) the obvious divergence between developments in the emerging international system, the traditional perspective from which most of crisis diplomacy and crisis management are still conducted today, and the perspectives through which part of the emerging leadership - namely my WWS 471 class - analyze, observe, and interpret these changes. This experience demonstrates that, if sufficiently challenged and motivated, our students not only produce outstanding results but can be expected to become leaders who stand for their values for the good of humanity.
Princeton, May, 2001 Prof. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS DIPLOMACY:
A Collective Approach for the Future of Conflict Management
Executive Summary
- State of the International System
- Goals
- Structure
There has been a shift in the geostrategic balance in the global arena. This includes an increased emphasis on fundamentalism in the absence of ideology (esp. in the North Middle East and South Asia). Is there a new role for the United States? The U.S. has begun to concentrate its energies on its domestic affairs - what does this mean for the international community and the agenda of international institutions such as the United Nations? Russia and China have united to play "balance of power" politics, and are against the proposed anti-missile defense system of the United States. Europe is also beginning to doubt Washington's new policies, and is dealing with potentially large-scale changes within the European Union.
There are increasing problems and potential conflicts coming from economic crisis, influence of organized crime, health and other (energy, water) problems in Africa, Southeastern Europe, the Central Asian States, Southeast Asia. In many of these emerging regions there are young states with fledgling institutions, a people who search for their identity, and a state who looks for international orientation.
The goal of a collective approach to international crisis diplomacy is to effectively manage international crises or possible conflicts in order to achieve just peace, stability, and prosperity in the international system. Among the other objectives sought by the international community: increased aid, international activism, and the protection of human rights.
· Instruments: the traditional dimensions of trade and its interruptions (sanctions) diplomatic means (negotiations, curtailing of diplomatic relations, international pressure, and eventually crisis up to declaration of war);
and the emerging instruments such as public pressure, international public scrutiny in form of mentioning problems in international organizations, mobilizing a public media campaign or mobilizing electronically via the Internet large-scale public opinion in order to put a leadership under pressure.
· Objectives must be clear and attainable, and realistic in terms of the circumstances of individual conflicts and resources available.
· Looking at emerging crises: nuclear proliferation, technology, human suffering and ethnic conflicts. These are problems with (even greater) potential for disaster, and the high stakes they present demand the attention of all nations. An "either/or" approach to these problems must be eliminated; these issues must be addressed separately, but with the others in mind. Approaches must successfully reconcile problems by solving diplomatic equations with more than one variable.
Throughout history, diplomats and world leaders have been faced with the challenges of trying to promote national interest, while at the same time striving for peace and stability in a constantly changing world. The very nature of conflict has evolved over time from interstate conflicts arising from aggressive state ambitions to the intrastate bloodbaths of ethnic rivalries frequent in our times. Nonetheless, there are certain fundamental principles by which the world operates, both in the international community, and the national, domestic, environment. Therefore the issues faced by contemporary leaders can often be compared with the issues faced by statesmen in the past. Thus, it is imperative that contemporary international crisis diplomacy incorporates lessons of history into the development of progressive conflict management or - even better - anticipatory conflict-avoidance strategies. For instance, Karol Holsti argues that "The study of international politics, while it must account for the unique, new, and nonrecurring phenomenon, is also concerned with processes and patterns of behavior found typically in many historical contexts. All attempts to understand the disparate aspects of political life at the international level implicitly assume some regularities of behavior." There are obviously perennial themes in International politics, which, through the study of past crises we are trying to discover. Our study of crises demonstrates that here are certain regularities which allow to compare future crises with past crises, and allow the discipline of crisis management to pinpoint these regularities and respond to them. In the post-Cold War era, really the time since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the emerging international system requires innovative diplomatic policies and tactics - which, however, have their roots in traditional diplomatic policies - in order to effectively address conflicts that may arise from the disintegration of the bipolar system. Members of leadership - national or regional - are encouraged to develop an acute understanding of diplomatic history because "the only resource that they have is the history of the ways in which states have regulated their relations with each other in the past, and they must study this with an eye to the light it casts on their present perplexities."The study of international crisis diplomacy enables practitioners and scholars to determine what confluence of events constitutes a crisis in order to establish appropriate methods of - ideally early - recognition of a potential crisis and crisis management (see page 11 for the definition of "crisis"). This policy report will trace the establishment of modern diplomacy by highlighting past and contemporary diplomatic ventures and conflicts in order to gain a deeper understanding of crisis management in the prevention of emerging conflicts. It will further show the ways in which world affairs have changed in recent years and what ramifications this has for conflicts and crisis management. By examining a variety of actors and the instruments at their disposal for the purposes of non-proliferation and human healing, this report recommends an all-encompassing differentiated approach to international crisis diplomacy. Such an approach should encompass issues of strategy, national interest, as well as perception, socio-political dimensions, communal interest, wherever possible, and - most importantly - long-time planning and the inclusion of non-state actors.
An examination of the instruments and players of the transitioning international order will further shed light on important traditional and emerging factors/issues. What conventional systemic factors/issues remain salient features of the modern international system? How have the instruments and strategies of international crisis diplomacy changed throughout the course of diplomatic history? What lessons can be learned from past conflicts, and how can these lessons be integrated into future crisis management approaches?
The world is more integrated and interdependent than ever before, but individual nations continue in their struggle for identity, purpose - and power. Age-old challenges, such as effective and just governance, adequate social services, and national security, are joined by new elements, such as media and technology, to frame a dynamic, complicated global system. National interests overlap with international responsibility in a way that makes sovereignty less clear and encourages collective values. Actors, more numerous and diverse in the 'New World Order,' offer new alternatives in international crisis management but, as always, also compete for world power and vary in interest. The way nations interact and use diplomatic instruments to pursue their objectives will be crucial in the time to come, as the cause and nature of conflict are redefined. The most pressing and dangerous issues of tomorrow converge in a way that challenges existing international structure, international organizations, and even threatens stability; thus demands creative and innovative thinking. On one hand, the ever more sophisticated, miniaturized, and indeed available development of weapons of mass destruction and technological innovation combine to create a devastating potential for conflict usage; on the other hand, human suffering spreads and worsens, as millions die from famine and disease; finally, the dominance of ideology as in the cold war has been replaced in many regions of the world by a revival of nationalism and the rise of fundamentalist religious ideas. Robert Gilpin argues that "a state will seek to change the international system [that is how the states are positioned relative to one another] if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs." This describes the political reality diplomats and countries face, and furthermore it is an explanation of why crises occur. No state will be content with the status quo if it has the power to change it, either by force or through diplomacy.
In order to avoid any mayor crisis, international leaders must work together to effectively monitor and contain nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. They must reprioritize the international agenda so that basic needs are provided and human rights are protected. Unprecedented access to information has enabled the world's population to learn of human suffering by witnessing it on the television and the Internet. Public awareness has led to greater propensity to intervene and put a stop to the atrocities of war and poverty. In response, international leaders must come together to pursue these humanitarian aims, learning from events of the past to fight for the future.
The most important lesson to be drawn from this report, is that neither crisis management, nor humanitarian intervention, nor anticipatory strategies are necessarily in opposition to the national interest. In fact, often it should be considered that maintaining international peace, especially for the major powers, is the highest of national interests. The major powers will benefit greatly from a world where conflicts are mitigated rather than allowed to turn into major conflagrations.
Although traditional international crisis diplomacy methods have placed a strong emphasis on the state as the primary actor in conflict management, and while this remains true today, the emerging characters of crises in the emanating secondary actors in the international system demand a more innovative and collective effort. It is recommended that the international community develop a "cooperative approach" to the management of emerging crises through the interaction of states, international organizations (such as the United Nations), supranational organizations (such as the European Union, EU), regional organizations (e.g. the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE), 'powerful individual actors,' (Messrs. Soros, Turner, or Prince Hans Adam II of Liechtenstein) non-governmental organizations (NGOs), corporations (direct, but controlled involvement), regional associations and local administrations. This approach strives to achieve the ultimate world objective: peace and stability in the international system, while maintaining the national security and promoting the national interests of the individual states that comprise the system.
II. ACTORS, INSTRUMENTS, AND OBJECTIVES
There are several aspects of the international system that must be examined if one is to study the field of international crisis diplomacy and attempt to draw conclusions based on these observations. Over the course of the development of modern diplomacy, some traditional issues have become less important while others have gained a new sense of urgency. What exactly are the traditional and emerging issues that must be considered when crafting diplomatic strategies? What accounts for the development of these factors, and how has the changing
world order affected the significance of these issues?
- Actors
on the international level. 1. States The role of the state in international diplomacy has remained an important issue throughout the course of history. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, diplomatic activities highlighted the primacy of the state. Governments formed relationships and alliances based upon the interests of the state vis-à-vis other states in order to promote a stable international system. Although the formation of alliances and conferences such as the Congress of Vienna brought states together in the pursuit of common goals, the state remained, for the most part, the solitary actor. The international system that evolved during the twentieth century saw a rise in the influence of collectivities of states and non-state actors. However, it would be fundamentally misleading to discuss foreign policy issues and crisis management without acknowledging that the national interest of each state - or the "cost-benefit-calculation" (according to Robert Gilpin) dictates its actions. Thus, while the role played by the state in the realm of international affairs remained important, there were now new actors on the international scene that challenged the position of the state in the context of crisis diplomacy.
2. International Institutions
International institutions became a staple of international crisis diplomacy in the 20th century with the creation of the League of Nations during the interwar period. Organizations like the League of Nations were formed with the intention of providing a forum for states to voice their interests and concerns in a peaceful manner so as to avoid situations of conflict. Since those early beginnings, several institutional formats have gained prominence in the world system, such as supranational and intergovernmental organizations, and military alliances. The actions of the United Nations (UN), the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), among others, are prime examples of the increasing importance of institutions as elements of effective strategies of crisis management.
In the emerging international system, institutions are faced with several challenges. For example, one of the problems confronted by the League of Nations was the lack of involvement on the part of the United States, a factor that eventually led to the demise of the organization. Today the institution of the International Criminal Court is facing a similar problem: will the United States participate in the organization, and if not, what does this mean for the future of international institutions if the most influential and powerful states choose to abstain from involvement?
3. Non-State Actors
The modern era of international crisis diplomacy has witnessed an explosion in the number and kind of non-state actors, in particular NGOs, multinational corporations, individuals and various domestic and international interest groups. These organizations had not yet evolved during the early years of diplomacy, and thus their entrance into the world system and their increasing influence is unheralded prior to globalization. Although limited by the lack of a security/military apparatus, the presence of these actors has provided crisis management strategies with a further sense of legitimacy and purpose, and thus they have emerged as necessary elements of any successful approach.
Why are these groups so important? Primarily it is because these actors have specific interests?and can therefore pursue in-depth analyses of particular issues?and many more unlimited resources than institutions such as the United Nations. In turn, they are able to provide other actors involved in diplomatic efforts with detailed information regarding the situation at hand, and therefore their wisdom is an extremely useful tool to have during the development of diplomatic approaches. Non-state actors often display a high degree of interest and enthusiasm, and a willingness to continue to pursue the peaceful resolution of conflicts long after state actors have moved on to other issues. Depending on the circumstances of certain conflicts, non-state actors may be more appropriate actors for crisis management.
In the future, non-state actors must be accorded an even stronger position in crisis management strategies because of the potential emergence of conflicts that will, if not dealt with in a prompt manner, demand a high degree of specific knowledge for their resolution. Used in conjunction with the United Nations, these actors can provide a new lease on life for the international institution.
4. Individuals
In the course of this policy report, the role of individuals in international crisis diplomacy has been increasing heightened throughout the transitioning international order. It will therefore become apparent that individual actors, both leaders and private citizens, can exert a powerful influence over the structure and application of crisis management. Not only do these actors offer financial resources to crisis management efforts, but they often harness the power of the Internet to interact with other individuals and form strong collective action forums. These individuals display a readiness to act independently of Governmental Organizations, and by using the Internet as a means to obtain information and to garner support for international issues, they gain certain advantages over organizations such as the United Nations.
Leaders and others in positions of influence will often rule and conduct affairs in accordance with their preferences and experiences. History has shown that individuals can indeed exert a powerful force and can influence the outcome of world affairs in both positive and negative manners (e.g. Adolph Hitler and Slobodan Milosevic). Therefore, it is extremely important that future diplomatic strategies take into consideration the personalities, constraints, motivations, and external influences of individual actors in order to develop coherent policies that address the immense power and destruction that one person can exert.
- Instruments
1. Influences
What factors affect the manner in which actors behave on the international scene? There are several elements that have traditionally influenced international conduct, such as public opinion (public discourse) and perceptions of one's opponents. There are also influences that have only recently begun to emerge, such as the rise in sentiments of national and ethnic identity. These influences, regardless of their origin, dictate the decisions that actors make and consequently the type of tactics they employ when faced with potential or immediate conflict situations. Although the international social system "imposes restraints on the behavior of all actors, the behaviors rewarded and punished by the system will coincide, at least initially, with the interests of the most powerful members of the social system."
One example of the impact of public opinion on the behavior of states occurred during the Balkan crisis. Public opinion crucially influenced the level of American involvement in this conflict. Many Americans did not advocate the deployment of military personnel to the region until images of emaciated victims were broadcast across the country ("CNN Effect"), dredging up memories of the horrors of the Holocaust. See Table 1 for a comprehensive list of elements that affect international behaviors.
2. Means of Interaction
States have traditionally interacted with one another through the use of force (military/security) and through diplomatic meetings between heads of state or state envoys. For all the potential changes in international politics, force, primarily military might seems to remain the ultima ratio. Prior to the technological advances of the twentieth century, the use of force was through conventional weapons only. With the advent of weapons of mass destruction and the changing geostrategic balance, interactions between states have taken on a much more crucial dimension. Warfare is now characterized as either limited or total according to the level of destruction that combatants can incite. Furthermore, conflicts between states (interstate) have begun to be surpassed by conflicts between groups within one state (intrastate). This vastly complicates the position of a state in the international system in relation to other actors, and hence domestic situations can place a high degree of strain on international interactions.
States continually interact through the mediums of trade and commercial interaction - "courant normal." Trade provides a channel of communication that not only involves states financially but diplomatically as well. Negotiations on issues of trade, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement discussions, provide important opportunities for states to develop and strengthen international relationships and partnerships. These, in turn, may serve to positively influence future diplomatic exchanges.
Interactions may also take place through bargaining and negotiation sessions. These situations allow states to communicate their interests with their allies and adversaries so that all parties to the conflict can attempt to reach an agreement. Although international crisis diplomacy has evolved over the course of several centuries, many of the factors affecting negotiation strategies and situations have endured the test of time. Among the most important factors that govern the interactions between states are time, cost-benefit analyses, and the stakes of success and failure. These factors will be enumerated within the specific contexts of international interactions in subsequent sections of this report.
C. Objectives
def. an aim or goal
In general, most actors in the international system strive towards the attainment of peace and stability in the world order, while concurrently pursuing domestic goals and visions. Therefore, during the development of diplomatic strategies and approaches, all decisions regarding which actors to involve and which instruments to use must be made in light of the goals of security, justice, peace and prosperity. States must consider time, costs, long-term versus short-term domestic and international goals, and their respective domestic situations. In each of the periods of the transitioning international order that will be highlighted, the actors involved in diplomatic ventures sought to achieve peace for the long-term. They recognized that long periods of protracted conflict would destroy their states politically, economically, and socially, and that as the world became progressively more interdependent, the potential for conflict spillover would increase drastically. Clear and attainable diplomatic objectives are therefore necessary to effectively avoid and end world conflicts. Effective crisis management strategies must be concluded at minimal cost for all involved parties and must also be acceptable to all sides.
III. CRISIS MANAGEMENT: DEFINITIONS AND STRATEGIES
A crisis can be defined in two ways, and which definition is used depends upon the approach one takes to the study of crisis management. The first definition utilizes a systemic approach to the study of crises: "A significant change in the quantity, quality, or intensity of interactions among nations." The other approach places a greater emphasis upon the differences in opinions held by participants as to what constitutes a crisis: "A situation characterized by surprise, a high threat to important values, and short decision time." For our purposes, it is necessary to consider both definitions in the context of individual crises, and thus both should be taken into account when examining crisis management in general.
States will try to change the international system through war, not because they enjoy war, but because, as Waltz writes, "Force is a means of achieving the external ends of states because there exists no consistent, reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interest that inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of anarchy." Waltz's quotation also brings up an important point about the international system being anarchic. Crisis management can be thought of as an attempt to mitigate that anarchy, most often in the interest of the great powers, as evinced by the Congress of Vienna. However, the moment (in the 19th century) Prussia thought that it would be in its interest to abandon peace and stability it did so, and thus Otto von Bismark was able to form the modern German state through war. Once he had formed the state, it was no longer in his interest to continue war, and so he made alliances that would guarantee the peace until Germany once more thought that it would be in its interest to go to war. After all, neither Slobodan Milosevic, nor Saddam Hussein, had any interests in mitigating their respective crisis until the costs placed by great powers exceeded the benefits of continuing. This reflects on our discussion of the UN, NGO, and other international organizations and how they fit into crisis management.
The field of crisis management is concerned with the notion of inadvertent war, which is characterized "as a war that neither side wants or expects at the outset of a diplomatic crisis but one that nonetheless occurs during the course of the development of the crisis." International diplomacy is a form of crisis management, and it has been a staple of the world system since the early beginnings of European diplomacy. It remains an important aspect of the present era due to the advent of modern technologies that can instantaneously annihilate the world (i.e. weapons of mass destruction). In order to attempt to manage a developing crisis, it is imperative that all parties to the conflict acquire an understanding of the issues at hand, develop adequate communication modes, and also agree to employ the necessary means to pursue the resolution of the conflict.
According to Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, there are seven requirements of an effective crisis management strategy:
- Maintain top-level civilian control of military operations in order to prevent any
- Create pauses in the tempo of military actions so as to provide for an adequate
- Coordinate diplomatic and military moves as part of an integrative strategy to
- Confine military moves to those that constitute clear demonstration of one's resolve and are appropriate to one's limited crisis objectives.
- Avoid military moves that give the opponent the impression that one is about to
- Choose diplomatic-military options that signal a desire to negotiate rather than to seek a military solution.
- Select diplomatic-military options that leave the opponent a way out of the crisis that is compatible with his fundamental interests.
inadvertent actions that could lead to the development of conflict.
amount of time for the evolution of diplomatic communications.
prevent the conflict from escalating into war.
resort to large-scale warfare and, therefore, force him to consider preemption.
Decision-makers must therefore utilize all available information when developing a crisis management strategy in order to lessen the chance that a conflict will develop or escalate. Nevertheless, there are several potential problems that may impair the ability of decision-makers to formulate a coherent strategy: cognitive rigidity, narrowed perspective, and perceptions of time pressure. Those individuals and groups that are involved in crisis management must remain open to alternative courses of action and must, to the best of their ability, take into careful consideration the alternatives available to their opponents. They also should demonstrate an acute awareness of the situation from all sides in order to avoid the potentially harmful effects of a one-track perspective. Finally, it is imperative that decision-makers clearly understand the time frame that they must work with in order to understand the "consequences of failure" if an agreement is not reached.
Crisis management strategies ought to evolve in order to remain in sync with the ever-changing nature of the international system. Advancements in technology and communications systems have been both a blessing and a curse for policymakers because although leaders can exert more control over military operations, the pace of conflict escalation is likely to increase and exhibit itself through the intensification of time pressure. The role of public opinion has made those in positions of leadership even more accountable for their decisions, and thus the importance of communication amongst all parties cannot be stressed enough. With a rise in the number of ideological disputes in the modern era, opponents must be willing to compromise some of their "fundamental interests" in order to avoid war. This entails a high degree of cooperation between adversaries, and decision-makers who have the ability to see past their own interests in order to pursue the attainment of a greater good for all involved.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM "[there are] three prerequisites of an effective international system, agreed aims,
appropriate structures, and commonly accepted procedures" - Craig and George, 105.
- The Emerging World System
- The Transitioning International Order: Lessons From the Past
In the past, conflicts, whether intrastate or interstate, were mostly caused by national interests. More often now, unrest is derived from human rights issues, cultural diaspora, religious faiths, or some combination there within.
Every crisis we studied was engendered by a group's the pursuit of power, the same as it always has been. Unlike previous centuries, however, groups, be they state or domestic political groups, posses the capability to inflict enormous destruction. These new sources of tension run deeper and more divisively due to their historical roots and personal nature, lending conflict a greater intensity and making resolutions harder to sustain. Ingrained beliefs and theology cannot be negotiated like political disputes or economic sanctions. Instead, human rights, culture, and religion should be thought of as issues with the power to unite, not the danger to divide, a people.
Humanitarian needs and the maintenance of human rights are principles that have been used increasingly to justify intervention in local skirmishes. Nelson Mandela writes,
The neglect of human rights is the certain recipe for internal and international disaster. The powerful secessionist movements that are found throughout the world are nurtured by neglect. The erosion of national sovereignty by global forces, from trade to communications, has paradoxically been accompanied by an increase in the means to ensure separateness: the right to differ has, tragically, become the fight to differ.
As time and distance are lessened by globalization, the amalgamation of cultures can cause serious friction. Cozy connotations of the "global village" are occasionally refuted by the overlap or disconnect between ethnic groups, necessitating a mending process that can be painful. Diversity and an incomplete national identity lead to the disenfranchisement of subcultures and the quest for greater representation. This understandable desire can lead to disorder or claims for self-determination and secession, either of which can result in bloodshed. In order for national disintegration not to occur, leaders must make a concerted effort to include and celebrate all cultures. With respect to conflicting cultures separated only by external boundaries, national leaders and the UN must mitigate any tension so that a local friction does not escalate into cultural and international warfare.
These three aspects, human rights, religion, and culture, have a direct relation to the presence of defense systems, weapons of mass destruction, and human suffering. Observance of personal freedom and basic provisions (education, health care, and security) fortify a populace, affording each individual opportunity and hope. Citizens should also expect a protection of faith and culture. Religion and heritage can bring together a torn people, fostering respect and positive relations among countrymen. If opportunity, hope, and respect are withheld from segments of a society, communities and governments are susceptible to crisis, whether it stems from violence or human tragedy, or both.
For now, sophisticated weaponry, disease and famine are separate. As weapons become more advanced and proliferate, and illness becomes more widespread and fatal, both threats swell and grow closer together. Imagine an iron bar. On one side, weapons of mass destruction; on the other, disease and natural disasters. Both issues worsen and grow heavier pushing down on their respective side of the bar. Once bent downwards, it is nearly impossible to bend the bar back. Disposing of weapons or curing epidemics is not done easily, especially in volatile regions. These sides get bent more and more until they are pulled together, resulting in a horrific combination: a high-powered arsenal controlled by victims of neglect and disease, emotionally driven, seeking only to redress their grievances towards their oppressors. Such a scenario may seem far-fetched or overly dramatic, but the unthinkable technology and unimaginable strife of today and tomorrow make anything possible, calling for a proactive and attentive international community.
The international political system is essentially about the politics of power. States who have power strive to retain it, while less-powerful states endeavor to gain more power. This results in a struggle for power, a situation that has characterized the state of international affairs for many centuries. Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson have identified several elements that interact with power: "power and influence, power and force, usable and unusable power, legitimate and illegitimate power." These types of interactions influence the decisions of policymakers in the international system by prioritizing the notion of power in the diplomatic process.
Over time, the world order has changed from a multipolar system to a bipolar system and finally to the system of unipolarity, which is currently in a precarious balance at the advent of the twenty-first century. This evolution of the international system has resulted in many power shifts that have undoubtedly affected relations between states. During the European balance of power era - 18th and 19th century - there were several states whose actions dictated the world state of affairs. This multipolar system consisted of a high level of interaction and alliance-building between the most powerful states in Europe. After the experience of two world wars, however, the period of multi-polarity gave way to the bipolar Cold War system in which the Soviet Union and the United States of America engaged in a long struggle for power. Other actors in the international system were forced to join one side or the other if they wanted to have any degree of influence or interaction with the two centers of world power.
Multipolar and bipolar systems tend to be viewed as more stable than unipolar systems because when there is one great power in the international system, other states may move to counteract this amount of power, which could lead to conflict. In the Post-Cold War era and the emerging system of the twenty-first century, the United States has assumed a unipolar position on the international scene. It has a "decisive preponderance in all the underlying components of power: economic, military, technological, and geopolitical." Consequently, the power position of the United States in the international order, although previously difficult and perhaps hindered, is increasingly threatened by partnerships between nations such as Russia and China - especially in the realm of nuclear weapons - and by international concerns over Washington's new policies.
What are the diplomatic ramifications associated with a unipolar system? The United States' hegemonic status entails that it take the lead in the realm of international affairs, which includes approaches to international crisis diplomacy. In many instances, however, the United States abstains from action if participation would contradict its interests. The lack of involvement by the United States in a conflict situation may serve to lessen the importance of that crisis on the world scale, which in turn allows the situation to worsen and possibly escalate out of control. Therefore, the reigning world power must be highly involved in collective approaches to diplomacy in order to legitimate interventions and change the course of conflict.
2. World War I and the Interwar Period: The League of Nations and Isolationism
The larger element of the interwar period was the rise in the use of economic diplomacy. The allied powers were intent on punishing Germany through the imposition of reparation payments. This raised an important question for the future of international diplomacy: to what extent should postwar diplomacy be punitive? Should the focus be placed upon the type of punishment or the process of rehabilitation? Using economic tactics as a diplomatic tool had consequences for the victors as well. With the ever-increasing degree of economic interdependence among states in the international system, there is a danger posed to one's own domestic markets if the economy is used as a weapon.
Was the League of Nations flawed as an institution, or did its failure lay in the fact that its creators misjudged the power of the public's desire for isolationism? In essence, the diplomatic efforts during the interwar period failed because of the lack of the establishment of an effective barrier against a repetition of the display of aggression. Negotiators underestimated the international dimensions of domestic punishments. The interwar period thus contributed an important lesson to the study of international crisis diplomacy: public opinion was a factor that was here to stay, and as such, future diplomatic approaches must include public discourse.
3. International Organizations: The Post-World War II Era and the United Nations
The United Nations is the only international organization examined thus far that has maintained a degree of permanence over the last nearly six decades. Therefore, it is apparent that the post-World War II leaders carefully considered past diplomatic experiences when crafting this institution. Although it has had its successes and failures, the United Nations has provided a forum for the coordination of international actions and the expressions of grievances. Yet it must work harder to recognize and address, to the best of its abilities, the views and grievances of its small-power members. The UN must continue to evolve in order to function as an effective element of international crisis diplomacy.
4. The Cold War and the Evolution of the International System
The role of leadership (personality, constraints, motivations, and external influences) and ideology during the Cold War proved to be an essential part of why the Cuban Missile Crisis stopped short of actual war. Kennedy and Krushchev were both strong proponents of their respective systems of government, and believed that their own nation's force capabilities vastly outweighed their opponents. Nevertheless, these men were extremely capable and intelligent leaders as well, and they understood the intensity and precariousness of the situation at hand. Kennedy was the leader of a democratic nation, and as such, he believed that although democratic ideals should be promoted throughout the world (and communism should be contained), democracy was not to be used as a basis for violence. Thus, ideological motivations can only go so far before other methods of reasoning must be considered. The fact that the Cold War was an ideological war and not an actual military effort can be attributed to the actions of both Kennedy and Krushchev.
The most important technological advancement during this period was the advent of the atomic bomb. This had severe consequences for foreign policy. First, war could no longer be used as a means of foreign policy because it had the potential to be totally destructive. Second, security policy began to be subjected to an increasing amount of democratization, and as such, the public became much more interested in the aims and instruments of security policy. Hence, nuclear weaponry compelled both sides to consider an alteration in the balance of power to be a threatening move. This had an incredible effect on international crisis diplomacy. Statesmen realized that the process of negotiation must be accorded a large degree of respect and that all parties to the conflict should make every attempt to resolve the issues short of war, because once one resorted to the use of force it was all over. The most important lesson that can be taken from this scenario was that there are times when even the most severe crises can bring about a greater degree of understanding between adversaries and thus begin the transformation from a negative relationship to a positive one.
5. Détente-1970s
Instead of promoting antagonisms between states in the international system, the strategy of accommodation used during this "experimental" period proved to be successful in increasing the role of communication in diplomatic ventures. Nonetheless, the force of public opinion left world leaders with no choice but to yield to the demands of the electorate. In future circumstances, the amount of power accorded to public opinion must, like all other power ventures, be kept in check. If public opinion is allowed to gain too much momentum, world leaders will be hampered in their efforts to negotiate and coordinate actions on the international level.
6. The New World Order II
This period marked the beginning of a changing dynamic in the world system. What did the emergence of unipolarity mean for the process of international cooperation? What role would international organizations, such as the United Nations, play in the new global system? What is the future role for regional organizations, such as the OSCE, and supranational organizations, such as the EU? To make matters even more complex, the rise in the number of rogue states combined with the spread of destabilizing nuclear technologies elevated the urgency of the development of new international crisis diplomacy strategies. Was the world becoming too complicated for the creation of effective conflict management approaches?
Rogue states present a challenge to the art of diplomacy because many of them exhibit threatening external behaviors and possess nuclear technologies. The proliferation of rogue states, or even quasi-state actors, and their interest in obtaining direct control of weapons of mass destruction changes the manner in which deterrence mechanisms are developed and implemented. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber expressed the problem with this growing situation: These developments not only challenge the established global system and five established nuclear powers under supposedly unipolar US leadership. They also raise the haunting specter not whether nuclear arms are going to be detonated in war, but merely when this is going to happen. Only a determined and humane global leadership by the US and its EU allies, considering strategic realities as much as economic and humanitarian and environmental needs, will be able to prevent escalation of the various crises and help avoid nuclear exchange. As more states and even other actors seek to acquire the technology to create nuclear weapons, the state of international affairs will become even more tenuous; certainly crisis management will become ever more complex. The international community must therefore advocate a collective approach to the containment of such technologies and create even stronger methods of enforcement.
The changing nature of conflict has posed a challenge for organizations such as the United Nations. There is an ongoing debate regarding the limits of sovereignty for the nation-state. Is there a clear point past which any degree of intervention by the international community would be violating international norms of sovereignty? In order to attempt to answer this question and formulate coherent intervention policies, the international community must take into account the motives, means, and consequences of potential interventions. When there are undue costs to human life, vast amounts of destruction, and/or other violations of generally accepted norms and regulations that exceed an "acceptable" level, the international community is generally justified to intervene in the conflict.
There are other factors to consider, however, when proposing an international intervention in the affairs of a sovereign nation. The case of Somalia was a clear failure for the United Nations and the United States as an example of conflict management. Due to operational mistakes and misperceptions, the United States was forced to pull out of Somalia after the Somalis mangled and killed several American soldiers. Their message: stay out of our affairs. American public opinion was influenced by the actions of the Somalis, and the public therefore called for a decrease in the degree of American involvement in humanitarian interventions. Consequently, the United States began to promote its domestic agenda over its international responsibilities, and thus when conflict erupted in Rwanda, the United States refused to participate in any form of intervention sponsored by the United Nations.
The rise of ethnic and nationalist sentiments became the number one concern of organizations such as the United Nations. Why has there been a sudden rise in claims of nationalism? The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the rapid increase in the process of decolonization left many groups without a unifying social factor. Thus, they began to form their own communities based upon ties of ethnicity and religion, and soon these groups began to demand their right to self-determination. This presented a huge problem for the field of diplomacy. In the Balkan crisis, ethnic and nationalist sentiments proliferated out of control while the international community argued over what type of action to take and who would implement such actions. If a diplomatic effort to the crisis was sought in the initial stages of conflict with adequate military reinforcement, it is very possible that the amount of lives lost and damaged in the former Yugoslavia could have been avoided.
The question that remains as we enter the twenty-first century is the future of the United Nations. Will the framework of collective security still function in the years to come? Will preventive diplomacy replace collective security? In a collective security system, "if a state crosses a line, all the others are to unite against it and push it back," while preventive diplomacy dictates that "if a state crosses a line, the United Nations steps in and holds the parties apart without saying who was right or wrong." In order to strengthen its system of multilateral diplomacy the United Nations needs to reassess its current methods of preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding, and adopt preventive diplomacy as its primary strategy. The UN needs to also develop and incorporate (1) a clear, contemporary international mandate, (2) the involvement and support of the great powers, and (3) adequate authority, resources (including financial) and equipment. This will promote the institution as a progressive leader in the emergence of future international systems.
V. ACTORS, INSTRUMENTS AND OBJECTIVES UNDER A NEW APPROACH
To contain proliferation successfully and care for the ill, a new approach to diplomacy and international affairs needs to be taken. States are now joined by a wide array of other actors, from regional and international organizations to multinational corporations, that have the capability of addressing these issues and working together to form a more collective crisis management framework. This cooperative model stresses specialization, utilizing the advantages of each actor and spreading the burden of intervention more evenly.
Individual leaders push for domestic reform and represent national interests abroad. Political stability and strong heads of state are critical to the preservation of institutional legitimacy and civil peace. Fair elections and political representation link the populace to their government and the degradation of either one of these elements invites an "us" versus "them" public mentality. Effective diplomacy is contingent upon international agreement on principles of governance, principles that leader's constituency must ratify first.
Constituencies have grown larger than single countries. In the aftermath of the Cold War, states look to form regional alliances, serving strategic purposes and bringing capital benefits through economic integration. Supranational institutions, like the European Union, provide a dimension of collective, regional identity and encourage group-decision making. Regarding military dimensions, international relations, and monetary policy, such an organization can act uniformly and command a stronger voice in diplomatic deliberations than individual (lesser) powers. Nevertheless, the EU is a phenomenon not easily replicable.
The UN has established itself as an effective force in conflict resolution. Because of its infrastructure and - many times - its neutrality, the UN assumes a unique role in peacekeeping, peacemaking and diplomacy. Possible actions from the representative assembly, the Security Council, special representatives and the SG include election observation, sanctions, weapons inspection, and troop deployment. All four of these options promote democracy and peace. Monitoring weapons development precludes states from covertly stockpiling an offensive arsenal and suddenly having the capacity to decimate their enemies. If international guidelines are not followed, the UN has the capacity to respond punitively.
In recent conflicts, humanitarian aspects have justified international intervention. Article I of the UN Charter asserts its purpose: To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of peace. Epidemics and natural disasters, such as AIDS and earthquakes, tear at the social fabric of countries, robbing families and communities of life and inciting rumblings against the system that cannot protect the afflicted. In Africa, 25 million people are infected with AIDS; fewer than one-tenth are treated. Even in cases where external factors or insufficient resources are to blame for the demise of a society, dissent against the State will rise and increase.
Leaders are to develop creative ways to provide health services and preserve public health. To do so, they must cooperate with new actors, delegating responsibilities when necessary or useful. Many of these new actors are nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), whose nature and purpose set them apart from classical diplomats. NGOs have specific knowledge and the capability to respond expeditiously and effectively. Their apolitical and proactive qualities keep them from getting entangled in issues of self-determination. Instead, with the backing of their respective governments, NGOs can prevent human atrocities and supply necessary provisions to suffering victims.
In addition, an NGO presence after a conflict can be quite stabilizing. Groups can perform a wide assortment of functions, such as: [D]emining operations, the demobilization of soldiers, resettling refugees and displaced persons, provide public services such as water, sanitation, and shelter repair and construction, encourage agricultural rehabilitation to achieve food security, manage health clinics, and undertake numerous other activities designed to promote reconciliation. To establish peace, diplomacy must be focused on the after as much as the before. NGOs provide vital assistance when it comes to community development and peacebuilding.
Nevertheless, there are dangers associated with NGO autonomy in the areas of accountability, transparency and ultimate responsibility. These dangers must be addressed in a cooperative setting with NGOs, international organizations, and governments. NGOs should be accorded a certain degree of autonomy, but states must coordinate these efforts and evaluate the performance of NGOs prior to establishing long-term partnerships as part of a collective approach to crisis diplomacy.
Somewhat similar to NGOs, multinational corporations and individual citizens can help cure the health crisis. Through debt relief or funding for health research and development, troubled nations are able to focus on domestic issues or work towards medical breakthroughs in the form of more effective treatments or cures. States and international organizations should appeal to corporations and wealthy individuals' senses of responsibility and common humanity, offering philanthropic incentives in the form of tax breaks or business contracts when necessary, for capital inflows to increase and social conditions to improve.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS DIPLOMACY--
Lessons of the Past, Factors for the Future
The evolving international system has engendered a host of diplomatic revolutions. The most recent of these has been the democratization of international crisis diplomacy. Although the actors and instruments of diplomacy have undergone profound changes, the main objectives pursued, peace and stability, have endured the test of time. During the nineteenth century, statesmen were concerned with the geostrategic expression of power, economic interests, colonial empires, and the reestablishment of the balance-of-power. As the years progressed, however, those interests gave way to issues of humanitarian ideals, competing ideologies, global political power struggles, and problems of cultural difference. Regardless of the nature of the conflict, diplomats have historically endeavored to bring peace and stability to the international system through the establishment of institutionalized forms of communication.
All actors, old and new, must be mindful of past acts of engagement and intervention, their success and warnings alike. Even as daily life, governments, and boundaries change, history manages to subtly repeat itself. Longtime adversaries and feuding religions return to rival claims to territory and sovereignty. Political chaos or economic hardship revisits a country or a region if international commitment is abandoned. If we do not study and apply the lessons from the past today, we only perpetuate conflict for tomorrow.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has dominated the international agenda, impacted where and to what degree intervention would take place. Regional blocs and new alliances are being formed to counter U.S. hegemony. Recently, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Lusyukob "raised the idea of a Russia-India-China axis in order 'create a solid foundation'for a new, multipolar world order." Nations seek protection of security and power under their own aegis and alliances like NATO before advancing the common cause of peace, suggesting that multipolarity, for better or for worse, is on its way back.
Beyond countries with nuclear firepower, the international system must do more to serve and protect all nations. If need and interest are ignored, marginalized states might retract from the international system and practice disgruntled statism, possibly ignoring compliance in the areas of proliferation and human rights. Emerging rogue states are presented with a less harmonious global system and greater access to harmful weapons. Weakened enforcement and participation further deteriorates social conditions in volatile regions. Decreased global attention and poor treatment result in potential spillover, spreading disease and sending the health spiral barreling downward.
"Diplomacy is the system and art of communication between powers," Martin Wight wrote simply. Greater interdependence and new threats of terrorism make diplomacy more important?and complicated. National representation occurs on many levels, sometimes with varying interests, and decisions are made quickly with advances in communication and technology. Nevertheless, the individual diplomat, the human dimension of engagement, continues to be decisive.
Since the beginning of "nuclear diplomacy" during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the interaction between leaders has determined outcome. U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Soviet leader Nikita N. Khrushchev, and their liaisons, Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, respectively, brought the world back safely from the precipice of nuclear war. Trust and respect must be maintained among leaders and diplomats, for regardless of the impact of innovation or the magnitude of catastrophe, the human element of international relations will be most vital.
The past decade has witnessed globalization like never before. Trade and technology have opened borders, promoting liberty and offering information to millions for the first time. Human rights and peacekeeping have been central to foreign policy in a time of relative calm and stability. Fledgling democracies have been upheld; diplomacy, not destruction, has been the method used to resolve conflict. But the last ten years have been comprised of downfall as well as determination. Failed missions in Rwanda, Bosnia, and East Timor cost lives and weakened credibility of international intervention. Uncertainty about when to intervene and partial commitment to intervention has caused failure and require international attention.
Guiding principles must be defined and adhered to avoid futile and fruitless diplomatic endeavors in the future. As Stanley Hoffmann puts it, If one is convinced that ethnic conflict is both a threat to peace and security and a threat to fundamental liberal values of respect for life and diversity, then one must provide mechanisms capable of accomplishing the tasks of prevention and settlement that are so badly carried out at present and that cannot be left to often questionable, fragile, and selfish states. What this requires is, on the one hand, the scrapping of the sacrosanct distinction between interstate and intrastate conflicts, once the latter begin to threaten peace or to violate fundamental human rights. Ideally, states and regions would manage their own conflicts and disputes. The appropriate infrastructure, however, does not yet exist for this to occur. Until then, the global community (the U.N. in particular) must advance human rights, clamp down on the spread of weapons, and stand firm in its purpose, so that these two pressing issues do not mix.
To reasonably pursue this aim, crisis management will have to democratized. Actors and social fragments are too many in number for pertinent heads of state to a craft peace plan alone. Representatives of international and nongovernmental organizations should be involved in conflict resolution and minority parties should be included as well. The three-sided experience in Bosnia (Serbians, Croatians, and Muslims) is just a taste of the complicated "potpourri crisis management" that will be required in the future. The more thoroughly minority grievances are addressed, the less likely escalation is to occur and the more likely a workable solution is to materialize and be implemented.
In the pursuit of nuclear containment and humanitarian aid, actors have numerous instruments at their disposal. Mass media has created a feeding frenzy for information and newsmaking. Cyberspace and the airwaves influence public opinion and drive diplomacy, affecting the way we think and act. Increased information can shape outcome and present alternative solutions, such as self-determination, that might be less fatal and more sustainable.
The media is a continued instrument of diplomacy, but its potential offers fresh hope in the areas of terrorism, famine, and disease. Around-the-clock, up-to-the-minute coverage gives the public a greater awareness and accessible visualization of current events. Suffering and war victims are captured on the screen and sent into millions of households, forcing citizens to be uncomfortable and hopefully compelled to act.
Selective coverage and media manipulation can mean the difference between war and peace. The international focus on the Balkans was caused by the diplomatic hype and the media's willingness to transmit "the message" to engender public support. Why the Balkans demanded such a concerted effort while dire situations like Rwanda did not speaks to the power of sound-bites and public response.
The press has a certain responsibility not just to report the news objectively but to be cognizant of its own impact on world affairs. In an age where rapid information necessitates quick decisions, inaccurate facts can be disastrous. To that end, reporters must be sure not to print relying on an option to retract, prioritizing expediency over professionalism. Diplomats need to use the media to their advantage, by shedding light on crises without weapons, those that are more silent but just as dramatic. Disturbing snapshots of emaciated villagers and helpless children might be necessary in order to elicit a charged public reaction to fund and save those threatened by terminal conditions.
Sometimes international actions have unintended consequences that bring about suffering. Economic sanctions are a popular way to punish - perhaps even attempt to displace - a leader. Generally, however, sanctions only come at the expense of the people. According to John Mueller and Karl Mueller, in an attempt to remove Saddam Hussein from power, "Economic sanctions may well have been a necessary cause of the deaths of more people in Iraq than have been slain by all so-called weapons of mass destruction throughout history." The head of state has public resources to tap into and ways of protecting himself from an insurgency. If and when a leader is ousted due to economic depravity, whoever succeeds the displaced is left with a bleak situation, having to reconstruct the country and come up with ways to treat ubiquitous poverty. Instead of making a country's people suffer for the actions of its leader, other punitive methods should be pursued.
One way to castigate leaders would be International Court of Justice and War Crimes Tribunal or something similar. Contentions are quickly raised here, due to concerns of sovereignty and Western dominance. As Joseph Nye opines, "International law basically reflects the fragmented nature of international politics. The weak sense of community means there is less willingness to obey or restrain oneself out of a sense of obligation or acceptance of authority." Full support and actual legitimacy have thus far been withheld, so perhaps another, more balanced international legal system would be prudent.
To construct this new system of jurisprudence, the leadership of the United Nations and the cooperation of states and nongovernmental organizations will be needed. This triangular approach will provide the following: (1) The United Nations Security Council will form a representative body to adjudicate the international legal system, which will consist of cases between states; (2) States can file grievances against one another to address issues of boundary, recompense, and humanitarian nature; (3) Nongovernmental organizations can provide testimony about domestic conditions and supply humanitarian assistance per U.N. judgments; (4) States found guilty of crimes against humanity will be forced to pay for NGO intervention (5) United Nations military troops will be employed if necessary to enforce decisions.
This "Triangle System" is a heightened challenge for the U.N. but, for the issues of governance and international fairness, there is no other choice. Such a model relies on the compliance of nations and nongovernmental organizations but fosters cooperation and dependence between the two actors. The International Court of Justice and War Crimes Tribunal should be preserved for the purposes of extradition and trying individuals who allegedly commit atrocities of war. However, the Tribunal must gain legitimacy in the international community in order to act as an effective deterrent against potential human rights violators and war criminals. Much of the Tribunal's legitimacy has been eroded due to its practices of selective justice, largely driven by the consensus of international public opinion rather than by actual legal practice. Therefore, the Tribunal must act as a consistent monitor and prosecutor of war crimes occurring around the globe. Former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic was indicted by the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal almost two years ago, and still has not been brought to trial as the Yugoslav government still denies the legitimacy of the War Crimes Tribunal. The situation is even worse with regard to Radovan Karadjcic and General Radko Mladic. While indictments might make a moral statement on the act of war crimes, if the War Crimes Tribunal can not effectively prosecute these indictments, it will serve no other purpose than to simply create international norms that can be acted against without facing any punitive repercussions.
In addition to international accountability, another settlement that has become more prevalent is that of self-determination. Self-determination provides self-governance and modest autonomy but stops short of ceding full independence or international recognition as such. Misperception about this solution, and fears of its consequences, have caused many governments to stray from this option, leading to deeper resentment among minority groups who seek representation. Regions largely comprised of a minority group claim that they are underrepresented or discriminated against, while two-thirds of all ongoing conflict is identity-based. National institutions must be willing to address the grievances of minorities appropriately or be willing to grant self-determination, for, as Stanley Hoffmann asserts, "There is...no way anymore of removing national self-determination from the list of rights granted by international law to individuals and peoples."
Russia worries that granting classical self-determination to Chechnya - permitting eventually Chechen independence - will lead to further disintegration in what is typically referred to as the negative "domino effect." Moscow is afraid, as are other central authorities, that classical self-determination with its ultimate aim will come at the expense of territorial unity. As research has proven however, this worry is unfounded: it appears that the Chechen leaders are far from demanding independence at all costs; rather they ask for effective autonomy, Moscow's and the world's assistance, and - most importantly - being accepted as a regular community with rights equal to the others. It seems that with some good will, Moscow could make a positive showcase out of the ashes of Grozny - and demonstrate to comparable situations that the new Russian leadership is indeed moving towards the implementation of traditional European values.
The potentially "state-shattering" consequences of self-determination is a concern among numerous governments and experts. If, however, the unsettled situation is not effectively dealt with, the resulting violence will in the end have a greater destabilizing effect than any allowance of a process which on the one hand may permit greater autonomy (and regional integration), while on the other offering a safety valve (assurance for continued communal autonomy) for the community concerned, and an excellent example of peaceful resolution for comparable cases elsewhere. The option of self-determination should be seen as not as an automatic decision, but as a fair compromise between two groups that are in an intractable situation. It can provide the necessary space and representative governance while not weakening the state at-large. However, it is important to keep in mind that not all cases of self-determination will actually be viewed as a fair compromise. Indeed, after announcement of the results of East Timor's 1999 UN-sponsored referendum vote, only four hours later, intense violence broke out on the island between pro-independence and pro-Indonesian militia groups. Pro-Indonesian East Timorese - the ostensible "losers" of the vote - refused to accept the results of the referendum (a 78.5 percent vote for independence from Indonesia), consequently protesting the referendum through violence for ten days in the absence of UN troops. Learning by this example, UN peacekeepers must consider whether or not self-determination is actually possible without widespread violence or claims of illegitimacy.
Once a solution, whether one to allow for self-determination or otherwise, is brokered, the true challenge is effectively implementing and sustaining an agreement. James Lane set out the following criteria:
- A joint agreement that sufficiently satisfies the underlying needs and interests of all parties and does not sacrifice any key values of the parties
- Enduring, so that the parties will not repudiate the agreement, even in periods of political change
- Largely self-implemented and monitored, since agreement are not likely to hold up if elaborate enforcement mechanisms are required over an extended period
- Built on standards of fairness and justice and not solely on compromise
- Of sufficient advantage to all parties, so that adhering to the agreement will be more beneficial than not.
Conflict resolution is more important in light of the technological revolution that has taken place over the last two decades. Information is more plentiful, but so are weapons. Accessing and employing weapons of mass destruction is facilitated by reductions in cost and infrastructure. Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons threaten not only the existence of institutions but of mankind, and technology levels the playing field: rogue states and international actors can limit U.S. dominance by "exploiting disruptive technologies that thwart America's advantages." Organized crime and terrorist groups might not have American resources, but they may soon have access to the some of the same weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
The United States and all nations have to be prepared to defend against such a destructive attack. This does not translate into missile defense systems, but more a global security that eliminates the possibility of diplomacy under sheer intimidation. Again, this will require greater responsibility and resources for the international organization, but member countries must be willing to pay more for the cause and assurance of peace. Heightened alert and preparedness must be joined by an effective containment strategy. The elusiveness of technology exchange makes defense more difficult, but international intelligence must be developed and restrictions must be in place to limit threats and know where they are coming from. In a way, technology must serve to solve the problems it helped create.
The nature of crisis in the modern era presents significant new diplomatic challenges. The emergence of crises of self-determination, organized criminality, and weapons of mass destruction dramatically shift the global power structure. It is therefore necessary to adopt new approaches to diplomacy in order for the international community to effectively address these rising issues. J. Lewis Rasmussen stresses that future diplomatic strategies [W]ill have to account for internal conflicts that, in a variety of ways, elude the confines of borders. Balance-of-power considerations cannot adequately explain the religious, ethnic, and other identity-based sources of contemporary international conflict. As a consequence, the new paradigm will be much more value-laden in its service as a prescriptive device - quite a different role from realism's emphasis on global superpower war. It is thus necessary to create anticipatory strategies (preventive diplomacy) in order to address the emerging tension between the global perspective, and the ideals and objectives of individual communities. These new strategies must address differences in value perspectives, and in the growing discrepancies between religious and ideological fundamentalisms. In addition, a common set of goals must be identified and pursued by the international community
The international community must therefore adopt a collective crisis management approach that involves a variety of state and non-state actors, individuals, international organizations and corporations, and local and regional administrations. Due to the increase in the number of intergroup conflicts in the world today and the changing nature of technological, social, economic, and political issues, it is very important that the international community and local organizations develop a close relationship in order to address these issues from both a bottom-up and a top-down perspective. In essence, "today's perspective on conflict and change requires closer examination of the grievances, emphasis on the needs of the protagonists, and fewer panoramas taken from the viewpoint of the major powers."
International crisis diplomacy strategies must consequently be both coherent and credible if they are to be effective conflict management and resolution tools. They must take into account the objectives and capabilities of all parties to the conflict. The emergence of a new international system demands the development of collective diplomatic approaches in order to achieve peace and stability in the coming era. Most importantly, however, international and national actors must consider the failures and successes of past diplomatic experiments as they embark on the journey to the future.
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Nicolson, Harold George, Sir. "Transition From Old Diplomacy To The New," Diplomacy. London: Oxford University Press, 1964, 56-79.
Nye, Joseph S. "Is There an Enduring Logic of Conflict in World Politics?" In Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts, Third Edition. New York: Longman, 2000, 1-29.
______. Understanding International Conflicts, Third Edition. New York: Longman, 2000, 147-176.
Rasmussen, J. Lewis and I. William Zartman. "Peacemaking in the Twenty-First Century?New Rules, New Roles, New Actors. Peacemaking in International Conflict?Methods and Techniques. United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997
Schroeder, Paul W. "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management." In Klaus Knorr (ed.), Historical Dimensions of National Security Policy. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976, 227-262.
Selth, Andrew. Against Every Human Law - The Terrorist Threat to Diplomacy. Australian National University Press, 1998. p. 15.
Stremlau, John. "Ending Africa's Wars." Foreign Affairs. Vol. 79. No. 4, 2000.
Tractenberg, Marc. "The Coming of the First World War: A Reassessment." In Marc Tractenberg (ed.), History and Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991, Chapter 2, 47-99.
Walt, Stephen M. "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," Foreign Policy, Spring 1998, 29-46.
Weller, Mark. "The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo." International Affairs, 75, 2 (1999). p. 248.
Wohlforth, William C. "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, Vol.
24, No. 1 (Summer 1999): 5-41.
Considering relevant elements
From the Case Studies
Of
Cuba, Kuwait, Bosnia/Kosovo, Chechnya, and Kashmir
Prepared
by
Jennifer Nam
Cuban Missile Crisis
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| Objectives |
Short-term: remove immediate missile threat from Cuba
Long-term: nonproliferation; status quo |
Short-term: defend Cuba
Long-term: repair strategic balance of power |
| Stakes/Costs | Mass destruction | Mass destruction |
| Actors |
State Leaders: JFK vs. Kruschev
|
| Instruments | Weapons of mass destruction: threat of mass destruction acted as a deterrent against the use of force |
| Influences |
Perceptions (or misperceptions) of the other: defensive measures were perceived by the other state as offensive intent
Public opinion: absent |
| Factors |
Luxury of time: game of threat, wait, respond
Extremely high costs: induced caution on both sides and motivation for peaceful resolution |
|
Endgame
Compromise: Soviet Union removes missiles from Cuba in exchange for removal of U.S. missiles from Turkey, re-establishing the balance of power |
Kuwait Crisis
| U.S./UN | Iraq | |
| Objectives |
Short-term: protect Kuwait's sovereignty; stop Iraqi expansion
Long-term: regional stability and status quo in the Middle East |
Short-term: annex Kuwait
Long-term: gain regional hegemony |
| Stakes/Costs |
Influence in Middle East
Oil prices Possible mass destruction |
Kuwait's oil
Iraqi economy Possible mass destruction |
| Actors |
George Bush: establish a new world order for the post-Cold War world
United Nations: collective security American public: averse to loss of American lives |
Saddam Hussein: wanted regional power and political survival |
| Instruments | UN coalition: disapproval of the international community Economic sanctions
Threat of nuclear retaliation |
Threat of chemical/biological weapons |
| Influences |
Public opinion: very supportive of use of American force
Experience: fear of another Vietnam debacle inspired strong military force Preventive Strike: offensive measures better than defensive First "CNN war": "patriotic journalism" by American media rallied public support; portrayed Saddam as Hitler |
Public opinion: manipulated and ignored by Saddam
Economy: failing after 8-year strain from Iran-Iraq War |
|
Endgame
Limited Military Action: Washington was unwilling to compromise, claiming that in a "just war" there are no compromises. American troops defeated Iraq in 100 days, yet the U.S. was unwilling to occupy Iraq, leaving Saddam in power. |
Kosovo Crisis
| U.S./NATO | Yugoslavia | |
| Objectives |
Short-term: end fighting/suffering
Long-term: peaceful settlement, regional security, status quo, autonomy for Kosovo within Yugoslavia |
Short-term: ethnic-cleansing of Albanian Kosovars
Long-term: create a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia |
| Stakes/Costs |
Regional stability
Fear of loss of life |
Borders |
| Actors | NATO: first military campaign; set norm of international intervention into sovereign territory EU: internally divided U.S.: no direct interests at stake American public: opposed to use of ground troops |
Milosevic: wanted power aggrandizement; used ethnic differences as propaganda |
| Instruments |
Aerial bombardment: killed citizens and rebels
Political and economic sanctions Multinational forces (UNPROFOR/IFOR/KFOR) Arms embargo: but actually disadvantaged Albanians against Serbian Army |
Conventional military forces Media control: disseminated propaganda to ignite nationalist sentiments |
| Influences |
"CNN effect": pressured U.S. into acting with force against humanitarian atrocities
International public opinion: need to stop human rights atrocities Misunderstanding of historical context |
Nationalism and Ethnicity: used as a claim to territory
History: used as justification for ethnic-cleansing |
|
Endgame
Temporary termination without solution: Air strikes eventually stopped Milosevic, but failed to reach a lasting solution to the ethnic conflict in Kosovo. For the next crisis in Kosovo - and there inevitably will be another crisis - the international community will have to invest larger resources with greater commitment. |
Chechnya Crisis
| U.S./UN | Russia | Chechnya | |
| Objectives |
Short-term: prevent Chechen self-determination
Long-term: regional stability and status quo |
Short-term: defeat Chechen rebels
Long-term: centralize power of Russian government |
Short-term: withdrawal of Russian army
Long-term: self-determination |
| Stakes/Costs | Fear of "Islamic bomb": nuclear weapons in hands of new Muslim states | Disintegration of the Russian Federation by Islamic fundamentalism | Self-determination |
| Actors | None: U.S. did not want to see disintegration of Russian Federation | Putin: solidified political standing through attack on Chechnya | General Dudayev: used Islam as propaganda |
| Instruments | Criticisms, but no action |
Aerial Bombardment: killed citizens and rebels
Propaganda: portrayed self-determination as terrorism Media blackout |
Religion
Low-tech arms |
| Influences |
Public opinion: first, Chechens are terrorists and must be stopped; then, criticism of Russia's human rights violations
Media: very little coverage of human rights atrocities |
Public opinion: Chechens are terrorists
Domestic: waning political power |
Organized crime: used to buy arms |
|
Endgame
Attention Fades: The U.S. and international community were unwilling to intervene, believing that a strong and stable Russia was necessary to preserve regional stability and maintain nonproliferation in Central Asia and the Caucasus - even at the expense of Chechen self-determination and lives. National interest dominated and continues to dominate over humanitarian concerns as the war continues. |
Kashmir Crisis
| India | Pakistan | Kashmir | |
| Objectives |
Short-term: calm internal disputes with Kashmir
Long-term: reclaim portions of Kashmir taken over by Pakistan |
Short-term: settle dispute through plebiscite
Long-term: annexation of Kashmir |
Short-term: withdrawal of Indian security forces from Kashmir
Long-term: self-determination |
| Stakes/Costs |
Fear of "domino effect"
Borders Possible mass destruction |
Fear of "domino effect"
Borders Possible mass destruction |
Self-determination
Loss of civilian life |
| Actors | None visible | None visible | Separatist rebels |
| Instruments | Weapons of mass destruction | Weapons of mass destruction | Rebel groups |
| Influences |
History: Kashmir part of India since 1947
Public opinion: strongly supports keeping Kashmir |
Religion: common Muslim religion used as justification for annexation of Kashmir
Public Opinion: weak support for leaders |
Religion: used as a claim to Kashmiri territory
Public opinion: wants self-determination, not annexation into Pakistan nor rule by India |
|
Endgame
No End: There has been little international intervention in Kashmir. The international community continues efforts to prevent Indian and Pakistani proliferation, yet fails to address the territorial dispute over Kashmir as the feud continues. |
Crisis Matrix: Objectives
| Kashmir | Chechnya | Kosovo | Kuwait | Cuba | |||
| Short term |
India: calm the internal disputes between people of Kashmir and Indian gov.,
Pakistan: would like to settle the dispute by having a "free, fair and internationally supervised" plebiscite Kashmir: withdrawal of Indian security forces from Kashmir |
Russia: defeat rebels
Chechnya: withdrawal of Russia army |
Message?"we will not tolerate this"?sent through political and economic sanctions and arms embargo; let the Serbs, Croats, Muslims work it out themselves (European problem) |
US: eject Iraq from Kuwait; protect Israel
Iraq: keep Kuwait |
US: remove missile threat from Cuba; avoid conflict
USSR: defend Cuba |
||
| Long term |
India: reclaim portions of Kashmir taken over by Pakistan
Pakistan: annexation of Kashmir Kashmir: self-determination |
Russia: centralize power of Russian federal government; rid Russia of terrorism
Chechnya: self-determination |
Bring all sides to the negotiating table in order to achieve a peace agreement; implement peace through the use of force |
US: long-term stability in Middle East; prevent Iraq from gaining WMD
Iraq: regional hegemony |
US: prevent nuclear proliferation in Western Hemisphere
USSR: repair strategic balance |
||
| National interest |
India: The Kashmir conflict is a domestic one
Pakistan insists on having Kashmir away from India because it feels that it has the religious obligation to protect the Muslim people from being oppressed by a majority Hindu state. Kashmir: The All parties Hurriyet conference wants a complete ceasefire of Indian military, wants human rights violations stopped, wants a dispute between India and Pakistan to include the people of Kashmir in the discussion. |
Russia: "We believe that the greatest threat [to Russia] comes from Islamic fundamentalism, namely Wahhabism. It is a special form of political extremism similar to terrorism" -Russian Minister of Justice.
US: Western paranoia about "Islamic fundamentalism", political Islam and terrorism. The West also has concerns about the regional stability of Central Asia and the Caucauses; wants to contain Afghanistan if at all possible. It is in the interest of Western powers to have a strong and stable Russia, even if that comes at the expense of Chechen self-determination. |
Inability to use force (no political commitment), national elections (US, France), domestic opinions and agendas favored over international action; Lewinsky scandal limited US options, altered perceptions of US abroad |
US: secure the supply of oil; gain allies in the Middle East
Iraq: territorial enlargement; keep oil prices high; expand economy |
US and USSR: Maintain strategic superiority, globally. | ||
| Status quo | Maintain status quo | ||||||
| Set an example | Fear of "Domino Effect" if Chechnya is not neutralized | If Kosovo gains independence, Montenegro may be encouraged to secede from Yugoslavia. | Send a clear message that interstate war will not be tolerated in the post-Cold War era. | Establish strong position (zero-tolerance) of additional threats to US | |||
Crisis Matrix: Actors
| Kashmir | Chechnya | Kosovo | Kuwait | Cuba | |
| Learning | Experience with the Bosnian crisis leads international community to take quicker action in Kosovo. | For US, the lesson from Vietnam is to use overwhelming force and not back down. | Group dynamics within JFK administration better defined as administration grows of age | ||
| Schools, beliefs |
Realists prioritize US-Russian relations; consider Chechnya to be an internal matter, nor worth a diplomatic rupture
Liberals focus on human rights abuses and the Chechens' right to self-determination |
Realists argued that there no compelling interest Kosovo, supported state sovereignty in principle, Realist paradigm reflects major turning points in the crisis (diplomatic recognition, war, economic conditions, domestic power struggles);
Liberals/pluralists supported human rights as a contravening element to challenge sovereignty, liberal paradigm helps to explain the complexity of the Balkan situation (many actors, international issue networks, etc.) |
Realists want to maintain a balance of power in the Middle East. Defeat Iraq, but make sure it doesn't become too weak vis-à-vis Iran.
Liberals want to prevent aggression with collective security; encourage democracy in Iraq and Kuwait |
"Us" and "Them" mentality of Cold War makes for less understanding and compromising parties | |
| Experiences | General Dudayev: born in Chechnya, Dudayev was banished by Stalin's purges with his family to Central Asia. Dudayev escaped further Russian persecution by joining Soviet Army |
Serbian memory of Jasenovac
Religious dimension Economic depression |
Iran-Iraq war |
US: Kennedy's experience with Bay of Pigs disaster.
USSR: Khrushchev's interaction with JFK |
Crisis Matrix: Leadership
| Kashmir | Chechnya | Kosovo | Kuwait | Cuba | ||
| Leaders | The fragmented nature of the insurgency in Kashmir makes it exceedingly difficult to pinpoint viable negotiators (as many as 130 insurgent groups). |
General Dudayev: Leader of the Chechen resistance from 1994-1996
Putin: New President of Russian Federation |
Milosevic, Clinton, Security Council | George Bush, Saddam Hussein | JFK, Khrushchev | |
| Personal character | Putin: no-nonsense approach, due to background in KGB; declares that some action must be taken in Chechnya in order to rid Russia of terrorism |
JFK-Khrushchev relationship: Shared perspectives: Grave fear and responsibility
President's Brother, Robert, a major player |
||||
| Constraints, motivation |
Indian public opinion strongly supports keeping Kashmir; any Indian leader who proposes independence will lose power
Muslim success in Kashmir may lead to anti-Muslim violence in the rest of India |
Putin's popularity soars with this campaign against Chechnya | M. was forced to continue racial politics in order to maintain power; C. had to juggle popular opinion against ground troops (Somalia memory) and attempt to avoid a "Wag the Dog" scenario in the wake of the Lewinsky scandal; within UNSC, Russia and China were wary of establishing precedent for interventions that might call into question their own problems in Tibet/Taiwan and Chechnya | Hussein seeks to increase personal popularity, especially after the failure of the 10-year war with Iran that he started. |
Stephenson and UN obligations
Element of surprise, desire to use missiles as a trump card in negotiations |
|
| Ideologies |
Islam unites Pakistan and Kashmir, but many pacifist Sufis in Kashmir resent the hard-line, violent tactics of their Pakistani and Afghan supporters.
"Clash of civilizations" element to Muslim-Hindu conflict |
Dudayev uses Islam to gain support for the conflict; creates a "clash of civilizations" fault line with Eastern Orthodox church |
Serbian mythology, Albanian mythology:
"Greater XYZ" state aims; emerging human rights culture presses various national governments to act in the wake of HR abuses |
Hussein tries to gain support by promoting pan-Arabism, but isn't a true believer. |
Anti-communism
Republicans critical of Kennedy, wanted action |
|
| Inner circle | Mira Martinovic | James Baker, Colin Powell | ExComm, Intelligence CIA, Politburo, Foreign & Def. Ministers | |||
| External influence |
Afghan guerillas train Kashmir people to fight in the conflict
Pakistan provides critical support for one of the largest rebel groups |
Support for Chechens among Muslims | Holbrooke, Vance and Owen | NATO allies, Arab public opinion |
NK risk-taker on inexperienced JFK
JFK determined to stand strong on NK aggressor The American public, media Sen. Keating |
|
Crisis Matrix: Instruments
| Kashmir | Chechnya | Kosovo | Kuwait | Cuba | |
| Administration | Clinton admin., EU, Yeltsin | ||||
| Armed/Security forces |
UNPROFOR,
IFOR |
UN coalition - mostly US, but includes many other states. | |||
| State-owned enterprises | |||||
| WMD | Both Pakistan and India have nuclear weapons. |
In a worst case scenario, Western involvement in Chechnya could damage relations with Russia enough to spark a nuclear war
The Russian Federation has nuclear capabilities. At the moment, the nuclear weapons are controlled by Moscow. If Chechnya gains independence and members of the Russian Federation follow suit, these nuclear capabilities will be diffused throughout the newly independent countries. It is daunting for the US to have nuclear weapons in the hands of potential rogue states (particularly those that are Islamic) à better to deal with the devil we know than the one that we do not know. |
No WMD involved | US threatens nuclear retaliation if Iraq uses its chemical and biological weapons | Both US and USSR have nuclear weapons; high danger of use. |
| Economic-strategic action | Sanctions | UN sanctions on Iraq |
Crisis Matrix: Influences
| Kashmir | Chechnya | Kosovo | Kuwait | Cuba | |
| National public opinion |
India: The national government has had acceptable level of support from the Indian people, unlike in Kashmir.
Pakistan: have a history of difficulty with elections and support for leaders. Kashmir: The people of Kashmir do not trust the system |
The Russian Government has succeeded in painting the Chechen independence movement as group of terrorists, engaged in terrorist (and therefore illegitimate) activities. Domestically, this caused the Russian public to support the second Chechen war, in contrast to the first, which was very unpopular. |
US
à
CNN effect mobilized the Clinton
Admin. to act with force |
Iraq: state-controlled media manipulates information for Hussein's benefit
US: generally supportive of war; Bush gets 92% approval rating |
Media well-controlled by US Government. |
| External public opinion | The conflict in Kashmir has commanded both domestic and international attention which has hindered Indian government and paramilitary forces from acting with impunity. | Internationally, because the Russian Government was seen to be fighting an 'anti-terrorist' they enjoyed the support of the West until reports of massive human rights violations became clear. Even then, NATO did little to question or challenge Russia on the Chechnya question. | Pressure on the international community to "DO SOMETHING" | Broad support for UN coalition, except for Jordan and PLO; Russian acquiescence. | |
| Perception, ideology, religion |
Pakistan: majority Muslim
Kashmir: mixed, majority Muslim |
Chechnya: Islam is one of many identity-defining characteristics of the Chechen people. During the years of "Russianification", religion served to strengthen ethnic ties and identities in the Caucauses. Later became a source of spiritual support against a stronger power. Islam became more politicized after the outbreak of the first Chechen War; a tool used by Dudaev for war, not a cause of war.
Russia: "We believe that the greatest threat [to Russia] comes from Islamic fundamentalism, namely Wahhabism. It is a special form of political extremism similar to terrorism" -Russian Minister of Justice |
Hussein attempts to make the issue into a) Arab nationalism and b) Muslim Jihad; he fails on both accounts. | Plays major role: Deception and perceived threats Soviet expansion |
Crisis Matrix: Factors
| Kashmir | Chechnya | Kosovo | Kuwait | Cuba | |
| Time |
Post-cold war environment, overload of world events in the early 1990s (Gulf War, Berlin Wall, Maastricht
Treaty, Velvet revolution), European integration |
Major factor: Cuban missiles quickly being assembled. Later, Kennedy's plan gave Khruschev time to cool off.
Control of story gave JFK time to cool off and way strategies |
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| Costs | Loss of life in Indian army, rebel groups. Civilians in Kashmir experience economic and humanitarian disruptions due to strong-arm tactics by the belligerents | General population pays the real price of the conflict | Human lives (on all sides, including peacekeeping force) | US: minimal loss of life; budgetary costs of the war paid mainly by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait | Very high: Cuba did have nuclear capability. "Quarantine" could have started naval battle. |
| Stakes | Self-determination, borders of India and Pakistan | Self-determination, anti-terrorism. | Borders, rights of minorities |
Security of oil supply
Collective security and the viability of wars of aggression in the post Cold War era |
Thermonuclear war, millions of lives, cities, civilization |
| Escalation | All three Indo-Pakistani wars resulted from deliberate, conscious decisions. Although both the Indian and Pakistani forces have shown considerable restraint along the LOC in Kashmir, such restrain can break down from the cumulative effects of stress, miscalculation, and misperception. Some evidence already exist that a spiral of mutual misunderstanding brought India and Pakistan close to another full scale war in 1990. The added threat of nuclear weapons makes this situation particularly precarious. | Russian intervention followed Chechen invasion of Dagestan, as well as bombing of apartment buildings in Moscow (though it is not certain that the Chechens planted the bombs). | NATO imposes ultimatum on Milosevic, then bombs. | Use of force was approved by UN Security Council; then, decisions to escalate against Iraq were made by US | US decision to impose the quarantine escalates the conflict. |
Crisis Matrix: Change
| Kashmir | Chechnya | Kosovo | Kuwait | Cuba | ||
| Media | Russia imposed a media blackout; very little coverage of the crisis in the West |
CNN effect, media attracting public opinion through
Photographs of tragedy (NY Times picture of man at Tuzla) |
Reporting is heavily censored by US military; conveys sanitized impression of war, which boosts its popularity.
Exception: live reporting from Baghdad during the bombing |
Much less probing/invasive as it is today | ||
| Technology | Russian Army becomes dependent on high altitude bombings that indiscriminately kill Chechen citizens along with rebels and terrorists | Virtual war (high tech weapons vs. low tech) | Smart bombs | Changing rapidly?geographic location of missile sites far less important today | ||
| Information | OSCE monitors and other NGOs document human rights abuses, military intelligence (poor at first, increasingly intimidates Serb troops as it improves) | See "media." | "Real time" and modern surveillance make for faster, more accurate info | |||
| Systems (weapons, transport, communication) | Issue: Arms embargo ensured that Serbs would have the upper hand in a pitched battle | See "technology." | ||||
Crisis Matrix: Other Influences
| Kashmir | Chechnya | Kosovo | Kuwait | Cuba | |
| Domestic | Nationalism; state sovereignty; self-determination; lack of political rights; state-controlled media; active intelligensia; linguistic-cultural debates linked to territorial (political-economic) claims; diaspora supports rebellion, undermines state power |
US political landscape (new Kennedy administration, Republican congressional rhetoric)
Threat of media exposure |
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| Economic |
The Chechen struggle for independence has been largely financed through organized crime: kidnappings, drugs, arms smuggling, and prostitution.
The first Chechen war destroyed the infrastructure and the economy of Grozny. In addition, during the inter-war period of 1995 to 1996, the Russian government cut off financial assistance to Chechnya. Organized crime, therefore, was one of the only viable methods of income generation left to the Chechen people. Nevertheless, organized crime threatens the rule of law and the overall "legal" economy. |
Former Yugoslav economy depended on the benefits of a policy of nonalignment. End of Cold War removed this aid. IMF austerity measures cripple Serbian economy in late 1980s. Kosovo is hit especially hard, since it gets short shrift in Serbia, a republic which was given less compared to Croatia and Slovenia under Tito. By 1996, UN sanctions further cripple economy, promoting criminalization and forcing government officials closer to Milosevic who survives by skirting the sanctions (Baghdad-Belgrade axis) | Russian aid to Cuba: oil and agriculture | ||
| Diplomatic |
Misreading of Balkan history by the international community; role of the US in the stability/peacemaking process; transatlantic relations (clash of interpretations)
Negotiation efforts (various peace plans: Vance-Owen, Rambouillet); major disparities between Dayton and Rambouillet processes; combatants had not exhausted themselves in Kosovo, they were not familiar with each other |
Personalized diplomacy (R. Kennedy and Dobrynin)
UN, OAS Perspective Trade in missiles (Cuba-Turkey) |
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Geographic
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| Military |
Post-Cold War environment (East-West relations and Military-advantage interests); Post-Gulf War fatigue;
Remnants of superpower order; NATO's "Virtual War" - no ground troops (affects diplomatic scenario) |
Hawks-convinced of US military superiority, press for invasion, Doves argue otherwise | |||
| Legal | Recognition of independent Croatia and Slovenia; creation of Bosnia-Herzegovina under UN mandate; illegality of NATO intervention; UN-administered Kosovo |
No real legal basis for the "quarantine"
Soviets "right" to place missiles in Cuba for defense or deterrence |
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| Intelligence | US ability to obtain reliable and complete information | ||||
| Communication | Misperception between superpowers and secrecy within countries send mixed messages externally and internally. Also, obsolete methods used for transatlantic Soviet communication |
Factors That Affect International Behavior
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The Impact of the Diplomatic Revolution on the Classical European International System
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Princeton University
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs
Fall 2000
International Crisis Diplomacy:
Theories, Challenges, and Opportunities
Prof. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber
This seminar is designed to exploit the intricacies, challenges, and capabilities of international diplomacy during crises between states or within states in a theoretical and applied manner. The emerging international system experiences major crises that emanate from the disintegration of the bipolar blocs, and from ethnic rivalries, ruthless leadership interests, power politics, globalization, and the progress of technology. We shall evaluate the causes of the crises, the role of leadership and negotiators, put them into the international and historic context, and search for appropriate crisis diplomacy and anticipatory strategies.
In the first part of the seminar we will deal with the fundamentals of international diplomacy, historic lessons, the relevant theoretic dimensions, negotiations, and the preparation for the case studies. Conceptual issues such as sovereignty, borders, great power interests, ethnicity, energy, weapons of mass destruction, and organized crime, as well as mediation, indirect diplomacy, and negotiation techniques obtain special attention. In the second part five specific cases will be looked at: the Cuban missile crisis, the Kuwait Crisis, the crisis in the Balkans, i.e. Bosnia/Serbia-Kosovo, the War in Chechnya and the crisis in the Caucasus, and the crisis around Kashmir. Finally, we will try to enumerate important criteria for a successful crisis diplomacy.
Lecture Schedule
1. Introduction
I. September 20, 2000
Introduction and Course Overview
2. Background of traditional (European) diplomacy
II. September 27, 2000 International diplomacy in theory and practice till the Conferences of Versailles 1919
III. October 4, 2000
From Interwar diplomacy to nuclear Superpowers and Multilateral diplomacy in Helsinki 1975
IV. October 11, 2000 The CSCE to the Millenium Summit 2000 in a less unipolar world V. October 18, 2000 Negotiations, Media, Dealing with Crises and Threats
3. Case Studies VI. October 25, 2000 The Cuban Missile Crisis
- November 8, 2000
- November 15, 2000
- November 22, 2000
- November 29, 2000
- December 06, 2000
- December 13, 2000
The Iraqi Aggression against Kuwait
The Violent Disintegration of Yugoslavia - the Crisis in the Balkans
The War in Chechnya - the Crisis in the Caucasus
Kashmir - or a Local Crisis with Potentially Nuclear Escalation
4. Conclusions and recommendations
Potentially Emerging Crises
1. Introduction
I. September 20, 2000
"Is there an enduring logic of conflict in world politics?"in Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts, Third Edition, 2000, pp. 1-29. E-Reserve Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," Foreign Policy, Spring 1998, pp. 29-46.
Background Reading
E-Reserve
Chap 3 in Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations?The Struggle for Power and Peace, Sixth Edition, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1985
"The Nature of International Political Change," Chapter 1, in Robert Gilpin, War & Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press 1981, pp. 9-49
2. Background of traditional (European) diplomacy
II. September 27, 2000
till the Conferences of Versailles 1919
"Balance of Power, 1815-1914"
in Gordon A. Craig and Alexander George, Force and Statecraft?Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, pp. 3-42 Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1, (Summer 1999), pp. 42-63. Background Reading Paul W. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management", in Klaus Knorr, ed., Historical Dimensions of National security policy, p. 227-262
Marc Trachtenberg, "The Coming of the First World War: A Reassessment," in Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, Princeton: Princeton University, 1991, chap. 2, pp. 47-99
- October 4, 2000
- October 11, 2000
- October 18, 2000
From Interwar diplomacy to nuclear Superpowers and
Multilateral diplomacy in Helsinki 1975
"System Building, 1919-1939," "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," "Economics and Foreign Policy," "Totalitarian and Democratic Diplomacy, 1919-1939,"
"Deterrence" (14), "War Termination" (17)
in Gordon A. Craig and Alexander George, Force and Statecraft?Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, pp. 43-73, 180-195, 229-244
E-Reserve
Daniel Druckman, "Negotiating in the International Conflict," Chapter 3. in I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen, eds., Peacemaking in International Conflict?Methods and Techniques, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997, pp. 81-124.
Ole R. Holsti, "Theories of Crisis Decision Making," Chapter 5 in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, 1979, pp. 99-136.
Paul Gordon Lauren, "Theories of Bargaining with Threats of Force: Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy," Chapter 8 in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, 1979, pp. 183-211.
Background Reading
Robert J. Beck, "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered", International Security, Fall 1989, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 161-191
Melvyn P. Leffler, "Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold War," International Security, Summer 1986, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 88-123
The CSCE to the Millenium Summit 2000 in a less uni-polar world
"A postwar system of security," "The Cold War as International System," "From Détente to the End of the Cold War," "The Evolving International System,"
"Negotiation" (13), "Crisis Management"(16), "Détente" (18), "Epilogue"
in Gordon A. Craig and Alexander George, Force and Statecraft?Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, pp. 87-152, 163-179, 214-228, 245-257, 285-293.
"Intervention, Institutions, and Regional Conflicts," "Interdependence, Globalization, and the Information Age," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts, pp. 147-206.
Background Reading
Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993).
Lynn-Jones, ed., Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995).
"The Post-Cold War Context," in Robert S. Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000, pp. 19-46. E-Reserve "Multiparty Mediation and the Conflict Cycle," "The Practitioner's Perspective," in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, Pamela Aal, eds., Herding Cats--Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999, pp. 19-62. 3. Case Studies
VI. October 25, 2000
- The Cuban Missile Crisis
Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and David Welch, "Essence of Revision?Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," International Security, Winter 1998/90 (Vol. 14, No. 3) pp. 136-172. Background Reading James G. Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink?Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis, Hill and Wang, 1989
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Waging Peace & War?Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy and Johnson Years, Simon and Schuster, 1988,
Esp. Chapts. 9, 10 VII. November 8, 2000
Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, "Epilogue: Reflections on the Kuwait Crisis as Part of an International Triple Crisis," in Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber and Charles R.H. Tripp, eds., The Iraqi Aggression Against Kuwait, Westview Press, 1996, pp. 271-312. Background Reading James A Baker III., Politics of Diplomacy?Revolution War and Peace, 1989-1992, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995.
George W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, Knopf, 1998.
Michael Howart, "The Prudence Thing," Foreign Affairs Vol. 77, No. 6, November/December 1998, pp. 130-134.
Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, Out of the Ashes?The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein, HarperPerennial, 2000.
Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991?Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, Princeton University Press, 1994.
- November 15, 2000
- November 22, 2000
- November 29, 2000
- December 06, 2000
- December 13, 2000
The Violent Disintegration of Yugoslavia - the Crisis in the Balkans
Marc Weller, "The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo," International Affairs 75, 2 (1999), pp. 211-251.
Richard Holbrooke, "The Road to Sarajevo," in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, Pamela Aal, eds., Herding Cats--Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, pp. 325-344.
Background Reading
James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, Columbia University Press, 1997
Richard Holbrooke, To End A War, New York, Random House, 1998
"Chairman's Summary," UN General Assembly, Security Council, S/1999/1210
The War in Chechnya - the Crisis in the Caucasus
Tyler Felgenhauer and William C. Wohlforth, "Self-Determination and the Stability of the Russian Federation," (uncorrected advance copy) in Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, ed., The Self-Determination of Peoples: Communities, Nations, and States in Global Interdependence (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, forthcoming 2001).
Stephen Kotkin, "Russia, the North Caucasus, and the CIS: A Realpolitik Approach," (uncorrected advance copy), and
David J. Kramer, "The War in Chechnya and Western Dimensions;" (uncorrected advance copy) in Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, ed., Chechnya and Russia: Conflict Without End? (Princeton: Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, forthcoming 2001).
Background Reading
Marie Bennigsen, "Chechnia: Political Developments and Strategic implications for the North Caucasus," Central Asian Survey, vol. 18, no. 4 (1999).
Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus (New York: New York University Press, 1998).
Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power, new ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
Kashmir - a Local Crisis with Potentially Nuclear Escalation
Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir?Portents of War, Hopes of Peace, Woodrow Wilson Center Series and Cambridge University Press, 1997;
Esp. Chapts. 1, 6, 7, Epilogue.
Paul Bracken, "The Second Nuclear Age," Foreign Affairs Vol. 79, No. 1, January/February 2000, pp. 146-156.
Background Reading
Sumit Ganguly, "Pakistan's Never-Ending Story," Foreign Affairs Vol. 79, No. 2, March/April 2000, pp. 2-7.
James Manor, "Ethnicity and politics in India," International Affairs, Vol. 72 No. 3, July 1996, pp. 459-476
4. Conclusions and recommendations
Possibly Emerging Crises
Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikov, "Catastrophic Terrorism," Foreign Affairs Vol. 77, No. 6, November/December 1998, pp. 80-94.
Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, "Self-Determination, self-governance, and security," International Relations, vol. XV, no. 1, London, April 2000, pp. 11-21.
Ted Robert Gurr, "Ethnic Warfare on the Wane," Foreign Affairs Vol. 79, No. 3, May/June 2000, pp. 52-64.
John Stremlau, "Ending Africa's Wars," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, 2000, pp. 117-132.
Foreign Policy Debate
Robert B. Zoellick, "A Republican Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs Vol. 79, No. 1, January/February 2000, pp. 63-78.
Stephen M. Walt, "Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs Vol. 79, No. 2, March/April 2000, pp. 63-79.
Background Reading
Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash," International Security, Summer 1998, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 141-170
Melvyn C. Goldstein, "The Dalai Lama's Dilemma," Foreign Affairs Vol. 77, No. 1, January/February 1998, pp. 83-97.
Jane S. Jaquette, "Women in Power: From Tokenism to Critical Mass," Foreign Policy, Fall 1997, pp. 23-37.
Walter B. Wriston, "Bits, Bytes, and Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs Vol. 76, No. 5, September/October 1997, pp. 172-183.
List of Members of the Class WWS 471 F 2000
'01 Aquilina, Bethany Allyson
'01 Arnold, Amanda Dawn
'02 Batchvarova, Nevena Koleva
'01 Biros, Jason Alexander
'01 Dammrich II, Thomas Joseph
'01 Dasher, Kimberly Michelle
'01 Desman, Rebecca Jayne
'01 Dewey, Thomas Rast
'01 Eakin Iv, Leroy
'02 Frazier, Matthew Stephen
'01 Garibian, Antranig N
'01 Greene, Megan Elizabeth
'01 Holland, Emily
'01 Kim, Judy Ruth
'02 Maciuceanu, Anora
'01 McIntosh Ralph, Jennifer
'02 Melzer, Marc Aaron
'02 Morlan III, Harold
'02 Nam, Jennifer S
'02 Nivelle, Alex Bruce
'02 Ostrow, Daniel Tawil
'02 Pecorella, Christine Marie
'02 Roslyn, Marshall David
'01 Schiess, Anya Tuthill
'01 Shariff, Aliya Farah
'01 Steinbock, Arthur Alfred
'02 Sturchio, Jeremy Giles
'02 Tompkins, Edward Graves
'01 Wolff, Christopher William
'01 Yuhan, Stephen H.
'01 Aquilina, Bethany Allyson
'01 Arnold, Amanda Dawn
'02 Batchvarova, Nevena Koleva
'01 Biros, Jason Alexander
'01 Dammrich II, Thomas Joseph
'01 Dasher, Kimberly Michelle
'01 Desman, Rebecca Jayne
'01 Dewey, Thomas Rast
'01 Eakin Iv, Leroy
'02 Frazier, Matthew Stephen
'01 Garibian, Antranig N
'01 Greene, Megan Elizabeth
'01 Holland, Emily
'01 Kim, Judy Ruth
'02 Maciuceanu, Anora
'01 McIntosh Ralph, Jennifer
'02 Melzer, Marc Aaron
'02 Morlan III, Harold
'02 Nam, Jennifer S
'02 Nivelle, Alex Bruce
'02 Ostrow, Daniel Tawil
'02 Pecorella, Christine Marie
'02 Roslyn, Marshall David
'01 Schiess, Anya Tuthill
'01 Shariff, Aliya Farah
'01 Steinbock, Arthur Alfred
'02 Sturchio, Jeremy Giles
'02 Tompkins, Edward Graves
'01 Wolff, Christopher William
'01 Yuhan, Stephen H.
