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Email this citationCIAO DATE: 04/04
Nonlethal Weapons and Capabilities
Graham T.Allison and Paul X.Kelley,Co-Chairs; Richard L.Garwin,Project Director
February 2004
Executive Summary
In the four weeks of "major conflict" in Iraq that began on March 19, 2003, U.S. forces demonstrated the power of training, transformation, and joint operations.However, the ensuing support and stability phase has been plagued by looting, sabotage, and insurgency. Wider integration of existing types of nonlethal weapons (NLW) into the U.S. Army and Marine Corps could have helped to reduce the damage done by widespread looting and sabotage after the cessation of major conflict in Iraq. Incorporating these and additional forms of nonlethal capabilities more broadly into the equipment, training, and doctrine of the armed services could substantially improve U.S. effectiveness in achieving the goals of modern war.Nonlethal weapons and capabilities have much to offer also in the conduct of war, in the prevention of hostilities, and in support of homeland defense. Indeed, a force using nonlethal weapons and capabilities has the potential of achieving combat and support goals more effectively than would a force employing only lethal means. How to achieve these benefits is the subject of this report.
While NLW are not yet widely integrated into the armed forces, their utility has been demonstrated when they have been used. In March 1995, a force of U.S. Marines equipped with NLW safeguarded the withdrawal of 2,500 UN peacekeepers from Somalia without a death among the peacekeepers, the marines, or the populace. Subsequently, in 1997, the Joint Nonlethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) was created, supporting the commandant of the Marine Corps in his role as the Department of Defense's executive agent for nonlethal weapons. Funded at some $30 million per year on average over the past five years, the directorate has created and deployed with the U. S. Army and Marine Corps approximately 80 nonlethal capability sets (NLCS). These sets have seen use in Kosovo and Iraq, helping to provide a continuum of force between "don't shoot" and "shoot." Many who have used these capabilities for force protection and crowd control are quick to sing their praises. As seen from successful utilization in conflicts abroad, NLW are particularly appropriate for stability and support operations such as those in Iraq. Last November in Iraq, a U.S. soldier shot and killed the chairman of the U.S.- appointed municipal council in Sadr City. Proper equipment and training in the use of NLW could well have avoided this debacle.
