CIAO DATE: 3/00

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Moving Forward or Tactical Retreat?

Samina Ahmed

February 2000

Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies

 

A full-fledged nuclear arms race between Pakistan and its regional adversary India is on the horizon following the BJP caretaker government’s declared intention to deploy nuclear weapons. Released by its National Security Advisory Board on August 17, 1999, India’s draft nuclear doctrine envisages a nuclear triad in which nuclear weapons would be delivered by aircraft, by submarines and by mobile land-based ballistic missiles. The doctrine also discloses India’s intention to respond with “punitive retaliation” against a nuclear adversary. ₁ Since Pakistan’s nuclear policy is India-centric and reactive in nature, the induction of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems into the Indian military is likely to result in a retaliatory Pakistani response. Addressing the UN General Assembly on September 22, 1999, Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz stated that, “India’s plans to acquire and operationally deploy a huge arsenal of land, air and sea-based nuclear weapons to threaten Pakistan,” warning that if India pursued its plans, “Pakistan will be compelled to enhance its nuclear and missile capabilities and operational readiness to preserve deterrence.” ₂ Should both Pakistan and India decide to deploy operation-ready forces, the nuclear arms race that will follow is bound to further destabilize a volatile and conflict-prone region.

Following Pakistan’s May 1998 nuclear tests its authoritative decisionmakers have repeatedly stressed that the abandonment of nuclear ambiguity for an overt nuclear weapons policy does not mean a Pakistani deployment of operation-ready nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. ₃ This apparent restraint is based more on tactical reasons rather than out of a conviction that full-scale weaponization and deployment do not serve Pakistan’s national security interests. A number of mutually reinforcing objectives are responsible for Pakistan’s nuclear restraint: to attain international recognition, tacit or overt, of Pakistani nuclear weapons status, ₄ to forestall the deployment of India’s nuclear arsenal, and to convince influential external actors to end proliferation-specific economic and military sanctions. Pakistan especially hopes to bargain for an advantageous incentives package from the US that would include the restoration of economic assistance and especially the supply and sale of conventional arms. ₅

In their bargaining with the US, Pakistani policymakers therefore reiterate their intention to retain a non-deployed nuclear posture so long as the international community removes all sanctions, economic and military. Internalized Pakistani beliefs in cold war concepts of nuclear deterrence however mean that deployment will follow at some stage in Pakistan’s nuclear development. The Clinton administration’s shift in emphasis from non-proliferation to a nuclear arms control regime in South Asia also reinforces Pakistani perceptions that the US will over time grudgingly accept the deployment of nuclear arms in Pakistan and India. ₆ Until then, it is perceived that Pakistan’s national security interests would be better served by a policy of nuclear restraint which would ease existing international constraints on economic assistance and military transactions. In fact, international pressure on Pakistan and India to freeze their nuclear weapons program below the level of deployment is more than acceptable to a Pakistani nuclear scientific estate which requires time to narrow the technological and material gaps between the two states.

The BJP’s declared intentions to deploy and to induct nuclear weapons and their delivery systems undermine Pakistan’s nuclear goals. On the one hand, India’s declared resolve to weaponize its nuclear capability enhances Pakistani perceptions of threat. ₇ On the other hand, the draft Indian nuclear doctrine moves Pakistan’s internal nuclear debate in the direction of retaliatory deployment. ₈ Since issues of prestige and the desire to offset India’s regional and international status play an important role in the formulation of Pakistan’s nuclear policy, the BJP’s decision to demonstrate its nuclear prowess also increases pressure on Pakistani policymakers to respond in kind.

The future directions of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program will ultimately depend on the cost-benefit analysis of its decisionmakers. This cost-benefit ratio will be determined by the international response to India’s draft nuclear doctrine. A tacit US acceptance of the nuclear weapons status of Pakistan and India emboldened the BJP to test nuclear weapons designs in May 1998, and the US inability to pressure India after its nuclear tests encouraged Pakistan to follow suit. Should influential external actors particularly the US fail to raise the costs of overt weaponization and deployment for India, internal Pakistani constituencies in favor of nuclear deployment will be strengthened. Should Pakistan opt for a retaliatory posture of overt weaponization, the resultant nuclear arms race in the subcontinent will undermine international efforts to constrain the nuclear rivalry between Pakistan and India.

Prior to the May nuclear tests, a number of analysts incorrectly assumed that Pakistan and India would remain content with the mere technical acquisition of nuclear capability. Hence the spread of nuclear weapons in South Asia could be halted by convincing Pakistan and India to cap their weapons capabilities short of assembly and deployment. ₉ These flawed assumptions were based on an acceptance of Pakistan and India’s declaratory nuclear rhetoric since the declared nuclear weapons policies in both states were characterized by nuclear ambiguity, that is neither acquiring nor renouncing nuclear weapons. This nuclear ambiguity was however abruptly abandoned in May 1998 when India and subsequently Pakistan exploded nuclear devices and laid claim to the status of nuclear weapons states.

To meet the challenges of South Asian nuclear proliferation, the attention of the international community and influential external actors specially the US should focus once again on non-proliferation strategies as opposed to arms control measures. The BJP’s draft nuclear doctrine challenges the assumption that either state will voluntarily accept a nuclear arms control regime that will forgo the further development and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. The implicit acknowledgment of nuclear weapons capability that an arms control bargain entails will moreover strengthen the internal standing of nuclear advocates in Pakistan and India.

Focusing specifically on Pakistan, the chapter will attempt to analyze the motives that drive Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program since an understanding of a proliferator’s motives is essential for any successful non-proliferation strategy. Tracing the history of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, an attempt will be made to examine the role of a number of interconnected external determinants in influencing Pakistan’s nuclear policy including its relations with its key regional adversary India, the impact to the international environment and the role of major international actors, particularly, the US and the China. Internal determinants particularly the influence of dominant domestic institutions and actors will also be analyzed in detail. Finally, the chapter will assess the directions of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons policy in the light of current developments and attempt to identify measures that could halt and reverse nuclear proliferation in South Asia before an incipient nuclear arms race becomes a reality.

 

The Making of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Policy

Three interlinked determinants are primarily responsible for the directions of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons policy--the India factor, the international environment, and Pakistan’s internal bargaining processes. In the past, Pakistan’s relations with India, the role of influential regional and extra-regional actors and the security perceptions and institutional interests of Pakistan’s politically dominant military directed its nuclear decisionmaking. These factors influenced Pakistan’s decision to pursue a nuclear weapons program, its adoption of an ambiguous nuclear posture, and the subsequent abandonment of ambiguity for an overt nuclear weapons policy in May 1998. In the future, the formulation of Pakistani nuclear policy will also be influenced by its relations with India, the response of the international community to Pakistan and India’s nuclear ambitions, and by the perceptions and organizational preferences of Pakistan’s nuclear decisionmaking apparatus.

From its inception, Pakistan’s nuclear policy has been India-centric in nature, revolving around perceptions of threat from and hostility towards India with which it has fought three wars. As a result of this adversarial relationship, Pakistan has consistently attempted to challenge or undermine India’s standing within the South Asian region and in global forums. Nuclear weapons are perceived as one of the means of advancing Pakistan’s regional interests and its standing in the international arena vis-à-vis India. The issue of prestige is also an important motivating factor since Pakistan is adamant on matching India’s nuclear accomplishments. ₁₀

Every landmark in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is closely linked to its troubled relationship with India and to India’s nuclear aspirations. This factor played an important role in Pakistan’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons capability in 1972 and its decision to hold nuclear tests in May 1998. Since Pakistan’s policy directions are determined by developments in India, the BJP’s decision to up the nuclear ante in August 1999 will have a significant impact on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.

Although the India factor dominates Pakistan’s nuclear decision-making, the international environment and the role of regional and extra-regional actors in particular the US and China also influence Pakistan’s nuclear directions. In the 1980s, for instance, Pakistan exploited an informal alliance with the US to attain nuclear weapons capability with the assistance of its neighboring ally and India’s adversary, China. Increased US pressures in the post-Cold War environment placed some constraints on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program which was ostensibly capped but in actuality developed even further with Chinese military and technological assistance. Following Pakistan’s retaliatory nuclear tests of May 1998, Pakistan’s policymakers had to take into consideration an adverse US reaction, including a successful US-backed multilateral sanctions regime, as well as joint Sino-American opposition to the deployment of nuclear weapons in South Asia. Hence, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reiterated his government’s resolve to refrain from deploying nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. ₁₁

After the May 1998 tests, there is little doubt that Pakistan has the capability of assembling and deploying crude nuclear weapons should it chose to do so. No decision has as yet been taken on large-scale assembly or deployment of nuclear weapons or their delivery systems. Such a decision will depend on the perceived economic and diplomatic costs of nuclear deployment, particularly the impact of multilateral sanctions. Pakistani decisionmakers could however chose to disregard the costs of international punitive action should India decide to induct nuclear weapons and their delivery systems into its military arsenal.

Internal cost-benefit analyses will ultimately determine, as they have in the past, the future directions of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons policy. Domestic factors such as the relative power balance between competing state actors and the composition of Pakistan’s nuclear decision-making apparatus are primarily responsible for the directions of its nuclear weapons policy. Long periods of authoritarian rule and weak or nonexistent representative institutions have reinforced the military’s control over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program which is formulated in line with the perceptions and institutional interests of the armed forces.

Since the Pakistani military views India with suspicion and hostility, the acquisition of a countervailing nuclear and conventional capability is given priority in the internal allocation of state resources. This stress on military security also advances the institutional interests of the armed forces as the considerable expenditure on a large standing military establishment is justified on the grounds of national security. Unable or unwilling to challenge the military’s dominance, the political leadership has for the most part accepted the military’s interpretation of security and its control over nuclear policy. A long-standing partnership between the armed forces and the civil bureaucracy, including its subsidiary nuclear scientific establishment, further marginalizes the role of the political leadership.

Although Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program was instituted by its political leadership in 1972, the military was actively involved in nuclear decisionmaking from the very start. Over time, the military with the bureaucracy’s support ousted the political leadership and also gained absolute control over defense decisionmaking. Even after the restoration of democracy in 1988, the military’s perceptions and institutional interests continue to dictate the acceptance or rejection of security choices, including the decision to opt for nuclear tests in May 1998.

The adverse impact of multilateral economic sanctions has however resulted in an unprecedented internal debate on the costs and benefits of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Although this debate is not reflected within Pakistan’s closed nuclear decisionmaking circle, the military high command can no longer ignore the domestic repercussions of its nuclear choices. Should functioning democratic institutions replace Pakistan’s quasi-authoritarian state structure, changed domestic priorities could result in a questioning of the military’s nuclear preferences by a less sympathetic and more assertive political leadership. Until that time, the military will continue to formulate Pakistan’s nuclear weapons to promote its corporate interests and in line with its perceptions of the Indian threat and the directions of India’s nuclear weapons program. The international response to South Asian nuclear proliferation and the Pakistani military’s calculations of potential domestic repercussions will however play an equally important role in determining Pakistan’s nuclear directions.

 

Pakistan’s Nuclear Setting

Although Pakistan formally opted for a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, the India-centric bias of its nuclear weapons policy has a longer history. The division of British colonial India in August 1947 into two independent states, Pakistan and India was accompanied by large-scale communal clashes, resulting in hundreds of thousands of casualties as Hindus and Muslims fled across the newly created international border. War with India followed soon after over the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, reinforcing Pakistani hostility towards India. Within newly independent Pakistan, a weak and divided Muslim League leadership neglected democratic governance. As a result, Pakistan’s inherited military-bureaucratic apparatus gained political ascendancy and soon exercised control over all decision-making. ₁₂ While the bureaucracy governed the state, security policy became the anti-Indian military’s domain. In 1958, Army Chief Mohammed Ayub Khan took over the direct reins of power, ousting the nominal political leadership and running the state with the assistance of the bureaucracy.

During the height of the cold war in the 1950s, Pakistan’s geostrategic position, located near the Soviet Union and bordering of communist China gave its military high command an opportunity to join US-sponsored security alliances such as the South East Asian Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization. As a result, Pakistan became the recipient of large-scale US military assistance, estimated by one source at $1.5 to $ 2 billion by the mid-1960s. ₁₃ The induction of sophisticated conventional armament reinforced the military’s belief that it could protect Pakistan against the perceived Indian threat. Massive US military and economic assistance also helped the high command to expand the armed forces, further strengthening the military’s standing vis-à-vis rival actors within the state. ₁₄

Although rival India embarked on an ambitious nuclear weapons program soon after independence, Pakistan’s security planners were initially disinterested in following suit. The alliance relationship with the US was considered sufficient by Pakistani decisionmakers to offset the perceived Indian threat and to counterbalance India’s regional and international standing. Although the Pakistani military high command showed little interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, a nascent indigenous nuclear scientific establishment did emerge after the creation of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission in the mid-1950s. The US helped to expand Pakistan’s nuclear base by training hundreds of Pakistani nuclear scientists under Atoms for Peace type programs and by providing Pakistan with a small nuclear research reactor.

By the decade of the 1960s, the rapid growth of India’s nuclear weapons infrastructure which included unsafeguarded heavy-water and research reactors lead to an internal debate on a Pakistani nuclear weapons option. Within General Ayub Khan’s military cabinet, the Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources and later Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was amongst the most enthusiastic of nuclear advocates. Bhutto however failed to convince the military regime to opt for a nuclear weapons program. By the mid-1960s, Pakistan’s nuclear energy infrastructure remained modest, consisting of its sole research reactor which began to operate in 1965 and a natural uranium-heavy water nuclear power plant, the Karachi Nuclear Power Project. Both operated under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Committee safeguards.

By the late-1960s, interlinked internal, regional and international imperatives changed Pakistani thinking on a nuclear weapons program. Internally, resistance grew against the military regime especially in East Pakistan and Sindh, fueled by the absence of representative institutions and lop-sided economic policies that favored the interests of the Punjab province, the recruiting ground of the Pakistan armed forces and the civil bureaucracy. In a bid to divert domestic attention, the military launched an abortive adventure against India in the disputed valley of Kashmir in 1965. The military’s failure to gain territory in Kashmir heightened domestic unrest as well as antipathy towards India. The 1965 war and its aftermath had a significant impact on Pakistani perceptions of nuclear weapons. A US arms embargo imposed during the 1965 war on both Pakistan and India deprived Pakistan’s US-equipped military of its main source of conventional weapons. As the conventional balance continued to tilt in India’s favor, the rapid expansion of India’s nuclear infrastructure also heightened Pakistani concerns about India’s nuclear intentions.

Internal politics played an equally important role in changing Pakistan’s nuclear preferences. After the 1965 war, Foreign Minister Bhutto distanced himself from an increasingly unpopular military regime. Bhutto also publicly renewed his bid for a Pakistani nuclear weapons capability, declaring, for instance in 1966, that if India acquired a nuclear bomb, “Even if Pakistanis have to eat grass, we will make the bomb.” ₁₅ Bhutto’s departure from his cabinet increased Ayub’s vulnerability to domestic opposition. Ayub’s main support base, the armed forces were also irked by his failure to restore Pakistan’s special relationship with the US, particularly the resumption of the preferential supply and sale of conventional arms. Although Pakistan had consolidated its relations with China, which became a major supplier of conventional arms, influential segments of the military believed that the quantity and quality of Chinese arms could not provide an adequate counterbalance to the growing conventional arms imbalance with India. Ayub could no longer ignore the growing support within influential segments of Pakistan’s opinion and decisionmaking elite for nuclear arms. In 1968, Pakistan’s refusal to sign the NPT following India’s rejection of the treaty clearly indicated an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.

After Pakistan’s humiliating defeat in the 1971 India-Pakistan war and the secession of East Pakistan with India’s direct intercession, powerful factions of the Pakistani military replaced Ayub’s successor Army Chief General Yahya Khan by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who was appointed as President and then as Prime Minister. ₁₆ The trauma of a humiliating military defeat and India’s role in the creation of Bangladesh reinforced Pakistani hostility towards India and enhanced perceptions of threat from an aggressive, expansionist foe. In the perceptions of the Pakistani military, moreover, neither of Pakistan’s allies, the US or China had intervened to prevent India from dismembering Pakistan. Facing the tasks of rebuilding a truncated state and retaining the military’s support, Bhutto embarked on a program to build Pakistan’s conventional strength, using the Indian threat as justification for the rapid increase in defense spending. Bhutto also adopted a nuclear weapons program to counter the perceived Indian threat and to simultaneously retain the military’s goodwill. ₁₇

At a meeting of high level military and civil bureaucrats and scientists in Multan on January 20, 1972, Bhutto disclosed his intentions to launch a nuclear weapons program, a decision that was strongly supported by the military high command and the civil bureaucracy. ₁₈ Bhutto and the military high command’s resolve to acquire a nuclear weapons capability was reinforced by India’s detonation of a nuclear device in May 1974. ₁₉ Even before the Indian nuclear explosion, Bhutto had entered into negotiations with France for a nuclear reprocessing plant, signing the formal agreement in 1976. Since Pakistan had neither the technological nor the economic resources to create the necessary infrastructure for an ambitious nuclear energy program, it was clear that the extracted plutonium would be diverted for military purposes. Bhutto also created a separate nuclear weapons establishment, headed by a metallurgical engineer, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. Khan was given the task of enriching uranium to weapons grade and clandestine networks were set up by the civil bureaucracy and military intelligence to acquire the necessary nuclear weapons technology and hardware.

India had succeeded in acquiring autonomy over the nuclear fuel cycle by diverting external, including US and Canadian material and technological assistance for civilian energy nuclear programs to military uses. When Pakistan attempted to follow India’s example, it faced a far more hostile environment. By the 1970s, the US was concerned about the implications of the sale of sensitive technologies to potential proliferators, apprehensions that were reinforced by India’s nuclear explosion, the sale of German nuclear reactors as well as reprocessing and enrichment technology to Brazil, and the proposed French sale of a reprocessing plant to South Korea. In 1976, the US strengthened its non-proliferation legislation passing the Glenn-Symington amendment to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, disallowing US military and economic assistance to any country importing unsafeguarded enrichment or reprocessing technology.

Strongly opposed to the transfer of nuclear weapons-related technology to states such as Pakistan, the US also pressured Pakistan and France to abandon their nuclear reprocessing plant deal. For Pakistan’s policy makers, there was no choice but to acquire nuclear weapons to meet the threat posed by India’s nuclear weapons capability and to counter India’s nuclear status and prestige. Publicly, however, to diffuse US pressure, Pakistani officials claimed that their nuclear program was solely for peaceful purposes, expressing their support for a number of regional nuclear disarmament measures. When the US successfully persuaded France to rescind the nuclear reprocessing plant deal in 1977, Pakistan could no longer pursue nuclear weapons through the plutonium route. Pakistan’s attention therefore shifted to efforts to enrich weapons-grade uranium. ₂₀ By the time Bhutto was ousted by a military coup d’etat in July 1977, Pakistan’s authoritative decisionmakers were committed to pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

 

Nuclear Ambiguity

Under General Zia-ul-Haq, the military regime attempted to use the Indian threat and the acquisition of a countervailing nuclear weapons capability to gain domestic legitimacy, a strategy that also served the military’s institutional interests since it was used to justify an ever-increasing defense budget. The anti-Indian civil bureaucracy also fully supported the nuclear weapons program but lost control over its subsidiary arm, the nuclear scientific establishment which operated under the military’s directives. Heading the nuclear weapons program, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan was more than willing to glorify General Zia’s nuclear achievements and to support the military’s justifications for a nuclear deterrent against an Indian threat since the nuclear scientific establishment benefited from official patronage, including generous funding. Khan also played an external role, reiterating Pakistan’s commitment to the nuclear weapons program before an international audience. Abandoning the earlier rhetoric of a peaceful nuclear program, the Zia regime’s declaratory nuclear policy was based on ambiguity, that is neither accepting nor rejecting nuclear weapons.

Efforts were also accelerated to acquire autonomy over the nuclear fuel cycle. An ultracentrifuge uranium enrichment plant was set up at Kahuta using plans allegedly stolen by Dr. A. Q. Khan, who had previously worked at the Almelo ultracentrifuge uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands. ₂₁ The necessary technology and equipment for Pakistan’s expanded nuclear weapons program was acquired through clandestine networks in Western Europe and with China’s assistance, which became a major supplier of nuclear know-how and hardware in a bid to counter India’s military capabilities. ₂₂

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program was domestically projected by the Zia regime as a symbol of prestige and status. It was also used to reinforce the military’s position as the ultimate guarantor of Pakistan’s security against an ever-present Indian threat. ₂₃ When US concerns about Pakistan’s growing nuclear weapons capability resulted in enhanced pressure including sanctions episodes in September 1997 and April 1979, to diffuse US opposition the military regime proposed a number of South Asia-specific non-proliferation measures to India, knowing full well that they would be rejected by an ambitious Indian leadership.

At this stage in its development, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program received assistance from an unexpected quarter. As US-Soviet relations deteriorated, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 gave the US and its allies an opportunity to destabilize the Soviet Union. The Zia regime played a key role in serving US interests in neighboring Afghanistan. In return, the US waived sanctions imposed on Pakistan under its non-proliferation legislation. To ensure the Pakistan military’s cooperation, the Reagan administration also gave billions of dollars in military and economic assistance to the Zia regime, thereby ensuring its survival against its political opponents. This assistance was justified on the grounds of non-proliferation. Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, James Buckley, for example, argued: “In place of the ineffective sanctions on Pakistan’s nuclear program imposed by the past administration, we hope to address, through conventional means, the sources of insecurity that prompt a nation like Pakistan to seek a nuclear capability in the first place.” ₂₄

In actuality, the Reagan administration turned a blind eye to the rapid growth of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons infrastructure, even ignoring US intelligence reports that Pakistan had acquired a bomb design from China. ₂₅ Concerned about the Administration’s tacit acceptance of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, the US Congress attempted to impose curbs on Pakistan through, for instance, the Pressler amendment of 1985 that called for economic and military sanctions unless the US President certified that Pakistan did not have and was not attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. Circumventing this legislation and continuing military and economic assistance to the Zia regime, the Reagan administration provided presidential certifications that Pakistan did not have a nuclear weapons program. ₂₆

Taking advantage of US dependence on Pakistani collaboration in Afghanistan, the Zia regime changed its nuclear rhetoric even further, publicly acknowledging Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability. In an interview with Time magazine, for instance, General Zia, declared that “Pakistan has the capability of building the Bomb whenever it wishes.” ₂₇ This changed nuclear rhetoric was also used to deter a potential Indian conventional threat. When war almost broke out in 1987, following a large-scale Indian military exercise, Brasstacks near the Pakistani border and retaliatory Pakistani military maneuvers, in an unprecedented interview with an Indian journalist, Kuldip Nayyar, Dr. A.Q. Khan disclosed that Pakistan had the ability to assemble a nuclear weapon. ₂₈

General Zia-ul-Haq was assassinated in 1988. The military was forced to restore the democratic process in the face of domestic opposition. The high command however retained its hold over security policy in general and specifically over nuclear decision-making since elected political leaders failed to assert their control over the armed forces. When Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party won the 1988 general elections, Army Chief General Mirza Aslam Beg delayed the transfer of power to the Prime Minister until she agreed to accept the military’s control over defense and security matters. ₂₉

By 1998, Pakistan had not only acquired the ability to assemble a nuclear devise but it also embarked on a ballistic missile program with Chinese help to counter India’s nuclear-capable missiles, which included the short-range Prithvi and the intermediate-range Agni. ₃₀ The international environment however became less conducive as US détente with the Soviet Union reduced Pakistan’s strategic significance, resulting in a rethinking of US policy towards Pakistani nuclear proliferation. As US pressures intensified, Pakistani officials claimed that the nuclear program had been capped. The pace of the program was actually accelerated by the military high command, which discovered new uses for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability. ₃₁

After Prime Minister Bhutto’s dismissal in 1989 and general elections in which the military ensured the victory of their political protégé, Mian Nawaz Sharif, an ethnic Kashmiri by origin, the high command accelerated a war by proxy against India across the line of control in Kashmir, a campaign that had been initiated by General Zia. As enhanced tensions threatened the outbreak of war in 1990, implicit nuclear threats were used by Pakistani officials against India to persuade the US to intercede to prevent a war that Pakistan would have lost. Thereafter Pakistani policymakers were convinced that low intensity conflicts could be safely waged against India since influential actors such as the US would prevent the outbreak of war between two nuclear-capable states. ₃₂

Pakistan’s continued enrichment of uranium to weapons-grade levels in 1990 finally forced the Bush administration to impose the sanctions contained in the Pressler amendment, halting all military and economic assistance. The cost of US sanctions were however limited since US economic assistance had already decreased considerably. US sanctions moreover lacked multilateral support and did not extend to loans and grants provided by International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Rejecting US pressure, Pakistan officially acknowledged its ability to assemble nuclear weapons for the very first time. In January 1992, Foreign Secretary, Shahrayar Khan declared in an interview with The Washington Post that Pakistan possessed “all the elements which, if hooked together, would become a (nuclear devise).” ₃₃ The changed posture was partly meant to convince the US of Pakistan’s commitment to its nuclear weapons program and partly to ensure that the Pakistani political leadership did not succumb to external inducements or pressure. ₃₄

In 1993, Sharif was dismissed by the military in retaliation against his attempts to assert his political authority. Benazir Bhutto once again formed government, winning a fragile parliamentary majority in the general elections. Hoping to regain the military’s patronage, Sharif became an advent supporter of Pakistan’s nuclear program. Heading a weak government and conscious of the consequences of opposing the military, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto accepted the high command’s nuclear preferences. The external environment was however far less conducive. The military was particularly concerned about the continued imposition of US sanctions on the supply and sale of conventional weapons. Hoping to persuade the US to lift its punitive sanctions, Pakistan therefore pledged to join the non-proliferation regime including the NPT and the CTBT in the event of Indian accession. Pakistani officials also claimed that discriminatory legislation such as the Pressler amendment only served to reduce US leverage in its dealing with Pakistan.

These arguments had some effect on US thinking as the Clinton administration adopted a more flexible approach towards South Asian proliferation, replacing an emphasis on punitive measures by positive engagement and incentives. In an acknowledgment of the key policymaking role of the Pakistani high command, the US offered military as well as economic incentives to Pakistan. The Brown amendment to the 1996 Foreign Assistance Act in 1996, a one-time waiver of the Pressler amendment, approved the sale of $368 million worth of military hardware to Pakistan, including air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles and submarines. Since US incentives were not conditional on Pakistani non-proliferation concessions, they failed to achieve their desired results. On the contrary, Pakistan moved even further down the nuclear road since the new US flexibility was perceived as a weakening of the US resolve to reverse South Asian nuclear proliferation. Just as the international environment seemed more conducive, Pakistan was confronted with a more pressing nuclear challenge as the BJP government opted for nuclear tests in May 1998.

 

Removing the Nuclear Veil

Although Pakistan’s relations with India had remained uneasy as a result of Pakistan’s war by proxy in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir where alienation against Indian control remained high, changed domestic and regional priorities in both Pakistan and India opened the doors for a limited rapprochement. In Pakistan, Prime Minister Sharif, a businessman by profession believed that improved relations with India, including expanded trade links, would better serve Pakistan’s national interests. Having changed the course of India’s policy from confrontation to cooperation with its neighbors, Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral reacted positively to Pakistani overtures. The budding dialogue between the two states however came to an abrupt halt after the BJP’s electoral victory in April 1998.

A Hindu nationalist party, the BJP adopted an uncompromising stand on the Kashmir issue, rekindling tensions between the two states. Within Pakistan, the BJP’s hardline stance forced Prime Minister Sharif to rethink his policy of dialogue with India which had incurred the displeasure of powerful domestic constituencies. These included Pakistan’s anti-Indian foreign office bureaucracy and the military high command for whom the BJP’s hardline stance on Kashmir provided an opportunity to derail the Prime Minister’s dialogue with India.

The nuclear issue proved another point of contention between the two states since the BJP supported an aggressive nuclear policy that would include the assembly and deployment of nuclear weapons. Reacting to the BJP’s nuclear assertiveness and signaling its opposition to Sharif’s support for rapprochement with India, the Pakistani military opted to test a nuclear-capable ballistic missile, the Ghauri in April 1998. It was claimed that the Ghauri had a range of 1,500 kilometers and was therefore capable of striking all major Indian cities. ₃₅ While the Pakistani military attempted to use its ballistic missile capability to offset India’s regional power and prestige, the BJP government drastically changed South Asia’s nuclear dynamics by testing a series of nuclear devices in May 1998.

The Indian tests caught the international community by surprise. In 1995, the Narasimha Rao government had abandoned its plans to conduct nuclear tests as a result of US pressure. It was therefore assumed that Pakistan and India would not openly flout non-proliferation norms, particularly an emerging norm against testing. Imposing military and economic sanctions on India under the Glenn amendment, the US warned and cajoled Pakistan against following the Indian example. Pakistan’s response was determined by its costs-benefit analysis, including calculations of prestige and status as well as assessments of the costs incurred by India for its nuclear tests.

Prime Minister Sharif himself was hesitant to test, concerned about the potential impact of economic sanctions since Pakistan was far more dependent on external sources of financial credits and grants than India. Within his cabinet, however, opinions differed and factions supporting or opposing nuclear testing attempted to influence public opinion through the broadcast and print media. ₃₆ Supporters of a retaliatory Pakistani nuclear test included Information Minister Mushahid Hussain, controlling the state-controlled broadcast media and Foreign Minister Gowher Ayub, whose views reflected those of influential segments of the armed forces, ultimately responsible for Pakistan’s nuclear policy. ₃₇ The military’s thinking was influenced by factors such as prestige as well as perceptions of an Indian threat. Since senior military personnel believed that, “We will never be able to remove the nuclear imbalance if we do not follow suit with our own explosion,” ₃₈ the internal balance tilted in favor of a retaliatory response.

Pakistan had acquired the ability to assemble and to test a nuclear device as early as 1984. Following India’s abortive bid in 1995 to test its nuclear devices, Pakistan had prepared a nuclear test site in the Chagai district of southwestern Baluchistan, bordering on Iran and Afghanistan. According to Pakistani Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan’s “aim was to tell the Indians that their move will be matched,” and to send the West “a clear signal that they had better do something to stop the Indians.” ₃₉ In May 1998, all the Pakistani nuclear scientific estate required was the necessary political approval which was withheld until Pakistani decisionmakers were sure that retaliatory tests would not incur unacceptable diplomatic and economic costs.

The US launched a concerted effort, including a visit by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott to prevent Pakistan from following the Indian example. Pakistan was offered a number of incentives including a repeal of the Pressler amendment, restoring military and economic aid. Punitive sanctions were also threatened under the Glenn amendment. US pressure and inducements failed to dissuade Pakistani policymakers. In the perceptions of Pakistan’s authoritative decisionmakers, US military and economic incentives did not measure favorably against issues of prestige and credibility. Under pressure from the military, Sharif warned President Clinton that the decision “was out of my hands,” implying that the military high command was ultimately responsible for Pakistan’s nuclear response. ₄₀

Sharif could however have influenced Pakistani public opinion against nuclear testing, undermining the position of nuclear advocates within and outside his administration if the US had made its offers of military and economic assistance as well as its threats to impose punitive measures in a more transparent fashion. In the absence of transparency, even elite Pakistani opinion was ill-informed about the potential costs and benefits of nuclear testing. The absence of an informed debate and the domination of the official media by nuclear advocates resulted in popular sentiment favoring a retaliatory nuclear test, especially in the politically dominant province of the Punjab.

Had the US succeeded in imposing a multilateral sanctions regime against India, Pakistan’s military high command and well as public opinion could also have been convinced by the political leadership that the costs of testing would far outweigh its perceived benefits. Since no such effort was made by the US, the other Security Council members and the G-8 merely condemned the Indian tests. This absence of a concerted international response tilted the internal balance in Pakistan even further in favor of retaliatory tests since it was believed that the diplomatic and economic costs would be bearable.

The Pakistani response was also influenced by the BJP’s post-test behavior. The BJP had correctly assessed that Pakistani nuclear tests would dilute international criticism of India’s nuclear behavior on the one hand. On the other hand, the BJP’s policy of overt weaponization would gain domestic legitimacy in the event of a Pakistani test. Inciting Pakistan to test, BJP policymakers such as Interior Minister Lal Krishna Advani adopted an aggressive stance on the Kashmir issue, announcing, for instance, India’s intention to adopt a pro-active stand against the Pakistani-sponsored insurgency. ₄₁ Prime Minister Vajpayee’s declaration that India had become a nuclear weapons power and was entitled to join the exclusive nuclear weapons club also evoked a Pakistani response where, as in India, nuclear weapons are equated with prestige. On 28 and 30 May, Pakistan tested its nuclear devices at Chagai in Baluchistan province, claiming the status of a nuclear weapons state. Prime Minister Sharif declared: “Today we have settled scores with India by detonating five nuclear devices of our own,” he added, “We have paid them back.” ₄₂

Although considerations of prestige had played a major role in Pakistan’s tit-for-tat tests, Pakistan was concerned about an adverse international reaction. A campaign was therefore launched to convince external actors, particularly the US that Pakistan had no choice but to respond to the threats posed to its security by India’s nuclear tests. In Prime Minister Sharif’s words, India’s nuclear tests had forced Pakistan “to restore the strategic balance. ₄₃ Pakistan also attempted to convince the international community to help resolve the long-standing dispute between Pakistan and India on Kashmir, arguing that the resolution of the conflict would remove the primary cause of discord between them and thus reduce the dangers of a nuclear confrontation in South Asia. ₄₄

The international response was however far more adverse than Pakistani policymakers had expected, given the lack of an international consensus against India’s nuclear tests. On 6 June, the UN Security Council passed a US-sponsored resolution strongly deploring the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. The P-F, the G-8 and the European Union condemned the Pakistani and Indian nuclear tests, called upon both states to refrain from assembling and deploying their nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems, and asked Pakistan and India to join the NPT as non-nuclear states, to unconditionally sign the CTBT and to participate in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a future Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT).

Pakistani policymakers had opted to test in the belief that US sanctions would remain unilateral in nature. Mandatory US sanctions under the Glenn amendment would have had little impact since Pakistan had been subjected to US military and economic sanctions since 1990. ₄₅ The US however successfully forged an ad hoc multilateral coalition behind sanctions, which included the Group of Eight. Sanctions on non-humanitarian credits and loans from International Financial Institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank were imposed on both Pakistan and India. Sanctions were also imposed by Pakistan’s major aid donor and trading partner, Japan. Multilateral sanctions on credits and loans from the IFIs seriously destabilized the fragile Pakistani economy, heavily dependent on foreign currency inflows to service a growing external debt and to purchase essential commodities including fuel and food. With the imposition of sanctions on IFI lending, domestic and external investor confidence plummeted and Pakistan was soon on the verge of an internal and external default. ₄₆

The collapse of the economy led to an unprecedented internal debate on the costs and benefits of nuclear weapons. Within the national and provincial parliaments, questions were asked about the decision to abandon ambiguity for an overt nuclear weapons posture. Segments of civil society also questioned the expenditure on defense, conventional and nuclear, at the cost of human development. In Baluchistan, where the Pakistani nuclear test site was situated, the ruling party, the Baluchistan National Party condemned the decision to test and was dismissed as a result. ₄₇ Pakistan’s nuclear weapons policy was also strongly criticized by factions of the political opposition in Sindh and in the North West Frontier Province.

Facing an imminent default as a result of sanctions on multilateral funding, Pakistan also found itself diplomatically isolated. Pakistan’s nuclear decisionmakers had mistakenly assumed that external allies such as China and the Islamic Middle Eastern states, particularly Saudi Arabia would extend diplomatic support to Pakistan and help it to withstand external economic pressure. While the Middle Eastern states ignored Pakistani appeals for economic assistance, to Pakistan’s alarm its decision to conduct nuclear tests was also condemned by its Chinese allies.

Although China was far more critical of the Indian decision to test, given the BJP’s attempts to legitimize India’s nuclear weapons policy on the grounds of the Chinese threat, China was concerned about an impending nuclear arms race in its immediate neighborhood. China therefore supported the UN Security Council resolution condemning the Pakistani and Indian nuclear tests. In a joint statement with India’s ally, Russia, China called upon both states to unconditionally join the NPT and the CTBT as non-nuclear weapons powers and in summit talks between Presidents Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton, China agreed to work with the US “within the P-5, the Security Council and with others, to prevent an accelerating nuclear and missile arms race in South Asia, strengthen international non-proliferation efforts and the peaceful resolution of differences between India and Pakistan.” ₄₈

In its post-test negotiations with Pakistan and India, the US focused its attention on preventing an accelerated nuclear and missile race. Adopting a sticks-and-carrots approach, the Clinton administration called for a cap on Pakistan and India’s nuclear and missile capabilities, identifying five preconditions for the removal of sanctions: curbs on the further development or deployment of nuclear-capable missiles and aircraft, non-transfer of nuclear weapons and weapons-related technology, accession to the CTBT, Pakistani and Indian meaningful participation in the Conference on Disarmament on a FMCT, and the resumption of a bilateral dialogue between Pakistan and India on normalization of relations. ₄₉

Facing diplomatic isolation, internal unrest and an imminent economic meltdown, Pakistan’s authoritative decisionmakers were amenable to nuclear restraint measures. Pakistan’s strained economy could not sustain the additional expenditures necessary for full-scale weaponization and deployment such as those required for an adequate command, control and communications infrastructure. Since China also appeared to have accepted US demands to end its support for Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs, Pakistan was deprived of its main source of technological know-how. Lacking the technological and economic means to match India’s nuclear and missile capabilities, non-deployment promoted Pakistani interests.

The goals of Pakistan’s nuclear policy were therefore three-fold: to gain tacit international acceptance of its nuclear weapons capabilities, to support international efforts for nuclear non-deployment which would impose constraints on India’s nuclear weapons program, and above all to convince international actors, especially the US to replace sanctions by a policy of engagement based on incentives. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program would therefore continue to grow apace, but under the cover of an overt nuclear status that would stop short of assembly and deployment.

The five benchmarks set by the US did not undermine Pakistan’s nuclear goals for a number of reasons. First, the US demanded a cap and not a rollback or the elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in Pakistan and India, implying a tacit US acceptance of their nuclear weapons programs. Nor did the US insist on a verifiable cap on Pakistani and Indian nuclear weapon capabilities. Hence Pakistan could continue to advance its nuclear weapons program under the guise of ambiguity. Second, the US did not demand tangible results of a future dialogue between Pakistan and India. Hence, there was little at stake in participating in such a dialogue. Third, Pakistan could demonstrate that it was a responsible nuclear actor by agreeing to the US demand for the non-transfer of nuclear weapon and missile hardware and technology. Fourth, participation in negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament did not entail Pakistani support for a FMCT. Finally, a verbal Pakistani pledge to sign the CTBT could be reversed in the future but such a commitment would help ease the pressure of international sanctions.

Pakistan’s foremost priority was in fact the easing and ultimately the removal of the sanctions regime, given its paucity of domestic resources and the likelihood of an external default which could cut Pakistan off from all sources of external finance. Pakistan’s authoritative decision-makers therefore pledged that they would not deploy nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and that Pakistan would participate in discussions on an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament. Pakistan also declared its willingness to sign the CTBT before September 1999 even without Indian accession, conditional on the removal of sanctions imposed by the US and other international actors. Following the fourth round of talks on peace, security and non-proliferation issues with US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott in London, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad indicated Pakistan’s willingness to sign the CTBT provided economic sanctions were lifted. According to Ahmad, the CTBT “does not impair or undermine our nuclear capability,” adding that, “It’s not the CTBT which poses a problem. It’s an atmosphere of (economic) coercion which poses difficulties for us. We want coercion to be removed to help the government take a decision.” ₅₀

In response to Pakistan’s willingness to sign the CTBT, the US expressed its “support for an early agreement between Pakistan and the IMF and Paris Club in order to alleviate Pakistan’s economic difficulties.” ₅₁ IMF lending resumed to Pakistan and the Paris Club rescheduled $3.3 billion of Pakistan’s external debt over a twenty-year period. ₅₂ In July 1999, the US Congress passed the Brownback-Robb amendment, giving the president the authority to waive sanctions imposed on Pakistan and India for a period of one-year. A further easing of sanctions was however made conditional on South Asian progress towards nuclear non-proliferation. To ensure that the US relaxed and ultimately removed economic and military sanctions, Pakistani policymakers took other steps to meet the benchmarks set by the Clinton administration. Domestic legislation was drafted to prevent the transfer of nuclear and missile technology and a dialogue was resumed to normalize relations with India. ₅₃

During their two-day summit in Lahore in February 1999, Prime Ministers Sharif and Vajpayee agreed to normalize relations. At the meeting, the two sides even identified a number of nuclear confidence-building measures. In the Memorandum of Understanding signed between their foreign secretaries, a decision was taken to sign an agreement on advance notification of ballistic missile tests. The two sides also agreed to notify each other “in the event of any accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of a nuclear war.” ₅₄

Since the May 1998 nuclear tests had focused international attention on the potential for conflict between two rival states with a history of war, Sharif’s peace overtures and the Lahore summit were welcomed by the Clinton administration. Even as the US administration suspended some and the Congress debated suspending all economic and military sanctions, promising a return to a South Asian policy of engagement extending beyond a one-point non-proliferation agenda, sporadic fighting broke out along the Line of Control in Kashmir. None of the CBMs agreed upon in Lahore were to materialized as relations between the two states plummeted to a new low. A year after the May nuclear explosions in South Asia, it was clear that Pakistan and India were unwilling to abandon a longstanding rivalry that now encompassed the nuclear sphere.

 

On the Nuclear Brink

Ever since the Pakistani and Indian nuclear explosions, sporadic artillery exchanges had occurred along the 720 kilometer Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir, a direct byproduct of the mutual hostility that characterized their relations. Suspicious of the BJP’s intentions, the Pakistan military opposed the peace process initiated by the Prime Minister. ₅₅ In May 1999, the situation on the ground in Kashmir deteriorated. India accused Pakistan of sending hundreds of regular forces and militants into the Kargil and Drass sectors in a bid to forcibly alter the Line of Control. Rejecting Pakistani denials that the fighters were Kashmiri Muslim militants, India launched a major military offensive, including thousands of troops and the use of helicopter gunships and jet fighters.

Military action was restricted to the disputed territory of Kashmir and both sides at first pledged restraint to ensure that border skirmishes did not escalate into a full-scale war. A massive military buildup on both sides of the disputed border, Pakistan’s downing of Indian aircraft intruding into its airspace, intensified shelling and artillery exchanges, and rising casualty figures however signaled that the fighting could spiral out of control. To Pakistan’s concern, the US rejected its denials that Kashmiri militants alone were involved in the fighting. Fearing an outbreak of all-out war in the subcontinent, the Clinton administration accused Pakistan of intervening across the Line of Control and demanded an immediate withdrawal of the Pakistani-supported infiltrators. ₅₆ Threatening to impose sanctions, the G-8 and the European Union also called for the immediate withdrawal of the Pakistani “armed intruders” and for Pakistani respect for the sanctity of the Line of Control. ₅₇ The US Congress also adopted a resolution recommending the suspension of loans from the international Financial Institutions to Pakistan until it withdrew its armed supporters to its side of the Line of Control.

Recognizing the central role of the Pakistan military in the Kargil crisis, US Commander-in-Chief, Central Command General Anthony Zinni met his Pakistani counterpart, General Pervez Musharraf in Islamabad, demanding the withdrawal of Pakistan-backed forces from Indian-administered Kashmir. After the Vajpayee administration threatened to extend the fighting beyond the Line of Control, massing troops along the LOC and the international border, Sharif visited China. More interested in regional peace than in their alliance with Pakistan, the Chinese leadership refused to support Pakistan on the Kargil issue. In its first open rift with Pakistan and collaborating closely with the US, China called for a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute and respect for the Line of Control. ₅₈

Diplomatically isolated and dependent on international goodwill to prop up its ailing economy still reeling from the impact of sanctions, Pakistan could ill-afford to take on a militarily superior foe. At Pakistan’s request the US played the role of mediator, concerned about an outbreak of war between two nuclear-capable states. Following a meeting with President Clinton in Washington DC on 4 July, during which Clinton consulted Vajpayee, Sharif declared that Pakistani-supported forces would be withdrawn across the LOC in accordance with the Simla Agreement. ₅₉

During the course of the Kargil episode, the nuclear factor influenced Pakistani policy and India’s response. Pakistan’s authoritative decisionmakers had decided to conduct a large-scale military operation across the LOC in the belief that the presence of nuclear weapons would prevent conventional war with India. ₆₀ In the Indian case, aerial attacks in close proximity to the LOC, intrusions into Pakistani airspace and a massive military buildup were meant to signal India’s willingness to use conventional force regardless of Pakistan’s nuclear capability. Although Pakistan and India pledged nuclear restraint during the crisis, senior Pakistani and Indian officials implicitly threatened the use of nuclear weapons on number of occasions. Pakistan Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad, for instance, warned, “We will not hesitate to use any weapons in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity.” ₆₁ On another occasion, the Leader of the House in the Senate, Raja Zafarul Haq declared that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if it was imperative for its security, “The purpose of developing weapons becomes meaningless if they are not used when they are needed.” ₆₂

Justifying his decision to withdraw Pakistani forces from Indian-administered Kashmir, Prime Minister Sharif claimed that a “fourth war” had been averted, ₆₃ and in his address to the nation, Sharif stressed that “it becomes difficult to find a winner after a war between two atomic powers.” ₆₄ Briefing parliament on the Kargil episode, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mohammad Siddique Kanju declared that the Clinton-Sharif meeting had averted a wider conflict in a nuclear environment. ₆₅ The very fact that Pakistani policymakers had not taken into account the potential for conflict with nuclear overtones when they initiated hostilities in Kashmir should be a matter of real concern to the international community since war was averted at the very last instance through US intervention. It should be matter of equal concern that Indian policymakers contemplated all-out war without taking into consideration Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. ₆₆ During the conflict, repeated threats by senior Pakistani and Indian officials sent mixed signals, increasing the chances of a pre-emptive nuclear attack.

While the Kargil incident highlights the dangers that confront South Asia as a result of Pakistan and India’s nuclear capabilities, the threat of conflict has not receded since the withdrawal of Pakistani backed-forces from the disputed region. Continued clashes along the LOC and incidents such as the shooting down of a Pakistani naval aircraft by India on August 10, 1999 continue to vitiate the atmosphere. ₆₇ Since the military takeover in Pakistan in October 1999, relations between the two states have deteriorated even further. Army Chief Pervez Musharraf is viewed with suspicion in India for his key role in the Kargil incident. Within Pakistan, where the military is now the sole decisionmaker, hostility towards India and perceptions of an Indian threat will determine all aspects of policymaking, including nuclear policy. Since bilateral tensions will continue to rise, so will the chances of an outbreak of conflict with nuclear overtones, underscoring the need for the international community to contain and to reverse the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia.

 

Pakistan’s Nuclear Future

After their May 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistan and India categorically rejected external pressures to abandon their nuclear weapons programs. At the same time, however, both sides expressed their commitment to nuclear restraint. Both states agreed to accede to the CTBT before the September 1999 deadline and to participate in discussions on a fissile material cut off in the Conference on Disarmament. Although Pakistan and India converged on their commitment to a nuclear deterrent, their nuclear rhetoric differed substantially on the issues of full-scale weaponization and deployment. The BJP adopted an ambiguous posture in its negotiations with the US, emphasizing its commitment to a “minimum nuclear deterrent” without affirming or denouncing the assembly and deployment of nuclear weapons or nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Pakistan on the other hand urged India to accept a “strategic restraint regime” and for “nuclear stabilization” in South Asia so as to prevent a nuclear and missile race. ₆₈

Pakistan’s apparent nuclear restraint was based on its assessment that the cost of deployment would far exceed its benefits. Aside from the potential costs of sanctions, deployment would also work to the advantage of India’s more advanced nuclear weapons program. In their dealings with India, Pakistani policymakers therefore offered to negotiate a mutually acceptance nuclear restraint regime which would “stabilize” nuclear deterrence in South Asia. In India, however, advocates of deployment were emboldened by the Clinton administration’s emphasis on a nuclear cap rather than a rollback or the elimination of nuclear weapons capabilities in South Asia. ₆₉ The position of Indian hardliners was strengthened even further as a result of Pakistan’s military debacle in Kargil. Consequently, in a draft nuclear doctrine released by its National Security Advisory Board on August 17, 1999, the BJP abandoned nuclear ambiguity for a posture of deployment.

In the draft nuclear doctrine, that will come into force after it is approved by the government, the BJP’s advisors recommend an aggressive nuclear posture and an ambitious force structure. According to the draft doctrine, India will develop a triad strategic defense system in which nuclear weapons could be delivered by aircraft, submarines and mobile land-based ballistic missiles. India would respond with “punitive retaliation” against a nuclear adversary. Hence India’s earlier rhetoric of “minimum credible (nuclear) deterrence” has been replaced by an “effective, credible nuclear deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability should deterrence fail,” implying that a massive arsenal of nuclear weapons that would give India an offensive nuclear capability. ₇₀

Pakistan’s authoritative decisionmakers are in the process of formulating an appropriate response to the BJP’s draft nuclear doctrine. Pakistan’s official response to the draft Indian nuclear doctrine has thus far been circumspect. Calling for international condemnation of India’s intentions to flout non-proliferation norms, Pakistani officials warn of an impending nuclear arms race should India goes ahead with nuclear deployment. ₇₁ At the same time, Pakistan is attempting to use the draft Indian doctrine to gain a tacit international acceptance of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons status. The Defense Committee of the Cabinet, for instance, stressed that “the development of Pakistan’s nuclear program will be determined solely by the requirement of our minimum nuclear deterrent capability” which had become “an indispensable part of our security doctrine” following India’s decision to deploy operation-ready nuclear weapons. ₇₂

Pakistan’s cautious reaction can be understood in the light of external constraints. The Pakistani economy has still to recover from punitive sanctions imposed by the US and other international actors, including the European Union and Japan after its May 1998 tests. ₇₃ Although the US has withdrawn some sanctions on multilateral lending to prevent a total collapse of the ailing Pakistani economy, the waiver could be withdrawn. Pakistani is in the midst of negotiations with the US for the removal of economic and military sanctions in return for nuclear restraint. To adopt a retaliatory posture of deployment would undermine Pakistan’s bargaining position and could also result in the reimposition of a stringent multilateral sanctions regime.

Pakistan’s ultimate response will depend on a number of factors. Given the reactive nature of its nuclear weapons program, Pakistan’s relations with India and developments within India’s nuclear weapons program will influence Pakistan’s nuclear directions. Domestic determinants, in particular the impact of the Kargil episode on Pakistan’s internal politics will also influence Pakistani nuclear decisionmaking. In the wake of the Kargil episode, relations between Pakistan and India have deteriorated considerably. In India, hardliners including the BJP leadership are exploiting anti-Pakistani sentiment to acquire domestic support. In Pakistan, the Kargil episode had resulted in an internal questioning of nuclear deterrence by influential segments of public opinion and mainstream opposition parties. In the debate on Kargil in the Senate, opposition leaders questioned the efficacy of nuclear deterrence in buttressing Pakistani security, pointing out the inherent dangers of pursuing military adventures that could result in a nuclear attack. ₇₄ India’s draft nuclear doctrine however once again tilted the balance of Pakistan’s internal debate in favor of advocates of nuclear deployment.

Public expectations about victory in Kargil and Pakistan’s subsequent military reverses also undermined the Prime Minister’s domestic legitimacy, while India’s diplomatic and military gains in Kargil also fueled unrest within the officer corps, especially amongst middle-ranking officers. ₇₅ Attempts by the Muslim League government to regain public credibility by placing the onus of the debacle on the military high command rebounded by straining civil-military relations at a time when Sharif’s political opposition has joined forces to campaign for his removal. On October 12, 1999, following Sharif’s decision to dismiss Army Chief Pervez Musharraf and to replace him with a close associate, Inter-Services Intelligence Chief, Lt. General Khwaja Ziauddin, the military ousted the Prime Minister. Following the military’s dismissal of the fourth elected government before it completed its term of office, political leaders in Pakistan will be even less inclined to question the high command’s nuclear preferences, while the high command’s growing antipathy to India in the wake of the Kargil episode as concern about declining military morale increase the possibility of a retaliatory Pakistani nuclear deployment should India proceed along that path.

The military’s opposition to the CTBT has already resulted in Pakistan reneging on its earlier pledge to sign the CTBT before September 1999, a policy reversal facilitated by India’s example. ₇₆ Pakistani officials cite the continued presence of sanctions as the main stumbling bloc for Pakistani accession to the CTBT. According to Foreign Minister Aziz, “Pakistan is ready” to sign the CTBT “in an atmosphere of free of coercion.” ₇₇ A linkage is also made between a future Pakistani accession to the CTBT and India’s declared intentions to deploy nuclear weapons. According to Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad, the changed regional security environment as a result of India’s draft nuclear doctrine means that Pakistan will “take a final decision (on signing the CTBT) in Pakistan’s supreme national interest.” ₇₈

External factors, particularly the US Senate’s stance towards the CTBT also affect the fate of a nuclear test ban in South Asia. “If the largest power is out of this, its all over---the treaty is dead,” stated Pakistan’s representative to the UN conference in Vienna on CTBT ratification. ₇₉ The US Senate’s rejection of the CTBT on October 13, 1999 will inevitably undermine international norms against nuclear testing particularly within the South Asian context where support for resumed testing is likely to accompany any move towards overt deployment.

It is possible that the BJP intends to use its draft nuclear doctrine to bargain with important external actors, particularly the US on the potential deployment of nuclear weapons at a lesser scale than the envisaged triad. A tacit acceptance on the part of the US or other international actors of Indian nuclear deployment could lead to the assembly and induction of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in Pakistan. According to Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad, “Pakistan’s doctrine of nuclear weapons program will be determined by India’s actions.” ₈₀ In his UN General Assembly address in September 1999, Foreign Minister Aziz called upon the international community to “act--and it must act immediately--if it is to avoid a hair trigger security environment in South Asia,” recommending that the P-5 and other interested major powers, as well as India and Pakistan participate in a conference “to promote the goals of strategic restraint and stability” in the region.” ₈₁

The dangers of the overt deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in South Asia are manifold. A crippling nuclear arms race would divert scarce economic resources from development to defense, retarding human security in Pakistan and India. The threat of the use of nuclear weapons would also increase considerably if either or both states possess operation-ready nuclear arsenals. Given geographic proximity, poor to non-existent command, control and intelligence, short warning times, inadequate safeguard mechanisms as well as uncertainty about the intentions of the adversary, either side could launch an intentional pre-emptive nuclear exchange.

The destabilizing effects of a deployed Indian nuclear arsenal extend beyond the South Asian region. China will be forced to react to the threats posed to its security by Indian nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. Given the uneasy relations between Pakistan and neighboring Iran, nuclear weapons deployment in Pakistan would strengthen the position of nuclear advocates within Iranian policymaking circles. The deployment of nuclear weapons in South Asia would also undermine the international non-proliferation regime since NPT signatories could reconsider their commitment to a treaty that fails to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.

To prevent a nuclear arms race in South Asia, Pakistan and India must be deterred from deployment. Since both states are presently bargaining with influential actors such as the US on the removal of economic and military sanctions, a window of opportunity exists to deter them from pursuing aggressive nuclear goals. Such opportunities can however only be fully exploited if there is an understanding that a tacit or overt acceptance of the Pakistan or India’s nuclear weapons status will embolden internal constituencies in favor of full-scale assembly and deployment of nuclear weapons. There is also need for caution in identifying and implementing incentives and sanctions to persuade and to pressure the two South Asian states into exercising nuclear restraint.

Within US policymaking circles, a debate is underway on the utility of incentives and positive engagement as opposed to sanctions in persuading Pakistan and India to cap their nuclear weapons programs. In the past, US sanctions and incentives failed to influence the nuclear policies of Pakistan and India for a number of reasons, including inappropriate and unconditional incentives and limited and inflexible sanctions. In the Pakistani case, for example, incentives such as conventional weaponry in the 1980s were seen by Pakistan’s politically dominant armed forces as a tacit US acceptance of their nuclear ambitions. Sanctions imposed under the Pressler amendment proved equally inadequate in capping Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program since they were discriminatory in nature and were not accompanied by targeted incentives. US sanctions were moreover unilateral in nature and restricted in their scope and duration.

Following the May 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia, multilateral support for US-sponsored sanctions has changed Pakistani cost-benefit calculations, forcing its decision-makers to opt for a tactical retreat, including an acceptance of a nuclear cap. Sanctions have also proved more effective since they are accompanied by incentives that are conditional on progress towards non-proliferation, including a relaxation of curbs on lending from the International Financial Institutions. The impact of this sticks-and-carrots strategy has been somewhat undermined by the US decision to ease sanctions and to provide incentives without tangible evidence of Pakistani progress towards non-proliferation. The effectiveness of the US sticks-and-carrots policy is also undermined by contradictory US goals. Although the Clinton administration’s stated non-proliferation goals include Pakistani and Indian accession to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states, in its negotiations with Pakistan and India, the US has chosen to emphasize arms control as opposed to non-proliferation. There is clearly an urgent need to prevent either Pakistan or India from further developing their nuclear infrastructure. An emphasis on arms control however implies a tacit acceptance of Pakistan and India’s nuclear weapons capabilities, thereby undermining the goals of a nuclear rollback and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons in South Asia.

The international community, spearheaded by the US can persuade Pakistan and India not just to cap but to rollback and to ultimately eliminate their nuclear weapons programs provided that Pakistani and Indian decisionmakers are convinced that the costs of proliferation would far exceed its benefits. These cost-benefit calculations will depend, as in the past, on internal, regional and international factors. In the Pakistani context, a consistent sticks-and-carrots approach could be effective provided that economic and military sanctions target institutions and officials that are supportive of the nuclear weapons program with the aim of changing their cost-benefit calculations. On the other hand, incentives should specifically aim at strengthening domestic constituencies that oppose nuclear proliferation. Any attempt to cap or to reverse Pakistani nuclear proliferation will also depend on the ability of the international community to curb the nuclear weapons program of its regional adversary. If the US and other concerned international actors fail to dissuade India from deploying nuclear weapons, retaliatory Pakistani deployment is more than likely to occur. Should Pakistan and India deploy nuclear-tipped arsenals, South Asia’s nuclear dynamics will change beyond recognition and the global non-proliferation regime will be damaged beyond repair.

 

Endnotes:

Note 1: Statesman News Service, “N-button in PM’s hands,” Statesman, August 18, 1999 Back.

Note 2: AFP, “Islamabad Slams Delhi’s Hegemonist Policies,” Dawn, September 24, 1999. Back.

Note 3: Speaking at the National Defence College to commemorate the first anniversary of Pakistan’s nuclear tests, Prime Minister Sharif said that Pakistan was sensitive to international non-proliferation concerns, “We are opposed to a nuclear arms race in South Asia. Nuclear restraint, nuclear stabilization and minimum credible deterrence constitute the basic elements of Pakistan’s nuclear policy.” “We will Preserve N-deterrence under all Circumstances,” The News, May 5, 1999. Back.

Note 4: According to Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, Pakistan would only sign the NPT if “they amend the treaty or include us as a recognized nuclear state.” Monitoring Desk, “NPT Signing only if Pakistan Recognized as Nuclear Power: Sartaj,” The News, February 24, 1999. Back.

Note 5: The removal of US military sanctions, stresses Aziz is urgently needed to “maintain the credibility of our conventional defense.” Carol Giacomo, “Pakistan Ties CTBT Signing to Lifting Sanctions,” Dawn, October 1, 1999. Back.

Note 6: Assessing the negotiations between the US and Pakistan after the May 1998 tests, former Chairperson of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Munir Ahmed Khan stresses that the US “has decided not to press Pakistan on giving up the nuclear option” or “rolling back its nuclear program.” Munir Ahmed Khan, “The Imperatives in Pakistan-US Dialogue,” The News, February 2, 1999. Back.

Note 7: India’s nuclear doctrine is designed to create a threatening “first strike force against Pakistan,” says Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz. “Indian N-doctrine Grave Threat to Peace,” Dawn, September 19, 199. Back.

Note 8: Influential supporters of weaponization such as former Foreign Secretaries, Agha Shahi and Abdul Sattar and former Air Chief Zulfiqar Ali Khan argue that India’s draft nuclear doctrine challenges the “credibility of Pakistan’s deterrence capability, ” adding that non-weaponization and non-deployment has to be ruled out since India’s nuclear doctrine “envisages induction and employment.” Agha Shahi, Zulfiqar Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar, “Responding to India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Dawn, October 5, 1999. Back.

Note 9: See, for example, George Perckovich, “A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia,” Foreign Policy; No. 91 (Summer 1993) and See also Sandy Gordon, “Capping South Asia’s Nuclear Weapons Program: A Window of Opportunity?” Asian Survey , Vol. 34, No. 7 (July 1994). Back.

Note 10: Following its May 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistan’s Minister for Information, Mushahid Hussain Syed declared: “The world community now treats Pakistan and India as equals,” adding that Pakistan’s decision to test “has proved that mere size does not give leverage to a country in the political world.” “N-tests Elevated Pakistan’s Political stature:” News, June 26, 1998. Back.

Note 11: Sharif expressed support for “urgent steps for mutual restraint and equitable measures for nuclear stabilization” with India. Cited in Ihtasham ul Haque, “Tests Aimed at Restoring Strategic Balance,” Dawn, May 29,1998. Back.

Note 12: Saeed Shafqat, Political System of Pakistan and Public Policy: Essays in Interpretation (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), p. 26. Back.

Note 13: Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, “In Search of Peace and Security: Political Relations Between Pakistan and the United States,” in Rais Ahmad Khan, ed., In Search of Peace and Security: Forty Years of Pakistan-United States Relations (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1990), p. 33. Back.

Note 14: Yunas Samad, “The Military and Democracy in Pakistan,” Contemporary South Asia , Vol. 3, No. 3 (Fall 1994), p.190. Back.

Note 15: Cited in Zafar Iqbal Cheema, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Policies: Attitudes and Postures,” in P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Iftekharuzzaman, eds., Nuclear Non-Proliferation in India and Pakistan: South Asian Perspectives (New Delhi: Monohar, 1996), p. 10. Back.

Note 16: Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party had won a majority of seats in West Pakistan during the 1970 general elections. Back.

Note 17: Zafar Iqbal Cheema, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy under Z.A. Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq: An Assessment,” Strategic Studies , Vol. 14, No. 4 ( Summer 1992), p. 8. Back.

Note 18: According to Farhatullah Babar, the Director for Scientific Information of the PAEC during 1976-1980, Bhutto gave his nuclear scientists three years to make Pakistan a nuclear weapons state. Farhatullah Babar, “Bhutto and the Making of Nuclear Pakistan,” The News, April 4, 1999. Back.

Note 19: Pakistan’s army chief declared that an Indian acquisition of nuclear weapons would mean that “we will have to beg or borrow to develop our own nuclear capability.” Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984), p.34. Back.

Note 20: According to Bhutto, Pakistan was “on the threshold of full nuclear capability. All we needed was the nuclear reprocessing plant.” Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, “If I Am Assassinated . . .” (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), pp. 137-138. Back.

Note 21: Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, pp.75-76. Back.

Note 22: China was also a major source of conventional arms, with Chinese military assistance estimated by one source at $ 2 billion between 1963 and 1990. Afzal Mahmood, “Ties with China in Perspective,” Dawn, October 3, 1999. Back.

Note 23: In the first official acknowledgment of Pakistan’s centrifuge project, General Zia, in an interview with an Indian newsmagazine in 1981, declared, “We are amongst the five countries in the world who know and practice this technology (the conversion of natural uranium into enriched uranium).” Akhtar Ali, Pakistan’s Nuclear Dilemma: Energy and Security Dimensions (Karachi: Economic Research Unit, 1984), p. 62. Back.

Note 24: Quoted in ibid., p. 10. See also Mitchell Reiss, “Safeguarding the Nuclear Peace in South Asia,” Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 12 (December 1993), pp. 1110-1111. Back.

Note 25: Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, p. 101. Back.

Note 26: The Reagan administration had been informed by US intelligence agencies that Pakistan had not only acquired weapons-grade material but had even cold-tested some components of its nuclear devise by 1986. Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambition: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), p. 95; 99. Back.

Note 27: Ibid., p. 97. Back.

Note 28: Kuldip Nayyar, “Pakistan has the Bomb,” Tribune, March 1, 1987. Back.

Note 29: Samad, “The Military and Democracy,” pp. 194-195. Back.

Note 30: China provided M-11 missiles to Pakistan. Back.

Note 31: Pakistani officials did admit that weapons cores, stockpiled before 1990, had not been destroyed. Reiss, “Safeguarding the Nuclear Peace in South Asia,” p. 1111. Back.

Note 32: According to Pervez Hoodbhoy, Pakistan’s belief that its nuclear capability provides a “nuclear shield” against Indian aggression applies to its policy of intervention in the disputed territory of Kashmir and the 1990 crisis. Although “the facts seem to indicate that the alleged reports of nuclear movements (in 1990) were false, the belief that Pakistan’s threat of nuclear devastation stopped Indian aggression dead in its tracks has become enshrined as an article of faith.” Pervez Hoodbhoy, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Future,” in Samina Ahmed and David Cortright, eds., Pakistan and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998) p.71. Back.

Note 33: Samina Ahmed and David Cortright, “Pakistani Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” in Ahmed and Cortright, ibid., pp. 3-4. Back.

Note 34: In 1991, Prime Minister Sharif was forced by the military to abandon an attempt to bargain with the US for concessions in return for a cap on the enrichment of uranium. Zahid Hussain, “Deliberate Nuclear Ambiguity,” in Ahmed and Cortright, ibid., p. 40. Back.

Note 35: The Pakistan government has repeatedly refuted media reports that the Ghauri was based on technology acquired from North Korea. Back.

Note 36: A pro-test official, for example, argued that Pakistan had “no other choice but to go for our own test, as the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent has been called into question,” while an official opposing the holding of nuclear tests argued that “A nuclear test would be a disaster for Pakistan,” calling on the government to use India’s nuclear tests to “seek Western support” to build Pakistan’s economy. Quoted in Zahid Hussain, “The Bomb and After,” Newsline (June 1998), pp. 22-23. Back.

Note 37: Ayub was the son of Pakistan’s previous military dictator, General Ayub Khan. Back.

Note 38: Hussain, “The Bomb and After,” p. 23. Back.

Note 39: Quoted in Zahid Hussain, “Laying the Groundwork,” Newsline (June 1998), p. 24. Back.

Note 40: Quoted in Michael Hirsh and John Barry, “Nuclear Jitters,” Newsweek, June 8, 1998, p. 16. Back.

Note 41: Justifying the Pakistani tests, Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad said that Pakistan was forced to retaliate since the BJP government had, after their nuclear tests, “threatened us with nuclear blackmail to impose a military solution to the Kashmir issue.” “Nuclear Tests Essential to Counter India’s Blackmail,” News, May 30, 1998. Back.

Note 42: Quoted in Hussain, “The Bomb and After,” p.22. Back.

Note 43: Correspondent, “PM Offers to Resume Talks with India,” News, May 29, 1998. Back.

Note 44: Urging the international community to find a solution to the Kashmir dispute, Foreign Minister Ayub warned that, “With the situation so volatile and in the presence of mistrust and suspicion between the two governments, a nuclear conflict could erupt.” Anwar Iqbal, “Pakistan Yet to React to US Sanctions,” News, June 20, 1998. Back.

Note 45: The Pakistani belief that sanctions would have a short-life was reflected in the 1998-1999 budget in which budgetary estimates were based on estimated foreign assistance inflows of Rs. 152 billion for 1998-1999, an increase over similar inflows of Rs. 141 billion in 1997-1998. Pakistan’s Finance Minister, Sartaj Aziz believed that economic sanctions would not last longer than six months. See “IMF Puts Loans to Pakistan on Hold,” Dawn, June 17,1998; and Staff Correspondent, “Economic Experts’ Views: Budget Lacks Steps to Offset Effects of Curbs,” Dawn, June 22, 1998. Back.

Note 46: Debt servicing accounts for 45% of Pakistan’s total federal expenditure, while defense takes up another 24%. Aftab Ahmed Khan, “Implications of Massive Domestic Debt,” News, July 6,1998. Back.

Note 47: The Parliamentary Secretary to the National Assembly, Muslim League’s Syed Zafar Ali Shah claimed that the center had been forced to impose a state of emergency to prevent the Baluchistan government from arresting the scientists involved in the nuclear explosions, a claim that was later refuted by his government. Staff Correspondent, “Mengal Denies PML Leader’s Charges,” Dawn, June 11, 1998. Back.

Note 48: “US, China Not to Target N-weapons at Each Other,” News, June 28,1998. See also “China Vows to Stop Missile Cooperation with Pakistan: US,” News, June 29,1998. Back.

Note 49: Strobe Talbott, “Dealing With the Bomb in South Asia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2 (March/April 1999), pp. 120-122. Back.

Note 50: Quoted in Nasir Malick, “No Giving Up of N-capability: Pakistan May sign CTBT if Curbs Lifted,” Dawn, August 26,1998. Back.

Note 51: Joint statement issued after the fourth round of the US-Pakistan dialogue. Cited in Far Eastern Economic Review , June 18, 1998. Back.

Note 52: Nasir Malick, “Paris Club Reschedules Pakistan’s $3.3 bn Loan,” Dawn, January 31, 1999. Bureau Report, “Pakistan to get $1.11 billion dollars from IMF, claims Government,” Dawn, January 17, 1999. Back.

Note 53: In March 1999, a Statutory Regulatory Order was issued to control the export of nuclear and missile technology and hardware. Back.

Note 54: Text of Documents Signed at Lahore in Dawn, February 22, 1999. Back.

Note 55: Senior military officials, for instance, questioned India’s intentions in holding a major Air Force firepower demonstration exercise in March 1999 in the Pokhran desert near the Pakistani border.Shakil Shaikh, “Pakistan not Informed about Indian Air Force Firepower Games,” The News, March 3, 1999. Back.

Note 56: “There is always the possibility of events spinning out of control,” stated US Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Karl Inderfurth. “Clearly the ingrediants are there for miscalculation.” Cited in Philip Shenon, “Risks High in Kashmir Clash, Even Huge, US Experts Warn,” New York Times, May 30, 1999. Back.

Note 57: Staff Correspondent, “EU FMs Concern over LOC Fighting,” Dawn, June 3, 1999. “G-8 Call for End to Kashmir Fighting,” The News, June 21, 1999. See also Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, “Anatomy of a Debacle,” Newsline (July 1999), pp. 32-33. Back.

Note 58: AFP, “Jiang ‘deeply concerned’ over LOC Tensions,” Dawn, June 30, 1999. See also Kamran Khan, “Unanimity of Sino-US Stand may have Forced Change in Pakistani Stance,” The News, July 8, 1999. Back.

Note 59: According to the joint statement issued after the Sharif-Clinton meeting: “It was agreed between the President and the Prime Minister that concrete steps will be taken for the restoration of the Line of Control, in accordance with the Simla agreement.” Hassan Ali Shahzeb, “Much Ado About Nothing,” Newsline (July 1999), p. 24. Back.

Note 60: A senior Pakistani official stated,” “The Indians cannot afford to extend the war to other areas in Kashmir, leave aside launching an attack across international boundaries” because of the “risk of nuclear conflagration.” Quoted in Zahid Hussain, “On the Brink,” Newsline (June 1999), pp. 24-25. Back.

Note 61: Quoted in News Desk, “Pakistan May Use Any Weapon,” The News, May 31, 1999. Back.

Note 62: “N-weapons can be used for National Security: Zafar,” The News, July 1, 1999. Back.

Note 63: Azim M. Mian, “US Visit has Averted War, says Nawaz: US Warned Delhi not to Attack Pakistan,” The News, July 7, 1999. Back.

Note 64: Ihtasham-ul-Haque, “Withdrawal Aimed at Diplomatic Solution: Talks Offer to Delhi to Ease Tensions, PM,” Dawn, July 13, 1999. Back.

Note 65: Correspondent, “Wider Conflict Averted, Kanju tells National Assembly,” Dawn, July 7, 1999. Back.

Note 66: Indian Defense Minister, George Fernandes, for instance, expressed the belief that the Pakistani military would not resort to the use of nuclear weapons against India because they would “liquidate” their own country in the process. Reuters, “India’s Defense Minister George Fernandes Sees No Nuclear Danger,” Dawn, June 1, 1999. Back.

Note 67: Accusing India of downing the plane within Pakistani airspace, Foreign Minister Aziz called the act “a clear violation of existing international norms relating to the inviolability of national borders.” “APP, “Sartaj Writes to Annan: UN Asked to Probe Downing of Plane,” Dawn, August 27, 1999. Back.

Note 68: See, for example, statement by the Pakistan Foreign Office on 14 April 1999 following a series of ballistic missile tests by both states. Cited in Anwar Iqbal and Raja Zulfikar, “Pakistan test-fires Ghauri-II,” The News, April 15, 1999. Back.

Note 69: In April 1999 following several round of negotiations with India and Pakistan, US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott had declared, “A complete adherance to non-proliferation is our ultimate goal but a more immediate objective is to maintain the thresholds that have already been crossed. And we feel our talks with India and Pakistan have been very useful in achieving immediate goals.” Cited in Anwar Iqbal, “Change in US may Delay Nuclear Talks with US,” The News, April 22, 1999. Back.

Note 70: Statesman News Service, “N-button in PM’s hands,” The Statesman, August 18,1999. Pamela Constable, “India Drafts Doctrine on Nuclear Arms: Policy Proposal seen Directed at Pakistan,” Washington Post, August 18, 1999. Back.

Note 71: Urging the international community, especially the United States to “dissuade India from pursuing the political and military ambitions as revealed in its nuclear doctrine,” Pakistan Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz warns that India’s nuclear doctrine “will intensify Pakistan’s dependence on nuclear deterrence. It will create a ‘hair-trigger’ security environment in South Asia.” “Sartaj Aziz Cautions the World over India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Dawn, October 5, 1999. Back.

Note 72: Ihtashamul Haque, “Delhi Nuke Plan Threat to Region: DCC,” Dawn, August 26, 1999. Correspondent, “DCC Voices Concern at Indian Militarization,” The News, August 26, 1999. Back.

Note 73: According to the World Bank, Pakistan’s growth rate declined to three percent in 1999 from five percent the previous year as a result of a foreign exchange and debt crisis provoked by the post-May sanctions. Staff Correspondent, “Nuclear Tests Affect the Region’s Growth Rate: World Bank, “ Dawn, September 23, 1999. Back.

Note 74: Bureau Report, “Senate debates Kargil: Pakistan will be declared Terrorist State,” Dawn, August 11, 1999. Correspondent, “Pakistan will Safeguard its Sovereignty: Sartaj,” The News, August 12, 1999. Back.

Note 75: “Backtracking from an advantageous position against the Indian army was a big psychological blow to the troops,” said a Pakistani officer. Quoted in Pamela Constable and Kamran Khan, “Pakistan’s Limits: Leaders will Engage India in Kashmir but Avoid Larger War, Experts Say,” Washington Post, August 15, 1999. Back.

Note 76: Asked by newsmen if there was pressure from the army on the government not to sign the CTBT, Army Chief General Pervaiz Musharraf responded, “No, there is no such pressure. But the armed forces strongly believe that the government would take a decision about signing the treaty in the best national interest.” Correspondent, “COAS Rules Out Probe into Kargil Issue,” Dawn, October 1, 1999. Back.

Note 77: Ibid. Back.

Note 78: Hasan Akhtar, “New Delhi’s N-doctrine Threatens Global Peace,” Dawn, September 8, 1999. Back.

Note 79: Quoted in Donald G. McNeil Jr., “Weight of US Treaty Vote Emerges at Vienna Panel,” New York Times, October 8, 1999. Back.

Note 80: Correspondent, “Pakistan Warns to Operationalize Nuke Capability: Signing of CTBT Remains Open; Islamabad’s Stance on Pak-India Talks Toughen; Delhi Blamed for Playing Politics with Pak Detainees,” The News, August 20, 1999. Back.

Note 81: Aziz urged the General Assembly to pressure India to disavow its nuclear doctrine, to refrain from any futehre tests an dto adhere to the CTBT, to undertake not to operationally deploy nuclear weapons on land, air or sea, to open negotiations with Pakistan for an agreement to achieve a balance in fissile stocks, to eschew the acquisition of Anti-Ballistic Missile System and any military-related capabilities in space, and to cut back its plans to purchase or develop advanced and destabilizing conventional weapons systems. “Sartaj Cautions the World over India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Dawn, October 5, 1999. Back.