CIAO DATE: 05/02

The New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia

M.E. Ahrari with James Beal

Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University

January 1996

The Framework

The dismantlement of the Soviet Union also brought about the liberation of six Central Asian Muslim republics—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (figure 1). Athough Azerbaijan is part of the Caucasus region, it is included in this study because:

The independence of that country, like that of the Central Asian states, was brought about as a result of the dismantlement of the Soviet Union.

Azerbaijan, like its Central Asian counterparts, is a Muslim state, and faces similar politico-economic problems. Azerbaijan's conflict with Armenia involving Nagorno-Karabkh reminds one of a number of conflicts in the Central Asian region. These include a seething ethnic conflict in Kazakhstan (involving the Khazaks and the Slavs), the ongoing civil war in Tajikistan along ethnic, national, and religious lines (since the Russian forces are also involved in this civil war), and the ethnic conflict in the Fargana valley that cuts across the borders of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

Like the economies of its Central Asian neighbors, the Azeri economy was largely dependent on the economy of the former Soviet Union. Consequently, like its other neighbors, Azerbaijan is also busy establishing economic self-sufficiency, along with strengthening its religious political, linguistic, and ethnic identities.

All these states are ethnically heterogenous, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan having the largest percentage of Russian population; except for Azerbaijan, the Sunni Muslim faith predominates; and the mother tongue of these countries, save Tajikistan, is of Turkic origin. Although these states appear to have more in common with the Middle East than with other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), quite wisely, these states decided to join that organization. Through this action, they appear to have postponed the political instability that their sudden independence was likely to have caused.

These states are either primarily or substantially Muslim. They have no tradition or institutional memory of a democratic government. The level of education of their population is among the lowest in the region. As these states deal with this unique period of independence, they will also try to find their proper places in the world community. During this time, they will be influenced by various regional and extraregional actors who have their own agendas vis-a-vis these states. The old version of the "great game" might have entered history; the new version began soon after the breakup of the Soviet Union. It is this "great game—post-Cold War style" that is the topic of this study.

The originator of the phrase "great game" was J. W. Kay, who used it in his book, History of the War in Afghanistan, ¹ but Rudyard Kipling popularized it in his novel, Kim, to describe the 18th- and 19th-century rivalry between Britain and Russia over the Indian subcontinent. Peter Hopkirk, in The Great Game, establishes that the territory of this struggle—characterized by intrigues and conspiracies—was the land between Russia and India. ² The Central Asian territory was then ruled by a variety of local khans. Even though they did not have much knowledge of the world beyond their immediate vicinity, they were indeed quite cognizant of Russian motives and of the British conquest of India. To prolong their own rule, they were able to play these two great powers against each other with considerable skill.

The new great game may not be aimed at the physical subjugation of Muslim Central Asia, but Russia—the only regional actor with the capability to conquer one or more nations of Muslim Central Asia—may indeed resuscitate its own historical will to reconquer one or more nations of Muslim Central Asia, especially if the democratic experience in that country becomes a miserable failure and if extremists gain control of the Russian government. It is possible, however, that any of these countries would intervene in the affairs of its neighbors in the event of an impending civil war, in the name of stabilizing the troubled area. In that case, Russian troops would be likely to play an important role in pacifying that area; this is exactly what is happening in Tajikistan, where Uzbekistan is reported to have intervened on behalf of the pro-Communist regime of Rahman Nabiyev. The Russian troops stationed in Tajikistan are also reported to be intervening on behalf of the ex-Communist forces.

An important aspect of this new great game is that the Muslim Central Asian republics are playing a crucial role in determining their own future. Such an independent role also entails choosing friends, alliances, government models (an Islamic or a secular one) and economic arrangements (e.g., emulation of the South Korean, Chinese, or Westen European models).

A number of great and regional powers are also likely to play an equally crucial role in the new great game. These include Russia, the United States, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. This aspect of the great game is quite crucial, for it involves political, military economic, and, most important, the religious agendas likely to determine the strategic future of Muslim Central Asia. The involvement of these great and regional powers also means that they would bring into the regional arena their respective strategic priorities, which are not of great significance to the Central Asian countries but which might influence the future dynamics of the great game itself. For instance, the Iranian-Turkish rivalry or the Saudi-Iranian rivalry is not of much concern to one or more of these republics, but whichever of these regional powers gains a diplomatic upper hand may have some bearing on the decision of one or more of the Central Asian republics to opt for an Islamic or secular model. One has to be careful about not overplaying or underplaying the significance of the Iranian or Turkish models. In the final analysis, the decision to remain secular or to turn toward Islam will largely be determined, in the near future, by the ruling elite groups. The popular preferences regarding these models are not likely to be apparent anytime soon, mainly because the decisionmaking in most of the Central Asian Muslim republics does not reflect popular preferences. Moreover, the political sophistication of the population is not sufficiently high in many of these republics to influence these issues in the short run.

The Central Asian states supplied raw material for the industrial part of the former Soviet Union. Since its breakup, these actors are earnestly seeking to adopt plans that would give them economic self-sufficiency. They want to exploit their own natural resources, not export them to Russia; they want to integrate their economies with those of their southern neighbors and Europe, not just with Russia. We might be witnessing the emergence of two dimensions of this new great game in Central Asia—the geopolitical and geoeconomic dimensions. ³

An emphasis on geoeconomic objectives motivates a nation-state to seek arrangements aimed at bringing about economic integration and links with other actors; such ties would inevitably lead to escalated political influence. An enhancement of political influence would, in turn, be a crucial aspect of geostrategic dimension. (It could be argued that all economic activities among nation-states may lead to the improvement of political influence, but when a nation-state is interested in systematically converting political influence to incorporate other nations into some sort of a political bloc—even an informal grouping of nations—or an alliance— a formalized and differentiated system— it is indulging itself in geostrategic activities.)

The geopolitical and geoeconomic aspects of the great game are aimed at keeping the inter-state conflicts in that part of the world at a manageable level. Various actors might attach different degrees of significance to its various aspects. For instance, an actor might be emphasizing its economic significance through aid and trade arrangements and through creating economic blocs. Iran, Turkey, and (to a lesser extent) Saudi Arabia might be underscoring this aspect of the great game, but an emphasis of their involvement inevitably leads to an escalation of their geopolitical significance in Central Asia. The Central Asian countries might value the integration of their economies with that of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, or Iran because, under these arrangements, they are likely to be treated as equals.

Russia, on the other hand, might prefer the continuation of economic arrangements that prevailed under the former Soviet Union. Although the continuation of these arrangements would result in the sustained subordination of the economies of the Central Asian countries to that of Russia, its side payoff might be the willingness of Russia to give these states stability and security. The Central Asian states, however, might view this continued subordination as too high a price to pay for security and stability.

The United States and Europe may attach utmost value to security and stability for the continued survival of the CIS, with or without paying much heed to how these variables are envisioned by the Central Asian states. If any of the preceding preferences are correct, we might be witnessing the making of a highly complicated version of the new great game in Central Asia. This study therefore will focus on the dynamics of geoeconomics and geopolitics from the perspectives of Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, and the United States and Russia.

The first section of this study offers an overview of the domestic problems, such as acute economic underdevelopment, absence of economic and industrial communication and transportation infrastructures, and ecological problems that need urgent remedies. The argument here is that not only is the resolution of these problems at the core of the Central Asian states' diplomatic activities, but that the potential resolution of these problems will also determine the future of peace and stability in that region. The prospects for political pluralism and democracy and the role of Islam are issues requiring a closer examination of these republics. A potential incorporation of democracy by most, if not all, of these states might enable them to shun political extremism of all shades. In this context, they also must try to involve Islamic parties in the ever-escalating pace of political activities in their domestic arena, and not curb the activities of these parties, or even try to ban them by using the excuse of "Islamic fundamentalism." The issue of nuclear weapons involving Ukraine and Kazakhstan is also analyzed.

The second section covers the modalities of the new great game, focusing on the activities of Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United States and analyzing three important observations:

Although the diplomatic and political maneuverings of these states are aimed at promoting their respective strategic agendas in Muslim Central Asia, it is the political preferences and priorities of the newly independent republics that are going to play a crucial role in assigning priorities to any of these actors.

While the competitive interactions of the three regional actors—Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia—serve as an important wrinkle of the new great game, one should be careful about assigning undue importance to these interactions. In the final analysis, the future significance of these interactions is most likely to be determined by the Central Asian republics themselves.

The resurgence of overly assertive, if not aggressive, tendencies of Russia's foreign policy is a development likely to intensify the level of turbulence in an already troubled region. As the sole remaining superpower, the United States cannot long afford to concede a free hand to Moscow in the name of bringing about stability in Central Asia.

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Notes

Note 1. As cited in Miron Rezun, Intrigue and War in Southwest Asia (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 2. Back

Note 2. Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game. Back

Note 3. Michael T. Clare discusses geoeconomic and geostrategic objectives in "Policing the Gulf--And the World," Nation, October 16, 1990, 401-405. Edward N. Luttwak also discusses these concepts in his "From Geo-Politics to Geo-Economics," National Interest (Summer 1990), 17-23. Back