'Rogue Nation' versus 'The Great Arrogance' 

Post-Cold War US policy towards Iran aims to change the latter's 'behaviour' in five areas: 1) Iran's search for the 'acquisition of weapons of mass destruction', success in which would change the balance of power in the Middle East, with serious repercussions for US and Israeli interests in the region; 2) Iran's support for 'international terrorism', that is, for organizations such as Hezbullah in the Lebanon or Hamas in Palestine; 3) Iran's opposition to the Arab-Israeli 'peace process'; 4) Iran's 'subversive activities' in, for example, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, which are aimed at overthrowing those countries' regimes'; and 5) Tehran's dismal human rights record at home.

Current US policy has its origins in US support for the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, whom the CIA installed in power in 1953. Iran became a US client-state, with the Shah fully committed to the preservation of US national interests in Iran: he ensured the continuous flow of oil to the West, actively supported Washington's crusade against communism, and provided the United States with the largest Middle Eastern markets for American military and non-military products.

Shared Values And Perceptions

Almost three decades of active American presence in Iran produced shared values and perceptions among the two countries' political elites. The Shah's modernization programme went beyond infrastructural changes: it aimed to 'westernize' Iranian society.

The US foreign policy community saw the Shah as a shrewd politician, a secular modernizer, and a patriot who shared American values. The threat to his rule came from the communists, and the religious opposition. US policy-makers agreed with the Shah that Iran was not yet ready for democracy; they supported his autocratic rule to such an extent that Washington became identified with his repressive policies - including torture - up to his last minute in power in 1979. This 'Pahlavism' persists today among US foreign policy-makers, who tend to underestimate the impact of the Shah's political repression, and blame the revolution on the fast pace of modernization in the country.

Given the pervasiveness of Pahlavism it is not surprising that Washington interpreted the 1979 revolution and the emergence of an anti-American leadership, inspired by traditional Islamic rather than American values, as a serious threat to its interests in Iran. The new Iranian leadership shared neither Washington's values, nor its perceptions of US economic and strategic interests in the Middle East and Iran. To Washington, Iran was a 'rogue nation'. To Tehran, Washington was 'the great arrogance'.

'Constructive Engagement'

Yet, in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, the rivalry with the Soviet Union encouraged Washington to offer Iran more carrots than sticks, arguing that 'constructive engagement' with Iran would be more successful than isolation. This produced the Reagan Administration's two-tier policy: in public, a refusal to deal with a 'terrorism'-supporting Iran; in secret, arms deals and negotiations to free American hostages in Lebanon.

Eighteen years after the Iranian revolution relations between the two countries remain hostile. Iran's Islamic values and American liberalism have proved incompatible. What Iran views as support for the just struggle of oppressed people, the US sees as terrorism and subversion. While the United States sees itself as the only mediator in the Arab-Israeli peace process, Iran regards Washington's partiality towards Israel as detrimental to Palestinian interests.

Opportunity Knocked?

The end of the Cold War provided the Clinton Administration with the opportunity to adopt a proactive policy towards Iran. The demise of the Soviet Union, the demilitarization of Iraq, the collapse of Arab nationalism, and the election of an Israeli government prepared to talk to the Palestine Liberation Organization - which increased the chances of a final resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict - all gave Washington the opportunity to focus on how it could 'change' Iranian behaviour'. However, the prerequisite for such a 'change' was the - unlikely - adoption by Tehran of US values and perceptions.

In short, the hostility which emerged between the United States and Iran with the 1979 revolution will not disappear in the foreseeable future. While trade relations may improve, the re-establishment of diplomatic relations still lies some way off.

Ali Tajvidi is a PhD candidate at CSD and a Visiting Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Westminster.