CIAO DATE: 02/02

The Role of the EU in Peace-Building in the Mediterranean

Fred Tanner
Deputy Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Joint Workshop on Europe and Transatlantic Security: Issues and Perspectives
Kandersteg, Switzerland
August 25-27 2000

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy

History is littered with failed attempts to create a Common Foreign and Security Policy which could be more than thesum of its parts.

Introduction

The disappearance of the overwhelming threat of Cold War confrontation has left the Europeans more sensitive to challenges, risks and threats from their southern periphery. The wars in the Persian Gulf and in the Balkans, the bloody civil war in Algeria, the recurrence of deadly violence between Israelis and Palestinians, the spread of religious extremism and the increasing migratory pressures from the South have obliged Europe and NATO to pay greater attention to their near abroad in the South.

Given the region's root causes of conflict such as poverty, economic cleavages and uncontrolled population growth, the North's balancing strategy of the Cold War days was replaced by policies of engagements, politico-economic partnerships and dialogue initiatives. The EU, recalling its Euro-Arab special relations of the 1970s, lobbied to get its share in the post-Gulf War peace process, that brought together for the first time Arab states with Israel and Western "sponsors" in the multilateral setting of Madrid. Short-cut by the Arab-Israeli bilateral tracks under US patronage after Oslo, the EU changed gears in 1995 and founded in Barcelona a Euro-Med partnership with all Mediterranean states, including those of North Africa (with the exception of Libya), the Near East and the Palestinian Authority. This Partnership includes a political, economic and social dimension. The founders of the Partnership hoped that it would turn into the Mediterranean equivalent of NAFTA on the one hand and provide a support structure for the Middle East process on the other.

The "Political and Security Chapter" of the Euro-Med Partnership was not only reminiscent of the Helsinki Process of the Cold War period, it also created a political platform of North-South co-operation in the Mediterranean that kept the Americans out and the Israelis in. The exclusion of the US from Barcelona (even as observer) was certainly one of the reasons why NATO enhanced its own security co-operation with some Southern Mediterranean states. Today, the Barcelona process finds itself in more or less direct competition with NATO with regards to soft security projection towards the South.

This paper examines future scenarios of Euro-Med relations as well as of Atlantic relations over Mediterranean issues - under the assumption that Europe would become an international security actor. It will suggest that - in the long term - a successful Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) would strengthen the EU security and crisis management capabilities in the Mediterranean region. The CESDP would entitle the EU to enter the domain of security-cooperation in the fields of peacekeeping, defence training and education and the use of military assets for humanitarian operations. But two obstacles will have to be overcome: First, the relations to NATO dialogue programmes in the region will have to be sorted out and second, the Southern partner states need to be assured that the EU headline force projection capabilities will not make Europe more interventionist in the region.

EU Foreign Policy towards the Mediterranean

The European states are in the process of creating security tools that cover the full spectrum of conflict prevention, non-military crisis management, military conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction. These crisis management capabilities take on even more importance in the Mediterranean region with the EU extension towards Malta, Cyprus and eventually also Turkey.

Current soft security projection by the EU towards the Mediterranean is based on the democratic governance-sensitive Barcelona Declaration, the Barcelona work programmes, Association Agreements, grants through MEDA funds and loans via EIB. Thus far, Barcelona is the only forum where regular meetings take place involving Israel, Syria and Lebanon. This aspect has become particularly important with the deadly violence in October 2000 and the fading prospects for a peace agreement based on Oslo and Camp David.

The political dialogue takes place in the Barcelona Committee of Senior Officials and at regular Ministerial meetings. There are to date no regional or working tables as it is the case in the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. However, the Charter for Peace and Security in the Mediterranean is expected to provide the formal basis for this: French-driven efforts should lead to the adoption of the Charter still under the French presidency later this year.

Under the presidential conclusions of the European Council in Santa Maria da Feira (June 2000) important steps were taken towards a greater Mediterranean-specific foreign policy. With its new "Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region", the EU aspires to make of the region a "prosperous, democratic, stable and secure region, with an open perspective towards Europe". The Barcelona region with its 27 members will serve as the geographic parameter. This combines the Near East, the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa in one single policy framework.

The EU's move towards creating its own military structures should facilitate military cooperation with the Mediterranean Partner states. The Annex to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council meeting in Portugal (19/20 June) indicates that the "EU intends to make use of the evolving common European policy on security and defence to consider how to strengthen, together with its Mediterranean Partners, cooperative security in the region".

This Common Strategy reflects a shift from a EU Commission-driven approach to a CSFP-driven policy. It is quite significant that the Common Strategy does not stay away from issues related to the Israeli-Arab conflict, in contrast to the Barcelona process. More specifically, the Common Strategy will focus on the Middle East and its peace process. Optimistically, the EU sees for itself a special role in preparing the region for the "post-peace era". With the Common Strategy, the EU seems to use the Mediterranean and the Middle East as a primary testing ground for its CFSP. This thesis has been validated by the unexpected involvement of Mr. Solana as EU representative in an emergency exercise of mediation and crisis management after the outbreak of a quasi-war between Israel and the Palestinians in September 2000.

NATO cooperative programmes in the Mediterranean and their limits

The NATO Summit of April 1999 identified the Mediterranean as an area of special security and reaffirmed its commitment to the existing NATO Dialogue initiative. But these policy declarations were not followed by doctrinal reorientations or new resource allocations: for the time being, there is no Southern strategy of NATO that reflects the new importance of the Mediterranean. According to Ian Lesser, NATO's Mediterranean strategy should include, in addition to Article V commitments towards Mediterranean NATO states, the containment of "new security risks of transregional character such as WMD and missile proliferation, spill-overs of terrorism and political violence and threats to energy security".

NATO's Mediterranean Initiative remains basically a soft security approach that intends to promote cross-cultural security cooperation with non-member states in North Africa and the Middle East in defence cooperation, training, and crisis management activities. Despite some efforts by Italy, NATO is not ready to promote a "PfP for the Mediterranean".

For the time being, the main activities of the NATO dialogue are limited to meetings in Brussels, mostly on a bilateral level (19+1), and to cooperation in military training and education: officers of Arab states and Israel are allowed to attend select courses at the SHAPE School in Oberammergau and at the NATO Defense College in Rome.

The limits of cooperative NATO involvement in the Mediterranean are due to three main reasons. First, the US has no interest in allowing players of the Middle Eastern Peace process to use the NATO dialogue forums for pushing their political agendas. Thus, any political extension of the NATO dialogue should not allow any points of contacts with the bilateral Arab-Israeli tracks. Second, the NATO dialogue runs into opposition with some European NATO members that perceive the NATO agenda in the Mediterranean as incompatible with the Barcelona process. Both explanations are linked to transatlantic relations and to their impact on Mediterranean and Middle Eastern policies. Finally, unlike NATO's relations to Eastern Europe and Balkan countries, NATO has no leverage over Mediterranean Dialogue states via pre-accession conditionalities.

Transatlantic ambiguities in the Mediterranean

European and US approaches towards the Mediterranean vary in terms of priority, responsibility and regional orientation. The US historically gave its priority and security commitments to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, whereas Europeans are more concerned with potential instability in the contiguous Mediterranean region. In short, the US is a security actor in the region, Europe is not.

Migration remains the engine that drives European policy towards the Mediterranean region today. The US, in turn, does not own a Mediterranean perspective; the Mediterranean has always been considered as a strategic crossroad from the Atlantic to the Near East and the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Therefore, American priority is given to hard security questions such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the spread of terrorism, that is often associated with the presence of "states of concern". The US all but succeeded at the NATO Summit of 1999 to make the spread of weapons of mass destruction an Article V issue. The greater Mediterranean region would have been likely to become the testing ground for such a NATO contingency.

The US and Europe also differ in their response capabilities to emerging crisis in the Mediterranean. For the US, the Sixth Fleet represents as much an instrument of crisis management as does mediation or negotiation. The EU, in contrast and faute de mieux - pursues a policy of projection of stability with the help of economic support and political engagement. The coercive side of EU crisis management and peace making has been left to other organisations such as NATO, the UN or to individual member states. This may now change with the creation of a European headline force.

Finally, a major difference between Europe and the US is the policy approach towards the Middle East Peace process. Officially, the Europeans define their role in the Middle East as complimentary to the American one. But, given that the EU bankrolls a major part of the reconstruction in the region, the European special envoy to the Middle East stressed that Europe aspires not just to be a "payer" but also a "player" in the region. This claim has been confirmed by the EU Common Strategy on the Mediterranean. Not helpful is the fact that in Israel Europe is perceived as pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel. In this context, Israel is only lukewarm about the Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Security, as it fears that the new Charter could be used by Arab states to isolate Israel.

Relations with the Southern Partners

The Petersberg Declaration placed no geographical limits to the crisis management missions. Nor did the NATO Strategic Concept of 1999. These facts could be construed easily as quite unsettling for Southern Mediterranean states, particularly in light of NATO's self-empowered intervention in Kosovo. There still lingers a Southern perception, stemming from the Cold War period, of NATO as being "a military instrument of the West to suppress national liberation movements". Not helpful were the remarks by NATO Secretary-General Claes when he argued that the Cold War threat of communism has been replaced by Islamic fundamentalism. Also, NATO extension as well as the new NATO Strategic Concept were widely perceived as evidence of expansionists power projections beyond NATO borders. Finally, the NATO bombardment of Kosovo evoked mixed reactions from Arab elites and publics.

The EU, as opposed to some of its member-states, has thus far not been considered as interventionist. The exception was represented by the launching of Euromarfor in 1997, a maritime force "answerable to the WEU". Arab states and even more so Arab intellectuals criticised the unilateral deployment of this force in the Mediterranean that happened without prior consultation or information. Euromarfor, that has been set up for Peterberg tasks, including emergency evacuation of European nationals in North Africa, is still considered an irritating factor in Euro-Med relations.

The emergence of the EU as an international security actor with military power projection beyond its borders will require much explaining and consulting with Southern Mediterranean Partners. The Mediterranean basin could very likely to be one of the first venues for Petersberg operations. It is conceivable that some Mediterranean states will be included in Petersberg operations, similarly to the possible involvement of non-EU European states in future operations "of the willing".

Towards a soft Mediterranean security regime

Europe and NATO are still at the beginning of a process that seeks to involve the Mediterranean states in joint defence cooperation. Given the progress in CESDP, should future North-South defence cooperation be orchestrated by the EU or NATO? The EU can offer more political legitimacy and economic commitments to the region. NATO, in turn, has already an emerging politico-military dialogue structure. In addition, with IFOR, SFOR and KFOR, NATO has a track record of peacekeeping and peace building with troop contributions from Arab NATO Dialogue Partners.

In the final account, the projection of security and stability to the Mediterranean region would require a coordinated and programmatic approach by NATO, the EU and the concerned Southern Partner states. Petersberg tasks in the Mediterranean are unlikely to succeed without the consent or active participation of Partner states. This means that future security cooperation in the Mediterranean will have to tackle activities pertinent to Petersberg-type operations. In practical terms, Mediterranean Partner states should be granted the possibility to join civilian and military co-ordination mechanisms of the EU crisis management procedures.

In this context, certain choices will have to be made in the relationship between NATO and the EU. For instance, who will be in charge of joint peacekeeping training and the joint force planning and exercises for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations? In the following section, a number of possible joint North-South activities will be presented that will inevitably raise the question of what institution should take the lead.

Joint peacekeeping training

Joint and multinational training is a very widespread practice today for UN-led and other peace operations. Such training could include classroom activities, language training and field exercises. The training would not have to be at one central venue, but could take place in various countries. The training should, however, correspond to certain standards that should be worked out jointly. Should this be done in the NATO Dialogue setting or the Petersberg context? Currently, some courses on peacekeeping taught at the SHAPE School in Oberammergau are offered to officers from NATO Dialogue Partners. Should the EU offer its own courses and establish its own standards in peacekeeping doctrine and rules of engagement, as is suggested by a group of experts of the Bertelsmann Foundation?

Joint force planning and exercises for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations

Joint force planning for peace operations including the stand-by arrangements for UN missions. It would also be possible to work out common rules of engagements for humanitarian operations or post-conflict missions. This could also include the preparation of non-military operations that require military support, especially in the field of emergency assistance, disaster relief and post-conflict rehabilitation missions. Finally, there would be the need to initiate a common planning and review process with regard to peace operations.

Creation of a Med Peace Battalion

The participation of a number of Partner states in peace operations in Europe is already a reality. Egyptian, Jordanian, Tunisian, Moroccan, Algerian and Turkish forces and observers have been part to missions in Bosnia, Eastern Slavonia and Kosovo .

The Creation of a Med Peace Battalion is thus not a far-fetched proposal and would be feasible without heavy reliance on an institutional framework. It would follow the example of similar initiatives in the Baltic States (Baltic battalion), Scandinavia (Nordic battalion), and Central Europe (CENTCOOM), and Southeastern Europe (Multinational Force South Eastern Europe).

Mine Action

Given the inter-relationship of mine action with post-conflict rehabilitation, this field of action fits very much into the spirit of the new Common Strategy of the EU. Many Partner states have already made commitments under the Ottawa process or through unilateral statements on national moratoria. The Barcelona Partnership could play the role as facilitator, co-ordinator and focal point for mine action in the Mediterranean, providing assistance to those Euro-Med countries wishing to create their own Mine Action Centres. Given the interconnection between mine action and post-conflict rehabilitation, the Partnership could promote mine awareness programmes in the framework of economic reconstruction with the adequate financial support from sponsor countries and institutions. NATO, in turn, has already been approached by Egypt to enlist support for de-mining. Individual EU countries have already agreed to support Egypt by sending experts and clearing equipment. A recent RAND study suggests integrating the mine clearing efforts into the NATO Dialogue programme.

Conclusion

The St. Malo process of militarising the EU crisis management capabilities will have important fallout on Europe's periphery. The Petersberg Declaration placed no geographical limits to the crisis management missions. It will be a difficult task to reassure Europe's near abroad in the South about the non-interventionist nature of the European headline force projection capability.

Should future Petersberg missions take place in the Mediterranean region, it will be important for the sake of legitimacy to work together with Barcelona Partner states. This could be done through a coalition of the willing or a specially negotiated status of the Euro-Med Partnership in EU crisis management or emergency operations in the South. Similarly to candidates for EU accession, the EU should grant Barcelona Partners the possibility to associate themselves - on a case-by-case basis with both civilian and military operations.

However, Europe's entry into the domain of peacekeeping and humanitarian support will require a division of labour with NATO's dialogue programme. Europe would be ill-advised to reinvent PfP-type programmes for its Southern Partners, even if a European Combined Joint Staff College would be established. Such duplication of NATO programmes would be uneconomical and would send the wrong political signals to the South and across the Atlantic.

The problem lies not in the rivalry between the NATO dialogue and the CESDP-empowered Barcelona process; the problem is to find an "Atlantic bargain" for the Mediterranean that should reflect an EU-NATO convergence on crisis management in the region.